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ABSTRACT
This work is a comparative study of shareholders' powers to appoint and remove
directors in the United Kingdom, United States and Germany as an internal
corporate control mechanism. It highlights the entrenched positions of corporate
managers in the face of shareholders' weakening powers in these systems.
Having recognised the importance of shareholders' position as the contributors
of corporate capital, the laws of these three systems give them the right to bring
about changes in the control of companies by vesting power in the general
meeting to determine the composition of corporate boards. Shareholders
appoint directors to act on their behalf, the board in turn selects and monitors its
executives to ensure that the interests of shareholders and other stakeholders
are protected.
The Anglo-American system is characterised by dispersed shareholding and
management dominated boards, with the result that shareholders do not
exercise their voting rights effectively. Under the German two-tier board system
companies are accountable to a wide range of stakeholders and have a different
structure of shareholding, where banks control the majority of shares. Despite
the absence of management-dominated boards in that system the depository
share system together with the practice of co-determination tend to restrict
shareholders' participation in corporate control. The reality is that directors may
2end up using certain devices to entrench themselves on the board so as to
restrict the ability of shareholders to remove them.
This thesis advocates a greater role for shareholders through improved
opportunities for them to use their voting powers in determining the composition
of their boards. It makes various recommendations in the different areas in which
shareholders face difficulties in exercising these powers. It is hoped that the
implementation of these suggestions will result in a system which will enable
shareholders to exercise their voting powers more effectively for the purpose of
controlling their companies.
3CHAPTER 1 - INTRODUCTION
" Imagine a system of government in which there are annual
elections, but these are almost never contested. Whenever they
are, the incumbent government wins by an overwhelming
majority ....... Changes in the senior leadership do take place,
normally through an orderly process of retirement in which the
incumbent leaders select and groom their successors ........This is
not a description of Eastern Europe before perestroika and
glasnost. It is a description of the system by which public
companies in Britain are controlled and governed.,,1
A. BACKGROUND TO THE CORPORATE CONTROL DEBATE
According to the traditional view of the corporate structure in public companies,
shareholders have an important role in corporate control through the exercise of
their voting rights to appoint and remove their board members. Owing to the
dispersion of shares in public companies among numerous holders, voting has
become ineffective as a control device." In private companies things are usually
quite different. Members of a private company usually exercise significantly
1. Davis, E. and Kay, J. Corporate Governance, Take-overs and the Role of the Non-
Executive Director, in Bishop and Kay (eds), European Mergers and Merger Policy,
1993, 200 Oxford University Press,
2. The diffused ownership structure does not give individual shareholders sufficient
incentive to collect information and discipline managers thus tending to be a less
effective governance mechanism. - Griffiths, A., Shareholding and the Governance of
Public Companies, in Sheikh and Rees, (eds) Corporate Governance and Corporate
Control, 1995,61, Cavendish Press,.
4more active roles in corporate control than their counterparts in public
companies. Their main aim in exercising control over the affairs of their company
is the protection of their financial investments. The reason for this is that the
company is in reality in many cases an "incorporated partnership" in which
shareholders contribute their money and labour and expect to participate in the
management of its affairs and share in its profits.
With no ready market in which to sell their shares, the only remedy available to
disgruntled shareholders in private companies is to seek judicial protection
which can be an expensive and a long drawn-out battle. This problem has
moved members of private companies to build into their corporate structure
protective devices or to enter into binding contracts with regard to the exercise of
their rights. 3
In both private and public companies the right of shareholders to vote has been
the primary mechanism for shareholder control over the board of directors. This
derives from the general view that as "owners" they are entitled to determine the
company's fundamental policies thus having a final say on its destiny, of which
board composition plays a vital role. Justifying shareholders' right of control,
Clark states:
3. Examples are disproportionate voting arrangements and shareholders' agreements.
See chapters seven and eight of this work for the abuse of these devices.
5"From an economic point of view, there is a strong
argument that the power to control a business firm's
activities should reside in those who have the right to the
firm's residual earnings ..... The intuition behind the
argument is that giving control to the residual claimants will
place the power to monitor in the hands of those who
have the best incentive to use the power."
As companies grew larger and shareholding became more widely dispersed the
result was that shareholders lacked the incentive to participate actively in
company affairs. As members became more passive, they increasingly relied on
company management to run their businesses. These increased powers
exerciseable by managers create the problem of how to keep management
accountable to shareholders so that management powers are not utilised for
their own personal gains at shareholders' expense. As far back as the
eighteenth century Adam Smith had stated this possibility thus:
"being the managers of other people's money rather than of
their own, it cannot well be expected that they should watch
over it with the same anxious vigilance with which the
partners in a private co-partnery frequently watch over their
own."
In the face of difficulties in exercrsmq their control rights through voting,
shareholders discovered another method of exercising some form of control
over their company. This power of control came from the ability to sell their
4. Clark, R.C., Corporate Law, 1986, 389, Blackwell Business
5. Smith, A., The Wealth of Nations, 1776 Reprinted in 1937, pp 699-700, New York:
Random House edition
6shares and leave the company, which resulted in successive take-over booms
such as that of the 1980'S.6 Shareholders would sell their shares to a particular
buyer, who would consolidate the voting of the otherwise dispersed shares to
replace the board and to take over the company. During such a take-over era
management actions and shareholders' reactions were watched closely, and any
sign of dissatisfaction on the part of members would bring bidders onto the
scene.'
B. The Present Debate On Corporate Control
In recent years the issue of corporate control has assumed an unprecedented
significance with trends in management behaviour bringing to the forefront of
public attention issues concerning the direction of companies and mechanisms
of internal control. The dominant role of large companies today has spurred the
6. Ezzamel, M and Watson R Organisational Form, Ownership Structure and Corporate
Performance: A Contextual Empirical Analysis of United Kingdom Companies, 4 British
Journal of Management, 1993, 161 at 166-69; Hart, 0., Corporate Governance: Some
Theory and Implications, 1995,105 Economic Journal, 678, 682-85
7. For the impact of take-overs on corporate control see Lipton, M. and Panner, M.,
Take-over Bids and United States Corporate Governance, in Prentice and Holland,
Contemporary Issues in Corporate Governance, 1993, 115, Oxford - where they state
that take-over bids were once considered to be the most effective means by which
corporate management could be held accountable for their performance; See also
Peacock and Bannock, Corporate Take-overs and the Public Interest, Chapter 4,
(Aberdeen, 1991), Chapter 4; Also Charkham J., Keeping Good Company, 1995, 308,
Oxford University Press, - where he states that when a company is thought to be badly
run over time, its share price declines and provides an opportunity for purchasers to
acquire it and make better use of the assets.
7interest of different groups in questioning who exercises final control in a
company and how that control is employed in meeting a company's goals.8
There have been increasing concerns over corporate board policy-decisions and
rewards of top managers with the effect that the structure and composition of
boards of directors have come under tremendous scrutiny." With the subjects of
management misconduct and corporate failures having become issues of
extensive academic, media and public attention," it is not surprising that there is
now a growing focus on management supervision. This has necessitated
reconsideration of board composition and its representation of shareholders'
interests. A number of key areas have formed the core issues in the present
debate on corporate control.
8. An effective corporate control system should provide mechanisms for restraining
directors from abusing their powers to ensure that they act in the best interest of
shareholders, stakeholders and the company at large. - Sheikh S. and Chatterjee, S.,
Perspectives on Corporate Governance, in Sheikh, Sand Rees, W (eds). Corporate
Governance, Corporate Control, 1995, 5, Cavendish.
9. Blair, M. M., Ownership And Control, Rethinking Corporate Governance For The
Twenty First Century, 1995, 77, The Brooking Institution, where she states that the
present corporate governance debate revolves around questions on what non-
executive directors should do and whose interests they should serve while they are on
the board.
10. Kay, J. and Silberston, A., Corporate Governance, Aug. 1995, National Institute
Economic Review 84-97; Geraldine Fabrikant, The Paramount Deal, New York Times,
Dec. 23, 1993, p. A1; Kelly, G., Kelly D., and Gamble, A., (eds) Stakeholders
Capitalism, 1997,48, Basingstoke : Macmillan Press Limited.
81. Ownership Structure
There has been much emphasis on greater involvement by shareholders to bring
pressure to bear on the management of their companies. Any attempt by
individual shareholders to monitor managers is an expensive and difficult issue
due to the collective action and "free rider" problems. As other shareholders can
take a free ride on the monitoring efforts of anyone shareholder, no individual
shareholder has sufficient incentive to expend the necessary resources in
monitoring management. The result is that the cost of individual shareholders'
action is high and unlikely to result in commensurate reward. Emphasising this
position Fischel states:
"because no compulsory cost-sharing mechanism exists for
shareholders wishing to oppose management policy, and
because no single shareholder can capture the whole gain
to shareholders generally from the proposal's defeat, there
will be insufficient incentive to organise opposition."!'
Under the German system ownership concentration is significantly higher than in
the Anglo-American system with the largest five shareholders holding an
average of over 40%.12 The result is that shareholders are likely to have a large
enough stake in their company to justify investing the resources and time
11. Fischel, The Corporate Governance Movement, 1982,35 VAND. L. REV. 1259 at
1277
12. Demsetz, Hand Lehn, K., The Structure of Corporate Ownership: Causes and
Consequences, 93 (6) Journal of Political Economy 1155 at 1169.
9required to collect information and exert the necessary control over
management.
One of the criticisms which has emerged is that shareholders in the United
Kingdom and United States are only interested in short-term gains, which is
often seen as the cause of take-over activities in these two systems." This
short-termism of Anglo-American shareholders is based on the general notion
that a company's primary purpose is to make profit and distribute dividend to
members. In such a situation the company will be under pressure to pay
dividends every year even when corporate profits are low with the effect that
long-term goals, such as re-investment and expansion, suffer. 14
On the other hand German shareholders have operated under a different
regulatory and cultural background with entirely different expectations. The
presence of committed, long-term shareholders protects German companies
13. Dimsdale, N., Restoring Corporate Accountability, in Dimsdale, Nand Prevenzer,
M., Capital Markets And Corporate Governance, 1994, 25-26, Clarendon Press.
14. Marsh, P., Short-termism on Trial, 1990, 32, London, where he states that
companies generally adopt short-term strategies in an attempt to maximise short term
performance to suit the wishes of fund managers and shareholders.
10
from short-termism experienced by their Anglo-American counterparts." The
dispersed and distant shareholders, to whom U.K. and U.S. managers are
accountable, judge companies on the basis of financial information which does
not always provide an accurate reflection of company performance. In the words
of Roe:
'" .long-term information needs constant private
interaction, in which a motivated group of stockholders ask
for predictions and see how they payout over years.
Distant shareholders with small blocks cannot readily be
part of that kind of ongoing evaluation."16
There has been a general appeal to institutional investors in these systems to
playa more active role in corporate control on the basis of their concentrated
holdings. The argument has been that if institutions step into the corporate
scene, their activities may alter the notion of shareholder passivity." The
interests of institutional shareholders are not normally contrary to those of
individual shareholders as the two categories have a common goal: to get the
maximum returns from their investments.
15. Commenting on the German long-term strategy of corporate control Parkinson
emphasizes that their system of control depends on a stable long-term investor and
creditor relationships with the company. - Parkinson, J.E. Corporate Power And
Responsibility, 1993, 150, Clarendon Press.
16. Roe, M., Strong Managers, Weak Owners, 1994, at 241, Princetown University
Press.
17. Wright, S., Two Cheers For The Institutions, 1994, 12-13, The Foundation Pub.
II
2. The Stakeholder Concept
The central proposition at the heart of the stakeholders approach is that the
purpose of a company should be defined more widely than the maximisation of
shareholder investments alone." It holds that there should be some recognition
of the well-being of other groups that have some form of association with the
company, and so an interest or 'stake' in the long-term success of the company.
These groups are usually taken to include employees, creditors, suppliers,
customers and shareholders.
Proponents of the stakeholder model have pointed to the fact that companies
which develop a reputation for the ethical treatment of their employees,
creditors, clients, suppliers and customers are able to build up relationships
based on trust. This in turn brings about mutually beneficial exchanges and
profitable investments to companies. Charkham made this point clearly when he
stated:
"Shareholders are one set of stakeholders among several,
and German management thinks of its customers and
employees first. The orientation and consensus matter, for
18. Jones, T. M., Instrumental Stakeholder Theory : A Synthesis of Ethics and
Economics, 1995,20 Academy of Management Review, 404, 421-425
12
they underly so much of the German approach to corporate
governance. ,,19
Under German law, therefore, a company is regarded as an autonomous
enterprise having a public and social dimension with a lot of emphasis being
placed on the different interests recognised by the company." The interests of
stakeholders, in particular those of employees, receive consideration in
management decision-making. Since the success of a company depends, In
most cases, on the contribution of employees, the case for recognising their
importance becomes a valid one.
This runs counter to the traditional Anglo-American practice which focuses on
maximising returns to shareholders and argues that shareholders, as owners,
are free to exercise their ownership rights in a way that maximizes their own
interests without being subjected to any responsibilities." This was the general
19. According to Charkham profits to shareholders on their investment is "not the be all
and end all". He goes on to argue that although consistently poor profits and
depressed share prices would reflect on the competence of management yet
shareholders' immediate value is not the main purpose of a company. - Charkham, J.,
Keeping Good Company, 1995, p. 10, Oxford University Press.
20. Kay and Silberston, Corporate Governance (1995), National Institute Economic
Review 84 at 86; Ireland, P., Corporate Governance, Stakeholding And The Company:
Towards A Less Degenerate Capitalism, 1996, Journal of Law and Society 287, 297.
21. North-West Transportation v. Beatty (1887) 12 A.C. 589.
13
view held until the second half of the 1980s when it was called into question. It is
now thought that simply focussing on shareholders interests is too narrow a
perspective as there are other groups who also have interests in the company."
3. The Supervision Of Management
In theory company structure in the Anglo-American system is one whereby
shareholders appoint members of the board who in tum choose the executive
directors from amongst themselves.23 In this system the chief executive officer is
usually the key figure with the power to make executive policy-decisions. The
chairman sets the agenda for board meetings and must conduct such meetings
in a manner that enables those present to give their honest views.
The Chief Executive Officer (CEO) may also be the chairman of the board which
multiplies the powers held24• In Germany the Chief Executive Officer does
22. Lipton and Rosenblum, A New System of Corporate Govemance: The
Quinquennial Election of Directors ,1991, 58 Chi. L. Rev. 187 at 224.
23. Short, H., Non-Executive Directors, Corporate Govemance and the Cadbury
Report: A Review of the Issues and Evidence, 1996, Corporate Governance, 123 at
127-8.
24. Charkham, J., Keeping Good Company, 1995,267, Oxford University Press where
he states that the Chief Executive Officer has considerable powers and responsibilities
which become onerouswhen combined with the position of chairman of the board.
14
not normally enjoy such a prominent status. The positions of CEO and
Chairman of the Board are, by virtue of the two-tier board system, held by
different persons. In that system the management board is the equivalent of the
executive directors while the supervisory board, which represents shareholders
and employees, monitors the management board."
In the Anglo-American system both the executives and non-executive directors
have legal responsibilities for the collective management and decision-making of
the company's business for the benefit of its shareholders. The result is that the
unitary board has two incompatible functions. First, the board is legally
responsible for planning and carrying out business decisions in the company.
Second, the board has crucial monitoring functions, being the primary body
through which managers are made accountable to shareholders.
On this dual role Ezzamel and Watson have clearly emphasized that:
" First, the board is the enterprise's supreme executive body. It
is legally responsible for formulating and implementing business
strategy on behalf of shareholders and for ensuring that all
business activities are conducted in a manner which complies
with company law and other legal requirements. Secondly the
board has crucial governance function to perform. The board is
25. The practice in companies with more than 2,000 employees is for half of the
members of the supervisory board to be elected by employee and in companies with
less than 2,000 employees the proportion of employee representatives falls to one-third
- Owen, G., The Future of Britain' Boards of Directors: Two Tiers or One, 1995, 11,
London: Institute of Chartered Accountants in England and Wales.
15
the primary institutional mechanism by which shareholders render
the executives, appointed to manage the assets on their behalf,
accountable for their stewardship.':"
Shareholders, on their part, have the right to vote at the Annual General Meeting
(AGM) to appoint and/or remove from office any or all directors and to determine
the conditions of their employment. The structure of the board and its
independence of management will, therefore, affect the degree of control
exercised over corporate management. This is largely governed by the rules
and regulations of a country's corporate law and differences therein are likely to
lead to differences in the board's ability to oversee corporate policies and
management.
In the Anglo-American system the primary monitoring element is the existence of
independent non-executive directors on the board. Non-executive directors have
been recognised as having an important role to play in the supervision of
corporate management, and are thought of as being in a position to represent
the interests of shareholders on the board. While non-executive directors have
been regarded as a means of strengthening shareholders' voice there is doubt
26. Ezzamel, M. and Watson, R., Wearing Two Hats: The Conflicting Control And
Management Roles of Non-Executive Directors, in Keasey, Thompson and Wright,
(eds), Corporate Governance, Economic, Management and Financial Issues,1997, 54,
Oxford Press.
16
whether they may be in a position to play this role 27
Apart from the fact that non-executive directors may be denied access to
relevant information with which they are supposed to monitor and evaluate their
executive colleagues, the selection and appointment of non-executive directors
are mostly effected by the Chief Executive Officer who leads the group to be
monitored. On these grounds the Cadbury Report recommended a formal
process for the selection of directors and emphasized the importance of
unbiased monitoring of corporate management by the board of directors. To this
effect it recommends the appointment of a significant number of independent
non-executive directors to corporate boards."
Under the German two-tier board system the supervisory board monitors and
controls the activities of the management board and has the power to appoint
27. Charkham has put the position succinctly thus ' a non-executive will often feel
alone, fearful of raising what seems an obvious point or checking a basic assumption
which everyone else treats like the laws of Medas and Persian.' - Charkham, J.,
Keeping Good Company, 1995, 270, Oxford Press.
28. Para 4.30 of the Final Report of the Committee on the Financial Aspects of
Corporate Governance, 1992, London: Gee & Co.; Parkinson argues that the precise
content of the duty of non-executive directors is obscure as the details of their
monitoring role have not been clearly articulated by the Report. - Parkinson J.E.,
Corporate Power And Responsibility, 1993, 99, Clarendon Press. Although the system
relies so much on non-executive directors, they may not always be in a position to give
an independent opinion of corporate policies.
17
members of the management board and remove them for just cause." In
Germany, a large part of internal control is by "insiders", mainly through large
institutions such as banks. German banks exercise significant voice within
companies through the depository share system, representation on supervisory
boards and interlocking directorates."
In practice, however, the executive boards are not really as accountable to the
supervisory boards as it would appear. The executives have considerable
freedom to manoeuvre and although the supervisory boards have a right to
demand additional information, the flow of information to them is sparse." These
criticisms of both the Anglo-American and German systems of corporate control
have resulted in moves to improve corporate control mechanisms in recent
times.
29. Alexander, I. and Mayer, C., Banks and Securities Markets: Corporate Finance In
Germany And The United Kingdom, Journal of the Japanese and International
Economies, 4 at 11.
30. German banks can vote such depository shares which give them significant power
at general meetings of shareholders. According to Baums, banks collectively represent
more than four-fifths (82.67 per cent) of all votes present in meetings with the big three
banks accounting for 45 per cent of the votes present. - Baums, T. , Takeovers Versus
Institutions In Corporate Governance In Germany, 9-11 Sept 1992, 8, Oxford Law
Colloquim.
31. Prodhan, B., Corporate Governance And Long-Term Performance, Oct. 1993, Vol.1
Part 4, Corporate Governance: An International Review, 176
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4. Disclosure Of Corporate Information
For shareholders to be in a position to vote at general meetings in an informed
manner they require sufficient information to assess the performance of their
boards. The traditional methods which seek to secure accountability have been
the stipulations that certain information has to be disclosed to shareholders and
that certain matters have to be approved by them. These methods can only be
effective if the boards actually disclose the relevant information and the
shareholders understand the information disclosed. Even when the board has
disclosed adequate information to the general meeting, shareholders will only be
able to influence decisions where they hold sufficient shares in the company to
vote effectively.
This role of shareholders in rendering accountable those who manage the affairs
of their company has been an important theme in the present corporate control
debate. It has, however, been argued that given the cost of making himself
informed to vote intelligently, the minimal impact of his votes and the possibility
that other shareholders may simply take a free ride on his effort, shareholders
are seriously hindered from making their boards accountable for their
pertormancs" The corporate control system should ensure that in exercising its
32. Black, ShareholderPassivity Re-examined, 1990, 89 Mich. L. Rev. 520
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discretion management is accountable for its decisions and actions so that the
necessary standards are maintained and the appropriate remedial actions can
be taken in the event of failure. The emphasis has, therefore, been that
company boards should comply with financial reporting and other disclosure
requirements that are stipulated under company law.
Without adequate information regarding the performance of management,
shareholders' voting rights become meaningless. The present debate stresses
that company law has set out the standard by requiring the board to produce and
make available to shareholders independently audited financial statements."
Commentators in this debate are of the view that despite statutory information
and financial disclosure requirements, the system is unable to prevent a
determined board from adopting reporting practices which hinder accountability
to shareholders. It is against the background of this present debate that this
research has been undertaken.
C) Aims Of The Research
The debate on corporate control is based on the concern that company law and
practice leave excessive powers in the hands of management who abuse them
33. Smith, T. Accounting For Growth. 1992, 25-28, London: Century Business;
O'Sullivan, N., Auditors' Liability: Its Role in the Corporate Governance Debate, 1993,
Accounting and Business Research, 23/91A, 412-20
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by serving their own personal interests This study aims at analysing the powers
of the general meeting to appoint and remove directors as internal corporate
control mechanisms to curb this improper use of power in three systems - United
Kingdom (U.K.), United States (U.S.) and Germany thus providing an
international dimension to the current debate.
It examines the inadequacies of the traditional constraints on management while
highlighting the entrenched positions of corporate managers in the face of
shareholders' weakening powers. It questions the exercise of these powers to
fulfil the purpose for which they are intended: keeping management under check
to ensure that their actions align with the interest of shareholders.
It discusses the possibility of dispersed shareholding, especially in the Anglo-
American system, operating to weaken these powers with the result that devices
such as proxy voting and shareholders' voting agreements, which were meant to
give shareholders some degree of control in their company, may be used by
management to perpetuate their positions on the board. Under the German
system, employee representatives sit on the supervisory boards of companies
that are subject to co-determination. This work sets out to examine whether the
German co-determination system has affected shareholders' powers to control
their company. The research also aims to put forward a number of
recommendations for the purpose of strengthening the position of shareholders
in controlling their companies.
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D) Methodology
1. A Comparative Study
The main thrust of the research consists of a comparative study of the controlling
powers of shareholders to appoint and remove directors within three systems
namely, the United Kingdom, the United States and Germany. A study such as
this uses, as its principal methods, the comparison of legal systems,
fundamental principles of law and institutions as between various countries ( or
indeed within the same country: comparative municipal law). 34
Cross-societal research which tends to combine prevailing and developmental
approaches has been one of the theoretical formulations in the social sciences."
The importance of comparisons cannot be overstated With the development of
modern methods of communication, distances have shortened with a resulting
facilitation of improved relations between states. This has brought about a
growing interest in comparative law especially in the commercial field.
34. Szabo, Law Theory And Comparative Law, 1972, 23 International Journ. of
Comparative Law, 13
35 Merritt, R.L. and Rokkan, S. (eds) Comparing Nations, 1963, 10, Yale University
Press;
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Comparisons help one to obtain a better understanding of one's own system
when seen from the perspective of other systems. Through a comparative study
one is able to recognise those legal rules, regulations and social institutions
which shape the special characteristics of a system. This, in turn, gives a clearer
view of the gaps and weaknesses which familiarity may have led one to
overlook. This awareness may result in appropriate steps being taken to make
improvements and implement changes where they are most needed.
In the heat of the present corporate control debate an observer of the
international scene is bound to ask some important questions, for examples:
i) What are the reasons for the dramatic differences in the corporate control
mechanisms in different countries?
ii) Is one system of corporate control more effective than others?
iii) If so why can the practices of that system not be adapted by others?
By subjecting rules, regulations and practices of companies in the United
Kingdom to comparisons with those of the United States and Germany and vice
versa, it is hoped that these systems will benefit from the innovative ideas of
others as cross fertilization of ideas should occur. An overview of corporate law
and practice in the United States" is invaluable to a clearer understanding of the
36. Particularly the emphasis on board committees, the regulation of proxy voting, and
the courts' attitude towards contracts by common directors of competing companies.
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loopholes of U.K. system. The fact that pressure can be brought to bear more
readily on companies by German financial institutions is instructive to the United
Kingdom where large financial institutions, despite their growing pre-dominance
in share-ownership, have not taken adequate steps to control the running of
companies.
A comparative legal study of this nature shows that the differences between
countries are not accidents of history and politics but the results of differences in
the legal and regulatory environments. While companies in the Anglo-American
system, with their dispersed shareholders, may rely on the threat of take-overs
German companies are, to a large extent, controlled by banks with which they
have close ties." Although a U.K. company based in the U.K. is subject to the
laws of that system, its subsidiaries in Germany and in the U.S. would be subject
to the laws of those systems. This makes an understanding of the dynamics of
other systems an important issue in the present globalisation of commercial
activities.
In the context of the on-going international debate on corporate governance a
comparative study of this nature should prove highly informative on a wide range
37. Cosh, A. , Take-Overs And Short-Termism In The U.K., IPPR Industrial Policy
Paper NO.3 (1990), 8; Schneider-Lenne, Corporate Control In Germany, (1992) 8(3)
Ox. Rev. Econ. Pol. 11
24
of issues especially those of board structure, composition and its representation
of shareholders' interests. This comparative study has been undertaken mainly
through an analytical approach with an evaluation of how effectively
shareholders actually exercise their power to determine the composition of
company boards.
2. Analytical Approach
In order to obtain a clear picture of the exercise of shareholders' power to control
their companies an awareness of the legal rules, regulations and corporate
practices of these three systems under study becomes necessary. To this effect
an analytical approach has been adopted within the main body of the research
which takes each of the systems in turn. Under this analysis extensive literature
on the current corporate control debate has been used in the different chapters
while examining shareholders' control through the exercise of these powers.
The way executive directors are made responsible to the board and they, in turn,
to shareholders has become a heated debate. The analysis seeks to shed some
light on the various devices which, although meant to aid shareholders in
controlling their companies, have been converted into tools which enable
directors to entrench themselves on corporate boards. The resulting
inconsistencies of legal rules (and regulations) and the practice have been
emphasised.
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3. Evaluation
First, there has been an evaluation of the structure and composition of boards of
directors in the three systems. The research posits that in the unitary board
structures of U.K. and U.S. there is the tendency to concentrate authority, in
large companies, in corporate managers with whom shareholders have little
direct contact. With boards being dominated by executive directors the
difference between the board and management tends to disappear. In evaluating
the structure and composition of U. K. boards recognition has been given to the
fact that since all directors bear equal responsibilities for the operation of the
company, this makes it difficult for non-executive directors to monitor effectively
the activities of the executive team.
The German two-tier board, on the other hand, ensures that the monitors are not
required to share the responsibilities of management decisions with the
executives. An evaluation of the unitary board has also shown the dilemma of
that system where the roles of the chief executive officer and the chairman are
sometimes combined. One of the functions of the chairman being to dismiss the
chief executive when necessary, such removal becomes impossible where the
office is combined with the chairmanship of the company.
The second evaluation has been in the area of shareholders' exercise of their
powers. This thesis indicates that by posing searching questions, shareholders
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could cause some discomfort to management and even effect changes to their
boards. Its evaluation is, however, that very few shareholders behave in this way
which leaves dissatisfied members with the option of selling off their holdings.
There appears to be more dialogue between the owners of German companies
and their management with major shareholders being able to express their views
through the forum of the supervisory board.
As the present debate emphasises the need for accountability of corporate
management, there is a strong case for reviving the traditional system of
corporate control by stipulating rules which clearly define boards' responsibilities
to shareholders. An evaluation of the present position shows that proposed
reforms 38 should not only be in the form of self regulatory codes which
companies can choose to ignore. On this basis the thesis puts forward some
proposals on how changes may be made for the purpose of improving the
chances of shareholders who wish to determine the composition of their boards.
38. In the form of the Cadbury Report, the Greenbury Report and the Hampel Report in
the United Kingdom; The ALI Corporate Governance Project in the United States and
the Reports of the German Monopolis Commission.
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4. Sources Of Information
In order to identify, analyse and evaluate the legal issues involved this work has
made extensive use of published legal resources from different sources. The
legal materials used can be sub-divided into three broad categories: primary
sources, secondary sources and finding tools. The primary sources of
information used for this research are provisions of codified and statue law,
constitutional provisions, legislative materials, decisions of courts and
arbitration. Being authoritative rules of governmental bodies these primary
sources have helped to identify significant issues thus providing the legal basis
for the analysis.
Secondary sources have been used to obtain important background information
and a general overview of this area of law. These have consisted, in the main, of
materials which have explained, interpreted, developed and criticised the
primary sources. The main types used have been scholarly treatises, textbooks,
law reviews and other legal periodicals, legal encyclopaedias and literature in
the mass media. These have all been invaluable in the analytical aspect of this
work.
Finding tools have been extensively used to locate primary and secondary
sources. These have been in the form of digests, annotations and legal
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periodical indexes. Computer data bases such as LEXIS and WESTLAW have
been extremely useful finding tools in accomplishing this research.
E) The Structure Of The Research
The implications of the separation of ownership and control have made the job of
supervising corporate managers a difficult one. According to the shareholder
model of the Anglo-American system the main objective of managing a company
is the maximisation of shareholder's value while the German stakeholder
approach emphasises a wider constituency with due consideration being given
to employees and trade relationships. The different aspects of this research
have been examined as follows:
Chapter two of this VIIOrk discusses the main control mechanisms in the three
systems under study. It examines how directors' actions are monitored to
ensure that the interests of shareholders and other stakeholders are protected.
Chapter three addresses the influence of institutional investors on shareholders'
powers to appoint and remove directors. It posits that the active participation of
this category of shareholders on the corporate control scene gives the hope that
shareholder control over management may become a reality.
Rules and regulations being some of the main causes of the differences in
control systems, chapter four examines the statutory and regulatory rules which
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enable shareholders to appoint and remove directors under United Kingdom,
United States and German laws. It reviews the limitations that are inherent in
these different systems' frameworks which restrict the exercise of these powers.
Chapter five starts by focusing on the structure of corporate boards in the United
Kingdom, United States and Germany. It explores the extent to which employee
representation on the boards of German companies may affect the powers of
shareholders to appoint and remove directors. The chapter concludes by
evaluating the strengths and weaknesses of the unitary and two-tier board
structures.
Chapter six evaluates the mechanism of proxy voting and questions whether this
practice ensures shareholders of any input in the composition of their boards.
While the issue of disproportionate voting share is not the norm in the systems
under study, the attachment of disparate voting rights to shares is still being
practised Chapter seven examines the effect of disproportionate voting rights of
shares on the property right of shareholders in general and their rights to
appoint and remove directors in particular
Chapter eight reviews the mechanics of shareholders' voting arrangements while
examining the potential of these devices being used to deprive shareholders of
any significant role in their companies. Where executive directors of one
company serve as non-executive directors of another this can foster mutuality of
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interest and affect the independence of the non-executive group. Chapter nine
of this work focuses on the implications of interlocking directorates on
companies. It examines the effect that such inter-linkages of board membership
have on the controlling and monitoring roles of non-executive directors for
purposes of protecting shareholders' interests.
Recognising that each system has its advantages and disadvantages the final
chapter concludes that it would be futile to attempt a convergence of the
practices of these different systems. It rounds up the work by making a number
of suggestions on the areas where rules and regulations could bring about a
more meaningful exercise of shareholders' powers to appoint and remove
directors.
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CHAPTER TWO
INTERNAL CONTROL IN THE LEGAL STRUCTURE OF A COMPANY
A) INTRODUCTION
Individual shareholders now own only a small portion of the total shareholding in
public companies and so lack the level of interest that justifies serious involvement
in their companies.' Instead they hire agents (directors and officers) to manage their
funds on their behalf. The separation of ownership and control has been the driving
force behind the development of the corporate governance movements in different
lunscictions." The central problem in the management and control of companies is
how to ensure that management does its best to pursue a profit maximising strategy
on behalf of shareholders and other corporate stakeholders. 3
Ayer had summarised the position as far back as 1863 when he stated:
" The present stockholders are scattered all over New England , and
other States. They have bought their shares as an investment with the
delusive hope that somebody is interested in the company who can
and will take care of the company .,,4
1. Davis, P, Institutional Investors In The U.K., in Prentice & Holland (eds), Contemporary
Issues In Corporate Governance, 1993, 74, Clarendon, where he states that in large
companies the need for capital has led to a situation in which no one individual shareholder
holds a significant block of shares to be able to hold management accountable.
2. Prowse, S. Corporate Governance In An International Perspective (1994), 36
3. Dooley, Two Models of Corporate Governance, 47 Bus Law 461, 465 (1992);
Easterbrook & Fischel, Corporate Control Transactions, 91 Yale L.J. 698, 705 (1982)
4. Ayer J. C, Some of the Usages and Abuses in the Management of Car Manufacturing
Corporations 3 (1863), Waterman.
:12
There was widespread concern even then that the board of directors would not have
sufficient incentives to do the job of protecting shareholders' interests. An 1877
editorial in the New York Times provides an equally precise commentary:
''The old relations between directors and shareholders, between
managers and the public, exist no longer. The power incident to a
directorship is used most frequently for the furtherance of
interests which indeed are often antagonistic to shareholders
interests."
These concerns about the ownership structure and the relationship between
managers and shareholders were more elaborately articulated over 50 years later
by Serle and Means." They claimed that shareholders were merely passive owners
and asserted that in large public companies management was not chosen by
shareholders but rather was a self-perpetuating oligarchy. According to them:
" Ownership is so widely scattered that working control can be
maintained with but a minority interest. Separation becomes
almost complete when not even a substantial minority interest
exists Under such conditions control may be held by the
directors who can employ the proxy machinery to become a self
- perpetuating body even though as a group they own but a
small fraction of the stock outstanding ..... In the corporate
system the "owner" of industrial wealth is left with a mere
symbol of ownership while the power, the responsibility and the
substance which have been an integral part of ownership in the
past are bein~ transferred to a separate group in whose hands
lies control."
5. Corporate Management, NY Times, Feb 2, 1877, at p. 4
6. Serle A. and Means G, The Modern Corporation And Private Property, 1932,
(Transaction Publishers Edition, 1991) 54
7. Ibid at 124
Although shareholders' interests may coincide with those of management, there is
also the possibility of the two groups having different and even conflicting interests.
This potential divergence in interests can result in substantial agency costs which
arise from the need to monitor management to keep it on task." The main question is
how to keep these costs low. One possible route is to make shareholder monitoring
easier through 'shareholder democracy' reforms such as extensive disclosure
requirements and the threat of derivative actions against management. 9
Broadly speaking corporate control refers to the way in which companies are
directed and governed. It is the machinery by which management actions are
monitored to enhance shareholders' interests and to meet the goals of a company. It
consists of a range of control and accountability mechanisms designed to meet the
expectations of corporate stakeholders. According to Tricker the concept covers the:
u practices of boards and their directors, the relationships between
boards and shareholders, top management, regulators, auditors and
other stakeholders»10
Corporate control, therefore, strives to provide a balance between the freedom of
management to make corporate decisions and control over those decisions. In any
8. Agency cost arises due to a divergence in interest between the agent and the principal.
The separation of corporate management from ownership results in certain costs which
include the cost of contracting the agents and the cost of monitoring and controlling them. -
Weston J.F, Chung K.S. and Haag S.E, Mergers, Restructuring, And Corporate Control.
1990, p. 48, Prentice Hall.
9. Davis E. and Kay J, Corporate Governance, Takeovers And The Role Of The Non-
Executive Director, 1990, Business Strategy Review p. 65.
10. Tricker, R.I., Editorial, Jan. 1993, Journal of Corporate Governance, Vol. 1 No.1, Jan(1993) pp1-3
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jurisdiction this should compose of :
a) direction, which has to do with the formulation of the strategic policies for the
present and future benefit of the company;
b) supervision, which involves monitoring and overseeing management
performance; and
c) accountability on the running of corporate business."
It has been argued that since shareholders supply capital and are the main risk
bearers in companies they are the best group to exercise control over those who
manage their capital - a general concept known as 'shareholder democracy'. This
concept has its origin in the traditional view that shareholders are most likely to act
as conscientious overseers of those who manage their property." Within the
traditional structure shareholders should be able to dictate how the company is to
be run by their ability to appoint directors who should operate with the main
objective of promoting shareholders' interests.
Companies in different countries are organised in different ways with a variety of
corporate control mechanisms. The differences in the legal and regulatory
framework are not simply accidental but can be traced back to differences in the
social, political and economic backgrounds of the different systems.
11. Sheikh S. & Rees W, Corporate Governance & Corporate Control, 6, (1995) Cavendish
Ltd
12. Smith, A. The Wealth Of Nations, 1778, Book V Ch.1, Part 111 1937, Modern Library
Edition, New York.
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This chapter brings together and examines aspects of internal control in companies
in the U.K., the US. and Germany. It discusses the main characteristics of each
control system and gives an analysis of their strengths and weaknesses. It examines
the powers of shareholders to monitor the actions of directors for the purpose of
ensuring that they act in the best interest of the company in the broad sense.
B) CORPORATE CONTROL IN THE UNITED KINGDOM
Under the traditional corporate structure shareholders had the right and power to
control the operations of the company. Shareholders were then considered as active
participants, and directors were regarded as agents of the shareholders. The
general body of shareholders should have some impact on the company to ensure
that it is well-managed and complies with proper principles of corporate governance.
This traditional position was reflected in Section 90 Companies Clauses
Consolidation Act 1845 which stated:
'The directors shall have the management and superintendence
of the affairs of the company, and they may lawfully exercise all
the powers of the company, except as to such matters as are
directed by this or the Special Act to be transacted by a general
meeting of the company; but all the powers so to be exercised
shall be exercised in accordance with and subject to the
provisions of this and the Special Act; and the exercise of all
such powers shall be subject also to the control and regulation
of any general meeting specially convened for the purpose, but
not so as to render invalid any act done by the director prior to
any resolution passed by such a meeting."
The interpretation of Section 90 was elaborated upon by the Court Of Appeal in Isle
Of Wight Rly Co. v. Tahourdin'" where Cotton L. J. stated that shareholders should
not be prevented from holding company meetings if such meetings were the only
way they could influence corporate pollcies." Section 90 was later replaced by
Article 80 of Table A to the Companies Act 1948 which was generally interpreted to
mean that shareholders could exercise control over their directors' management
powers by passing a special resolution at general meeting
Article 80 itself was replaced by Article 70 of Table A15. The effect of Article 70 is
that shareholders cannot interfere with management's exercise of its powers unless
they give directions by special resolutions at general meetings16. Members,
however, have certain power over the affairs of their company, exercisable by them
through their right to vote on resolutions, of which the most important are the rights
to appoint and remove directors. 17
13. (1883) 25 Ch.D. 320
14. Also Exeter and Credition Rly v. Buller (1847) 16 LJ Ch 49 where the court held that
the powers vested in the directors were subject to the resolutions of the general meeting,
which have the effect of controlling directors' activities.
15. Companies ( Tables A to F ) Regulations 1985
16. In Breckland Group Holdings Ltd v. London & Suffolk Properties Ltd (1989) BCLC 100 it
was held that Article 70 conferred the management of a company's business on the
directors and that the general meeting could not interfere with that power.
17. Article 78, Table A and Section 303, Companies Act 1985; see also Sheridan 1. and
Kendall, N., Corporate Governance, 1992, 54
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1. Shareholders' Role In Corporate Control
The traditional model of corporate control separates the functions of those who
provide capital ( the shareholders) from the directors who manage the company's
business." While shareholders have no control over ordinary business decisions
their collective interests are represented by the board. Shareholders are supposed
to exercise control through their voting for the appointment and removal of directors,
approval of fundamental changes, and alteration of the articles. In private
companies shareholders rely on their company for their livelihood, and with no
ready market for disposing of their shares, shareholders in private companies
assume active roles in the control of their companies.
As members of private companies desire some control over their cash and
protection of their human investments the participants often operate it in the form of
an "incorporated partnership.,,19 Members normally contribute their money while
managing the business of the company even though the traditional model
contemplates a different organisational structure. Where disgruntled shareholders
seek judicial protection, such processes, apart from the effect of the business
judqrnent rule, are usually long drawn-out and expensive. These have moved
shareholders in private companies to build into their company structure ways of
protecting their interests".
18. Article 70 of Table A which vests management powers in the board.
19. Ebrahimi v. Westbourne Galleries [1973] A.C. 360
20. An example is Bushell v. Faith [1970] A.C. 1099
In large public companies with widely dispersed holdings and a market for their
shares, shareholders' participation in the appointment and removal of their directors
is not so easily achieved as the traditional model suggests. Shareholders' control
over corporate affairs, in this type of company has, been significantly diluted." The
right to vote, which is meant to be a control device in the hands of shareholders, has
turned out to be a mere window dressing. In reality most shareholders do not attend
meetings to exercise this right. The normal practice is for them to hand over their
votes to individuals often selected by management. This leaves control in the hands
of the directors who virtually select their own successors. 22
In the 1980s shareholders discovered that, despite failures in the use of their voting
rights, the threat of take-over gave them some control over their companies. Their
power came from the threat to sell their shares as they were able to sell to a
particular buyer who would consolidate the voting power of the otherwise dispersed
shares, take-over the company and replace the boarc." This way the threat of take-
over provided a means of disciplining management where shareholder voting rights
failed.
21. Prentice, D.O., Aspects Of Corporate Control Debate, in Prentice and Holland (eds),
Contemporary Issues In Corporate Governance, 1993, 41, Clarendon Press
22. Chapter six of this work pages 214-217 gives a review of the use of the proxy voting
machinery by corporate management.
23. Jensen, M.C, Take-overs: The Causes And Consequences, (1988), Journal of
Economic Perspectives, Winter 2 : 21, 34 - where he argues that takeovers serve as
important sources of protection for investors.
19
After the takeover era, a new era began during which institutional investors emerged
as a powerful force in the corporate control scene. The power of this group is based
on their voting incentive when compared with individual shareholders. With their
small stake in companies, individuals shareholders have little time to spend
familiarising themselves with the issues involved." Given this information
disadvantage it is not surprising that individual shareholders are indifferent to
corporate control issues. As institutions have larger stakes in individual companies
than individual sharehotders," they are expected to play an important role in
corporate control since moves by them to sell their shares would drag down the
market thus lowering the selling prices.
One of the significant powers endowed on shareholders - the power to evaluate
directors and replace under-performers with credible individuals while holding the
board responsible to put in place the best managers - has turned out to be less
effective than expected". In an attempt to come to the aid of shareholders, U. K.
company law has adopted a range of mechanisms with the aim of monitoring
24. Bain N. and Band D., Winning Ways Through Corporate Governance, 1996, 11,
Macmillan Business - where they state that individual shareholders are subjugated to the
needs of large shareholders who get the first opportunity to gain new insights and
information.
25. Stapledon, G. P., Institutional Shareholders And Corporate Governance, 1996, 107,
Clarendon Press - where he indicates that institutions hold a large chunk of equity in U.K.
companies
26. Sheikh S. and Rees W. (eds), Corporate Governance and Corporate Control, 1995,61
Cavendish.
40
corporate management for purposes of shareholder protection. These include:
1. Mandatory disclosure of corporate information which enables shareholders to
decide whether to remain investors of the company.
2. The requirement that certain decisions should be approved by shareholders."
3. The requirement that corporate management's actions should be undertaken only
for the benefit of the company as a whole ( which includes shareholders as the main
stakeholders ). In this respect the law imposes certain duties upon directors which
define the standard of behaviour expected of them.28
In view of these requirements shareholders are expected to determine whether there
has been any departure from the stipulated standard and where necessary to take
actions to redress such departures. It has, however, long been realised that these
strategies are inadequate for each seems to be capable of being controlled by,
rather than facilitate the control of, a powerful rnanaqement." Turning to the first
safeguard mentioned, it cannot be over emphasized that management possesses
the information that shareholders need. They can influence how that information is
collected, presented and released thus management can manipulate the disclosure
process. The second safeguard of shareholder approval is also a formality since
management controls the proxy voting process and in the face of dispersed
27. These include the award of long service contracts, ( S. 319 CA 1985 ) substantial
property transactions (S 320 C A 1985) and loans to directors (S.330 C A 1985)
28. Regal (Hastings) Ltd v. Gulliver [1967] 2 AC 134; Boardman v Phipps [ 1967] 2 AC 46
29. Finch, Company Directors: Who Cares About Skill and Care? 1992, 55 MLR, 179
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shareholding it can procure almost any shareholder approval it requires." Finally
the ratification process enables directors who are also shareholders to cast votes at
general meetings to ratify their breach of duty. In the United Kingdom allegations of
unchecked managerial abuses" have brought about a growing interest in the
subject of corporate control with particular emphasis on the role of non-executive
directors.
2. The Contributions of Different Committees
As shareholders generally do not exercise their voting rights, they normally have
very little say in their company's policy-decisions and the composition of their
boards. The Cohen Committee, as far back as 1945, identified the lack of active
participation on the part of shareholders and emphasized the need to encourage
them to take active involvement in their companies. According to that Committee's
report:
" The illusory nature of the control theoretically exercised by
shareholders over directors has been accentuated by a
dispersion of capital among an increasing number of small
shareholders who pay little attention to their investment, so long
as satisfactory dividends are forthcoming, who lack sufficient
time, money and experience to make full use of their rights as
occasions arise and who are, in many cases, too numerous and
too widely dispersed to be able to organise themselves. ,,32
30. Gower, Principles of Modern Company Law, 1992, 5th ed., 512, Sweet and Maxwell
31. Instances such as Robert Maxwell, Asil Nadir of Polly Peck and Ernest Saunder of
Guiness are but a few.
32. Board Of Trade, Report Of The Committee On Company Law Amendment, Cmnd
6659, 1945, 135
The Cohen Committee drew the attention of the U.K. business world to the effect of
the separation of ownership from control in companies. It insisted that it was
desirable to encourage shareholders to consider proposals required by law to be put
before them by the directors, and stressed that shareholders should participate
actively in overseeing the running of their companies. The Jenkins Committee
reporting in 1962 also took the view that, shareholders should be given a
reasonable degree of control over their companies."
Under U.K. corporate practice there is the concentration of authority, in public
companies, in the board of directors with whom shareholders have little direct
contact. There has been a tendency in such companies to increase the proportion of
executive directors with the effect that the board is sometimes dominated by the
executive team. Where that is the position the difference between the board and
management largely disappears - normally referred to as the "inside board"."
It is only in recent times that attempts have been made at increasing the number of
non-executive directors for purposes of protecting shareholders' interests"
33. Board Of Trade, Report of the Company Law Committee (1962) Cmnd 1749 (' Jenkins
Committee') p.3 para11.
34. Davies E. and Kay, J. Corporate Governance, Takeovers and The Role of the Non-
Executive Director, Business Strategy Review, ( Autumn 1990), 17 at 21.
35. Clutterbuck D. and Waine P, The Independent Board Director: Selecting And Using The
Best Non-Executive Directors To Benefit Your Business, 1994, 24, McGraw-Hili; Russell
Reynolds Associates, Independent Directors: U.K. Companies, 250 Survey, 1995, at 10;
Some measures have, however, been taken in the U.K. in an attempt to redress the
imbalance between the powers exerciseable by management and the representation
of shareholders on the board. The Cadbury Committee considered shareholders'
role in corporate control to be an important one. It emphasized that shareholders
should exercise their control powers and should satisfy themselves that an
appropriate governance structure is in place. Giving prominence to these important
roles of shareholders, that committee stressed that the relationship between
shareholders and directors should be that the shareholders appoint directors who in
turn report on their stewardship by accounting to shareholders for their actions."
The report recommended that the roles of the chairman and the chief executive
officer be separated by urging that:
" there should be a clearly accepted division of responsibilities
at the head of the company, which will ensure a balance of
power and authority, such that no one individual, has unfettered
powers of decision. 37
The committee also identified various board level mechanisms as essential for
ensuring high quality monitoring of the financial aspects of corporate governance. It
stressed the need to clarify the chain of accountability and to build monitoring and
36. The Committee On The Financial Aspects Of Corporate Governance: Final Report, 1
Dec. 1992 (Cadbury Committee) p.15. This committee's recommendations on the
appointment and role of non-executive directors have been discussed in the later part of
this chapter at page 46
37. Cadbury A, the Financial Aspects of Corporate Governance: The Code of Best practice,
1992, para. 4.5 - 4.7
control into boardroom and management decision-making processes".
Another committee on corporate governance was set up, chaired by Hampel to
promote high standards of corporate governance for the purpose of investor
protection and in order to preserve and enhance the standing of companies listed
on the Stock Exchanqs." This committee has addressed various areas of company
structure. It emphasized that boards' main role is to monitor corporate management
while exercising vigilance for their company's welfare. According to this committee,
boards have to create an adequate machinery for carrying out the different board
functions.
Some of the important recommendations of this committee are:
a. That the board should disclose the non-executives that are independent. 40
38. Cadbury, A., Reflections On Corporate Governance, The Chartered Institute of
Bankers, 1993; In 1994 there was clear evidence of public concern based on the suspicion
that there was some collusion at board level in the fixing of executive remuneration. This
study group chaired by Sir Richard Greenbury, came out with a Code of Practice and
recommended that the Stock Exchange makes compliance with the code mandatory for
listed companies - Para 2.4 of the Greenbury Recommendations. The committee made a
number of recommendations which should help to solve the problem of directors awarding
themselves huge salary increases which have no links with corporate performance. One of
the most important recommendations of this committee is that boards should set up
remuneration committees of non-executive directors to determine the company's policy on
executive remuneration and specific remuneration packages for each of the executive
directors. See para 4.3 - 14.7
39. The Committee on Corporate Governance, Final Report January 1998, London: Gee &
Co.
40. Recommendation 9
b. That non-executive directors make up at least one third of the board."
c. That companies' annual reports should identify a senior non-executive director."
These recommendations are all aimed at reducing the risk of mismanagement, fraud
and corporate failures but the question is whether companies have actually
responded to them. A survey that was carried out after the Cadbury Report has
shown that in over two-fifths of cases, appointment of non-executive directors are
still made through personal contacts of board members." Short has commented that
since it is the executives that actually hire the non-executives, they are unlikely to
have any incentive to act in shareholders' interests."
3. Non-Executive Directors
There is a general consensus that control and monitoring should be some of the
functions of the board of directors". It is in the exercise of this monitoring function
41. Recommendation 12; The Cadbury Committee had merely recommended that
companies should appoint non-executives of a sufficient calibre.
42. Recommendation 15
43. Intelligence, Pensions Investment Research Consultants (PIRC) April (1993)
Vol. 7, No.3, 16, London,
44. Short H., Non-Executive Directors, Corporate Governance and the Cadbury Report: A
Review of the Issues and Evidence, (1996), 4/2 Corporate Governance 123 at127
45. Mitchell A. and Sikka P, Corporate Governance Matters, Discussion Paper 24(1996), 2,
Fabian Society; Prentice D.O. and Holland P.R.J. (eds) Contemporary Issues In Corporate
Governance, (1993) p. 215 Clarenden Press; Stapledon G.P, Instititutional Shareholders
And Corporate Governance (1996) p.12 Clarenden Press
that the main difference between the roles of executive and non-executive directors
becomes clear. Executive directors are responsible as managers for corporate
decision-making while non-executives should review their performance."
a) Their Role In Corporate Control
The argument has been that by vesting shareholders with the powers to appoint and
remove directors the legal and regulatory framework has created a structure
responsive to shareholders' interests. The board is granted the power to make
important decisions on behalf of the company including that of choosing the
company's executive officers, setting executive compensation and reviewing
management policies. It has been argued, however, that the board should not only
be concerned with financial incentives and remuneration of directors but should
create the right environment for all the directors to perform effectively to achieve the
company's goals. 47
The role of non-executive directors has been in the spotlight of the corporate
governance debate with numerous proposals put forward for a new improved role for
this category of directors." Although the legal system already relies on non-
46. Cadbury Report supra note 22 at paras 4.4 - 4.6
47. Maw, Lane and Craig-Cooper, Maw On Corporate Governance, 1994,49, Datmouth Ltd
48. BDO Binder Hamlyn, Non-Executive Directors - Watchdogs or Advisers? (1994) 11;
Confessions of a Non-Executive, Fin. Times, 15 July 1991, p.11; ISC, The Role And Duties
Of Directors - A Statement of Best Practice (1991); PRO NED, Code Of Recommended
Practice on Non-Executive Directors (1987) 89; PRO NED is a body sponsored by a
number of leading financial bodies.
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executive directors to act as a check against managerial indiscretion." some
reformers have recommended that the law should take a step further by requiring
that the majority of board members should be independent of rnanaqernent." To be
independent they will have to be free from any relationship which could interfere
with the exercise of their judgment. In an attempt to enhance boards' ability to
effectively monitor there have been calls for an increased numbers and more active
presence of non-executive directors on boards and key board committees. 51
One of the main recommendations of the Cadbury Committee was that companies
should appoint unbiased non-executive directors to protect the interest of
shareholders. The committee believed that the independent judgment of this
category of directors should raise standards of good corporate governance. It also
recommended that there should be a minimum of three non-executive directors, two
of which should be independent of the company."
49. The rationale for this reliance on outside directors is that since they do not have
personal financial interests in retaining management they can ensure that the company is
run in the long-term best interests of the shareholders
50. See Rosenstein S. & Wyatt J, Outside Directors, Board Independence, and
Shareholder Wealth, 26 J. FIN. ECON. 175 (1990); PRO NED, Research Into The Role Of
The Non-Executive Director: Executive Summary (1992) 6.
51. It has been widely recognised that the boards of directors of U.K. companies are
generally dominated by executive directors. A 1992 study by Hemmington-Scott of 1,612
commercial and industrial listed companies found that on average 63 per cent of board
members were executives and that the majority of the non-executives were actually
executives of other listed companies - Hemmington-Scott, Non-Executive Director
Statistics, Corporate Register (Mar. 1992) , Hemmington-Scott, 5-9;
52. See The Committee On The Financial Aspects Of Corporate Governance: Final Report,
1 Dec. 1992 p. 15, ( London: Gee & Co. )
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b) The Issue Of Independence
The question has been whether non-executive directors actually act in shareholders'
interests or whether they are more inclined to be sympathetic to the desires of their
executive colleagues? The qualification of 'independent' becomes questionable
when non-executive directors have personal ties with the CEO or other executive
members. Definitions of independence have ranged from barring all business
relationship between the director and the company to focusing on personal as well
as business ties 53
Generally speaking, any outside connection between them and the executives will
hamper their effectiveness on the board. As Clark rightly points out, even non-
executive directors may not be completely objective decision-makers due to their
connection with the executive team which they are supposed to monitor." The result
is that the non-executives are not in a position to oversee the actions of the
executive team. Emphasizing this position Elson identifies the management-
dominated, passive board of directors as the most significant problem facing public
companies today. 55
53. The National Association of Corporate Directors, Report of the NACO Blue Ribbon
Commission on Directors' Professionalism (1996), appendix Cat 37 gives the definitions of
director's independence from various sources
54. Clark, J.J., Khan v. Lynch Communications Systems, Inc.: A Major Step Toward
Clarifying the Role of Independent Committees, 1995,20 Del. J. Corp. L 564, 581
55. Elson, C.M., Director Compensation and the Management-Captured Board - The
Historyof the Symptom and a Cure, (1996), 50 SMU I. Rev. 127 at 127.
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Where the selection of non-executive directors is being done by the chief executive
they are bound to feel that they 0'W8 their tenure on the board to the executives
which they are supposed to monitor. According to Davis and Kay:
" Non-executives are, in general, picked by the executives, 0'W8
their salary to the executive, and commonly share social and
business connections with the executives. .... It is hardly
surprising that changes in executive management are more frequently
the product of expensive, external action through take-over than
consequences of the activities of non-executive directors."sa
c) Membership Of Board Committees
Companies have sought to enhance non-executive directors' roles through their
participation on board committees the most important of which are the nomination,
remuneration and audit committees. Membership of such committees is meant to
give non-executive directors greater scope to exercise their independent influence,
protected from the risk of domination by the executive team. Involvement in board
committees should, therefore, afford them the opportunity to oversee important
policy decisions of the company
Although there is evidence that U.K. companies are now attaching importance to the
creation of board committees, more companies have remuneration committees than
they do nomination committees. A 1995 survey shows that almost 50% of the
companies that responded did not have a nomination committee. When compared
56. Davis, E. and Kay, J. Corporate Governance, Takeovers and the Role of the Non--
Executive Director, in Bishop, M. and Kay, J. (eds), European Merger Policy Ch. 5, p. 212
(Oxford University Press)
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with the U.S. position, where it has been shown that 95% of potential boardroom
candidates are recommended by a nominating committee, it becomes obvious that
U. K. companies have a long way to go in this direction"
It is note-worthy, however, that even when non-executive directors are determined
to fulfil their duties to shareholders they may not be given the detailed information
about their firm's business, thus having no basis on which to challenge management
decisions. Apart from that, non-executive directors normally hold only a nominal
amount of shares in companies on whose board they serve." Given how little non-
executive director's financial well-being is tied to corporate performance these
directors have little incentive to devote the amount of time and energy needed to
effectively monitor corporate managers.
Despite the fact that the establishment of board committees offers more scope for
non-executive directors to exercise their monitoring powers. this position docs not
rosolvo the conflict of interest that sometimes exists. Even when they are acting in
their capacity as committee members, non-executive directors still fern: an integra!
part of the overall board, with the same rights and duties as their executive
colleagues.
57. Ibid at 194
58. Monks Rand Minow N, Corporate Governance (1995),199, Blackwell Publishers -
where they note that all too often, outside directors hold, at best only small proportions of
their net worth.
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C) CORPORATE CONTROL UNDER GERMAN LAW
1. The Main Characteristics
The German system is the classic two-tier model consisting of the supervisory board
(Aufsichrat), which has both shareholder and employee members, and the
management board (Vorstand). The supervisory board's main functions are to
:"!r'r":-!;;-;~ d;s;-;,;~~ ~;-;rJ supervise the company's management and to report to the
mtorcst and function the supervisory hoard members may not also be members of
the company's management board Thus a signifit·;:.:,nt ,:::;;:",,,,"ct ,-,f th;:. (':;;:.,·,n:::;" ,,\;~t;:';i,
. - .;
lil LUI fJUI die LUIIII UI j::; i11t:: ::;upel vi:->ul y uoal J as the traditional body of control. This
board deals with policy matters such as long term plans and important corporate
tr;-jn,"~l,-t;C!n<:; A!thnl!'Jh GC:!Tn8n supervisory boards do not include any management
members, co-determination law requires that they include employee members 5 9
One of the strengths of co-determination is that it enhances a better flow of
information from the shop floor to the boardroom. This can lead to improved working
conditions for the employees and better working relations Corporate goals, in that
<-:}i,:;tenl, are [i'ererc1re .jeT'!!ed ni'y'::, vv!dely than shareholder profit with the interests
of labour and other stakeholders receiving particular s;Jfc:'gu;Jrds 1,-; rn<:Jn<JgC':nc';ll
system where there is little or no labour input in decision-making
59. Section 96 para 1 AktG 1965
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The German system of corporate control takes the long-term interests of their
companies into consideration" and companies are accountable to a wide range of
interests than solely that of shareholders. This emphasis on long-term benefit is also
reflected in greater investment in plants, equipment and research than occurs in the
Anglo-American system. The result is that less emphasis is placed on returns to
banks - as they have other business relationships with the companies in which they
invest."
This long-term relationship with stakeholders i"i1kp.s it difficijit fli, c:o!t'p,:;nip.s to ti1kp.
with U.K. and U.S. boards, the decision-making prGCC'3S snci .Sp0 f_' d of rr~'spcn'c:c to
Issues uy Gell!!CHl UUi::JIU::; lJIClY ll ierefore, be slower. On the other hand, the dual
,. ,~, ·.:cgen:ent b':J2fd members and vet does not participate in its decision-making
processes, enables the decisions of management to be free from the infk!snce of
the supervisory board. On this Roe comments:
60. The importance attached to the long-term welfare of German companies is reflected by
thp. hF>;wy investment in human resources which, according to Hampden-Turner and
Trompenaars up to 70 per cent of all German employees dlC: OCCLlfJdliCn-ldl:y quzMn::d.
r.nrY'r·'=!:!"<! tn ~() r!": r.!"r:t in th!" U l< Harnpden-Turner.C. and Trompenaars,A, The Seven
Cultures of Capitalism, 1994, 233-4, ( London Piatkc:s),
61. Ibid at p. 226.
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" The supervisory board provides shareholders with influence,
although not control, in corporate governance. Managers still
have the upper hand, but the tilt is not nearly as pro-
management as it has historically been in the United States.,,62
This more formalised German structure constitutes an advantage in that recognition
is given to the difference in the position of executive and non-executive directors
with the effect that non-executive directors are not legally required tn r;:;,hr'p;:;tp In
managing the affairs of the company." In addition the supervisory board posseses
the authority to compel reports on demand and can require management to obtain
its approval before entering into certain fransactions." Despite the supervisory role
of this, it must not interfere with the active management of the company's affairs,
thus the supervisory board cannot give binding orders to the management board."
The function of management cannot, therefore, be assigned to the supervisory
council, nor does approval of any transaction by the supervisory council preclude
the management board's liability for darnaqes." The general meeting, on its part,
62. Roe, M.J., Some Differences In Corporate Structure in Germany, Japan and the United
States, 1993, 102 YALE L. J. 1 at 19.
63.The conflict in the functions of directors on a unitary board can be exacerbated where
on person occupies the positions of Chief Executive Officer and Chairman of the board.
The occupant of these positions would experience a conflict between his or her
~'"':;-::;-::~"..,;:;:;~ t,", rr.anaqernent and the need to give due regard to the interests of
shareholders.
64. For example, a company's supervisory board may insist on the extension of credit
::::h~ •.r: ~ :-""';,;.~ L~ ...~I .-L~~~~-li,...~.. ..-- .... receiot Of crier approval - Baums supra note 37 at
-- ---·--·~·;--._;""""'''''''''-il·''''lil~Vjll '"'tJ" Ir- I .
p.510
65. Section 111 para 4 AktG 1965
66. Section 93 para 4 AktG 1965
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cannot interfere with questions of business management and may only deliberate on
and resolve matters if the management board so requests." In practice, the
management board may obtain prior consent of the shareholders when
contemplating important contracts in order to protect themselves from liability."
Decisions in the supervisory council are taken by a simple majority vote unless the
articles provide for higher majorities. Absent members may vote in writing 69 and
written, telegraphic, or telephoned resolutions are permitted if no member
prostests"
Under German law although it is the management board that has sole responsibility
for managing the company" it's functions depend on the type of company, and the
number of its employees. Two of the main functions of the management board are
the preparation of the annual accounts for submission to shareholders and
decisions on the declaration and payment of dividend. Statute gives the power to all
the management board and not just a majority of them.72 The articles of
67. Section 119 para2 AktG 1965
68. Section 93 para 5 Aktg 1965.
09 Section 108 para 3 AktG 1965
70. Section 108 para 4 AktG 1965.
71. Section 76 para 1 AktG 1965.
72. Section 77 para 1 AktG 1965
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a company or the rules of procedure for the executive board may, however, provide
otherwise but may not provide that one or more members of the executive board can
decide differences of opinion within the organ against a majority.
The relationship between the executive board and the supervisory council is
governed by detailed legal provisions. The executive board has to supply the
supervisory council with complete and correct information about the business of the
company". The supervisory council may, however, demand additional reports at
any time from the executive board." Under German law the issue of shareholder
supremacy is less important since there is scope for external influence on the board
by other factors. Although the chairman of the supervisory board, who comes from
the shareholder side, always has a casting vote, in practice management is not
answerable only to shareholders. This is because employee representatives and
union leaders constitute half the directors on the supervisory board of German
companies with more than 2000 employees, and one third in smaller companies."
73. Section 90 AktG 1965
74. If the demand for additional information is supported by another member of the
supervisory council, the executive board is required to furnish the information - Section 90
para 3 AktG 1965. The reports of the executive board are open to inspection by every
memberof the supervisorycouncil - Section 90 para 5.
75. Franks J. & Mayer C, Capital Markets And Corporate Control : A Study Of France,
GermanyAnd The U.K.(1990) 5 Econ Poly 191.
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2. The Role Of German Banks In Corporate Control
An examination of internal control in German companies leads naturally to the role
of banks in influencing management. The banks have played an important part in
financing industrial development when compared with the market-based Anglo-
American system. Since German public companies rely on banks and not the market
as their primary source of external finance, banks participate actively in governing
German companies as creditors and substantial holders of equity." In addition the
institutional structure of German financial system is also based on the principle of
universal bankinq" A universal bank is free to provide a wide range of services
from commercial to investment banking, to investing in equities on its own account.
This freedom is limited only by a few prudential rules which are not very effective
thus giving banks wide latitude to own equity".
German banks' voting powers come not only from direct ownership of shares but,
more importantly, from serving as custodians for individual shareholders. Banks act
as brokers for their clients, and individual investors deposit their shares with banks
76. See chapter three of this work on The Role Of Institutional Shareholders in Corporate
Governance at p. 26
77. Eckstein W, The Role Of Banks In Corporate Concentration In West Germany, 1980,
Zeitschrift Fur Die Gesamte Staatswissenschaft 465 at 471,
78 The most restrictive rule appears to be the requirement that total qualifying
Investments in equity and real estate should not exceed the banks capital. However,
special banks such as savings banks and mortgage banks are often subject to different
and more onerous legislative rules with regards to their equity holdings. - Deutsche
Bundesbank, Banking Act of the Federal Republic of Germany, 1991, 31, Frankfurt.
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which vote these custodial shares. Professor Baums has summarised the voting
powers of German banks thus:
" All banks together on average represented more than four-
fifths of all votes which were present in company meetings. With
one exception, they always had at least a majority ( more than
50 % ) of the votes present. Consequently, they were able to
elect the members of the supervisory boards (so far as these
are elected by the shareholders, not the employees ). Changes
to the articles and bylaws of the corporation could not be
effected against their votes. In 22, or two - thirds, of the firms
the banks voted more than three - fourths of the stock present,
and thereby could change the articles and by_law.,,79
It is, therefore, difficult for German corporate managers to pursue damaging
corporate strategies for extended periods without facing outside intervention from
institutional shareholders. Reiterating this Roe asserts:
" It is doubtful that German managers can even lawfully make a
proxy solicitation. Instead German managers must filter proxy
solicitation through bankers, who vote their own stock, their
mutual funds stock, and their customers custodial stock .,,80
Such limits placed on corporate managers ability to manipulate the voting processes
appears to give German banks huge powers, but the extent to which these banks
actually use their powers to influence corporate decision-making for the benefit of
shareholders is difficult to assess. There is, therefore, no way of guaranteeing that
bank powers will be exercised in the shareholder's interests and not used in
protecting banks' positions as major creditors.
79. Baums T, Should Banks Own Industrial Firms? Remarks From The German
Perspective, (1992), Revue de la Banquede Belgique 5. at 507 .
80. Roe, M.J. Some Differences In Corporate Structure In Germany, Japan and the United
States, (1993) 102 Yale L.J. 46
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In the face of the growing internationalisation of capital markets and the increasing
competition for capital the German 'Universal' banking system, which was generally
seen as an attractive feature of the German corporate structure, is now being seen
in a different light.81
The Oxford Analytica has put this changing view succinctly when it states:
" structures and practices which have been established over the
years to favour domestic management within the country over
foreign and non-managerial interest are now being threatened
by the need to attract the capital of major international
investors. ,,82
The number of industrial disasters involving big German banks seem unending - the
massive financial losses by Metallgesellschft, controlled by Deutsche and Dresdner
banks, the fraud scandal involving Deutsche bank supervised Balshaml Procedo
and the cash-flow crisis and emergency refinancing of Kloeckner-Humboldt- Deut,
which is 38% owned by Deutsche bank, are but a few.83 The realisation of the
advantages of international competition is likely to bring about the introduction of the
long demanded legislative changes. To this effect formerChancellor Helmut Kohl
81. Fisher A, Survey - Germany 96: Two-Tier System Under Scrutiny, Fin. Times 21 Oct.
1996 p. 11
82. Oxford Analytica Ltd, Board Directors and Corporate Governance: Trends In The G7
Countries Over The Next Ten Years ( Oxford, 1992), 81 at 142; Also Frank and Mayer,
European Capital markets And Corporate Control, in Bishop and Kay (eds) European
Mergers And Merger Policy ( Oxford, 1993) p.163
83. Saunderson A, Power Point, The Banker, March (1995) p. 23
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had stated:
" the cumulation of influence by banks via industrial stakes,
supervisory board mandate and voting proxies must, alongside
their function as credit suppliers, be reviewed"."
D) CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN THE UNITED STATES
Under the U.S. traditional corporate structure the board of directors manages the
company's business and makes policy decisions, the officers act as agents of the
board and execute its decisions, while the shareholders elect the board and decide
on major corporate actions or fundamental changes. Under this model the officers
are agents not of the shareholders but of the board, while the board itself is
conceived of not strictly as an agent of the shareholders but as an independent
organ of the company. The effect is that shareholders have no legal power to give
binding instructions to the board on matters within the boards' powers.
In recent times, it has become increasingly clear that this traditional model has
become inadequate as corporate boards rarely perform either the management or
the policy-making functions. In large public companies policy-making, like
management, has become an executive function. The ownership structure of a
company and its relationship with management affects, to some extent, the way that
a company is directed. To ensure good governance of companies, it has been
84. The release of Chancellor Helmut Kohl's government in The Annual Economic Report,
January 1995, 4.
60
proposed that active involvement of shareholders be encouraqeo."
1. The Corporate Electorate
According to the traditional corporate structure, shareholders - the electorate - have
a role in corporate control which they exercise at properly convened meetings. They
appoint directors annually" and can also remove them before their terms expires for
cause or without cause depending on the provision of the regulating statute" and
have power to alter the bylaws". At such meetings they have the right to increase or
decrease the share capital, approve voluntary dissotution." and authorise other
fundamental changes in the company. Like in the U.K. it is viewed that the
appointment of non-executive directors, who are not affiliated to the company,
should enable shareholders to rely on this group to protect their interests. To this
effect para 3A.01 of the American Law Institute's Principles of Corporate
85. Bain N. and Band D. Winning Ways Through Corporate Governance, (1996) p. 17,
Macmillan Books.
86. Section. 8.03 ( d ) revised Model Business Corp. Act 1984
87. Section 8.08 Revised Model Business Corp. Act 1984
88. For the difference between articles, by-laws and charters see Cox J.D., Thomas L.H.,
and O'Neal F.H., Corporations, 1995, Sections 3.11 - 3.12, Little, Brown & Co.
89. Section 14.02 RMBCA
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Governance recommends that:
The board of every large publicly held corporation should have a
majority of directors who are free of any significant relationship
with the corporation's senior executives, unless a majority of the
corporation's voting securities are owned by a single person, a
family group, or a control group"90
Important though these powers are, the situation with individual shareholders is still
as Serle and Means described it.91
Even if individual shareholders have the knowledge and motivation they would be
faced with the "free rider problem:" and for the active it would turn out a costly
venture. One of the ways that they can overcome this problem is by acting in
concert with others. Even when shareholders are willing to bear the cost of
intervention, certain restrictions come into play. They cannot interfere with directors'
powers to carryon the ordinary business of the company. These include binding
the company contractually, selecting and removing officers ( even for cause ), fixing
executive compensation, setting dividend policies and deciding on marketing or
production policies. In addition shareholders cannot compel or change particular
decisions of the board unless the board has failed to comply with the corporate
90. The American Law Institute's (ALI's) Principles of Corporate Governance, 1994; The
American Business Roundtable Statement also endorses a board structure based on the
majority of outside directors. - Business Roundtable's Corporate Governance And
American Competitiveness, p249
91. Berle, A. and Means, G. supra note 6, at p. 65
92. Some shareholders rest in the knowledge that other shareholders will make the efforts
needed to bring about management changes or to rectify problems which will serve to
benefit all shareholders. Such shareholders see no reason to incur a private cost for public
gain so they simply take a free ride on the efforts of the active shareholders.
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statute or constitutive document, or the directors are in beach of their fiduciary
duties. Shareholders can, however, still exercise a monitoring role by compelling
information from the company or by challenging board actions." There is also the
requirement that a company should provide shareholders with annual financial
information, including profit and loss accounts, and the end of year balance sheet.
In addition, the right to inspect the company's shareholders' list is an indispensable
tool for proxy voting. The statutes" are, however, often ambiguous about what
shareholder information should be furnished when a list is requested. Some simply
specify a "shareholder list" without describing its content.95
As contributors of corporate capital, shareholders are entitled to employ watchmen
to guard their enterprise and to this effect they may appoint a committee to
investigate the affairs of the company, and may require management to give an
account or a report of the proceedings at the annual meeting.96 If the charter vests
the power to manage the affairs of the company in a board of directors, it is not
within the power of the shareholders under company bylaws or otherwise, to vest
management in an executive committee or to appoint an agent to act or function with
93. Section 16.20 revised Model Business Corp. Act 1984
94. For an example see section. 219 (a) Del. Gen. Corp. Law 1991.
95. Delaware courts only require management to provide those lists to existing
shareholders and not potential ones. - Hatleigh Corp. v. Lane Bryant; Inc., 428 A. 2d 350
( Del. Ch. 1981 )
96. Securities & Exchange Comm. v Trans-American Corp. 163 f2d 511,332 US 847
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the directors." The separation of ownership and control might result in power being
concentrated in private hands with the creation of top-level corporate managers who
have far too much power over corporate decision-making. To prevent this situation it
is thought that shareholder democracy should be encouraged to ensure that
corporate power comes from a broad base of owners."
Many reformers have viewed shareholder democracy with scepticism by looking at
shareholders as being interested only in profit maximisation and being far more
concerned with their own good than the overall good of the company. It is, thought
that shareholders are too narrowly focused on their own self-interest and corporate
managers should make it their duty to balance shareholders interest with those of
the company and the public at large.99 Both the 1969 Model Business Corporation
Act and the 1984 Revised Model Business Corporation Act provide that the
business of the company is to be managed by a board of directors, and a majority of
state company codes have similar or identical provlsions.l'" In the absence of
97. Charlestown Boot & Shoe Co. v Dunsmore, 60 NH 85
98. Blair, M. M., Ownership And Control: Rethinking Corporate Governance For The
Twenty First Century, (1995), 75-76, The Brooking Institution - where she stated that
various ways have been explored to encourage shareholder participation, increase their
influence and strengthen the mechanisms of shareholders' voting for purposes of keeping
the exercise of management powers under constant check.
99. Bamonte, The Meaning Of II Corporate Constituency II Provision Of The Illinois Business
Corporation Act, 1995, 27 Loyola U C L J I; Committee on Corporate Laws, Section of
Business Law of the American Bar Association, Other Constituency Statutes: Potential For
Confusion, 1990,45 Bus. Law 2253.
100. Section 300 Cal. Corp. Code 1992; Section 141 Del. Code Ann Law tit 8, 1990;
Section 701 NY Bus. Corp. Act, 1989.
statutory authority the powers of management vested in the directors must be
exercised by them and not by shareholders. 101
To this effect it has been held that a shareholders' agreement that violates a statute
by attempting to usurp directors managerial responsibilities is invalid. In a New York
decision, the highest court of that state held invalid an agreement by the
shareholders that gave the holders of 50 % of the company's shares broad powers
in the management of the company's tnearres.!" In Charlestown Boot & Shoe Co.
v. Dunsmore,103 the plaintiff company in general meeting voted to set up a
committee to act with the directors in winding up its affairs. The directors refused to
act with the committee and continued to run the company's business. The court held
the general meeting's action to be a violation of statute. According to the court:
" Statute does not authorise a corporation to join another officer
with the directors nor compel the directors to act with one who is
not a director..... When a statute provides that powers granted
to a corporation shall be exercised by any set of officers or
agents such powers can be exercised only by such officers or
agents, although they are required to be chosen by the whole
corporation ..... ,,104
101. The Delaware case of Securities & Exchange Commission V. Transamerica Corp. 67
F Supp. 326 or 163 2F d 511
102. Long Park v. Trenton - New Brunswick Theatres Co., 297 NY 174, 77 NE 2d 633, see
also the case of Clark v. Dodge, 269 NY 410, 199 NE 641
103.60 N.H. 85 ( 1880 )
104. Ibid at 108
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There has also been growing public concern over the ability of the law to regulate
managerial power for the purpose of protecting the interest of corporate
stakeholders. In the heat of that concern the American Law Institute (ALI) authorised
the commencement of the Corporate Governance Project (CG Project) in 1978. 105
The launching of the CG Project by the ALI was clearly a move towards the setting
up of standards for the internal operations of corporate systems to enhance
monitoring and accountab.nty'?" The CG Project advocates what might be called a
'board monitoring scheme' for the oversight of managers of "publicly held
corporations" (PHCS).107 The project envisages a division of functions between the
senior executives of the company, in charge of the day-to-day management, and the
company's board of directors whose task is to monitor and control the executives.
The CG Project also puts forward a number of other recommendations designed to
enhance the monitoring power of the board. It recognises that if the board is to act
as an effective overseer, its composition must be wrested from management. It
105. The outline for a 'Project On The Structure and Governance of Corporations' 13th May
1978, is filed as Appendix 1 to the Minutes of the 164th meeting of the ALI council, 16th
May 1978; Selimen has also dealt elaborately on the background to this project - Selimen,
A Sheep In Wolf's Clothing: The American Law Institute's Principles of Corporate
Governance Project (1987) 55 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 325
106. Eisenberg, An Introduction To The American Law Institute's Corporate Governance
Project, (1984) 52 Geo Wash. L. Rev. 495
107. A puolicty held corporation (PHC) is defined in S.1.31 of the CG Project as a
corporation with 500 or more record holders of equity securities and at least $5m of assets.
seeks to achieve this through its insistence on 'independent outside directors' and
its recommendation of the establishment of committees of the board. Section 3.05
requires the adoption of audit committees by large public companies while Section
3A.05 recommends the adoption of a compensation committee to advise on
directors' and senior executives' remuneration.
2. Independent Outside Directors
An outside director does not automatically equate with an independent director
since that director may still have business relationships with the company which
might influence the director's judgment. Outside directors are essentially part-time
participants in their companies due to the fact that they hold other important and
demanding jobs thus subject to severe time constraints. Apart from the issue of time
constraint there is often informational imbalance between the outside and inside
directors 10a. The result is that U.S. corporate boards tend to be dominated by the
chief executives. 109 The role of independent, outside directors is said to be critical in
the concept of corporate control. According to Chancellor William Allen of the
Delaware Court of Chancery:
108. Cox, Hazen and O'Neal, Corporations, (1995), at 9.4, Little Brown & Co. - where they
state that outside directors have difficulties in playing an active role on company boards
because of time constraints and lack of adequate information.
109. Lorsch J. and Maciver E, Pawns or Potentates: The Reality Of American Corporate
Boards (1989) at 84-89
" Outside directors should function as active monitors of
corporate management, not just in crisis, but continually; they
should have an active role in the formulation of the long-term
strategic, financial and organizational goals Promotion of the
long-term, wealth producing capacity of the enterprise ensures
the benefit of the shareholders as the main risk bearers of the
firm,,110
In recent years there has been a concern in the U.S. for a new improved role for
outside directors."!' There is evidence to show that this is yielding good results. A
1991 survey found that the typical board of a U.S. public company had an average
of three 'inside' and nine 'outside' drrectors.!" The main question is whether outside
directors actually act in shareholders' interests or whether they are simply endorsing
the policy decisions of the executive. On this Harold Geneen comments:
" nominally, outside directors are elected by the stockholders;
actually, in most instances they serve at the pleasure of the
chief executive 1t is well known and accepted that only
those men and women who can get along with the chief
executive' are elected to the board and stay on it. One might
also ask how independent board members can be if they accept
all the perks heaped on them by the management they are to
judge. ,,113
Reiterating this point Prokesch notes that;
110. Chancellor W.1. Allen, address at the Ray Garner (Jr) Corporate and Securities Law
Institute, Northwestern University (30th April 1992), at p. 3
111. Johnson, An Insider's Call For Outside Direction, Harv. Bus Rev. Mar- Apr 1990 at 46;
Rosenstein S. and Wyatt J, Outside Directors, Board Independence, and Shareholder
Wealth, 26 J. FIN. ECON. 175 (1990); Weisbach M.S, Outside Directors And CEO
Turnover, 20 J. FIN. ECON. 431(1988)
112. Kornl Ferry, Board of Directors, 1991, 15
113. Gereen S.H, Why Directors Can't Protect The Shareholders, FORTUNE, 17th Sept.
1984 at 28
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" nominating committees that are supposed to choose impartial
outside directors act as the arm and will of the chief executive,
who feeds the names."!"
A board of directors can only act at meetings which last for just a few hours. By
reason of the time constraint alone, the typical board could not possibly manage
the business of a large public company in the strict sense of the term. This same
constraint precludes the board from making business policy decisions since policies
cannot be formulated and developed by persons who put in a few working hours a
month. Secondly if a typical board consists of directors who are economically tied to
the executives, and are dependent on the chief executive's good will, outside
directors are unlikely to dissent at a board meeting from the policies formulated by
management. Shareholders' hope may be in the fact that different committees may
be appointed to investigate the affairs of the company, recommend the level of
remuneration for executive directors and appoint independent auditors to review the
affairs of the cornoany.!"
3. Committees Of The Board
Statutes allow the board to delegate many of its functions to committees composed
114. Prokesch S., America's Imperial Chief Executive, N.Y. Times 12th Oct. 1986 at 25
115. In Securities & Exchange Commission v Transamerica Corp., 163 2d 511, 332 US
847 - the court clearly stated the position in which shareholders find themselves.
of some of the directors. 116 The functions or powers that cannot be delegated to
committees are normally specified, such as authorising the distribution of dividend,
share repurchases, issuance of shares, amendment of the bylaws and other
fundamental corporate changes 117 Committees of the board have, in recent years,
assumed growing importance in the U. S. especially in public cornparues.!" Board
committees act on matters that come up between regular board meetings and often
deal with open questions before presentation to the board. Normally the full board
simply adopts or ratifies the committees' actions.l'"
These committees often consist of outside directors in order to provide an element
of independence in matters where there are potential conflicts between the interests
of management and those of shareholders. A recent development has been the use
of specially appointed temporary committees to deal with particular transactions in
which conflict of interests are likely to arise. An example is the special litigation
committee (SLC) which decides on the company's position regarding shareholders
derivative actions against management.
116. Section 8. 25 Revised. Model Bus. Corp. Act 1984.
117. Section 8. 25 (e) Revised Model Bus. Corp. Act 1984.
118. Baysinger R. and Haskisson , R. E., The Composition Of Boards Of Directors And
Strategic Control: Effects On Corporate Strategy, 1990, Vol. 15, Academy Of Management
Review, 72 at 84.
119. Charkham states, with regard to board committees, that although all U.S. boards have
at least one committee the list of committees is quite long, including finance, public policy
planning, human resources. - Charkham, J., Keeping Good Company, 1995, 191, Oxford
University Press
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The SLC was in common use during the 1980s when company boards responded to
a spate of derivative lawsuits by which shareholders challenged illegal activities by
corporate officers.':" Normally the board would appoint a committee, giving it full
power to make decisions in the specific area on behalf of the company. Such a
committee would usually comprise of directors who had not participated in the
challenged transaction and hence could not be named as defendants. One is
tempted to question whether members of a special litigation committee can be
viewed as independent since they would be subject to pressure to dismiss charges
against fellow directors. In Lewis v. Faqua 121 the court held that a committee
member was not independent since he was a director when the challenged actions
took place, was named as a defendant, had political and financial dealings with the
company's Chief Executive Officer, and was the president of a university that had
received significant contributions from the Chief Executive Director and the
company.
E) CONCLUSION
In the three systems under review ultimate control, at least in theory, is in the
shareholders. The trend in the Anglo-American system simply illustrates the
problems caused by the separation of ownership from control. Although
120. Solomon, L.D. and Palmiter, A.R., Corporations, (2nd ed) 1994, 506 (Little Brown &
Co.)
121.502 A.2d 962, Del. Ch., 1985
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shareholders still own their share certificates which is evidence of their property
right, this piece of paper no longer accords them the rights which were traditionally
associated with ownership. Within the existing control structure shareholders are
given the right to appoint members of the board of directors and remove those that
they are dissatisfied with. They should, be able to rely on the board to manage the
company in a way that promotes their interests. In practice, however, shareholders
are not well-protected in any way.
Although the usual language is that a company shall be managed by the board of
directors, the reality is that the board usually appoints one or more full-time directors
to serve as executive directors, with the chief executive officer as the head of the
executive team. In modern corporate practice it is the chief executive officer rather
than the board, who runs the company. In both systems a distinction has been made
between management and the board of directors. The board in turn supervises and
makes general policy decisions with the emphasis being placed on independent
non-executive directors who are supposed to monitor the executive team.
Under the German two-tier system the supervisory board is the body that monitors
and controls the management board. Two of the most significant functions of the
supervisory board are the appointment and removal of the management board
members. Though Anglo-American company law does not establish a special
supervisory body, practice has often created a similar organ. The functions of non-
executive directors is comparable to those of the German supervisory board, though
it has to be remembered that under U.K and U.S. laws every board member has the
obligation of managing the company and safeguarding their investor's interests.
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Although the supervisory board is generally excluded from management, it quite
often fulfils management function since its meetings set the pattern of the general
corporate policy. On this basis members of the management board are normally
permitted to participate in supervisory board meetings although they do not vote. 122
This situation shows that it can prove difficult to preserve a clear division between
management and supervision. Just like the monitoring role of non-executive
directors have been questioned so have there been doubts whether members of the
supervisory board are really competent to control the executive board effectively.
There is no doubt that in most situations the executive board has a more detailed
knowledge of the company and its prospects. Although this is partly due to the fact
that the supervisory board only meets infrequently123 it has to be emphasized that,
like non-executive/outside directors of the Anglo-American system, the members
come from many different backgrounds, professions and perspectives. The draw-
back in the unitary board system is that with the role of the non-executive as
'watchdogs' a possible danger is that they may ignore the shared legal responsibility
that corporate board members are supposed to have. This might set one category of
directors against another and could lead to a weakening of the notion that a board
should be a homogeneous group with shared responsibilities.
122. Section. 109, para 1 AktG 1965
123. Section 110 para. 3 AktG 1965 provides that the supervisory board shall, as a rule, be
convened once every calendar quarter.
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CHAPTER THREE
THE ROLE OF INSTITUTIONAL SHAREHOLDERS
IN CORPORATE CONTROL
A) INTRODUCTION
Although shares in small private companies are usually owned, directly or
indirectly, by individuals involved in the management of a company, in public
companies shareholding is generally concentrated in the hands of
institutions. Institutional investors are organisations which raise funds from
individuals and companies with the intention to re-invest as principals. This
category of investors includes insurance companies, private pension funds,
public pension funds, investment trust companies, unit trusts, industrial and
commercial companies, banks and building societies.
Institutional investors therefore constitute a diverse group with pools of
money invested for different purposes and with different obligations, owing
the duty to manage funds and assets on behalf of other people. Stating this
duty to produce good returns to fund owners Bain and Band have asserted
that:
" the policy of institutional investors is generally to invest in
companies or sectors which they see as offering sustained
above-market average growth, in terms of total return.,,1
1. Bain, N. and Band, D., Winning Ways Through Corporate Governance, 1996,95,
Macmillan Press Ltd.
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For institutional shareholders in any system to exert any level of influence
over the composition of their board of directors a reasonable proportion of
shares must be held by them." Apart from the shareholding structure, the
effort, time and financial cost involved in monitoring corporate management
can only be beneficial if many institutions are involved in such moves.
Despite their growth over the past three decades the question remains
whether there will be active participation by this group to make shareholder
control over management a reality.'
As already noted" it can be difficult to organise individual shareholders to
play an effective monitoring role and determine the composition of their
boards. Although institutional shareholders share a common interest with
individual shareholders - which is that their company should be well run and
profitable - institutions are in a position to ensure good corporate standards
through the use of their large shareholding.
2. Benfield has emphasized that institutional investors have begun to bridge the gap
created by the separation of ownership from control in large companies. - Benfield,
R.E., Curing American Management Myopia: Can The German System of Corporate
Governance Help?, 1995, 17 Loy.L.A. Int'l & Compo L. J. 615 at 617; Also Gordon,
J.N., Institutions As Relational Investors: A New Look At Cumulative Voting, 94
Colum. L. Rev. 124, 130
3. Brancato C.K, The Pivotal Role of Institutional Investors In Capital Markets, in
Institutional Investors : Passive Fiduciaries To Active Owners, Corp. Law and
Practice Handbook Series No. 704, 1990,406
4. See chapter one of this work at p.11
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This chapter analyses the influence of institutional investors on corporate
management and their ability to promote the exercise of shareholders'
powers to appoint and remove directors in the United Kingdom, United States
and Germany. It examines the prospect of the increasing number of
institutional holdings leading to a change in the attitude of shareholders as a
whole. Attempts will be made at answering the question whether the present
efforts by institutional shareholders at determining the composition of their
boards is seen as adequate for purposes of controlling the companies in
which they invest. It will consider the question whether institutional investors
are in a position to play a more active part by channelling their efforts
towards controlling their managers instead of voting with their feet whenever
they are dissatisfied with management.
B) INSTITUTIONAL SHAREHOLDERS IN THE UNITED KINGDOM
The era of take-overs in the United Kingdom led to a revival of the corporate
governance debate and in the heat of that debate attempts were made at
persuading institutional shareholders of the importance of their monitoring
role over corporate management. Institutions have been encouraged to
discipline inefficient management instead of simply relying on market forces."
They have various courses of action, one of which is the exercise of their
5. Marsh P.R, Short-Termism On Trial, (1990), Report Commissioned by the
Institutional Fund Managers' Association, 35; Also Robinson A., Shareholder Power
: Time For Institutions To Flex Muscles The Guardian, 30 June 1995, 23,
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voting rights at general meetings. Institutions have been urged to make
positive use of their voting rights by registering their votes whenever
possible. Emphasising the importance of the exercise of institutional voting
rights the Cadbury Report states:
"Voting rights can be regarded as an asset, and the use or
otherwise of those rights by institutional shareholders is a
subject of legitimate interest to those on whose behalf they
invest. liS
Available emperical evidence on the level of institutional (fund manager)
voting has shown that voting levels are low. According to surveys undertaken
by the National Association of Pension Funds the voting policies of
investment managers of pension schemes that responded to its surveys in
1990 to 1994 were as indicated in Table A below.
Table A - National Association of Pension Funds: Survey of Voting Policy (%)
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994
Voting at all times if practicable 20 21 26 26 28
Voting only on contentious issues 33 34 34 31 32
No Votes 23 24 22 24 21
Others( with no policy) 24 21 18 19 19
Source: National Association of Pension Funds (NAPF) (1990-4), Annual Survey of
Occupational Pension Schemes (London: National Association of Pension Funds)
6. Para. 6.12, The Report on the Financial Aspects of Corporate Governance, Dec.
1992, ( Cadbury Report) Gee and Lee Ltd.
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1. The Attitude Of U.K. Institutions
U. K. institutions have been passive owners and whenever anything goes
wrong in their companies they would rather sell their shares than intervene.'
Institutional shareholders in the U. K. are said to be only interested in short-
term gains which the capital market reflects. An important aspect which is
often ignored is the pressure put on some institutions like fund managers to
maximise performance. Institutions are then criticised for capitalising on large
price rises resulting from take-over bids by selling their stakes knowing that if
the bid fails share prices will fall. As Charkham rightly puts it:
" All company managers want their own shareholders to belong
to type A school. If they put pressure on their pension fund
managers for short term results they push them towards type B.8
2. Recent Attempts At Monitoring By U.K. Institutions
In recent times institutional investors have become more actively involved in
7. Confederation of British Industry, Investing for Britain's Future: Report of the CBI
City and Industry Task Force, 1987, London, 18; see also Holberton S, Institutional
Investors As Interventionists, Financial Times, 10 August 1990, p. 10 - where he
stated that a familiar criticism made against institutional investors is that they are
capricious owners who are too willing to take the short-term profit rather than stay
with the company for the long-term gain.
8. Charkham, J.P., A Larger Role for Institutional Investors, in Dimsdale N. and
Prevezer M. (eds), Capital Market and Corporate Governance, 1994, 103, Oxford:
Clarendon Press; Also Blake, D., Issues In Pension Funding, 1992, 86, London:
Routledge
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the issue of corporate control in general and board composition in particular".
The strategies used by U.K. institutions include active dialogue with
corporate managers and intervention where their company's business is not
properly managed. This technique has been clearly stated in the report of M
& G Group thus :
"We believe strongly that, as an institutional investor, we
should have constructive dialogues with management of
companies in which we have a significant interest .....
We do not attempt to tell management how to run their
businesses, but if a company's action seems likely to
jeopardise the interests of shareholders, we find that
constructive intervention can often be preferable to
disposing of our holdinq.""
Along these same lines there have been a number of instances when
publicised pressure of institutional holders has prompted a change in a
company's board structure. This has been effected through institutional
insistence on the dual position of chief executive officer and chairman of the
board being split' 1 and the appointment of truely independent non-executive
directors to safeguard shareholders' interests. In 1991 efforts by a coalition of
institutional investors led by Norwich Union, one of U. K's largest insurance
9. Lewis W., Voting Record of Big Shareholders Improve, Financial Times 10th
February, 1995, 8; See also Barnett A, Institutions Demand More Rights At
A.G.M.'s, The Observer, 30th June 1996, 3
10. M & G Group pic, Annual Report And Accounts, 1992, 3; Also Lewis W.,
Institutions Press For All Directors To Face Re-Election, Financial Times, 25th
September 1996 1,
11. Brown J.M, Smurfit Ready To Appoint New Chief Executive, Financial Times, 12
March 1996,27
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companies resulted in the replacement of the board of Tace p1C. 12 This
incident received widespread press attention mainly because the whole
board was removed.
In 1993 there was a campaign led by Prudential to install a new management
for Spring Ram. The company had falsified its accounts and, when it was
discovered, Prudential and other institutions urged Spring Ram to find a new
chief executive officer. In the end a new chairman chosen by Prudential was
installed together with some other new directors. 13 In 1996, Sir Rocco Forte
bowed to pressure from institutional shareholders to split his roles as chief
executive and chairman of Forte, the hotel group. Institutions had lobbied for
the roles to be split in line with the recommendations in the Cadbury report on
corporate governance. 14
In 1997 an influential institutional shareholder made a strong call for
companies to appoint independent non-executive directors for the protection
of shareholders' investments. A representative of Hermes, which controls
£30 billion of British Telecom and Post Office Pension Funds, insisted that
companies should take steps to ensure that non-executive directors are
12. Gourlay R., Institutions Launch Bid To Oust Tace Board, Financial Times, 4 May
1991,10; Cohen N, Getting Directors On Board, Financial Times, 6 April 1992, 12
13. BolgerA, Rooney's Future Remains Unclear, Financial Times, 15 July 1993, 22
14. Daneshkhu S. and Blackwell D, Forte Chief Agrees To Divide Role, Financial
Times, 16 January 1996, 21
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independent of management. It stated that in its view too many non-
executives are being appointed "on the basis that they are related to the
boss, or because they were 'old cronies' of the chairman,,15
Opposition to the creation of equity shares which carry non-voting rights
appeared as the third point on the 1991 Institutional Shareholders'
Committee Code of Practice." In 1992 the Institutional Fund Managers'
Association carried the same message both to United Kingdom and
continental stock exchanqes." Another area of intervention by U. K.
institutional investors has been in connection with pre-emption rights of
shareholders. Institutions have insisted on more restrictive rules than statute
imposes, for instance where statute allows shareholders to disapply the pre-
emption requirement for up to five years at a time the Stock Exchange's
Rules, under institutional shareholders' influence, have placed some limits to
that oerioo."
15. Finch J, Boardroom 'Old Boys' Under Fire, The Guardian, 20 September 1997,
20.
16. ISC, The Responsibilities Of Institutional Shareholders In The United Kingdom
1991,5, London
17. Investors Seek More European Rights, Financial Times, 15 July 1992 18.
18. Pre-emption Rights, 1987, 27 Bank of England Bulletin, 545; Council of the
Stock Exchange, Admission Of Securities of Listing, Section 5, Chapter 2, para.
37.1. This provision is buttressed by the requirement of Section 3, Chapter 2, Part
3, para. 3.5 that when an issue is proposed and 10% or more of the voting capital of
the company is likely to remain unissued, directors must undertake in the listing
particulars to make no further issues of shares within the following year, except on a
pre-emptive basis, unless the shareholders in general meeting approve of the
specific issue.
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Institutional shareholders in the U.K. have also shown their concern over the
potential conflicts of interest involved in the setting of executive
compensation. They have insisted on detailed information being given to
shareholders on how directors' pay are determined by remuneration
cornmittsas" Institutional investors have also emphasized that executive
share option schemes should only be used where there has been a genuine
. 20Improvement in the performance of management.
These attempts by institutional shareholders show that intervention by
institutions definitely occurs. The difficulty lies in making an accurate
estimation of the scale of activism by this category of investors. Although
changes to the composition of corporate boards are recorded, 21 the type of
pressure that produces the changes, which can be applied behind closed
doors rather than in general meetings, is sometimes unknown." Another form
of intervention has involved informal collaboration between institutions for
19. Lewis W, Institutions Call For Detail On Top Pay, Financial Times, 29 March
1995,7
20. The gUidelines produced by the National Association of Pension Funds, entitled
Share Schemes - A Consultative Approach, 1992, London; Lewis W. Shareholders
Flex A Muscle On Top Pay: A look At The Options As Whitehall Ponders Ways Of
Restraining Directors' Salaries, Financial Times, 7 December 1994,8
21. Barrie C, British Telecom Engineers Reshuffle In Boardroom, The Guardian, 25
November 1995, 38; Daneshkhu S. and Blackwell D., Forte Chief Agrees To Divide
Role, Financial Times, 16 January 1996, 21
22. House of Commons, Session 1990-91, Trade and Industry Committee Minutes
of EVidence, 8 May 1991, HC 226-X, para. 928ft, (question to Mr Sandland, Chief
Investment Manager, Norwich Union Fund Manager Ltd)
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purposes of exerting pressure on boards to persuade them to make policy
changes or change the managers. Most such informal intervention is
exercised privately in order to avoid damaging the relationship with a
company's management. 23 The most prominent move by British institutions at
collaborating together for purposes of monitoring corporate activities has
been the formation of the Institutional Shareholders' Committee (ISC).
3. The Institutional Shareholders' Committee (ISC)
This committee was set up in response to the changing pattern of share
ownership in the United Kingdom and, while originally formed in 1973,
stopped functioning by the late 1970s. 24 It was revived in the 1980s with its
main goal being the formulation of general policies. This committee
constitutes of five associations:
The Association of British Insurers (ABI)
The Association of Unit Trusts And Investment Funds (AUTIF)
The Association of Investment Trust Companies (AITC)
The Asset Management Committee of the British Merchant Bankers'
Association (BMBA)
The National Association of Pension Funds (NAPF)
23. Snoody R., Emap Assures On Non-executives, Financial Times 13 July 1996, 8;
Lewis W, Institutions Press For All Directors To Face Re-Election, Financial Times,
25 September 1996 1, .
24. Dobbins R. and McRae T., Institutional Shareholders And Corporate
Management, 1978, 5-6.
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Being an association of associations, the Institutional Shareholders'
Committee (ISC) acts as a medium through which major shareholders can
express their views 25 and looks after its members' interests. One of the
purposes of the ISC is the provision of a forum for member associations to
meet and discuss common problems. Every six months or so the committee
circulates a discussion paper asking the associations involved for
comments."
Even though the responses to these papers vary according to the particular
viewpoint of each association, the opportunity to discuss them at ISC meeting
enables this category of shareholders to express their views. Discussions at
such meetings have focused on shareholders' duty to vote at companies'
annual meetings to ensure that they have a say in the composition of their
boards in order to maintain their investment value."
It is therefore clear that there have been various instances when institutional
shareholders' actions have brought about fundamental changes in their
companies as a result of collaborations with other associations and
25. An example is institutional opposition of the favourable terms on which housing
was made available to Marks and Spencers' directors - Schuller, Age, Capital and
Democracy, 1986, 99; Lewis W, Institutions Call For Details On Top Pay, Financial
Times, 29 March 1995 7, .
26. Corporate Governance And The Market For Corporate Control Of Companies:
Aspects Of The Shareholders' Role, Economic Division, Nov. 1989, Bank of
England, Discussion Paper No. 44
27. Lewis W, Pension Funds Told Of Duty To Vote : Plan To Ensure Institutional
Shareholders Are Responsible Investors, Financial Times, 15 November 1995, 22.
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institutions under the umbrella of the ISC.28 Commending the work of this
committee Charkham states that it 'gives a steer in the right direction.:"
4. The Growth of Institutional Shareholding
Statistics show that the growth of institutional shareholding in the United
Kingdom has exceeded those of the other jurisdictions under study. In 1969,
34.2 per cent of listed U. K. equities were held by this category of investors
and it was estimated that 42.9 per cent of the ordinary shares of listed U. K.
companies were held by institutions in 1975. By 1985 that figure had
increased to 59 per cent. 30 In 1990 an estimate of 60 per cent was given as
the percentage held by institutional shareholders." and that figure increased
to 60.4 per cent by 1992. 32 With these increases in their shareholding
institutions should have sufficient incentives to monitor and control the
functioning and management of their companies. The high stakes that
institutions hold in their portfolio companies should justify the cost of
28. Barnett A, Institutions Demand More Rights At AGM's, The Observer, 30 June
1996, 3; Cohen N, Lewis W. and Sharpe A, Institutional Concern Over Possible
Dividend Cut, Financial Times, 7 February 1996, 22
29. Charkham J, Keeping Good Company, 1995,287, Oxford University Press
30. Cosh, Hughes, Lee and Singh, Institutional Investment, Mergers And The
Market For Corporate Control, 1989, lint. J. Indus. Org. 73, 77
31. See Pensions Investment Research Consultants Limited, Intelligence, July
1990, 11
32. Central Statistical Office, Share Register And Survey Report end 1992, London
1994, 8, London.
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intervention even if this allows individual shareholders to take a free ride on
institutional efforts.
5. The Need For Greater Activism
This increasing concentration of shares in the hands of institutional investors
has brought about proposals to encourage institutional activism to ensure
that their company management is more accountable to them. The rationale
for these proposals is that the emergence of institutional investors as major
shareholders in U. K. companies should provide the basis for enforcing the
support for strengthening shareholders' riqhts." In this regard the Cadbury
Committee called on institutional investors to play a more active role in
securing better corporate governance and to take positive interests in the
composition of their boards.
The committee saw the development of constructive relationships between
companies and their owners as central to this role of institutions. It
emphasised:
"Because of the importance of their collective stake, we
look to the institutions in particular, .... to use their
influence as owners to ensure that companies in which
they have invested comply with the Code ......34
33. Riley B, Big Investors Urged To Be Active, Financial Times, 25 February 1994,
11; Robinson A, Shareholder Power: Time For Institutions To Flex Muscles, The
Guardian, 30 June 1995, 23
34. The Cadbury Reportsupra note 6 para 6.16;
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Activism by institutional shareholders can make individual investors with less
voting powers rest in the knowledge that their interests are well protected.
This will only happen if institutions are willing to bear the cost for the general
good of shareholders. A survey published in 1987 found that voting by fund
managers, as a matter of course, is uncommon" in spite of institutional
insistence that companies should not issue non-voting shares. Although the
value of votes lies in the threat of their use rather than their actual use, it
would aid the role of institutions as interventionists" if they were obliged to
express a view on all matters put to vote at general meetings. This important
issue has been addressed by the ISC Code'" and has been endorsed by the
Cadbury Report"
Although there has been some degree of activism on the part of institutions,
the main question is what the chances of extensive institutional intervention
in the management of large U. K. companies coming about without the force
of regulation are? Given the problems which dissatisfied institutions face in
organising effective collective action, it is unlikely that mere exhortation will
encourage institutions to be more active in their portfolio companies.
35. Management Of United Kingdom Equity Portfolios, 1987, 27 Bank of England
Quarterly Bulletin, 253, 257
36. Holberton S, Institutional Investors As Interventionists, Financial Times, 10
August 1990, 10
37. ISC, The Responsibilities Of Institutional Shareholders In The United Kingdom,
1991,6
38. The Cadbury Report supra note 6, 50-51
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C) INSTITUTIONAL SHAREHOLDERS IN THE UNITED STATES
Institutional investors in the United States are generally grouped into five
categories: foundations and endowments, bank (non-pension) trusts,
insurance companies, investment companies and pension funds." The
1990's have witnessed dramatic increases in institutional share ownership in
United States companies. In 1990, institutional investors owned 45% of
corporate equity."? By 1993 that figure had increased to 54%.41
In the light of these developments it is tempting to think that these increases
in the shareholdings of institutions will bring an end to the indifferent attitude
of shareholders. It is expected that this increased ownership concentration in
the hands of institutions should bring about improved activism by this
category of investors? Commenting on this position Pozen states:
"Because institutional investors now own a majority of the
voting stock of publicly traded companies in the United
States, they have an influence on the way these companies
are run. Given their influence, institutional investors are
under increasing pressure to become activist shareholders
,,42
39. Institutional Investor Project, Columbia University, School of Law, The Growth
Of Institutional Investors In United States Capital Market, 1988,6
40. Koppes R.H. and K.J. Gillan, The Shareholder Advisory Committee, Directors
and Boards, Spring 1991, 29
41. Cordtz 0, Corporate Hangmen, Financial World, 30 March 1993,24 at 25
42. Pozen R.C, Institutional Investors : The Reluctant Activists, Jan-Feb 1994, Harv.
Bus. Rev. 140
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Indicating its expectation of this group of shareholders the American Security
Exchange Commission emphasizes:
"Institutions, in becoming major shareholders, acquire
the ability to play a pivotal role in monitoring the
stewardship of their portfolio companies. They often
possess the special expertise needed to effectively
express shareholder concerns to the company and have
the motivation to employ all available resources,
including the right of shareownership, in order to
maximize the economic performance of their
portfolios."?
1. Evidence Of Activism
The appearance of institutional shareholders in the corporate arena gives the
hope that they may be in a position to play an important role in the
supervision of corporate management. There is evidence to show that
owning large illiquid blocks of shares, for which there is only a limited
secondary market, has prompted United States institutional investors to
monitor their investments more diligently than individual shareholders." To
this effect one of America's most prominent advocates of shareholder
activism, the California Public Employment Retirement Systems (CaIPERS)
has organised
43. SEC, Report For Senate Commission On Banking, Housing And Urban Affairs,
96th Cong., 20 Sess. Staff Report On Corporate Accountability, 383.
44.The reason for the illiquidity being that selling their large blocks of shares would
depress the market and would prevent holders from realising the shares' true value
- Wingerson M. and Darn C, Institutional Investors In The United States And The
Repeal Of Poison Pills: A Practitioner's Perspective, 1992, 92 Colum. Bus. Law
Rev., 223, 227.
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the Council of Institutional Investors, which in 1989 had sixty three
members."
In 1986 the United Shareholders Association was founded in Washington
D.C. with the purpose of encouraging shareholders in general and institutions
in particular to take a leading role in corporate governance matters."
Institutional shareholders in the United States have also begun to create
national organisations for pooling information and research on corporate
policies. In 1985 a group of public and private pension funds trustees formed
the Council of Institutional Investors to protect their rights as shareholders by
collecting data and providing information to members."
U.S. institutional investors have also sought direct influence over the
appointment of non-executive directors of their companies. An example is
the agreement by Texaco to select a board member from a list provided by
CalPERS with the result that the President of New York University was added
to the Texaco board." Institutional pressure caused Exxon to name an
45. White, CalPERS Chief Wields Big Stick For Institutional Shareholders, Wall St.
Journal 3 April 1990 c.4
46. United Shareholders Association Fact Sheet, 56 Georgetown Law Journal,
1991/92,84
47. Pension Funds Trustee Form Council, Washington Post, 25 January 1985 at 12
Col. 3
48. Flanigan J, Texaco Stresses The "Share" In Shareholder, L.A. Times, 25
January 1989 at D1, col. I
90
environmentalist to its board following the Exxon Valdez Oil Spill incident."
In addition, the United States Department of Labour (DOL) has promulgated
guidelines to encourage corporate pension fund managers to vote their
shares for purposes of fulfilling their monitoring role."
Apart from the incentive of increased holding and arrangements by
institutional organisations, the marked increase in management
entrenchment in recent times has also fuelled institutional shareholders'
activism." Institutional intervention has been seen to occur when a
company's management has been completely discredited and the ability of
incumbent management to pursue the goals of the company is in question."
This recent activism by large institutions has received recognition by legal
writers. According to Charkham these moves by institutions at overseeing
the management of their companies is keeping corporate managers on their
toes. Describing managers' anger at these developments Charkham states:
49. Wald M. L, Exxon Head Seeks Environmentalist To Serve On Board, N.Y.
Times, 2 May 1989, at A1, col. 4
50. Interpretative Bulletins Relating To The Employee Retirement Income Security
Act, 59 Fed. Reg. 38, 860 (1994) Codified at 29 C.F.R. s.2509
51. Duff C, K-mart's Embattled CEO Resigns Post Under Pressure From Key
Shareholders, Wall Street Journal, 22 March 1995, at A3
52. Salwen K.G. and Lublin J.S., Activist Holders : Giant Investors Flex Their
Muscles More At United States Corporations, Wall Street Journal, 27 April 1992 at
A1, A6; Cowan A.L., Investors' Power Test At Borden, N.Y. Times, 13 December
1993 at 01
9\
" There seems little doubt that U.S. management is angry at the
hint of greater shareholder activism and perhaps a little
frightened jUdging by the vigour of its reaction"
Lowenstein is of the opinion that institutional shareholders have awakened to
their role in corporate governance and have created councils and other
mechanisms for that very purpose. S4 Along these lines Matheson and Olson
have stated that large U.S. institutions who are major players in the corporate
governance arena, are now having direct influence over the control of their
companies. ss Confirming this point Blaire states:
"Despite the multitude of legal constraints that have kept
most financial intermediaries out of corporate board
rooms, public employee pension funds, union pension
funds, and a few other financial institutions have begun
organizing themselves so that their voice would be
heard." s6
2. Limitations To Activism
Despite all these positive moves by institutional shareholders in the direction
of more active monitoring of corporate management, there still are a number
of factors which may mitigate against institutional intervention on a significant
scale. An important question that needs to be asked is whether U. S.
53. Charkham J., Keeping Good Company, 1995,213, Clarendon
54. Lowenstein, Shareholder Voting Rights: A Response To SEC Rule 19c-4 And
To ProfessorGilson, 1989,89 Colum. Law Rev. 979 at 981
55. Matheson J.H. and Olson B.A, Corporate Co-operation, Relationship
Management And The Trialogical Imperative For Corporate Law, 1994, 78 Minn.
Law Rev. 1443, at 1464
56. Blaire M.M, Ownership And Control, 1995, 165, Brookings
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institutional shareholders are in a position to playa more effective role than
they are currently undertaking. There are obvious reasons why this category
of shareholders in the United States may find it difficult to be more actively
involved in monitoring. These reasons include:
a) Regulatory Impediments
Institutions in the United States face significant constraint on their ability to
take large shareholdings in comparues." With the enactment, in the U. S., of
laws that limit financial institutions' ability to hold concentrated blocks of
shares, a high level of institutional monitoring and supervision of
management functions may be difficult. The Glass Steagal Act58 which
regulates banking businesses, prohibits commercial banks from owning and
dealing in securities. 59 The Bank Holding Company Act which has been in
force since 195660 prohibits banks and bank affiliates from holding more than
five per cent of a company's shares unless the shares are non-voting. The
Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) ensures that pension
57. Roe M.J, Political And Legal Restraints On Ownership And Control Of Public
Companies, 1990, 27 Journal of Financial Economics 7
58.48 Stat. 184 (1933) (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. s.24 (Supp. 11, 1990) )
59 Franzen C.A, Increasing The Competitiveness of United States Corporations: Is
Bank Monitoring The Answer? 1993,2 MINN. J. Global Trade, 271,274
60. Its codified amendment is at 12 U.S.C. s. 1843(c)(6)-(7) (1988)
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funds remain highly diversified." Confirming the restrictive nature of the
ERISA, Roe states:
"Congress enacted ERISA ..... which, with no
discernible governance-related motive, confirmed the
pre-existing structure of corporate governance, by
encouraging pensions to adopt the fragmented,
passive stockholding structure that the three other big
financial institutions - banks, insurers, and mutual
funds - usually adopt.:"
Several other laws also prevent mutual funds, pension funds, and insurance
companies from controlling other companies through shareholdinq."
Commenting on the effect of these restrictions imposed on U. S. institutional
shareholder Grundfest states that:
"America seems not to trust her capitalists and for more
than half a century State and Federal governments have
limited investors' influence over the governance of
publicly traded corporations. Investors' ability to monitor
corporate performance and to control assets that they
ultimately own has been subordinated to the interests of
other constituencies The persistent theme of this
legislative trend is that society cannot trust stockholders
and bondholders to promote the public interest. Society
is better served, according to this view, if management is
sheltered from the discipline that results from active
capital-market oversight. ,,64
61. Pubublication No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 829 (Codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. 55.
10041-1161 )
62. Roe M.J., The Modern Corporation And Private Pension, 1993,41 U.C.L.A. Law
Rev., 75, 76
63. Roe, M.J, A Political Theory Of American Corporate Finance, 1991, 91 Colum.
Law Rev., 10, 12
64. Grundfest, J.A., Subordination Of American Capital, 27 Journal of Finance
Economics 89-90
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b) The Collective Action Problem
Institutional investors have the incentives to take collective action for the
purpose of monitoring the activities of their companies in order to preserve
the long-term value of their investments. The position is that they sometimes
choose to pursue short-term passive investment strategies instead of
grouping up to take collective and effective actions especially where activism
turns out to be an expensive venture. 55
Institutions will only contribute to collective good if the advantages or benefits
are greater than the cost of providing that benefit. The existence of
alternatives to collective action by shareholders such as selling off shares,
investing in other viable and well-managed companies, or simply holding
shares and not contributing to any aspect of corporate control constitutes a
limiting factor.
Where the gains offered by one of the alternatives are greater than the
benefits of monitoring management, shareholders are unlikely to engage in
the latter. Institutions, like individual shareholders, are faced with the free-
rider problem and the question is why should they undertake to monitor for
the benefit of others when there often is rivalry between them? The cost of
individual institutional action is likely to be high and unlikely to result in a
65. Coffee J.C, Jr., The SEC And The Institutional Investor, (1994), 15 Cardozo L.
Rev. 837 at 843
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commensurate reward. Part of the reason for this is that there is no
compulsory cost-sharing mechanism for shareholders wishing to object to
management decisions or attempting to remove directors.
c) Inability To Monitor Effectively
One of the reasons why institutional investors do not intervene as often as
they should is the organisational ability and skills required to monitor
corporate managers. Staffing constraints mean that monitoring resources are
usually allocated to emergency cases." Where there is a mismatch between
staffing and the size of shareholding by an institution then no serious
monitoring can be expected. Institutions, in the circumstance, will be unable
to ascertain whether the managers are doing a good job under difficult
circumstance or whether the management team has made a vital mistake that
cannot be remedied. Due to the lack of skills, institutional perception of
management weaknesses will be tainted with uncertainty. In the face of such
uncertainty institutions tend to intervene only at the crisis stage when there is
a likelihood of change resulting from the intervention."
66. Roe M.J, The Modern Corporation And Private Pension, UCLA L. Review, 1993,
75, 104-7
67. Gourlay, R., Institutions Launch Bid To Oust Tace Board, Fin. Times, May 4,
1991, 10; Also Simms, J., Management: Investor Pressure Builds on all-in-one
Executive, The Independent, Aug. 16, 1992, 19
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d) Agency Problem
Although institutional investors now have increased holdings in their
companies, it has to be recognised that institutions can only act through their
agents, which involves practical problems and costs." Commenting on this
problem Short and Keasey have stated that:
" Because the mechanics of institutional management mean that
there is often a division between voting control of shares and
the ultimate beneficial owner, agency problems of ownership
and control arises at every level of the relationship between the
beneficial and the final manager. ,,69
Since voting decisions are made by individuals other than the owners or
beneficiaries of the shares, the question is whether fund managers can be
relied on to act in a way that maximizes the value of owners' investments.
The choice that fund managers face is that they have to consider the benefits
of acting in the interests of the beneficiaries and the costs of doing so. Due
consideration must be given to the cost of monitoring management and that
of organising other shareholders. The gains from monitoring activities would
have to be substantial to justify such actions. Secondly, the time input
necessary for effective corporate governance activities may be too costly for
68. This agency problem may arise if institutions delegate investment management
to fund managers. Problems may arise due to the competition among fund
managers' interest in the annual league tables which is based on short-term
evaluation while institutions emphasize the long-term value of the funds. - Rock,
E.B., The Logic and (Uncertain) Significance of Institutional Shareholder Activism,
79 Geo. L. J. 445, 468-72 deals with this problem.
69. Short, H. and Keasey, K., Institutional Shareholders And Corporate Governance
In The U.K., in Keasey, Thompson and Wright, Corporate Governance, 1997, 27,
Oxford Press.
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mstitutrons."
Due to the divergence of interests between fund managers (agents) and
those of their principals one cannot assume that monitoring which may
increase the value of the managed portfolio will be in the interest of the
agents. There is very little (if any) economic incentive, therefore, for money
managers to embark on monitoring corporate management. Evidence abound
to show that portfolio managers rarely outperform the market with the result
that assets are driven into passive (indexed) portfolios."
e) Activism Might Trigger Moves To Exit
One of the potential dangers of approaching others to join a coalition is that it
might trigger a panic by institutions to sell off their shares. The mere
knowledge that a major shareholder is dissatisfied with management actions
might have a negative effect on other institutional shareholders. It could
induce other institutions to sell off in the fear that if the major shareholder did
not secure satisfactory reform it might sell its shares and depress the prices.
Black and Coffee have argued that the worry for causing a move by
70. Gordon, L. A. and Pound, J., Gordon Group Inc., Active Investing In The U.S.
Equity Market: Past Performance And Future Prospects, (1993), 2 at 14 assert that
existing funds contemplate a holding period of three to five years which is a rather
short period for intensive corporate governance activities.
71. It has been shown that CalPERS indexes 77% of its $22 billion United States
equity portfolio and College Retirement Equities Fund (CREF) indexes
approximately 80% of its $30 million equity portfolio - Bartlett, A California Pension
Fund Cuts The New York Umblical Cord, New York Times, 26 August 1990, at F. 12
col. I
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shareholders to sell off their shares and depress the market:
"Forces the coalition builders to narrow the field of potential
partners, thus further complicating the process of forming a
coaunon.:"
In conclusion, there may be important factors which make monitoring difficult
for institutions yet there are good reason for institutions to be active
investors. It is obvious that the option of exiting becomes problematic as
institutions increase their stakes in companies. In addition the potential buyer
of an institution's shares is likely to be another institution and with the latter's
full knowledge of the problems such a purchase is unlikely to happen.
D) GERMAN INSTITUTIONAL SHAREHOLDERS
Institutional investment in Germany is of a very distinctive nature Among the
categories of institutional holders already mentioned two are relevant to the
German scene - insurance companies and banks. Endowments are non-
existent, industrial foundations do not function as institutional investors,
pension and investment funds have very little importance." Although large
German insurance companies have had some impact on public companies
the most influential institutions have been the banks."
72. Black, B.S. and Coffee, J.C. (Jr), Hail Britannia?: Institutional Investors Behavior
Under Limited Regulation, 1994,92 Mich. L. Rev. 1997,2062
73. Baums T.H, Banks and Corporate Control, 1993, Universitat Osnabruck
Working Paper No 91-1, at 4
74. Roe M.J, Some Differences In Corporate Structure In German, Japan, and The
United States, 1993, 102 Yale Law Journal, 1927 at 1968.
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1. The Power Of German Banks
The background to the importance of German banks is that German
securities market has been underdeveloped for much of the post-war period.
This has given banks a position of influence since they constitute the largest
single external source of capital. 75 The relationship between banks and other
companies is normally a close-knit one. A bank's relationship with other
companies may involve the following:
1. Providing the whole range of commercial and investment bank services;
2. Representing shareholders in general meetings by the use of proxies;
3. Having representatives on a company's supervisory board; and
4. Holding a substantial block of a company's shares.
Being a large creditor of a company gives a bank the ability to exercise
control over management through the power to control the company's access
to credit" Until recently there have been considerable restraints on access
to external non-bank finance by companies in Germany. The issue of long-
term bonds was restricted by requirements under the issue authorisation
procedure. These requirements included obtaining prior approval of the
Federal Ministry of Economics before such bonds were made available."
75. Schneider-Lenne E.R, Corporate Control In Germany, 1992, 8(3) Oxford Review
of Economic Policy, 11 at 18
76 Although this is not absolute power since the company could always go to
another lender yet such a step would involve some cost of information acquisition to
be borneby the company seeking the loan.
77. Monthly Report of the Deutche Bundesbank, March 1992, 47
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Since debt finance constitutes a more important source of corporate finance
in Germany than equity the result is that banks, as the main providers of
capital, have additional influence to that attributable to ownership. This ability
to influence corporate policies has been said to give banks the incentives to
exercise active supervision in German companies. Consequently German
shareholders rely on institutional precautions as a means of exerting control
over corporate management. 78
The depository voting rights through which banks vote the shares held by
them for their customers, together with rights based on their own equity
holdings, provide them with large voting powers which also enable banks to
influence corporate policies." Another reason for the large equity holdings
by German banks is the close relationship with and encouragement by the
government. 80 The three largest banks have enjoyed the support of the
German government and are normally sure of being bailed out by it if
78. Baums T, Corporate Governance in Germany: The Role Of The Banks, 1992,
40 A. J. Compo L. 503 at 506 - states that German banks do classical banking
businesses in addition to organising rescue operations for companies in financial
distress, owning shares in companies and voting their clients share which together
gives them the incentive to monitor; See also Parkinson, JE. Corporate Power and
Responsibility, (1993), 170, Clarendon
79. The three largest German banks - commonly known as 'universal banks'
Deutsche Bank, Dresdner Bank and Commerz Bank have great influence over
German large companies - Buxbaum R.M., Institutional Owners And Corporate
Managers: A Comparative Perspective, 1991, 57 Brooklyn Law Review 1 ; Harm C,
The Relationship Between German Banks And Large German Firms, May 1992,
Policy Research Working Paper, World Bank, 9
80. Tilly, R. H. German Banking, 1850-1914 : Developmental Assistance For The
Strong, 1986, 15 J. Eur. Econ. Hist. 113
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something goes wronq." This support has given German banks the impetus
to take more risks than banks in the U. K. and U. S, holding large blocks of
shares, acting as lenders, sitting on the supervisory boards and voting as
proxies of other shareholders. On this Artus comments:
"My guess is that any conceivable increase in shareholder
activity will not ..... match that of the bank-based economies,
since share ownership unaccompanied by the additional
involvement in providing finance and other services will never
provide the depth of knowledge and commitment that arises
with the combination of banking and proprietary mterests.:"
2. Weaknesses Of The Bank-Based System
Although the view has been that German banks may be in a better position to
reduce mismanagement and fraud in their companies through active
supervision'" this idealised view is presently under serious doubt. The series
of corporate failures involving large banks, and the conflicting interests that
may occur when a German bank acts in its different capacities, have
portrayed the weaknesses of the bank system. These weaknesses have
81. Ibid at 117 where he discusses the involvement of German government in the
growth and infuence of German banks.
82. Artus R.E, Tension To Continue, in Creative Tension? 1990, Nat. Assn. of
Pension Funds Limited, 14
83. McCahery J., Picciotto S. and Scott C, (eds), Corporate Control and
Accountability, 1993, 17, Clarendon Press
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shaken the confidence of some of the enthusiasts for importing German
methods of corporate governance to the U. K. and U. S. The next part
highlights two aspects of the weaknesses inherent in the once much-praised
German bank-based system of corporate control.
a) Corporate Failures
Germany has experienced a number of major corporate crisis in recent years.
The problem appears to be that German institutions are very slow to act and
often wait until their companies are in crisis before they take steps to bail
them out or go to their rescue. The shock induced by the near-collapse of
Metallgesellschaft, the Frankfurt-based industrial group which came to the
brink of insolvency in January 1994 was amplified by the failure of the
Schneider property group in April of the same year."
In both cases the companies had close relationships with Deutsche Bank,
Germany'S biggest bank. While the Schneider case raised questions about
Deutsche's lending procedures, the Metallgesellschaft issue brought under
the spot-light the relationship between large banks and the companies in
which they hold large blocks of shares and on whose supervisory boards they
sit. Metallgesellschaft is owned by some of the most reputable institutional
holders including Deutsche Bank, Dresdner Bank, the Allianz insurance
84. Waller D., Frankfurts' Role Consolidated - Many Foreign Institutions Have
Boosted Their Frankfurt Operations, Meanwhile, Pressure For Reform Of The
Financial System Is Mounting, Financial Times, 31 May 1994, I
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group and Daimler-Benz. According to Eisenhammer :
"Together, Deutsche and Dresdner banks, Daimler-
Benz and Allianz own over 40% of Metallegellschaft.
The remaining big institutional shareholder is the
government of Kuwait, with 20%. Deutsche Bank is
also Metallegellschafts biggest creditor, to the tune of
OM 539 million". 85
Another serious crisis involved Daimler-Benz, then Germany's most important
engineering and aerospace group which lost OM 5.7 billion. At Daimler's
annual meeting in May 1996 Hilmar Kopper, who was the head of Daimler-
Benz's supervisory board and the chairman of Deutsche Bank, was sharply
criticised by shareholders for the fall of the company in which Deutsche Bank
owned a dominant 24.4% stake." In addition Klockner-Humboldt-Deutz, a
household name in German engineering in which Deutsche Bank has a
47.7% stake, was in a situation where its survival was threatened following
the discovery of an alleged multi-million pound fraud at a subsidiary - the
Humboldt Wedag plant construction unit. It was said that the alleged fraud
would have resulted in unexpected losses running to several hundred million
Marks." In the words of Tooher these:
"embarrassments for Deutsche and its chairman, Hilmar
Kopper, have raised doubts about the German system of
corporate governance. ,,88
85. Eisenhammer J, A Supervisory Board That Could See No Evil, Independent, 17
January 1994, 28
86. Rodgers P, German Boards Under Scrutiny, Independent, 31 May 1996, 24
87. Tooher P, Huge Fraud Discovery At Deutsche Bank Subsidiary, Independent,
29 May 1996, 16
88. Ibid.
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The idealised view of the German system is that bankers ensure that
company managers have the finance for long-term investment and are
shielded from the short-term pressures that stock markets bring to bear on
companies in the U.K. and U.S. They are deemed to exercise their influence
at various levels including sitting on supervisory boards, voting as proxies in
general meetings and supplying finance to the company. The reality is that
the mutual support that exists between banks and large companies results in
a closely-knit unit which sometimes closes corporate Germany to the outside
world. This sort of closed system harbours the danger of creating a cosiness
which prevents those who are meant to scrutinise and control from playing
that role effectively."
b) Conflict Of Interest
The question has been how far the different functions of German banks,
namely equity ownership, proxy voting and board membership, interfere with
the interests of other groups in the company. As already indicated, and in
addition to the above functions, the German banker issues loans to his
clients, underwrites their equity in financial markets and markets these claims
to the general public."? The result is three different areas which may bring
89. Eisenhammer J, A Supervisory Board That Could See No Evil, Independent, 17
January 1994, 28
90. Harm C, The Financing Of Small Firms In Germany, 1991, 35
105
about serious conflict of interests. With these other business interests to
consider banks are less likely to oppose management for fear of jeopardizing
those interests and their business relationship with the company.
This potential conflict of interests that may result from banks' multiple roles
may make it difficult for it to adequately represent its clientele since the
interest of a bank as a lender might not coincide with the interests of the
shareholders which it is representing. Commenting on this potential conflict
of interest Otto Lambsdorff, a leading member of the German Free
Democratic party stated :
"The position and influence enjoyed by banks on
supervisory boards is open to question as never
before, ..... They look after the company's capital
market issues, they advise on mergers and
acquisitions, and in some cases they own big share
stakes as well. Is it surprising that their judgment as
supervisory board members is c1ouded?,,91
With institutional investors being themselves quoted companies, it may also
be argued that institutions have good reasons for aligning themselves with
the management of the companies that they have invested for fear of certain
practices, which they themselves use, becoming unacceptable
In addition, the involvement of large banks in detailed discussions with
management, in their capacity as institutional shareholders, can bring up the
91. Waller 0, A Giant Burnt By Hot Metal : Metallgesellschaft's Ills Highlights The
Failings Of Germany's System Of Corporate Governance, Financial Times, 24
January 1994, 13
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issue of inequality of treatment of shareholders. The information and
knowledge obtained by the participating institutions make them insiders who
may take advantage of the ignorance of other shareholders that do not have
access to such information. Apart from the issue of insider trading this can
lead to a conflict between their interests and those of other shareholders.
3. Moves To Limit Bank Holdings In Other Companies
The interwoven relationships between German banks and industrial
companies that many have admired as a model of corporate governance is
now under review. Investors are of the view that, even with the amount of
power that German banks have, they have not used their powers effectively. 92
There have been proposals to limit the amount of equity that German Banks
can hold in other companies to 5%B3 Along these lines some German states
have introduced legislation aimed at limiting the powers of banks." Apart
from a more developed stock market, foreign banks have now increased their
92. Parkes C, German Poll Finds Little Love for Banks, Fin. Times, Aug. 25, 1994,
19
93. Reuter, German Banks Under Fire, Fin. Times, Sept. 28, 1994, 2 states that
Chancellor Helmut Kohl was concern about the complains of small companies that
big banks were too powerful and on that basis wanted to limit bank holding and their
representation on company boards; Also Chernoff, J. German Banks May Face
New RUles, Pension and Investment, May 2, 1994, 42, asserts that investors believe
that restricting the role of the banks would be a welcomed change.
94. The Bonn parliament introduced a legislation to this effect on the ze" of
September 1997 - Norman P., German Banks Under Fire, Fin. Times, Sept 27,
1997, 3
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businesses in Germany, giving corporate customers better opportunities of
doing business more cheaply with other banks and raising money on the
stock market. Stating this position Fisher writes:
Shareholders are becoming less willing to accept the kind of
return on equity and dividends that German banks have
historically produced. Deutsche has led the way in adopting
international accounting standards, which give banks less
freedom to hide profits and reserves." 95
CONCLUSION
So far the United States has not achieved the level of oversight of corporate
managers by major institutions that is obtainable in the United Kingdom. In
the United Kingdom banks, insurance companies and pension funds have not
only increased their shareholding in recent times, but have become active in
companies that they have invested in.96 This level of concentration and
cohesion by institutions found in the United Kingdom has been inhibited in
the United States by the enactment of laws which limit the ability of large
financial institutions from holding concentrated blocks of shares. Even if U.S.
institutions desired to be more active in their interventionist role the prevalent
obstacles would inhibit continuous monitoring on a significant level.
95. FisherA. , German Banking and Finance: Institutions Face A Painful Transition,
Fin. Times, May 29, 1996,4
96. Denis, D.J. and Denis D.K., Majority Owner-Managers and Organisational
Efficiency, 1994, 1 Journal of Corporate Finance, 91, 102-5; See also Jackson,T.,
The Institutions Get Militant, Fin. Times, June 11, 1991, 18;
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Despite the lack of legal restrictions in the United Kingdom institutional
activism is sometimes constrained by the costs associated with forming and
maintaining shareholder coalitions. As a result United Kingdom institutions
are, comparatively, less involved in monitoring and determining board
composition than their counterparts in the bank-based German system."
Oversight is deemed to be more thoroughly undertaken by German banks
when compared to U.K. and U.S. due to their roles as both equity holders and
lenders. Institutional investors in the Anglo-American system, therefore, lack
the incentives enjoyed by German banks which flow from their multiple roles.
German banks may acquire and hold shares in non-bank companies as there
are no rules comparable to the United States Glass-Steagall Act or the Bank
Holding Act which limit shareholding by certain institutions.
The practice of appointing institutional representatives to corporate boards is
not as common under the Anglo-American system as it is in Germany. The
present emphasis on non-executive directors, who are generally selected by
and owe their tenure to the rnanaqement" cannot be equated with this and
does not solve the problem of monitoring management indiscretion.
97. Parkinson is of the view that the key factor which may move German banks to
exercise an active ownership role is their stable long-term interests which is
reinforced by their multifaceted functions. In comparison U.K. institutions have a
much more limited relationship with their portfolio companies - Parkinson, J.E.,
Corporate Power And Responsibility, 1993, 171, Clarendon Press
98. Chapter Five on Board Structure and Shareholders Representation On
Corporate Boards discussesthis position.
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Through representation on the supervisory boards German institutional
shareholders are supposed to have a formal channel for intervention. They
are, however, slow to act with the result that intervention is only undertaken
when a client is in serious trouble. On this basis it has been stated that the
banks are too relaxed and cosy in their different roles that they fail to see a
crisis coming until it actually arrives."
These different limitations on the ability of institutional shareholders to
intervene in the affairs of their companies have brought about some level of
convergence in institutional behaviour and attitude. Vocal shareholder
activism, the American style of intervention, is now being increasingly used in
the United Kingdom. 10G In addition, United Kingdom institutions have
observed their United States counterpart's insistence on audit committees
and the dominance of independent, outside directors on the boards and are
now pressing for similar changes in U. K. companies.'?' On their part, U S
Institutions are now following the example of their counterparts in the U.K. to
insist on the separation of the positions of chairman of the board and the
chief executive officer. 102
99. Harm, C. supra at note 79 at p, 12
100. Miles R, Stirrings of Activism In The United Kingdom, Summer, 1993,.
Georgeson Rep., 3, Georgeson & Co., New York,
101. Oxford Analytica Ltd., Board Of Directors And Corporate Governance: Trends
In The G7 Countries Over The NextTen Years, 1992,62
102. Fuchsberg G, Chief Executives See Their Power Shrink, Wall Street Journal,
15 March 1993, at B1.
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There have also been attempts by German banks to limit their holdings in
individual companies thus reducing the excessive powers exercised by such
banks. According to Ellen Schneider-Lenne, a member of Deutsche Bank's
management board, who is also on the boards of l.C.'. and Morgan Glenfell
in the United Kingdom, German companies are now learning from the
practices of Anglo-Saxon institutional holders and company boards. 103
103. See Views From City Road: Why Germans Are Offered British Role Model,
Independent, 10 February 1994 at 40.
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CHAPTER FOUR
APPOINTMENT AND REMOVAL OF DIRECTORS:
THE LEGAL AND REGULATORY FRAMEWORK
A) INTRODUCTION
Early capitalism consisted typically of entrepreneurs who ran their own
businesses1. In the more recent past there has been the growth of publicly-
quoted companies and the tendency towards dispersed ownership of shares
with a consequent weakening of the links between ownership and control of
companies. 2 With management pO'N8rs being exercisable by directors,
shareholders have very little influence over the day-to-day running of their
company. In an attempt to give back to shareholders some level of control
over the management of their funds, regulations and statutes have vested in
them the powers to appoint and remove directors.3
1. Fried, V. and Hisrich, R., The Venture Capitalist: A Relationship Investor, 1995,
3712, California Management Review, 101, 109
2. For a discussion of separate objectives of management and shareholders see
Dimsdale, N.H., The Need to Restore Corporate Accountability: An Agenda For
Reform, in Dimsdale and Prevezer, Capital Market and Corporate Governance
(eds), 1994, 17, Clarendon Press
3. Tricker argues that the most fundamental right of shareholders in terms of the
traditional legal model is the right to elect the board of directors to serve and protect
their interest- Tricker, R.I., International Corporate Governance, 1994, 10, Prentice
Hall
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Shareholders' role in corporate control is exercisable by them collectively
through their right to vote. Their voting rights should provide them with some
protection against the abuse of managerial indiscretion by enabling them to
remove directors with whom they are dissatisfied. The potential power of
shareholders' voting rights underlies the so-called 'market for corporate
control" which is supposed to neutralise the discretionary powers exercisable
by corporate management.
For a meaningful discussion of the powers of the general meeting to appoint
and remove directors a discussion of the statutory and regulatory rules
becomes necessary. This chapter will examine the provisions which entitle
shareholders to appoint and remove directors in the U.K, U.S. and Germany.
B) APPOINTMENT AND REMOVAL OF DIRECTORS UNDER U.K. LAW
The current legislative frame'NOrk is to be found in the Companies Act 1985
as amended by the Companies Act 1989. These are based on earlier Acts
4. This theory posits that shareholders influence the board of directors and the
management of their company through the ability to sell their shares thereby
lowering the value of their company shares. A company's management has good
reason to be concern if the share prices go down as such developments would
encourage threats of take-over and the adverse publicity that goes with it. -
Bradley, Corporate Control: Markets and Rules, (1990) 53 MLR 170; Coffee, J.C.,
RegUlating The Market for Corporate Control: A Critical Assessment of the Tender
Offer's Role in Corporate Governance, 1984, 84 Colum L. Rev. 1145; Parkinson,
J.E., Corporate Power And Responsibility, 1993, 119, Clarendon Press
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which date back to the 1844 Joint Stock Companies Registration Act.
1. Power To Appoint Directors
At formation the incorporators have to deliver to the registrar of companies a
list of the persons that are to be the first directors of the company with the
memorandum of assoclatlon." The statement is required to be signed by or on
behalf of the subscribers to the memorandum. The persons nominated to act
as first directors are required to sign the statement to show their consent to
the appolntmsnt" Subsequent to the incorporation of a company, the
Companies Act has very little to say about the appointment of directors and
the matter is left mostly to the articles of companies.
a) Appointment By The General Meeting
Table A article 78 empowers the general meeting of shareholders to appoint
directors by passing an ordinary resolution. Where the general meeting of a
public company is to appoint more than one director to the board they must
be voted for individually otherwise the resolution will be void7. This power of
5. Section 10(2)(a) Companies Act 1985
6. Section 10(3) Companies Act 1985
7. Section 292 Companies Act 1985
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appointment as given by article 78 is to be exercised for the benefit of the
company as a whole and not to secure a personal advantage. This fiduciary
duty imposed on shareholders introduces a clear contrast to the old position
where the right to vote at general meeting was regarded as a right of property
which a shareholder could exercise in his own interests even where they
conflicted with those of the company.
Walton, J. had stated the old position succinctly in Northern Countries
Securities Ltd v. Jackson and Steeple Ltd8 thus:
"when a shareholder is voting for or against a particular
resolution he is voting as a person owing no fiduciary duty to
the company and who is exercising his own right of property to
vote as he thinks fit. The fact that the result of the voting at the
meeting will bind the company cannot affect the position that in
voting, he is voting simply in exercise of his own property
. ht ..9ng s .
The present position is, however, that in exercising their powers the majority
shareholders must, within the broad limits, exercise them for the benefit of the
company as a vvhole and not to secure some ulterior advantage.10
The provisions of article 78 aim at vesting in the general meeting an inherent
power to appoint directors thus giving it the ability
8. {1974} 1 W.L.R. 1133
9. At p. 1144
10. The majority shareholders are sometimes constrained to act bona fide in the
common interest, examples are when altering the articles or varying class rights.
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to determine the composition of the board. One is, however, tempted to ask
why such an important matter is not made a provision in the statute? Why is
this power, as given to shareholders, left to be regulated by the articles when
a company has the discretion to decide not to be regulated by the standard
form articles of Table A or to have a completely different clause in its articles
of association?
b) Appointment By The Board
There are two instances when the power to appoint a director can be
exercised by the board - when a casual vacancy occurs on the board and
where the board has not achieved the required minimum number of members.
i. Filling Of Casual Vacancies By The Board
Corporate directors are entitled to co-opt directors to fill casual vacancies.
Fry J. in Munster v. Cammell C011 defined a casual vacancy as" Any vacancy
in the office of directors arising other than through retirement by rotation.n In
York Tramways Co. Ltd v. Willows 12 Coleridge C.J. observed that a casual
vacancy is "any vacancy not occurring by death, resignation or bankruptcy".
11. (1882) 21 Ch. D 183 at 187
12. (1882) 8 Q B D 686 at 694
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A vacancy on the board which occurs other than by the regular expiration of a
director's term of office will be deemed a casual vacancy. Where a casual
vacancy is not filled before a general meeting it may be filled then, and if not,
the power remains with the board of directors·13
At first glance the provision dealing with the filling of vacancies by directors
appears to be simply one of technical interest. In reality it is extremely
significant for management or any other group seeking to strengthen its
control over a company. A regulation of this kind has the effect of preventing
shareholders from exercising their right to appoint directors to the board. It
may be that the directors' terms have not yet expired or that the next
shareholders' meeting for the removal of old and appointment of new
directors will only take place after a certain period. In such situations the use
of directors' power, under the articles, to fill vacancies will be called into play.
The normal practice is that at a subsequent meeting the shareholders will
simply confirm the appointment with the effect that shareholders are deprived
of the power to actually determine the calibre of persons appointed to sit on
their boards.
One of the techniques used by directors to ensure that this power is actually
exercised by them is by getting their colleagues on the board to retire
13. Munster v. Cammell Co. (1882) 21 Ch 0 183
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mid-term or long before a general meeting is due hence giving themselves
the opportunity to fill the vacancy". This practice enables existing directors to
have control over the future composition of the board. The justification that
has been offered for this is that directors must act collectively as a board in
the management of the company and that the board usually operates better if
it is a group of like-minded and compatible individuals15.
ii. Appointment Of Additional Directors By The Board
Under U.K. law directors are normally vested with the power to appoint
additional directors by the arnctes." Where the articles of a company entrust
directors with this power even the general meeting cannot usurp the power.
In Blair Open Hearth Furnace Co.v. Reigart17 the company's articles of
association provided that the directors may from time to time appoint
additional directors, but so that the total number of directors shall not exceed
the prescribed maximum. Eve, J. held that by the provision of that article the
power of appointing additional directors had been divested from the general
meeting and entrusted in the board of directors.
14. Mercer D., IBM: How The Wor1d's Most Successful Corporation Is Managed,
(1987), 15-18, ( Kogan Page, London); Clinnard, M.B., Corporate Corruption: The
Abuse of Power, 1990,21-24, Praeger.
15. Zimmers Ltd v. Zimmer [ 1951] WN 600
16. Art. 79 of Companies (Tables A - F) Regulations 1985
17. (1913) 29 LTR 449.
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The position with regard to the appointment of additional directors is,
therefore, that once a company is regulated by article 79 or an equivalent
article, the power to appoint additional directors, to meet the required
minimum will be exerciseable by the board of directors. The general meeting
can only override this power as conferred on the directors by way of a special
resolution for purposes of altering the articles.
There are, however, two exceptional situations when this power can be
exercised by the general meeting:
a) Where the power could not be exercised by the directors owing to
dissension or deadlock on the board. In Barron v. Potter18 Warrington J.
decided that where a board was unwilling to exercise a power to appoint
additional directors, the company had power to do so in general meeting.
b) Where the power to appoint additional directors is a concurrent power to
be exercised either by the board of directors or the general meeting of
shareholders. 19
18. [1914] 1 Ch 895
19. In WorcesterCorsetry Ltd v. Witting [1936] Ch. 640, the articles of a company
gave a concurrent power to both the board of directors and the general meeting of
shareholders. Distinguishing this case from Blair's case the court held that the
power of appointing additional directors had not been delegated to the board
to the exclusion of the general meeting.
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2. Shareholders' Power To Remove Directors Under U.K. Law
Prior to the passage of Section 184 of the Companies Act 1948 shareholders
were not able to remove a director by an ordinary resolution before the
expiration of his term of office unless the company's Articles of Association
made provisions for their removal. It was common at the time for companies
to provide in their articles for life directors, and permanent directors who
could only be removed by an alteration of the articles. That position was
altered in 1948 by Section 184(1)20 which provided inter alia:
"A company may by ordinary resolution remove a director
before the expiration of his period of office, notwithstanding
anything in its articles, or in any agreement beMieen it and him."
This provision was introduced pursuant to the recommendations of the Cohen
Committee that shareholders should be given "greater powers to remove
directors with whom they are dissatisfied,,21. This was one of the means by
which the Cohen Committee hoped to grant shareholders some measure of
control over the management of their companies. The intention of the
provision was to prevent articles of companies from making directors
irremovable and to render impossible the appointment of life directors.
Section 303 of the Companies Act 1985 which replaced S.184 of the 1948
Act, has continued the task of its predecessor by giving shareholders the
20. Companies Act 1948
21. The Cohen Committee Report (Cmnd 6659,1945) para 130
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right to remove their directors by simply passing an ordinary resolution 22.
There are, however, a number of ways by which directors can avoid the effect
of this section. The following indicate the difficulties that shareholders can
face when they wish to exercise their rights under this provision.
a) The 'Just And Equitable' Winding-Up (Section 122(1)(g)
Insolvency Act 1986)
A serious check on the exercise of shareholders' power to remove directors
under Section 303 is the provision of Section 122(1)(g) of the Insolvency Act
1986. This subsection enables a winding-up order to be made if "the court is
of the opinion that it is just and equitable that the company should be wound
up." The effect of this is that if a company has been set up and developed by
a small group of people, the founders have an equitable interest in
participating in the management of its business.
This affects shareholders' power of removal under Section 303 in that a court
may order a winding-up on the ground that it just and equitable to do so even
though it has no jurisdiction to declare a resolution for the removal of a
director invalid.
22. Seethe provisions of Section 303 Companies Act 1985
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A court can wind..up a company in these circumstances if it believes that the
company in question was incorporated and operated as a quasi-partnership.
If the court finds that the relationship, which is so important to the continued
existence of the company, has completely broken down it may order its
winding up, thus subjecting the exercise of legal rights to equitable
considerations.
This principle was considered in this specific context in the case of Ebrahimi
v. Westboume Galleries Ltd23. In that case a minority shareholder, the
appellant, was removed from office by a resolution passed by the general
meeting. The appellant petitioned the court for a winding..up order on the just
and equitable ground. Granting the order in the court of first instance
Plowman J stated:
" ... it is an abuse of power and a breach of the good faith which
partners owe to each other to exclude one of them from all
participation in the business upon which they have embarked
on the basis that all should participate in its management. ,,24
Russell L.J., in the Court of Appeal, reversing that decision pointed out that
the exclusion of a director from participation in the management and conduct
of company's business does not form a ground for holding it just and
equitable that the company be wound-up,
23. [1972] 2 AER 492
24. [1970] 1 WLR 1378 at 1389
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The House of Lords reversed the decision of the Court of Appeal holding that
a petition to wind the company up on the just and equitable ground would
succeed if the petitioning director could show that the business was operated
on the understanding that he would be entitled to participate in its
management. It found that although the shareholders had acted within their
legal rights in removing Ebrahimi, since the company was formed on the
basis that they were to have joint participation in its management, the only
just and equitable course was to wind-up the company. The position is,
therefore, that if members of a private, quasi-partnership type of company
pass a resolution under Section 303 to remove a director they run the risk of
a dissolution of the company under this subsection.
This approach by the House of Lords has been followed in Re A and BC
Chewing Gum Ltd.25 Here the minority shareholder was entitled, under the
articles and by virtue of a separate shareholders' agreement, to appoint one
director to the board but the majority refused to give effect to the
appointment. Plowman J., relying on Ebrahimi's case, held that the company
should be wound-up as the majority had repudiated the minority's right to
participate in the management of the company, a right which was the
underlying basis in the formation of the company.26
25. [1975] 1All ER 1017,
26. A more recent application of the Ebrahimi principles is to be found in ReZinotty
Properties Ltd [1984] 3 All ER 754, where the courtfound as evidence of breach of
the ~equired trust and confidence, among other things, that A had not been
appointed as a director as he wasentitled to expect.
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b) Unfairly Prejudicial Conduct (Section 459 CA 1985)
Section 459 of the Companies Act 1985 which can be traced to Section 210
of the 1948 Companies Act has itself been amended by the Companies Act
1989. Section 459, as amended, provides:
"A member of a company may apply to the court by petition for
an order under this Part on the ground that the Company's
affairs are being or have been conducted in a manner which is
unfairly prejudicial to the interests of its members generally or
some part of the members or that any actual or proposed act or
omission of the company (including any act or omission on its
behalf) is or would be so prejudicial. ,,27
The use of the word "unfairly" in Section 459 enables the court to have
regard to some equitable considerations in the same way as the House of
Lords did in Ebrahimi's case. In Re Posgate and Denby (Agencies) Ltd28 the
court emphasised that the concept of unfair prejudice in Section 459 enables
the court to take into consideration not only the rights of the members under
the company's constitution, but also their legitimate expectations arising from
agreements and understanding of the members inter se.
27. Amended by CA 1989, 5ch 19, para 11. It replaces the previous requirement
which was that the conduct had to be prejudicial to the interests of some part of the
members.
28. [1987] BC LC 8
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This section is concerned with the interests of members in their capacity as
members." In an attempt to identify the interest of members in a particular
situation the courts will take into account the relationships, rights, obligations
and expectations of the parties involved. In Re Sam Weller & Sons Ltd,30
Peter Gibson J. observed that the word 'interests' is wider than a term such
as 'rights'. In that case the petitioners complained that the company had not
increased its dividend in 37 years despite having been prosperous in recent
years. In 1985, out of the net profits of over £36,000, it had paid out only
£2,520 in dividends. The court ruled that the non-payment of dividends
constituted unfairly prejudicial conduct. In Re a Companv. ex p Schwacz ( No.
2),31 the court stated that:
II the relevant interests are the interests of members (including
the petitioners) as members, but such interests are not
necessarily limited to strict legal rights under the company's
constitution and the court may take into account wider equitable
considerations such as a member has which go beyond his
legal rights."32
29. In Re A Company [1986] BCLC 382, failure by the directors to advise
shareholders impartially regarding two competing take-over bids was held to
constitute unfairly prejudicial conduct
30. [ 1990] en 682,
31. [1989] BCLC 427
32. Ibid at p. 437
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Section 459, therefore, protects legitimate expectations which are based on
an informal agreement among all the members and not provided for in the
articles. A range of expectations may be protected through the use of this
section. The most common one is where the petitioner had expected to have
a continuous involvement in the management of the company by sitting on
the board. For a court to uphold such an expectation there has to be a clear
demonstration of an agreement or informal arrangement which is outside the
provisions of the articles.33
Under the old section 210 of the Companies Act 1948 a petitioner who
complained of removal from the board and exclusion from management was
not entitled to any relief since he was not oppressed 'qua member' as was the
requirement under that sectiorr" Since Section 459 has no such limitation a
petitioner who now makes the same complaints may obtain a relief under this
section. The position will, however, vary greatly from small private or family
companies to the large public companies since a small family company would
have been formed or continued on the basis of a personal relationship
involving mutual confidence and understanding.
33. Re Saul D. Harrison & Sons pIc [ 1995] 1 BCLC 14 at 19; Re Posgate and
Denby (Agencies) ltd [ 1987] BCLC 8; Currie v. Cowdenbeath Football Club Ltd
[1992] BCLC 1029
34. Re Lundie Bros ltd, [1965] 2 All E R 692; See also Re London School of
Electronics ltd. [ 1972 ] 2 A.C. 165
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c) Directors' Compensation And Remuneration
Another limiting factor on the power of the general meeting to remove a
director under Section 303 is the provision that the section shall not deprive a
director of any claim for compensation or damages in respect of the
termination. Section 303(5)35 provides that where an executive director has a
service contract with the company and he is removed in breach of that
contract, the provision of the law which enables the general meeting to
remove him will not prevent him from suing to claim damages for breach of
contract.
The provision of this subsection was upheld in Southern Foundries (1926)
Ltd v. Shirlaw and Fowler Commercial Timber Company.38 The main question
was whether the removal of the managing director who was appointed by the
board under a service contract for a specific period constituted a breach of
his contract which entitled him to claim damages.37 Where, on the other hand,
a director does not have a separate service contract and was appointed
under the articles, he will not be entitl.ed to recover damages on removal
35. Section 303(5) Companies Act 1985
36. [1930] 3 KB 1
37. Also Shindler v. Northem Raincoat Co. Ltd, [1960] 2 All E R 239 which followed
the decision in Shirlaw's case
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from the board."
The provision of Section 303(5)39 constitutes a serious restraint on
shareholders' pO'N6r to remove directors in that in removing directors before
the expiration of their term, members are taking the risk of imposing on their
company liabilities for damages in breach of contract. Since directors
actually appoint the executives and fix the terms of their contracts, members
may later find that directors have entrenched themselves by contracts of
service with the result that the company has to pay exorbitantly if members
exercise their pO'N6r under Section 303.
Knowledge of the huge damages that may be payable by the company in the
event of such a director being removed from the board may constitute
sufficient deterrence to shareholders. Even with the present requirements
that directors' service contracts are to be available for inspection by
rnernoers" and that contracts which exceed five years must be given prior
38. In Read v. Astoria Garage (Streatham) Ltd, [1952] Ch 637, one of the
company's artides stated that the directors may appoint the managing director for
such term and at such remuneration as they thought fit. His appointment was to be
subject to termination by the company. Read was appointed managing directorand
seventeen years laterwas removed from the board. It was held that he had no claim
for damages.
39. Companies Act 1985
40. Section 318 CA 1985
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approval by the general meeting41, by controlling the voting machinery such
an approval would not be difficult to obtain.
i) Statutory Controls
To avert any abuses that may flow from the exercise of directors' power to fix
the remuneration of the executive members, the Companies Act requires
every company to keep a copy of each director's service contract at an
appropriate place." Where a director has no written contract a written
memorandum of the terms on which the director serves must be kept.43
Members of the company may inspect copies of directors' service contracts or
memoranda of terms of service without any charge. 44 Where inspection is
refused the court may order it to be allowed. 45 In addition, Section 31946
requires that shareholder approval must be obtained for any provision
whereby a director is to be employed for a period which exceeds five
41. Section 319 CA 1985; The Cadbury's Report recommends that such contracts
should not exceed three years - para 4.41 of that Report.
42. Section 318 (1)(a) & (3) of the Companies Act 1985; Appropriate places for this
purpose are the company's registered office, the place where its register of
members is kept, or its principal place of business, where that is situated in that part
of Great Britain in which the company is registered.
43. Section 318 (1) (b); There is no requirement for a copy or a memorandum to be
keptwhere a contract is for a durationof less than 12 months - Section318(11).
44. Section 318(7)
45. Section 318(9)
46. Companies Act 1985
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years without being terminable by the company or terminable only in
specified circumstances. Where shareholder approval is sought a
memorandum of the proposed agreement has to be made available for
inspection by members, without a charge, at the company's registered office
for at least 15 days before the meeting and during the meeting.47
Where approval is not obtained in contravention of this section the
agreement will be terminable by the company giving reasonable notice." This
section does not prohibit lengthy service contracts but simply subjects them
to the approval of the company in general meeting. Where the directors are
also the shareholders in a private company this section will not be in issue as
the member-directors will simply decide from time to time how much to pay
themselves. Recent occurrences have proved these statutory controls to be
inadequate.49 1994 saw more publicity of these practices \\'hen directors'
remuneration, especially those of the privatized utilities, raised public
concerns. The directors of those companies awarded themselves generous
salaries and stock option packages in the face of redundancies, salary
47. Section 319(5)
48. Section 319(6)
49. Sheikh, Curbing Top Pay Bonanza, 1995, Co. Law 117; Major Set To Tackle
Executive PayDeals, Daily Tel., Mar. 1, 1995, p.1
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cuts and dismissals of some of their employeesSO
ii) The Contribution of the Greenbury Committee
As a result of public outcry against these practices by top directors the
government set up a 'study group' chaired by Sir Richard Greenbury with a
term of reference:
" to identify good practice in determining directors' remuneration
and prepare a Code of such practice for use by U.K. PLCsn51
One of the important recommendations of this study group is that companies
should replace share option schemes with payment in shares to directors
whose company meets financial and share-price targets as they are likely to
align directors' compensation with corporate performance52. Another
important recommendation is that which requires all U.K. listed companies to
establish remuneration committees consisting exclusively of non-executive
50. The Great Utility Scandal, Times, Feb.S, 1995, p.16; House of Commons
Employment Committee, Third Report: The Remuneration of Directors and Chief
Executiveof Privatized Utilities, (1995), para 23, n. 85
51. StUdy Group on Directors' remuneration - Report and Code of Best Practice,
(1995), Greenbury Report, London: Gee & Co.
52. Para. 4.4 of the Greenbury Report; See also Lewis, W., Directors Tips Too
Generous For Investors, Fin. Times, Aug. 6, 1996,6
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directors.53 These remuneration committees would determine both the
company's general remuneration policy and the pay packages of individual
executive directors.
Although the Greenbury Report aimed to subject the determination of
executive remuneration to an acceptable yardstick, the effect has not yet
been felt. Despite moves by companies to set up remuneration committees, it
has been noted that there is still a significant executive presence on such
committees.54In addition the non-executives, 'Nho are supposed to man these
committees, are often executive directors of other companies and may not be
stricter in their role of formulating directors' remuneration policies than they
would be 'Nhen tackling other policy decisions as board members. The result
is that the executive directors still have an upper hand in determining their
own pay and this is not always linked to the performance of a company. In
this regard the issue of executive compensation 'Nhen removing directors
with long-term contracts and large remuneration packages still remains a
burning issue.
53. Para 4.8 of the Greenbury Report; The Code of Practice produced by this
committee appears as an annex to the Stock Exchange's Listing Rules and para
12.43(w) of the Listing Rules now requires listed companies incorporated in the U.K.
to state in the annual report whether they have complied with Section A of the Code
and to "explain and justify" any area of non-compliance.
54. Conyon emphasizes that for those companies with remuneration committees
executive directors are still appointed to sit on them with the result that members of
remuneration committees could be dominated by the executives who may make
decisions that are in management rather than shareholders interests.- Conyon, M.J.,
Institutional Arrangements For Setting Directors' Compensation In U.K. Companies,
in .Keasey, Thompson and Wright, Corporate Governance, 1997, 112, Oxford
University Press.
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3. Removal Of Directors By The Board For Reasonable Cause
The articles of a company may provide for dismissal of a director without
special notice55• It is common for the articles to provide that a director can be
removed by the board for reasonable cause. In Inderwick v. 8nell,56 the court
held that the expression reasonable cause refers to any cause deemed
reasonable at the time and that the court had no jurisdiction to interfere. 57
C) APPOINTMENT AND REMOVAL OF DIRECTORS IN THE U.S.
1. Appointment Of Directors
In the absence of any provision in the charter of a company or the general
law, the general meeting of shareholders has the inherent power to appoint
directors annually.58 In jurisdictions following the Model Business Corporation
Act directors are appointed at the first annual general meeting and at each
55. Special notice means that the person intending to move a resolution is required
to give the company at least 28 days notice before the meeting at which the
resolution is to be moved - Section 379(1) Companies Act 1985.
56. (1850) 19 L J Ch 542,
57. See also Lee v. Chou Wen Hsien [1984] 1 WLR 1202.
58. S.8.03(d) RMBCA 1984. In the Utah case of Hinckley v. Swaner, 13 Utah 2d
93, 366 P 2d 709, it was held that the appointment of directors is a right to which
shareholders are entitled, and a court has no power to preclude shareholders from
the full exercise of such a right.
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annual general meeting subsequently unless their terms are staggered.59
The directors of a private company are generally appointed in accordance
with the procedure of nomination and vote at general meetings, in the
absence of contrary provisions in a charter or by-law.
The by-law may provide that the directors be divided into t'NO or more classes
whose terms of office shall respectively expire at different times.eo A company
can be precluded by its by-laws from appointing directors where it has not
fulfilled certain legal requirements such as presenting the annual accounts,
ceasing to do business or becoming insolvent."
a) Initial Directors
The Revised Model Business Corporation Act, 1984 provides that the names
and addresses of the initial board members are to be stated in the articles of
incorporation and such persons are to hold office until the first annual general
meeting at which their successors are appointed.62
59. See s.8.03 Rev. Model Business Corporation Act 1984; s.10-2A-58 Ala. Code
1987; Ss.33-314 and 33-315 Conn. Gen. Stat. 1987; Chap. 32, para 8.10 III Rev
Stat. 1993; Ss.23-1-33-3 to 23-1-335 Ind. Code 1989; and 5.79-4-8.03 Miss. Code
Ann 1989. A staggered board is one which is divided into several groups or classes
with the term of office of each class expiring at different annual meetings.
60. Solomon, L.D. and Palmiter, A. R., Corporations, 1994, 182, Little Brown
61. The Michigan case of Bruun v. Cook, 280 Mich. 484, 273 NW 774 upheld this
position.
62. Section 8.05(a) Revised Model Business Corporation Act 1984
134
Most jurisdictions in the United States have similar provtsions'"
b) Subsequent Directors
Subsequently the board is elected by the shareholders who have voting
rights. The usual term provided by State Statutes is one year or until another
board is chosen and takes office. The majority of statutes provide that,
unless the articles or by-laws provide otherwise, the directors need not be
shareholders in their company.64 There seems to be a move by most of the
states towards statutory provisions on classified directors. The operation of
this system is such that if there are nine directors, for example, the first three
may be appointed for three years, the second three for two years and the last
three for one year. To this effect the Ohio Gen. Corporation Law provides:
''The articles or the regulations may provide for the
classification of directors into either two or three classes
consisting of not less than three directors each, and that the
terms of office of the several classes need not be uniform,
except that no term shall exceed the maximum period (three
years) specified in division (A) of this section."65
63. See for examples 8.1D-2A-58, Ala. Code (1987); 8.10.06 453d Alaska Stat.
(1989); 8.4-27-805Ark. Code Ann. (1990); Cal. Corp. Code 8.301,1990.
64. An example is 8.371, MaineGen. Corp. Law 1992
65. Section 1701-578 Ohio Revised Code (1986 8uppl.).
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In the absence of provisions to the contrary, the power to appoint directors is
in the shareholders provided that the company is doing business and has the
authority to issue shares.66 In some states failure to pay dividend to
preference shareholders will entitle that class to elect a certain number of
directors to the board. In the Delaware case of Petroleum Rights Corporation
v. Midland Royalty Corporation67, it was held that failure to pay dividend as
provided in the certificate of incorporation gave preference shareholders the
right to elect a certain number of directors.
c) Vacancies On The Board Of Directors
Under statutory authority by-laws are usually adopted that provide for the
filling of vacancies which occur on the board and the general provision of
such by-laws is that vacancies shall be filled by the board of directors68. If the
statute authorizes the board of directors to fill vacancies, the board may
accept the resignation of a director and elect a successor" and may also
66. In the Alabama case of Holcomb v. Forsyth, 216 Ala 486, 113 So 516, the court
emphasized that the right to control the election of members of the board is a right
inherent in majOrityownership of shares.
67.19 Del. Ch. 334, 167 A 835.
68. An example is S.223(a) Del. Code Ann (1991).
69. Seal of Gold Min. Company v. Slater, 161 Cal. 621,120 P 15
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elect a new director where the number falls below the minimum fixed7D. This
right as vested in the board of directors, to select corporate officers cannot be
precluded by a shareholders' agreemene1.
The by-law will normally provide that any vacancy on the board of directors,
whether arising through death, resignation, removal or through an increase of
the number of directors of any class, shall be filled by a majority vote of the
remaining directors". There are however instances vvhen the courts have
given shareholders the power to fill such vacancies. In Bverly v. Camey73 the
Texan Civil Appeal Court held that where directors, who had power to select
successors, died without making the selection the shareholders had the
power to fill the vacancy.74
70. Wright v. First National Bank, 52 NJ Eq 392, 28 A 719.
71. In the New York case of Schmidt v. Magnetic Head Corporation, 97 App. Div.
2d 151,468 NYS 2d 649 despite the contention of shareholders who owned 45.8%
of the company's shares that they were entitled to select at least one-third of the
board of directors during the existence of a particular shareholder agreement, it was
held that such an agreement was inconsistentwith the authority vested in the board
of directors by statute and therefore ineffective for that purpose.
72. Homac Inc. v. DSA Fin, Corp., 661 F Supp 776
73. 180 Tex. 2d 831 (App)
74. In the case of Burr v. Burr Corp.,SO the Delaware court, construing Section 223
of the Delaware Code Ann tit 8 (1991) emphasized that since the by-laws so
permitted, shareholders had the power to fill vacancies on the board of directors if
directors remaining in office failed to exercise this power within 60 days.
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In addition, vacancies occurring on the board by reason of the removal of
directors without cause may only be filled by shareholders unless the articles
or by-laws provide that the vacancy should be filled by the board. Modern
statutes often give the board of directors the power to appoint new members
to its body upon the death or resignation of a director75. The new member is
normally appointed to serve until the next annual general meeting when
directors will be appointed.
2. Removal Of Directors
Under U. S. law whether a director can be removed before the end of his or
her term of office is a question governed by the company's charter, the by-
laws, applicable shareholder agreements and the local business corporation
statutes". Company statutes of several states provide that any officer or
agent may be removed by the board of directors whenever, in its judgment,
the best interests of the company will be served but the removal shall be
without prejudice to the contract rights, if any, of the person so removed".
75. See for example S.705(b) NY Business Corporation Law (1986)
76. Springut v. Don & Bob Restaurants of America, Inc., 57 AD2d 302, 394 NY52d
971.
77. Section 10-051 Ariz. Rev. 5tat. Ann. 1990; 5.30-1-51 Idaho Code 1993; Ch. 32,
para 8.55 III. Rev. 5tat. 1993; S.496A 46 Iowa Code 1991; 5.35-1-411 Mont. Code
Ann. 1993; 5.53-11-49 NM 5tat. Ann 1991; S. 60 NY Bus. Corp. Law (1986); art
2.43 Texas Business Corporation Act Ann. 1993; 5.13.1-335 of Va. Code Ann.
(1993) and S.23A 08.490 Wash. Rev. Code 1993.
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Company statutes of most states and the Model Business Corporation Act
authorize shareholders to remove directors from office with or without cause
at a meeting called specifically for that purpose by the votes of holders of a
majority of the shares entitled to vote at an election of directors". Under U.S.
law a company may, therefore, adopt a by-law providing for the removal of a
director with or without cause.
a) Right To Remove With Cause
Irrespective of a contrary provision in the statute, charter or by-laws,
shareholders have the power to remove directors from office during their term
if substantial grounds can be shown. This common law right is known as
'amotion' and may be exercised not-withstanding the existence of a
contractual obligation. The right to remove for substantial cause cannot be
excluded by a shareholders' agreement requiring the maintenance in office
78. See for example5.39 of the Model Business Corporation Act 1971; 5.10.06 455
Alaska Stat. (1989); 5.10-039 Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. (1990); 5.303 Cal. Corp. Code
(1990); 5.706 NY Bus. Corp. Law (1986); 5.16-10-37 Utah Code Ann. (1993); Also
the California case Elevator Operators and Starters Union, Local 117, of San
Francisco v. Newman, 30 Cal. 2d 799, 186 P 2d I which held that even the entire
board of directors may be changed by a vote of the majority shareholders. 5.304
Cal. Corp. Code gives the superior court of the county, where the principal office is
located, the power to remove any director in the case of fraudulent or dishonestacts
or gross abuse of authority, on an application of shareholders holding at least ten
percentof the outstanding shares with or without voting rights. Once removed such
directors may be barred from election for a period prescribed by the court. See
Starbird v. Lane, 203 Cal. App. 2d 247, 21 Cal. Rptr. 280.
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of a particular director designated by a shareholder",
There are case law authorities to show that neither shareholders nor directors
have the power to remove directors or officers before the expiration of their
term, except for cause, if the term of office is fixed by the charter or by a
general statute. In Wolf v. Gegen-Seittige Unterstuetzungs Gesellschaft
Germania80, the Wisconsin court stated that every company has at common
law, as incident to its existence, the power of removing directors, but that this
power can be exercised only for cause and after notice and hearing. In the
New York case of Grace v. Grace Institute,81 the court emphasized that a
company possesses the power to remove a director or officer for cause
before the end of his term regardless of the existence of a provision in the
Charter or by-laws providing for non- removal.82
79. In Springut v. Don & Bob Restaurants of America, Inc., 57 A.D. 2d 302, 394
NYS 2d 971 (1977), a director contested his removal for cause on the basis of a
shareholders' agreement which gave certain shareholders the right to elect or re-
elect their nominees. The court held that the director could be removed for cause
despite the agreement. The court clearly stated that implicit in any agreement to
maintain a director in office is the director's duty to fulfil the requirements of his
office. Also the Pennsylvania case of Visor v. Waters, 320 Pa 406, 182 A 241.
80.149 Wis. 576,136 NW 175
81.19 NY 2d 307, 279 NYS 2d 721, 226 NE 2d 531
82. Also the Texas case of Textile, Inc. v. Wineburgh, 373 SW 2d 325; the Florida
case Frank v. Anthony, 107 SO 2d 136 (Fla.); and the New York case of People v.
Powell, 201 NY 194, 94 NE 634.
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b) Ground For Removal
Statutes, charter provisions and by-laws can sometimes limit the right of
shareholders to remove directors to certain grounds. Where the grounds for
removal are expressly designated then the main question will be whether the
facts bring the case within the provision and whether there is sufficient
ground for purposes of removal. 83 Statute may stipulate various causes that
can warrant removal and these have included conviction for a felony, a
declaration that a director is of unsound mind by a court order," a declaration
that a director is bankrupt or unable to perform duties for six months by
reason of illness.as
Removal may also be justified where a director assumes a managerial or
executive position with a competing enterprise.88 Furthermore, an officer with
a fixed term contract may be removed for breach of contract by undertaking
83. Section 306 Cal. Corp. Code 1990; Ch. 32 para 8.35 III Rev. Stat. Ann. 1993;
S.707(6) Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit 13-A 1981; S.706(d) NY Business Corporation Law
1986; S.55.27(g) NC Gen. Stat. 1990; S.7-1.1-36.1(d) R1 Gen. Law 1992.
84. Section 302 Cal. Corp. Code 1990; S.55-27(b) NC Gen. Stat. 1990 and
S.1701.58(8) Ohio Rev. Code Ann. 1986.
85. Section 12.18C(2) La. Rev. Stat. Ann. 1969.
86. Eckhaus v. Ma, 635 F Supp. 873.
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unauthorizedacts, misapplication of funds, or incornpetence'". Mere failure to
attend directors meetings for several months does not, however, constitute
sufficient ground for removal and a director's absence from a state thus
failing to attend some of the meetings does not warrant removal from the
board88.
c) Right To Remove Without Cause
The common law prohibition against removal without cause is, however, no
longer applicable in jurisdictions with modern company statutes89. These
statutes accept the view that since shareholders are the "owners" of the
company, they should have the poYler to change the directorate at will. In
New York and Rhode Island removal without cause is authorized only if the
articles of incorporation or by-laws so provide90.
Tennessee law generally allows for removal with or without cause but if a
director is elected by a group of shareholders only that group may participate
87. In Miller v. Ortman, 124 Ind. App. 290, NE 390, the Indiana appeal court held
that since the conduct of the company's fiscal affair by the president was such that
endangered the company's stability, there was sufficient grounds to remove him.
88. Alliance Co-op. Ins. Co., v. Gasche, 93 Kan. 147, 142 P 882.
89. Examples are Section 8089(a) Rev. Model Business Corporation Act 1984,
Section 303 Cal. Corp. Code 1990 and Section 141(K) Del. Code Ann. tit 81991
90. Section 706 NY Business Corporation Law 1986 and Ss.7-1.1-36.1(a)-(c) R.1.
Gen. Law 1992.
142
in a vote to remove the director without cause". Texas allows the articles of
incorporation to provide for removal of directors without cause, subject to
restrictions contained in the by-laws92.
When shareholders are given the power to remove directors without cause,
their motive for exercising that power is irrelevant93. If an officer is removed
without cause, although his or her authority to represent the company
ceases, the company will be liable to the officer for breach of contract. In
Heller v. Clark Merchandisers,94 the court reiterated this point when it held
that an officer deposed by majority votes of the directors had the right to
damages for breach of contract.95
d) Jurisdiction Of The Court To Remove Directors Or Officers
Although the general rule is that the power to remove corporate directors and
officers is in the company, an exception to this general rule has been made
where fraud or misappropriation is alleged. It is a well-established position,
under American law, that the courts have the power to remove
91. Section 48-18-108 Tenn. CodeAnn. 1988.
92. Section 16-10-37 Tex. Business Corporation Act Ann. 1993.
93. Section .8. 48 Rev. Model Business Corporation Act 1984
94.9 Misc. 2d 106,154 NYS2d 150
95. AlsoStott v. Stott Realty Co., 246 Mich. 267, 224 NW623
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trustees for substantial cause, such as misappropriation, long continued
absence, antagonism of interest and other grounds. Directors have no
personal interest in their office but may be compared with trustees, who are
subject to removal by the courts - as fiduciaries directors are sometimes
referred to as trustees.
In some states statutes have been adopted authorizing the removal of
directors by the courts for sufficient cause either at the suit of the corporation
or a shareholder acting on its behalf, or at the suit of a certain number of
shareholders designated by statute." In a few jurisdictions statute permits an
action to be brought to remove a director for cause either by the attorney
general or by holders of ten percent of the outstanding shares, YJhether or not
they are entitled to vote97. The Revised Model Business Corporation Act, and
a few other jurisdictions that have adopted the provision of that Act, permit
holders of ten percent of outstanding shares to institute a court action to
remove a director for certain conduct involving fraud, or gross abuse of
authority98 .
96. Section 304 Cal. Corp. Code 1990, S.55-27(g) NC Gen. Stat. 1990; 5.706 NY
Business Corporation Law 1986; S.1726(c) Pa. Stat. Ann. tit 15, 1993.
97. Examples are S.706(d) NY Business Corporation Law 1986 and S.7-1.1-36(d)
R.I. Gen. Laws 1992. In People v. Lyon, 119 App. Div. 361,194 NYS 319, referring
to S.706(d) the court ruled that the New York statute authorizes an action against
on~ or more trustees, directors, managers or other officers of a company to procure
a .Judgment removing such a person from office upon proof of a conviction of
misconduct.
98. Section 8.09 Ark. Code Ann. 1991; S.79-4-8.09 Miss. Code Ann. 1989; S.48-
18-109 Tenn. Code Ann. 1988
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To this effect the California statute provides that a court
" may, at the suit of shareholders holding at least 10 percent of
the number of outstanding shares of any class, remove from
office any director in case of fraudulent or dishonest acts or
gross abuse of authority or discretion.... 99
American courts have, therefore, given recognition to the fact that the law is
opposed to directors or officers continuing in office after having been guilty of
wrong-doing or against whom exists a prima facie case of malfeasance in
office1OO• Ross v. 311 North Central Avenue Building Coro.101 involved a
class action brought by minority shareholders against a company and its
directors for fraudulent loans, the Appeal Court held that when the trial court
found that the acts of the directors were fraudulent and oppressive, it rightly
removed them from management of the company.
D) APPOINTMENT AND REMOVAL OF DIRECTORS
UNDER GERMAN LAW
1. INTRODUCTION
In order to understand the processes of appointing and removing corporate
99. Section 304 Cal. Corp. Code ( West 1990)
100. The New Jersey case of Shuster v. Vetnor Gardens, Inc., 103 NJ Eq 93,141 A
457
101.130 III. App. 2d 336,264 NE 2d 406 (1970)
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directors under German law it is important to point out that there are two main
types of incorporation available to businesses under that law - these are the
Stock Corporation (AG) and the Limited Liability Company (GmbH).
Traditionally the GmbH has a unitary board structure unless the shareholders
provide in the articles for a tvvo-tier structure but this traditional structure can
be modified with respect to companies to which one of four Co-Determination
Acts applies. The creation of a supervisory board is optional for the
shareholders in a GmbH but mandatory if it is required by a Co-
Determination Act. The AG, on the other hand, is required to have a tvvo-tier
board system consisting of a management board and a supervisory board.
2. The Stock Corporation (AG)
a) Appointment Of The Supervisory Board Members
The founders of a company have the duty of appointing the first supervisory
Board members. To this effect Section 30(1)102 provides:
''The incorporators shall appoint the first supervisory board of
the company ....Such appointments shall be made in the form of
a notarial deed."
102. Section 30(1) AktG 1965
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The initial board members are to hold office until the end of the first general
meeting of shareholders. The first supervisory board is generally not subject
to any applicable co-determination law. Subsequently the members of the
supervisory board that are to represent the shareholders are elected by the
general meeting,103 unless certain shareholders are entitled to appoint a
specified number of members to the board. Such right, as given to
shareholders, to appoint a certain number of board members may be granted
by the article to the holders of registered shares of the company.104
For companies that are subject to the Shop Constitution Act 1952, the Act
Supplementing the Coal and Steel Co-Determination 1956 and the Co-
Determination Act 1976, employee representatives are elected by the
employees105. Employee representatives and neutral members of supervisory
boards of companies that are subject to the Iron and Steel Co-Determination
Act are elected by the general meeting but the meeting is regulated by the
provisions of the Works Council106.
103. Section 101(1) Akt G 1965
104. Section 101(2) Akt G 1995
105. Section 76 Betr VG 1952; SS.6 and 7 Montan Mit Best Erg G 1956; and S.9
Mit Best G 1976
106. Section 6 Montan Mit Best G. 1976
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Where the supervisory board does not have the number of members
necessary to constitute a quorum the court may appoint the required
members to the board'". If there has been a vacancy on the board for three
months but the existing members still constitute a quorum, the court, on
application, will appoint additional members. In emergency situations the
court need not wait for the expiration of three months.'?" In all such cases, the
application to the court for the appointment can be made by the management
board, any supervisory board member, a shareholder, an employee
organisation or by a certain number of employees109.
b) Removal Of Members Of The Supervisory Board
Any member of the Supervisory Board may be removed prior to the expiration
of his term of office either without cause or with important justifications.
i) Removal Without Cause
Supervisory Board members that are elected by the general meeting may be
removed by a three-quarters majority resolution of the general meeting110
107. Section 104 Akt G 1965
108. Section 104(2) Akt G 1965
109. Sections 104(1) Nos 3 and 4, 104(2) No 3 Akt G 1965
110. Section 103(1) Akt G 1965
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although the articles may provide for a different majority and stipulate
additional requirements. Members that were appointed to the board by
individual shareholders may be removed or replaced by those shareholders
who had the right to appoint them and failing that the general meeting may
effect the removal. Section 103(2) which provides for this states:
"If the requirements specified in the articles in respect of the
right to appoint are no longer met, the shareholders' meeting
can remove those delegated members by a simple majority of
votes."'"
The members that were elected by the employees in accordance with the
provisions of the Shop Constitution Act 1952 may be removed by a resolution
passed by a three quarters majority of the employees' votes'". The other Co-
Determination Acts also contain provisions on the removal of supervisory
board members appointed thereunder as employee representatives'P.
111. Section 103(2) Akt G 1965
112. To this effect S.76(5) of the Works Constitution Act 1952 (Betr VG 1952)
states ''the appointment of an employee representative to membership of the
Supervisory Board may be revoked before completion of the term at the request of
the works councilor by at least one fifth of the employees in the establishment of
the enterprise. The resolution requires a majority comprising at least three quarter
of the votescast".
113. Section 11 of The Coal and Steel Co-Determination Act 1951 (Montan Mitbest
G. BGB1 195); S.10 of The Supplemental Co-Determination Act 1956 (Montan
Mltbest Eng. G BGB1 1956)' and Section 23 of The Co-Determination Act 1976(Mitbest G BGB1 1976 '
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ii) Removal For Important Cause
Any member of the supervisory board may be removed by the local court
(Amtsgericht) of the company's domicile if an important reason is given,
irrespective of who appointed the member or pursuant to which law he had
been appointed114• If a supervisory board member who has been delegated to
the board by shareholders is to be removed in this manner, in addition to the
supervisory board resolution, holders of ten percent of the stated capital or
those holding shares with an aggregate par value of OM 2 million or more
may make the application. Any removal effected by the court is required to
be justified by an "important reason" such as the members' inability to fulfil
his duties, a serious breach of obligations, or unlawful disclosure of business
secrets.115
c) Appointment Of The Management Board Members
Members of the management board are normally appointed by the
supervisory board of the company!". Each member may be appointed for a
114. Section 103(3) AktG 1965.
115. Ibid
116. Section 84 AktG 1965; In urgent situations the court, at the request of the
company, can appoint a member who is known as a Notvorstand to fill a vacancy
on the board - Section 85 AktG 1965.
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term not exceeding five years with an extension or a re-appointment being
permissible as long as the extension is effected at least one year before the
expiration of the initial term'". The supervisory board has the discretion to
decide how long to extend the appointment of a management board member
for and cannot be forced to re-appoint a member beyond a term of five years.
The procedure for the appointment of the management board members
depends on which Co-Determination law applies. In companies that are not
SUbject to co-determination such appointments are made by a simple majority
resolution of the supervisory board'". In companies that are subject to the
Co-Determination Act of 1976, the appointment of a management board
member generally requires a supervisory board resolution passed by two-
thirds majority of all the members. Where this majority cannot be achieved, a
committee provided for in the Co-Determination Act119 must propose a
candidate.
d) Removal Of The Management Board Members
The appointment of members of the management board can be terminated by
117. Section 84(1) Akt G 1965
118. Sections 84 and 108 Akt G 1965
119. Section 27(3) Mitbest G 1976
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a resolution of the supervisory board and only if an important cause exists120.
A member of the management board who has been removed can challenge
his removal by taking the matter to the court 121.
3. The Limited Liability Company (GmbH)
a) The Supervisory Board
The creation of a supervisory board in the German Limited Liability Company
(GmbH) is either optional or mandatory. It is mandatory if it is required by
The Coal and Steel Co-Determination Act 1951, The Supplementary Coal
and Steel Co- Determination Act 1956, the Co-Determination Act 1976, the
Shop Constitution Act 1952 or if the company is a capital investment
company122. While the Co-determination Acts regulate, in details, the election
of the employee representatives on the supervisory board they leave the
appointment of the shareholder representatives to the shareholders. Where
~20 S.ection 84(3) Akt G 1965; "Important cause" has been defined in the Act as
~ndudlng gross violations of duty or inability to manage the company properly. An
Important cause is also deemed to exist if the general meeting has resolved that a
member of the management is no longer trustworthy, unless the resolution was
dearly adopted for arbitrary reasons.
121..~he Panel for Commercial Matters of the Regional Court at the company's
domiCile has jUrisdiction over such matters.
122. C~pital investment companies are also subject to more complex rules on
accounting standards, auditing and disdosure.
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the optional supervisory board is concerned the Limited Liability Company
Act ( GmbHG ) contains references to a number of provisions of the Stock
Corporation Act123 .
i) The Optional Supervisory Board
The optional supervisory board is normally created on the basis of the
provisions of the articles. A company's articles may either establish the
supervisory board directly or authorise the shareholders to establish one by a
resolution of the general meeting. Although members of this board are
generally required to be appointed by a simple majority resolution of the
shareholders, the articles may require a greater majority. Any member may,
at any time with or without cause be removed from this board by a three-,
quarter majority shareholder resolution124.
ii) The Mandatory Supervisory Board
When the establishment of a supervisory board for a GmbH is mandatory the
rules governing such supervisory boards are found in the applicable
123. Section 52(1) GmbHG which states "If pursuant to the articles of association a
supervisory board shall be constituted, then S.90(3), (4) sentences 1 and 2; S.95
sentenC?9 1; S.100(1) and (2) No 2; S.101(1) sentence 1, S.103(1) sentences 1 and
2; Sections 105, 110 to 114, 116 of The Stock Corporation Act in connection withS.93(1~ and (2) and Ss. 170, 171 and 377 of The Stock Corporation Act shall apply
aceorchngly unless the articles of association determine otherwise.
124. Section 52(1) GmbH and Section 103(1)AktG.
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Co-determination Act where they are set out in part directly and in part by
reference to provisions of the Stock Corporation Act. Those provisions
concerning mandatory supervisory boards take precedence over conflicting
provisions of the GmbH Act, the articles of the company and shareholder
resolutions. The appointment and removal of members of the mandatory
board are, therefore, regulated by the same provisions as regulate the
appointment and removal of the supervisory boards of stock companies
b) The Management Board Of The Limited Liability Company (GmbH)
The GmbHG requires every limited liability company to have one or more
managing directors to manage the affairs of the company and to represent it
in and out of court125. The appointment of the managing directors to the board
is a corporate act which is governed by company law. It must be
distinguished from the service agreements of such managing directors which
are governed by the law of contract.
i) Appointment Of The Managing Directors
The managing directors are appointed by a simple majority resolution of the
125. Sections 6(1) and 35(1) GmbHG.
154
shareholders unless the articles provide otherwise or a Co-determination Act
requires that the managing directors be appointed by the supervisory board.
A company's articles may, however, provide that the appointment of the
managing directors by shareholders' resolution be subject to a greater
majority126. The supervisory board has the exclusive right to appoint the
managing directors if the company is required to have a supervisory board by
the Coal and Steel Co-Determination Act, the Supplementary Coal and Steel
CO-Determination Act or the Co-Determination Act127.
If a company is subject to parity co-determination under the Coal and Steel
Co-Determination Act, the Supplementary Coal and Steel Co-Determination
Act or near-parity co-determination under the Co-Determination Act then at
least one of its managing directors is required to be a labour director128• Such
a labour managing director is to be appointed by the supervisory board and a
resolution to appoint a labour director cannot be passed if a majority of the
labour representatives on the supervisory board votes against it129.
126. Section 45(2)GmbHG
1~7. Section 12 Montanmitbest G 1951; S.13 Montanmitbest EngG 1956 and S.31
Mltbest G 1976whichare in each case connected to S.85 AktG.
128. Section 13 MontanmitbestG 1951; S.13 MontanmitbestEngG 1956 and S.33
MitbestG 1976.
129. Section 13(1)MontanmitbestG 1951
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ii) Removal Of The Managing Directors
Any managing director of a limited liability company may be removed from his
office by a shareholder resolution passed by a simple majority vote130 unless
the articles provide otherwise or a co-determination law assigns the authority
to the supervisory board. The articles may, however, increase the majority
required for a shareholder resolution which removes a managing director
from the board. The supervisory board is given the power to remove
managing directors where a limited liability company is required to have a
supervisory board under a Co-Determination Act.131 A company's articles can
restrict the right of shareholders to remove managing directors without cause
but cannot restrict rights to remove them for cause132.
E) CONCLUSION
In the Anglo-American system, the statutory and regulatory framework paint a
picture of shareholders having the power to hire and fire directors which
seems to run contrary to the powers given to directors to co-opt members on
130. Sections 46(5) and 47(1) GmbHG
1~1. Section. 12 MontanmitbestG 1951, 5.13(1) MontanmitbestEngG 1956 and 5.37
MltbestG which are each in connection with 5.84(3) AktG 1965.
132. Section 38(2) GmbHG . The articles for instance, could provide that a~anaging director cannot be r~ca"ed dUring ~ specified term of his office except for
Important cause.
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to the board. The reality is that in the U.K. and U.S. management picks the
slate of candidates with shareholders playing very little (if any) role in the
nomination and appointment processes. To this effect the electoral process
has not been an effective mechanism for assuring shareholder control over
their board of directors133.
One of the most important weapons of shareholder control under U. K. law-
the power to remove a director - is supposed to be one which can be called
into play regardless of any term in a director's contract. Shareholders may,
however be intimidated by the compensation payable to a director for the loss
of earnings. Apart from this there is the practical problem of procedural
restriction which can act as serious deterrent to shareholders who want to
remove directors. This leaves corporate managers in a position of exercising
managerial Powers with no viable mechanism by which shareholders can
hold management accountable for its decisions.
The position under German law is in no way better in that the rights of
German employees as embodied in the Co-determination Laws enable
employees to be represented on supervisory boards and on workers'
133. KomI Ferry International, Board of Directors, Twentieth Annual Study 1993;
Also a 1992 ProNed Survey found that 86% of directors were dissatisfied with the
approach adopted by companies in appointing non-executive directors.
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councils. Employee rights under German law constitute an attenuation of
shareholders' right to determine the composition of the board134. When
compared with U.K. and U.S. positions where employee involvement in
corporate decision-making is discretionary German shareholders are at a
disadvantage, in this respect, in comparison with their Anglo-Saxon
counterparts.
An important difference betvveen U.K. law and those of U.S. and Germany is
the statutory right given to the court under U.S. and German laws to remove
directors for substantial cause. By giving minority shareholders135 the right to
petition the court for purposes of removing directors, the laws of these two
systems have made shareholders' right to remove directors much more
meaningful.
In the U.K. there is no judicial power to remove directors on the basis of
dishonesty or inability to perform their duties. Although shareholders have the
power to remove directors by a majority vote in the U.K., that power may not
be a practical remedy for shareholders who wish to use it. With the
requirement that a minority can institute proceedings to remove a director
134. The possibility that membership of the supervisory board may be divided
~u~lIy .between employee and shareholder representatives may have serious
Imph~tions on the ability of shareholders to exercise control over the management
of theircompanies.
135. In b~th U.S. and Germany the requirement is that holders of 10 percent of the
share capItal can file a suit asking the courtto remove certain directors.
158
for substantial cause in the U.S. and Germany, shareholders have a better
chance of effecting changes to their board composition.
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CHAPTER FIVE
BOARD STRUCTURE AND SHAREHOLDER
REPRESENTATION ON CORPORATE BOARDS
A) INTRODUCTION
The traditional corporate structure conceives a board's roles as those of
management and accountability. With the emergence of large public
companies it has become clear that the board of directors is unable to play
these roles that has been entrusted to it by the legal model." This realisation
has resulted in the recognition of a functional division within a company's
board between managementand supervision.
The board of directors is the principal management authority with the
responsibility of ensuring that the goals of the company are fulfilled1• The
board's relationship with its management team is, hovvever, governed by the
rules and regulations of a country's corporate law and practice with variations
leading to differences in the effectiveness of the board as an overseer of
management, regardless of the ownership structure.
1. Charkham, J., Keeping Good Company, 1995,272, Oxford Press
2. Ezzamel and Watson have argued that criticisms of boards accountability to
shareholders have resulted in measures for improvement being seen as a necessity
for purposes of protecting shareholders interests. - Ezzamel, M. and Watson, R,
Wearing Two Hats: The Conflicting Control And Management Roles of Non-
Executive Directors, in Keasey, Thompson and Wright, Corporate Govemance,
1997,75, Oxford University Press
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This new board model posits a supervisory team with the role of monitoring
management's business decisions on behalf of shareholders. As it becomes
increasingly apparent that the supervisory group is neither properly equipped
nor in a position to perform their monitoring role effectively the search for
remedies has intensified.3
Under the Anglo-American corporate practice, although members of the
board are appointable by the shareholders, with the diffused nature of share-
holding rarely does any individual shareholder cast enough votes to secure
active representation on the board. The primary controlling element on the
board is supposed to be the existence of non-executive directors. Under the
German tvvo-tier board structure the management board manages the
company on a day-to-day basis reporting regularly to the supervisory board.
On its part, the supervisory board appoints and dismisses members of the
management board"
One major sector of corporate affairs that has resisted the European
Community harmonisation efforts has been the area dealing with board
structure and powers of the different types of directors in the company. Board
3. Short, H. Non-Executive Directors, Corporate Governance and the Cadbury
Report: A Review of the Issues and Evidence, Corporate Governance, 4/2 (1996)
123,. 1~9-31; see also Hart, 0., Corporate Governance: Some Theory and
Implications (1995) 105 Economic Journal 678, 681-4
4. Chapter two of this work deals with the main functions of the two arms
of the German two-tier board.
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structure was, however, one of the main subjects of the proposed Fifth
DirectiveS which has not been adopted to date.
This chapter analyses the different ways that corporate boards are structured
in the U.K., Germany and the U.S., and identifies the categories of persons
that serve on those boards. It explores the question of how far the idea of
placing 'NOrker directors on corporate boards would affect the powers of
shareholders to remove directors that they are dissatisfied with and replace
them with others more suited for those positions. It examines the proposed
Fifth Directive and its various amendments in the light of the Commission's
proposals on co-determination and discusses how the proposed changes
'NOuld affect board structure and corporate practice in the U.K. For the
purpose of comparing the unitary and t'NO-tier board structures the last part of
this chapter examines the advantages and disadvantages of each type.
B) BOARD STRUCTURE IN THE UNITED KINGDOM
Until the mid 1960s there was very little active interest in the concept of
'NOrker directors in the U.K. The practice until then had been based on the
tradition of collective bargaining between unions representing workers,
management and the representatives of capital.
5.15 J.O. COMM EUR (NO. C131) 49, Oct. 13, 1972, as amended in 1983, 260.J.
EUR. COMM (NO. C240) 2, Aug. 19, 1983.
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In presenting written evidence to the Donovon Commission in 1966 the
Trade Union Congress ( TUC ) gave real impetus to the discussion on the
prospects of appointing worker-directors to corporate boards." The TUC.
was in favour of a discretionary provision to allow companies to make
provisions for trade union representatives on the board of directors.12 To this
effect they stated:
" provision should be made at each level in the
management structure for trade union representatives of the
work people employed in these industries to participate in the
formulation of policy and in the day to day operation of these
industries." 13
The bulk of the British steel industry was nationalised in 1967, under
conditions which were not economically favourable. Associated with this
nationalisation was a drive to improve efficiency and productivity. It was
against this background that the British Steel Corporation (B.S.C.) launched
its worker-director scheme. Brannen summarises the objectives thus:
" First, (the scheme) would act as a symbol of a new departure
in industrial elations in the newly nationalised industry.
Secondly, worker directors would provide the board with new
dimension in its discussions....Finally, the scheme should be
seen as a part of a serious effort on the part of the corporation
to involve its numerous employees in working out the future
policies of the industry.,,14
11. Royal Commission on Trade Unions and Employers Association (The Donovon
Commission) 1965-68 Report, CMND 3623
12. Trade Unionism, (T.U.C., London 1966) para 290
13. Ibid para 262
14 ~rannen P., Batstone E., Fatchett D., and White P., The Worker Directors: A
SOCIology of Participation, 1976, 96, Hutchinson, London.
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Worker directors Vv'8re eventually appointed to the nationalised British Steel
Corporation in May 1968. The initial proposal, relating to the appointment of
workers as part-time directors provided for up to three worker directors to be
appointed to each of the four group boards for a period of three years." The
mechanics of the appointment of worker directors Vv'8re of particular interest.
First, the Steel Corporation, through the T.U.C., asked unions that Vv'8re
active in the industry to put forward nominations. Those nominations then
Vv'8nt through a vetting process before tVv'8lve worker directors Vv'8re finally
appointed by the corporation16
1. The Input Of Committees On U.K. Board Structure
Despite the changes in the nationalised Steel industries little had happened
by the early 1970's to indicate that U.K. was moving towards a worker
director system. With Britain joining the E.C. on the 1st of January 1973,
soon after the first draft of the Fifth Directive was published in 1972, renewed
interest was stimulated in the area of employee representation. The main
reason for the interest was that Britain, along with the other E.C. member
states, would be placed under an obligation to implement board level
employee representation if the Directive was passed as community law.
15. Ibid at p. 134
16. Ibid at p. 98
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a) The Bullock Committee's Recommendations On Board Structure
This renewed interest resulted in the setting up of a committee to enquire into
the issue of industrial democracy." This committee had a term of reference
which stated:
" Accepting the need for a radical extension of industrial
democracy in the control of companies by means of
representation on the board of directors, and accepting the
essential role of trade union organisations in this process, to
consider how such an extension can be achieved, taking into
account in particular the proposals of the Trade Union
Congress Report on industrial democracy as vvell as experience
in Britain, the E.E.C. and other countries. Having regard to the
interests of the national economy, employees, investors and
consumers, to analyse the implications of such representation
for the efficient management of companies and for company
law.,,18
The Committee undertook an extensive review of the different alternatives of
board structures. Faced with the task of deciding whether employee directors
should sit on unitary boards or on supervisory boards under a two-tier
structure, the majority report expressed a preference for the former model
thus rejecting the introduction of a two-tier system19
17. Inquiry On Industrial Democracy Committee, First Report, Cmd. 6706 (1977)(Bullock Report)
18. O.R. (House of Commons) 5 August, 1975, col. 245.
19. Supra note 12 at para 8.15
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b) Cadbury Committee's Recommendations On Board Structure
In the U.K there is a distinction between the categories of directors on the
unitary board - namely non-executive directors and executive directors. The
board has the power to appoint one or more of the full-time directors to serve
as managing directors.'" In practice it is the managing directors, rather than
the board who manage the company. The board on its part supervises
management and makes general policy decisions. U. K boards are often
made up of a majority of executive directors, the very group which the board
is required to monitor." To reduce this problem the Cadbury Report
suggests an increased role for non-executive directors. The Report
encourages every listed company to have at least three non-executive
directors whose
" calibre...... should be such that their views will carry significant
weight in the board's decision. ,,22
The rationale for this reliance on non-executive directors is based on the
belief that they are of independent status and bring to bear on the company's
problems a wide cross-section of opinion and experience. Being independent
20. Art. 84 TableA of the Companies Act 1985
21. Byrd, J.W. and Hickman, K.A, So Outside Directors MonitorManagers? , (1992)
32 Journal of Financial Economics 195 198-200,
22. See The Report of the Committee On The Financial Aspects Of Corporate
Governance (Cadbury's Report) 1992, para. 4.11, Gee & Co.
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of management non-executive directors should be free from any business
and other relationships which could interfere with the exercise of their
independent jUdgement.23 The Report, however, fails to resolve the
COnflicting roles of non-executive directors. In this regard the Cadbury Report
has done little or nothing to improve the independence or incentives for non-
executive directors to take their monitoring role seriously.
The Report also recommends that there be a separation of functions between
the chairman of the board and the chief executive director" with the purpose
of preventing one individual from having unfettered powers. To this effect the
Report states:
" Chairmen should be able to stand sufficiently back from the
day-to-day running of the business to ensure that the boards
are in full control of the compar/s' affairs and alert to their
obligations to their shareholders."
It is interesting to know that the past few years have seen encouraging signs
of compliance with these recommendations by U.K. companles."
23. See para 4.12
24. See para 4.9
25. Ibid
26. The report on a study undertaken by the accountancy firm Arthur Anderson in
conjunction with Director Magazine in the New Law Journal, 15 Oct. 1993, 1434 at
1435 - states that the Cadbury's recommendations on ways of preventing abuse of
boardroom powers are beginning to take effect; Cohen N. cites examples of moves
b~ U.K. companies to separate the positions of chairman and chief executive
director. BAT Industries have asked the chairmen/chief executive directors 'to take
off one of their hats' in compliance with Cadbury's recommendations - Cohen N, OfHa~ and Heads, Fin. Times, 5 Feb 1993 p. 10; see also Preston R, Chairman of
Spnng Ram Urged To Quit By Shareholder, Fin. Times, 10 July 1993 p. 24;
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All the recommendations of the Cadbury Report are, however, made in the
context of preserving a unitary board structure with the emphasis being
placed on internal governance and monitoring within the one-tier board. Very
little attempt is made at employee participation in corporate decision-making.
Directors are simply instructed by statute to have regard to the interest of the
employees in managing the affairs of the company which is enforceable only
as a duty owed to the company."
c) The Hampel Committee's Recommendations On Board Structure
The Hampel Committee, which was established in November 1995, was a
continuation of the effort to put in place a process of reform in the area of
corporate control.28 Its main purpose was to examine the role of directors,
shareholders and auditors, and to promote high standards of corporate
governance in listed cornpantes." Although the Hampel report largely repeats
and approves the Cadbury recommendations it made a few additions in the
area of board structure. It recommends that the board should disclose which
non-executive directors are considered to be independent. 30. The Hampel
Report also recommends that non-executive directors should make up at
27. Section 309 Company Act 1985
28. The Committee On Corporate Governance, Final Report, ( Hampel's Report)
(London: Gee & Co., January 1998)
29. Hampel's remit extended only to listed companies.
30. Recommendation 9.
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least one-third of the board of directors". It states that companies should
identify a senior non-executive director to whom concerns can be conveyed32
and that all board members be subject to three yearly re-election.33 It
commends as best practice the use of nomination committees for purposes of
ensuring that the nomination process is not dominated by the executives.34
The setting up of these committees is a clear indication of the reliance on
self-regulation based on non-legal Codes of Best Practice. Despite the broad
consultative processes undertaken and the carefully thought out Codes of
these different committees, the core problems on board structure still remain.
It is still envisaged that non-executive directors should combine their
monitoring role with management functions. It has to be recognised that to
remain co-team members with the very group that they are to monitor can
restrict the effectiveness of non-executive in performing their monitoring
role.35
31. Recommendation 12; The Cadbury report did not indicate any proportion but
simply stated that they should be 'of sufficient calibre and number'.
32. Recommendation 15
33. Recommendation 17.
34. Recommendation 16; The Cadbury Report had merely endorsed their use.
35. Ezzamel. M. and Watson, R.. Wearing Two Hats: the Conflicting Control And
Management Role of Non-Executive Directors, in Keasey. Thompson and Wright
(eds), Corporate Governance: Economic Management and Financial Issues 1997,
64, Oxford University Press
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The committees have not addressed the problem of availability of relevant
and adequate information for non-executives to perform their important roles.
While the Cadbury Report has not touched on this area at all, the Hampel
Report states that
II management has an obligation to provide the board with
appropriate and timely information and the chairman has a
particular responsibility to ensure that all directors are properly
briefed. ,,36
Even with the input of the Hampel report much discretion is still left in the
hands of the group that is to be monitored. Emphasis has been placed on the
issue of non-executive independence from the executive directors. Hampel's
Report goes so far as requiring that the board should assess and report on
directors' independence. There has, however, been no attempts by these
committees to specify the criteria for determining this independence.
2. The Effect That Worker Representation Would Have On U. K. Law
A scheme of worker directors in the British context would require the
compulsory appointment of a certain number of employee representatives to
the boards of companies. It also would amount to certain fundamental
changes in the nature of British company law and in the way the boards
traditionally operate. At present worker influence in corporate decision-
making is expressed primarily through joint regulation by representatives
36. Recommendation 6 of the Hampel Report
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of employees and management as enshrined in the institution of collective
bargaining, which is confined to the traditional issues of wages and hours of
YJOrk37.
The decisions accorded by the Companies Acts exclusively to shareholders
include many that the employees would expect representation on the board to
give them joint control over ( for instance major constitutional changes and
corporate re-arrangements). Another area of concern vvould relate to the
position of the board of directors who constitute the policy-making body of the
company and upon which it is proposed that employees should be
represented.
English company law simply requires that all public companies registered
after 1910 must have at least tvvo directors while private companies are
required to have at least one.38 For the rest, matters are largely left to be
settled by individual company's articles of association. Since the articles are
under the control of shareholders in general meeting it would become
necessary to modify this position if the board, through employee
representation, ceases to be representative only of the shareholder interest.
For employee representation to be implemented it vvould seem that the broad
37 McCarthy W.E.J. and Ellis N.D., Management By Agreement (1973), p.103;
Gordon, Business Leadership In The Large Corporation (1966) pp. 53-55
38. Section 176 Companies Act 1948 which is now Section 285 Companies Act
1985
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parameter of directors powers which is left to the optional articles would need
to be prescribed by legislation.
C) THE PROPOSED FIFTH DIRECTIVE
1. The 1972 Draft
The first draft of the Fifth Directive in 1972 had two major subjects of
controversy which were the two-tier board structure and the representation of
employees in the supervisory councils of companies with 500 or more
employees.39 The ratio was to be one to two whereby for every two
supervisory board members named by the shareholders, one member would
be named by the national works council. It proposed that employee
representatives be labour union officials who themselves vvere not
employees.4O
Under the first draft, as far as board structure and employee participation
were concerned, the requirementswere that:
a) all public limited companies, regardless of their size, should have a
compulsory two-tier board structure comprising of a management board
responsible for managing the company's affairs and representing the
39. Art.4., 15 J.O. Comm. EUR. ( No. C 131) 49 (Oct 13, 1972)
40. Lang, The Fifth EEC Directive On The Harmonization Of Company Law, 1975,
12 COMM MKT. L. REV 155
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company in negotiating contracts and a supervisory board which was to
supervise and control the management board.41
b) the supervisory board was to elect the management board for a fixed
period which could not exceed six years.42
c) members of the supervisory board could not simultaneously be members of
the management board43
d) the supervisory board was to give ultimate approval on decisions made by
the management board in a specified number of fundamental corporate
matters.""
e) the supervisory board was to approve all contracts to which the company
was a party if any supervisory or management board member had an interest,
direct or indirect, in the contract.45
This initial draft provided that member states would have to adopt one of the
following methods of employee participation:
a) Participation in the appointment of members of the supervisory board;
b) Participation through employee representation on the supervisory board or
administrative board',
41. OJC 131,12.12.72, arts 1&2
42. Ibid art. 3(1)
43. Ibid art 6
44. Ibid Art 12, the list in Article 12 could, however, be extended by State law
45. Ibid art 10(1)
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c) Participation through a body composed solely of employee
representatives;
d) Participation through collective bargaining corresponding to the principles
of one of the previous models. In response to this draft the European
Parliament proposed a tripartite membership for the supervisory board,
consisting equally of representatives of owners, employees and independent
individuals. The latter were described as persons representing general
interests, possessing relevant expertise and not dependent on the owners or
employee organisations.46
2. Towards A More Flexible Fifth Directive: The Revised Draft Of 1983
The proposals of this initial draft aroused vigorous controversies and the
Commission, being aware of the need for a more flexible approach which
would take account of the economic, social and legal developments existing
in each member state, asked the Economic and Social Committee for its
opinion." This committee, although in favour of the dual board system and
employee representation on the board, proposed that member states should
be allowed to keep their single board system.
46. Schwartz D. (ed), Commentaries On Corporate Structure And Governance 1979
p.48
47. The Economic And Social Committee is a consultative body comprising of
representation of employer, employee and other interests. Members of this
committee are appointed for a four-year renewable term - EEC Treaty
Arts 193, 194 & 195
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In 1982 the European parliament developed some alternatives and in 1983
the Commission put forward a revised proposal for a Fifth Directive designed
to appease its critics while achieving the principal objectives of the original
proposal.48 With respect to the supervision of corporate managers the
amended Draft Fifth Directive offered a choice between the original tvvo-tier
structure and a one-tier in which a majority of the members would be non-
executives49. It raised the threshold from 500 to 1,000 employees with respect
to the participation of employees in the supervision of large companies.50
The 1983 proposal stated that for all public companies a distinction should be
made bet\veen directors responsible for supervision on the one hand and
management on the other. This is to be achieved in one of two ways:
a) A one tier board with the executive directors managing and the non-
executive directors supervising.
b) A two-tier board structure consisting of a supervisory and management
board. The management board having the sole power of day-to-day
management. The main role of the supervisory board being to appoint
members of the management board and to monitor their actions.
48. Seethe amended proposal for a Fifth Diredive26 O. J. EUR. COMM.
( No. C 240) 2 (Aug. 19, 1983)
49. Ibid arts. 2(1), 3(1) & 21a (1)
50. Ibid arts. 4(1) & 21b
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The proposal also required every public company with 1,000 or more
employees (including employees of subsidiaries) within the European
Community to install a system of employee participation. Three options were
madeavailable:
1. Board representation for employee by way of electing between one third
and one half of the supervisory board members or alternatively co-option by
the supervisory board subject to control by the general meeting or
employees' representatives.
2. A works council ( which should represent all employees entitled to regular
information and consultation).
3. A collective agreement ( with one or more trade unions ) effectively giving
the same rights as in one or other of the previous two options to members of
those trade unions.
To some extent boards of U.K. listed companies are already moving towards
the direction of the first board structure proposed by the 1983 draft which
requires a one-tier board with executive directors managing and non-
executives supervising. This has been evidenced by the establishment of
audit committees of non-executive directors to whom the auditors report
matters of concern in the company's draft account. There are also moves to
establish committees of non-executives for purposes of remuneration and
nomination.
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D) GERMAN BOARD STRUCTURE AND EMPLOYEE PARTICIPATION
1. A Brief History Of The German Two-Tier Board System
Germany is a classic example of a system with two arms of corporate
management and has always been referred to as the land of industrial
democracy". The management/supervisory board structure of German
boards is not a recent development. The practice can be traced back to an
old system in Germany where major enterprises 'Here organised as limited
partnerships with shares. During the second half of the last century the
practice arose in these limited partnershipsof setting up a small committee of
persons to represent the limited partners and to act as a supervisory body
over the actiVities of the unlimited partners. It was originally introduced by
the GermanCommercial Code of 1861 and was made compulsory in 1870.52
The underlying aim was to ensure that the function of controlling
management, which was formerly exercised by the state, was undertaken by
shareholders. Although under German law supervision of corporate
management by non-managers dates back to 1870, the practice of
consultation with employees on German industrial matters had been put in
51. Davies P. and Wedderburn The Land Of Industrial Democracy, (1977),
Industrial Law Journal 197 '
52. Vagts, D., Reforming the Modem Corporation: Perspective from the German, 80
Harv. L. Rev. 23, 50-51.
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place long before then, what was new in the system was actual
representation of employees in the decision-making organ of a company.
This practice eventually spread to companies and German company law
came to require a supervisory board in all public companies and some private
companies which vvere large enough to be caught by the co-determination
laws.
2. The Limited Liability Company (GmbH )
Traditionally the German limited liability company ( GmbH) consists of the
managing directors and the shareholders unless the shareholders provide in
the articles for a supervisory board to oversee the managing directors without
engaging in management activities. This traditional structure has been
modified with respect to those companies to which the co-determination laws
apply. Thus the creation of a supervisory board is either optional or
mandatory for limited liability companies. It is optional for companies that are
not subject to any of the co-determination Iavvs, with the option being given to
shareholders to provide for it in the articles. It is mandatory for limited liability
companies which are subject to anyone of the co-determination laws.
Where the optional supervisory board is concerned the shareholders are free
to deviate from the statutory regime and shape a supervisory board that is
more suitable to their special interests and needs. Where the establishment
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of a supervisory board is mandatory by virtue of a co-determination law, the
rules governing its structure will be those in the applicable Co-determination
Act. The different Codetermination Acts are:
The Coal and Steel Co-Determination Act of 21st May 1951
(MontanmitbestG) which is applicable to certain companies in the
industries of mining, coal and steel production and requires eleven
members on the supervisory board53
The Supplementary Coal and Steel Co-Determination Act of 7 August
1956 (MontanmitbestErgG) which is applicable to certain holding
companies that own enterprises in the industries of mining and coal
and steel production and which creates what is known as parity 00-
determination.
_ The CO-Determination Act of 4th May, 1976 (MitbestG) which is
applicable to enterprises with certain types of legal structures,
including GmbH, that employ more than 2000 individuals and which
create a near parity co-determmatlon."
The Shop Constitution Act of 11th October 1952 (BetrVG) which is
applicable to enterprises with certain legal structures including the
GmbH, that employ more than 500 individuals and which creates 'one-
third' co-determination. 55
53. Section 4 MontanMitbestG 1951
54. Sections 1 & 7 MitbestG 1976
55. Section 76(1) BetrVG1952
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As the degree of co-determination that is required depends on the Co-
determination Law that is applied changes to the traditional structure of the
GmbH vary depending on the applicable Co-determination Act.
3. The Stock Corporation (AG )
The German stock corporation is characterized by the strict separation of the
management board from the supervisory board. The management board
bears responsibility for managing corporate activities while the supervisory
board has the duty to appoint, supervise and remove members of the
management board. The composition of the supervisory board of the AG will
depend on whether and which co-determination law applies. The following
are the different co-determination laws that can determine the composition of
the supervisory board:
a) The Coal and Steel Co-Determination Act 1951
This enactment provides for workers in the steel, iron and coal industries to
elect five of eleven members of each company's supervisory board56. The five
employee representatives on the board exercise a voice equal to the five
shareholder representatives which results in a system of
56. Gruson & Meilicke, The New Co-Determination Law In Germany, 1977,32 BUS.
LAW 571, 572
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parity co-determination. This element of parity was further preserved by
requiring all ten board members to select the chaeman", Under this Act the
supervisory board is also responsible for appointing a three-member
management board which in tum is responsible for running the company on a
day-to-day basis and addressing specific problems. WOrker-participation on
the supervisory board tends to be restricted to the policy-making level and
does not lead to participation on the technical managing boards58.
b) The CO-Determination Law 1976
The 1976 CO-Determination Law greatly expands the number of business
entities that are subject to the principle of parity co-determination. The
provisions of this law now apply to most legal entities, including joint stock
companies (AG), limited liability companies and partnerships limited by
shares58. Excluded from the effect of its provisions are entities already
regulated by other co-determination laws60 as well as political, charitable and
news media organisations61. For a company to come within the regulation of
57. Vorbrugg, Labor Participation In German Companies And Its European Context,
1977, 111NT'L LAW, 249, 255
58. Comment. Co-Determination in West Germany. 1971,51 OR. L. REV. 214.215-
16
59. Section 1(1} Co-Determination Law 1976
60 Such as the coal and steel industries that still are subject to the 1951 Act.
61. Section 1(4} Co-Determination Law 1976
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this law it must employ more than 2,000 employees62• Every company that is
subject to this law is required to create a supervisory board, if it does not
already have one63• Such a supervisory board is to have an equal number of
shareholder and employee members".
The 1976 Law clearly specifies the size of the supervisory board based on a
sliding scale according to the number of employees, and also specifies the
proportion of union and other employees entitled to sit on each supervisory
board65. Office staff and clerical workers are entitled to vote for a number of
electors proportionate to their representation in the total work force66. The
electors in tum vote for the supervisory board members. These arrangements
suggest a legislative purpose of preventing production worker from
dominating the employee seats. Requiring proportional representation
obviously prevents the more numerous production workers from blocking the
election of any representatives from the clerical and administrative minority.
The CO-Determination Law thus recognises that different groups of
employees constitute separate interest groups according to their work
classification.
62. Section 1(1)
63. Section 6(1) .
64. Section 7(1)
65. Section 7(1) & (2). It provides that the supervisory board with six to eight
employee members should have two union members. This law does not, however,
interfere with the intemal procedures by which such union members are selected.
66. Section 11(2)
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A striking contrast to the Anglo-American position is the Co-Determination
Law's treatment of managerial employees by defining and treating senior
managers as part of the office worker rank67. The Co-Determination Act also
authorises the supervisory board to appoint one labour director who is to be a
member of the company's supervisory board. Once appointed the official is
regarded as a member of the enterprise's management, similar to a Vorstand
member.
The law requires that all the responsibilities of labour and social activities be
concentrated in the duties of the labour director and that such responsibilities
may not be diluted by delegating them to any other official of the company.68
The labour director also exercises powers and performs such duties as are
prescribed by the Co-Determination law as well as those provided by other
lavvs.69 As is in the case of the managing directors appointed to the
management board, divesting shareholders of the right to appoint this
important member of the supervisory board constitutes a significant
appropriation of shareholders' powers in German companies. This constitutes
one of the key differences between German shareholders' rights to determine
the composition of their boards and those of their Anglo-American
counterparts.
67. Section 3 (3) (1)
68. See Hoffmann 0, The German Co-Determination Act 1976 at 34 (1976).
69. Such as the Labor Management Relations Act of 1972, BGBI1 13 (1972)
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c) The Works Council Act 1972
First enacted in 1952 the Works Council Act provides for co-determination at
the shop level, as opposed to the corporate boardroom." The 1972 Act also
applies to small enterprises not subject to the 1976 Co-Determination Law.
The Works Council Act has a very wide scope. Any enterprise employing five
or more workers shall elect a works council with at least three of the
employees being eligible to act as electors". This Act requires works
councils to co-operate with employers for the welfare of "the employees and
the enterprisen
The role of works councils is, however, not limited to that of soliciting and
facilitating employee suggestions but they are also granted a specific, but
limited, role of resolving policy issues and disputes. Members of the works
council are also responsible for facilitating employees' efforts to exercise
various rights that are granted to them under the Works Council Act. Among
these rights are the right to inspect one's personal file,73 the right to lodge
70. This law sUbstantially amends and extends the Works Council Act 1952
71. Section 1 Works Council Act 1972; S5 7-9 specify the eligibility rules for election
to a work council.
72. Section 2(1)
73. Section 3 Works Council Act 1972
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complains74 and the right to demand explanations on how the employees are
remunerated. 75
With regard to companies that are not subject to any co-determination law,
the Stock Corporation Act will apply. The number of supervisory board
members stipulated by the Stock Corporation Act depends on the amount of
stated capital. The requirement under this Act is that for companies with a
stated capital:
- of up to OM 3,000,000.00 : nine members
- exceeding OM3,000,000.00 : fifteen members
- exceeding OM 20,000,000.00 : twenty-one members.
The German supervisory board is, therefore, the controlling body and the
management board is required to report regularly to it. Although parity
representation between the shareholders and the employees is required in
large companies in practice the chairman, who has a veto power, is normally
from the shareholders' side and is almost always a bank representative.
Despite the supervisory board's right to appoint and dismiss members of the
Vorstand, outright dismissals are rare. Members of the Vorstand who no
longer enjoy the confidence of the Aufsichtsrat often resign and may stand for
re-election after five years.
74.5.84
75.5.82 (2)
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E) BOARD STRUCTURE IN THE UNITED STATES
As in the U.K., U.S. boards of directors have, in the main, the duty of making
the major business decisions and defining the general policy while leaving
the execution and the day to day operations to the officers. Thus, in theory,
there is a clear distinction betvveen directors and officers with the usual
officers being the president as the chief executive officer, the vice
president(s), the secretary and the cashier76.
1. Attitude Towards Codetermination
For a long time there was no worker participation at enterprise level in U.S.
companies. The unions rejected any such role for they viewed their function
as one of confrontation with management through collective bargaining, and
any participation in management would have been inconsistent with that
function. The general attitude of Americans towards the issue of worker-
director was well worded by Ellenberger when he stated:
" He ( the American worker) is smart enough to know, in his
bones, that salvation lies - not in reshuffling the chairs in the
board room or the executive suite - but in the growing strength
and bargaining power of his 0""" autonomous union." 77
76. Vagts, D. F, Basic Corporation Law, 3th ed, 1989,298, Foundation Press Inc.
77. Ellenberger, The Realities of Co-Determination AFL - CIO Federationist, 15 Oct.
1977,25
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In this regard the European idea of codetermination initially had a cold
reception in the U.S. Apart from this general attitude, a variety of legal
provisions impeded companies from adopting co-determination. Companies
Codes provide for the election of directors only by shareholders78 and
bondholders.79 It is also note'NOrthy that effective co-determination requires
reasonably strong employee organisations to whom the employee board
members are ansvverable, and with a co-operative relationship between the
managers and the employees. A good relationship between employer and
employee, in that system, 'NOuld require changes in legal rules and attitude.80
One of the most obvious contrasts between American law and that of
Germany is the right of workers to information concerning the enterprise.
Section 106 BetrVG requires that the employer should keep the employee
representatives informed" in time and thoroughly" concerning a wide range
of matters including the economic and financial situation of the enterprise.
This enables the representatives to make informed decisions on behalf of the
workers. In the U.S., unions are not entitled to such information. Employee
78. Section 36 of the Model Business Corp. Act (1979); This exclusive right of
shareholders could, however, be side-stepped by a provision in the charter under
the " otherwise provided" clause of S. 35 of the Act.
79. Section 221, General Corporation Law, Del. Code Ann tit 8 (1974)
80. Summers C.W, Worker Participation In The U.S. and West Germany: A
Comparative StUdy From An American Perspective, 1980,28 AM. J. COMP LAW,
381-2,
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participation, which should be a means of avoiding confrontational situations
between managers and workers, was, therefore, not given the same
emphasis in the U.S
Although American company law does not expressly provide for a supervisory
body within the corporate structure as it exists in Germany, in practice the
functional position of the outside directors" amounts to a somewhat similar
institution. The main difference is that • outside directors' do participate in the
management of the enterprise by approving the acts of the executive
directors". This structure of management has been quite flexible in practice.
The trend presently is to find what is called " inside boards" where most or
even all the directors are executive directors of the company or of affiliated
companies.
Though some large companies have "inside boards" that consist only of
executives, yet most boards are mixed, with inside or full-time and outside or
part-time directors. At the state level, beyond the obligation to appoint
directors, state statutes normally have no mandatory provisions regulating
board structure83. As far as federal laws are concerned, only the Investment
81. These are members of the boardof directors who are not officers.
8~. !he NewYork Stock Exchange, however, requires that listed companies have a
mInimum of two directors independent of management - S. 303, New York Stock
Exchange, Listed Company Manual.
83. The vast majority of American states' statutes still require that every company
h~s. a board of directors although different statutes differ with respect to the
minimum number of directors - see H. Hennand J. Alexander, Laws of Corporations
741-42, LittleBrown & Co.
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Company Act of 1940 as amended in 1970 and 1982 expressly require that
every investment company should have a board of directors of which at least
40% of whom are to be disinterested in the sense of not serving other interest
in the management of the company84.
2. The Contributions Of the Courts
Despite this lack of uniform compulsory requirements the courts in their
rulings have promoted the idea of independent board supervision85. The
courts, in particular, have contributed to the American board structure in a
rather unusual way by according high regard to the business judgment of
outside board members86. Such regard is seen in the presumption that
outside directors act reasonably and in good faith in making decisions on the
company's behalf. In Kamin v. American Express Co.51 the directors of
84. Section 10(a) InvestmentCompany Act, 15 U.S.C. 80a - 10(a) 1982
8~. Dent, The Revolution In CorporateGovernance, The Monitoring Board, And The
Director's Duty of Care, 1981,61 B.U.L.REV 623,629-81 discusses the concept of
an independent monitoring board and assesses the concept in light of legislative
proposals.
86. ~he business judgement rule is a presumption that directors, in performing their
fu~ctions, are honest and well-meaning and the their decisions are informed and
rationally undertaken. - Solomon, L.D. and Palmiter, A.R., Corporations, 1994, 132,
Little Brown.
87. 383, NY.S. 2d 807 ( Sup. Ct 1976)
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American Express faced the choice of liquidating a bad stock investment or
distributing the stock to the shareholders as a special dividend which \YOuld
have resulted in additional tax liability for the shareholders. The board opted
for the distribution of dividend despite shareholders' protests. The directors
explained to the court their concern that liquidation might have had an
adverse effect on the company's net income figure and the court found the
concern sufficient. In Graham v. Allis Chalmers Manufacturing Co.88 the court
refused to hold the directors liable for not instituting antitrust compliencs."
Institutions and associations have had considerable influence over board
structure in the U.S. The New York Stock Exchange requires that newly listed
firms should have at least two independent board members90. The most
outstanding contributions on the issue of board structure has been made by
the American Law Institute (ALI) Corporate Governance project.
3. The American Law Institute's (AU's) Contribution To Board Structure
The ALI's Principles of Corporate Governance ( PCG)91 advocate a board
88. 188 A. 2d 125 ( Del. 1963)
89. Also Shlensky v. Wrigley, 237 N.E. 2d 776 ( III. App. 1968)
90. New York Stock Exchange, Inc, Company Manual, 1988,29
91. ALI Principles of Corporate Governance: Analysis and Recommendations 83-84
(Tent. Draft No.2 1984)
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monitoring scheme for the oversight of managers of "publicly held
corporations"92 This scheme envisages a division of functions between the
senior executives of the company who are in charge of the day-to-day
management and the company's board of directors whose task is to monitor
and control the executives.93 This division of functions between the
executives and the board is supported by a number of other provisions
designed to refashion the board so that it can perform its monitoring role
more effectively. The peG requires that all large public companies with no
controlling shareholder should have independent non-executive directors as
the majority on the board and at least three for all other public compernes."
Other provisions designed to enhance the monitoring role of the board
include Section 3A.04 which recommends a nomination committee for all
public companies to be composed entirely of non-executive directors, a
majority of whom should be independent. Section 3.05 requires the adoption
of audit committees by large public companies. Section 3A.02 recommends
the adoption of compensation committees by large companies to advise on
directors' and senior executives' remuneration. These committees are to
92. A pUblicly held corporation is defined by Section 1.31 as a corporation with 500
or more record holders of equity securities and at least S5m of assets
93. Sections 3.01 and 3.02 of the ALI's Corporate Governance Recommendations.
94. A large public company has been defined in Section 1.24 as a corporation with
2,000 or more record holders of its securities and at least S100m of assets
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be composed of non-executive directors, a majority of whom are to be
independent. Sections 3.03 and 3.04 require that all directors be given rights
to corporate information and advice from their own experts at the expense of
the company.
Comparing these provisions with the corresponding ones in the Cadbury's
Report it becomes clear that although Cadbury also emphasizes the
monitoring role of the board and also advocates reforms to boardcomposition,
its provisions do not carry the same force as those of the PCG. It does not
specify anyminimum number of non-executive directors95 and fails to formally
recommend a nomination committee. 96
One of the main purposes of independent outsiders on the board is the
loosening of internal corporate power structure by creating an intermediate
supervision of corporate management within the unitary board system. The
lameness of outside directors in fulfilling this role is illustrated by their
inability to monitor and oversee the actions of the executives. Given the
domination of the internal election processes by management it is not
surprising that managers select outside directors who
95. Paras. 4.8 and 4.9 simply enumerate the qualities of non-executive directors
and recommend that they should form a majority.
96. Para 4.30 discusses the merits of nomination committees without making any
recommendation.
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are sympathetic to their views and are unlikely to challenge them in their
positions.97
In such situation supervisors are chosen by the good graces of those to be
supervised and therefore feel personally indebted to and dependent upon
them
98
. This is obviously the case for outside directors who are unlikely to
depart, at a board meeting, from the inside line determined by management.
Milgrom and Roberts have indicated that non-executive directors
" rely on the executives for most of the information they receive,
and they need relationships with the officers if they are to
function well in guiding corporate policy. Often, directors share
similar backgrounds and interests with the firms executives. ,,99
Moreover they often occupy interlocking directorates, and merely change
their respective roles as executive and non - executive directors. 100
97. A common phrase used in describing this situation is that management prefer to
choose directors who do not" rock the boar. Green H. S, Why Directors Can't
Protect The Shareholders, FORTUNE, 17th Sept. 1984 at 28.
98. Herman, E., Corporate Control, Corporate Power, 1981, 31 - indicates that
directors serving on the board at the chief executives request will have a sense of
loyalty to him with personal ties also being present.
99. Milgrom, P., and Roberts, J., Economics, Organization and Management, 434,
Englewood Cliff, N J Prentice Hall
100. Senate Subcommittee On Reports, Accounting And Management Of The
Committee On Governmental Affairs, "Inter1ocking Directorates Among The Major
U.S. Corporations " S. Doc. No. 107, 95th Cong., 2nd Sess.1 (1972). The
implication is that the managers of one company oversee the managers of another
- Cowan A.L. , Board Room Back Scratching, New York Times, June 2, 1993, 01 -
where it was stated that five pairs of companies had their executives sitting on each
others compensation committee.
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4. Moves Which Favour Emlpoyee Representation
On U.S. Corporate Boards
Since the mid 1980s there has been a tremendous amount of attention in the
U.S. focused on various measures by which workers can be drawn into the
decision-making and production processes of their companies. The
continental view that corporate management should consider the interests of
other constituencies in the system, thus, appears to have now attained some
credence in the United States. The reason for this interest in the participatory
role of workers is based on the present notion that participatory work
arrangements bring about dual gain. By allowing workers participation in
production decisions that affect their daily work life, it is believed that 'NOrking
can be made more meaningful and satisfying to the 'NOrkers. The other arm of
the dual gain lies in the potential for improvement in production because to
ignore workers' input is to overlook a vast reservoir of potential improvements
in the business industry.
A number of Delaware decisions have expanded the business judgment rule
to allow corporate directors to take into account the impact of their decision-
making on other corporate 'stakeholder' groups especially employees and
creditors. In Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum CO.,101 the court suggested that
101.493 A. 2d 946, 955 (Del. 1985)
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the business judgment rule allows directors to consider, among other factors,
the effect of takeovers on creditors, employees, customers and even the
community generally 'Nhen implementing defensive measures102. Twenty-
eight states in the U.S. have now passed U other constituency" statutes
permitting, though usually not requiring, senior managers and corporate
directors to consider the interests of other stakeholders103• Although there is
evidence that workers do desire some input into actual strategic corporate
decisions-making104 such participation will involve decisions in areas that
have historically been regarded as management's domain. Reiterating this
102. In Revlon, Inc V. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc, 506 A 2d 173, 182
(Del. 1986) the court stated that the board may give regard to other various
constituencies of the company when discharging its responsibility
103. The Minnesotastatute is typical in this regard. It reads:
U In discharging the duties of the position of director, a director
may, in considering the best interests of the corporation,
consider the interests of the corporation's employees,
customers, suppliers, creditors, the economyof the state and
nation, communityand societal considerations, and the long-
term as well as short-term interestsof the corporation and its
shareholders including the possibilitythat these interests may
be best served by the continued independence of the
corporation."
MINN. STAT. ANN. S. 302A. 251(5) ( West Supp. 1993). Other Statutes include
those.Of Connecticut, Iowa, Indiana, Pennsylvania and Georgia - Hansen, C. Other
Constituency Statutes : A Search For Perspective, 46 Bus. Law. 1355, at 1355 (
1991).
10~. Kochan T.A, Katz H.C. and Mower N.R, Worker Participation And American
Unions: Threat or Opportunity? Kalamazo, Michigan: W.E. John Institute for
Employment Research, 1984, 108 - 112.
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point Howard Samuel, President of the AFL - CIO Industrial Union
Department, has stated :
u What is needed is a much more deep - seated change in
labour-management relationships, in which workers through
their unions are kept informed of major decisions affecting
production and employment, and they have the means of
influencing those decisions to protect the best interests of
workers and the company. ,,105
There has been greater emphasis on providing a more humane working
environment in which employees achieve greater job satisfaction. The
Chrysler Corporation which was in great financial distress, asked the
President of the United Auto Workers, to serve on its board of directors
which he did.106 Since then the Chrysler union has voted for the practice of
union participation on the board to be continued. 107 Other industries have
since negotiated for worker participation on their company boards although
so far it has been limited to companies in severe financial distress. In the
airline industry, at least six airlines have worker representation on their
boards of directors as a result of the collective bargaining process.108
105. II Worklite II Plans Given Mixed Review, AFL - CIO News (January 28,
1984 ).
106.116 LAB. REL. REP. (BNA) 92 (1984).
107. Ibid at 94.
108. See Developments, Employee Ownership, December 1983 at p. 4
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The most comprehensive arrangement for worker participation on a board of
directors appears to be that of Eastern Airlines, one of the largest airlines in
the U.S. The company was in severe financial difficulties having lost about
7.5 million dollars in 1982109• Because of this employees agreed to a one -
year pay cut of approximately eighteen per cent in return for shares worth
approximately twenty five per cent and the right to designate four members ,
one from each of the four major employee groups, for appointment to the
company's nineteen -member board of directors.110
Other elements to this agreement include:
1/ Union Choice of Directors: Management agreed to support the unions
nominations for directors, thereby making it clear that the choice of the
represertatives was that of the unions and not of management. 111
2/ Union Participation In Decisions : The agreement established a plan to
allow the employee group to review, comment and make suggestions on
issues regarding business plans and major capital expenditure112 .
3/ Director Representing Non - Union Employees: One of the directors was
109. Comment, Eastern Airlines, N.Y. Times ,December 9,1983, at 1 col 4 .
110. The agreements are contained as appendixes to the Eastem Airlines , Inc,
PROXY STATEMENT ( April 24 , 1984 ) and are further summarised in the
EASTERN AIR LINES INC.PROSPECTUS, (1984 Wage Investment Program).
111. 116 LAB. REL. REP. ( BNA) 92 ( 1984 ).
112. EASTERN AIR LINES INC., PROXY STATEMENT (April 24 ,1984)
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to be appointed by employees who are not represented by any union. This
addresses the concern that employees who are not union members should
also be given participatory rights.113 In addition to improving the level of
profitability, the agreement has clearly improved the work atmosphere at
Eastern Air tmes'",
The federal government is also encouraging worker participation
programmes . On May 1, 1984, the President's Commission On Industrial
Competitiveness ( PCIC) issued recommendations emphasizing the need for
greater labour - management co-operatoin and new collaborative efforts to
maximise productivity through open communication and worker
participation.115
F) UNITARY VERSUS TWO-TIER BOARD STRUCTURE
The question that has to be asked is how the German supervisory board
compares with the Anglo-American non-executive/outside directors. In an
attempt to answer this question this part of the work will compare the two
board structures. A closer look at both the unitary and two-tier structures
shows that each has its advantages and disadvantages. Under the U.K and
113. Summers, Codetermination In The United States: A Projection Of Problems
and Potentials, (1982),4 J. Compo Corp. L & Sec. Reg. 155, 161
114. Comment, Eastem Airlines, Wall St. J. Oct31,1984 at 1 col.6
115. Industrial Competitiveness Commission Report, 116 Lab REL REP.(BNA) 36(1984)
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u. S. systems independent non-executive directors are supposed to perform
functions similar to those of the German supervisory board. When compared
with non-executive directors, the supervisory board offers an advantage in
that the respective competences are clearly separated.
This very aspect of the two-tier structure can be criticized on the ground that
the board is supposed to be a homogeneous group which should work
harmoniously for the general good of the company. Like non-executive
directors , the supervisory board members may not be acquainted with the
details of the day-to-day business but as far as independent control is
concerned, the supervisory board may be at an advantage.
Although the functions of non-executive/outside directors can be compared to
those of the supervisory board, the representation of employees and trade
unions on the supervisory boards of German companies may, however, have
important implications on corporate control. While profits are of more
importance to shareholders, employees attach more importance to job
security. Output and employment growth may be in conflict with profit
maximisation which is the main concern of shareholders. In view of the self-
interest of corporate managers to acquire influence and reputation by
expanding the operations of their company, their preference is likely to have
a lot in common with the interest of employees. This is one of the reasons
why it has been contended that the German system of codetermination
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encourages inside collusion betvveen management and employees.116
Membership of the supervisory board is not determined by the Chief
Executive Officer but consists, by law, of shareholder and employee
representatives. No insider, including the Chief Executive Officer, can sit on
the supervisory board let alone dominate it as in the Anglo-American
system.!" Much of the success attributed to German boards can probably be
put down to the existence of institutional shareholders, who are also large
creditors, motivated to protect their investments and loans to the company but
the presence of employees on the same board may help to balance the
conflict of interests that may arise.
Under U.K. and U.S. laws shareholders exhaust their powers as equity
owners once they have voted in the election of directors - with the agency
rules stepping in to make such directors agents of the company. The
executive directors thereafter acquire powers delegated to them by the board.
The powers exercised by the German management board, in contrast, is not
116. Baums, T., The German Banking System and Its Impact on Corporate Finance
and Govemance, Universitat Osnabruck, Institut fur Handels-und Wirtschaftsrecht,
Working Paper, No. 2/93 (1993) at 24
117. Roe, M., Some Differences In Corporate Structure In Germany, Japan and
America, 1993, 102Yale LawJournal, 106
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delegated to it but rather conferred upon the board by statute. 118
The supervisory board possesses the authority to compel the management
board to submit reports on demand and can require that it obtains the
supervisory board's approval before entering into certain trensacnons'".
Board membership may provide major shareholders and creditors of German
companies with regular access to the company's long term plans. Another
striking features of the dual board structure is that it allows owners to interact
regularly with management and to review, though informally, management's
performance about four times a year120.
With such flow of information shareholders may be able to minimise their
investment risk and refrain from insisting on short-term objectives. The
infrequency with which the supervisory board meets has, however, been
viewed as one of the factors which makes the German model of internal
corporate control ineffective. On average such meetings are four times
118. Section 71 AktG 1965 - this section refers to the representation of the
company. In this regard German law strictly distinguishes between representation
and management. Representation has to do with extemal matters in which the
powers of the Vorstand can be restricted.
119. For example a company's supervisory board may make the extension of credit
above a certain level conditional upon the receipt of its prior approval - Baums, T.,
Corporate Govemance In Germany: The Role Of The Banks, 1992, 40 AM. J.
COMPo L. 503, 510
120. Roe, M. Some Differences In Corporate Structure In Germany, Japan and the
United States, 1993, 102 Yale L. J. 1 at 18
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a year and sometimes no more than the legal minimum of once every six
months.121 In such circumstances it becomes difficult to exercise any
reasonable level of control over the company. This is a contrast to the
frequent and often monthly meetings of the unitary board of the Anglo-
American system.
Critics of the German two-tier system have also argued that the supervisory
board has evolved into a closed shop, where all members work to perpetuate
each other's power and perks122• Heinrich Weiss, President of the Federation
of German Industries has described the atmosphere at supervisory board
meetings SUccinctly when he stated:
" the supervisory boards sometimes has no real control
over the managing board. If you sit on the supervisory board of
a large company and have labour representatives at the same
table, you do not dare to put a critical question to members of
the management board because you would be blaming them in
the presence of the works councillors, when the managers need
to keep their full authority it has come to be considered
impolite for a member of the supervisory board to ask a
question that is critical of management. This has led to a
situation, especially in very large companies, where control over
the management board has diminished to the point where
management board members invite their friends and colleagues
from other companies to join the supervisory board.........123
121. Section 110(3) AktG 1965
122. Schneider-Lenne, E., Corporate Control In Germany, Oxford Review of
Economic Ploicy, 1992,8(3) at 120
123. Biney, G. (ed), Debunking the Myths About the German Company, (1993),
Anglo- German Foundation Report in collaboration with the Royal Society for the
Encouragementof Arts, Manufactures, and Commerce (London: RSA), 12
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From all these the supervisory board appears to be far from perfect as a
monitoring organ and is not too far from the unitary board of the Anglo-
American system where the chief executive officers choose their own non-
executives. Roe is of the opinion that a more suitable title should be 'advisory
board' instead of 'supervisory board' as it exists merely to be consulted'".
Despite this the two-tier board structure has some advantages over the
Anglo-Saxon structure.
One obvious advantage of the German model of corporate control is the
emphasis on the long-term interests of stakeholders. The disadvantage,
however, is the rigidity that goes with it. Although long-term relationships with
shareholders and the involvement of employees foster business stability, they
discourage flexibility and make it difficult for German companies to change
directions as quickly as their Anglo-American counterparts.
G) CONCLUSION
In all three systems corporate boards are charged with monitoring
management on behalf of shareholders. In the Anglo-American system it has,
at least, the nominal power to hire and fire the Chief Executive Officer,
124. Roe, M., German Populism and the Large Public Corporation, (1994), 14
International Review of Law and Economics, 187 at 195; Also Prodhan, B.,
Corporate Governance and Long-Term Performance, (1993), Corporate
Governance: An Intemational Review, 172 at 176, criticises German supervisory
boards as degenerating into a clique of men perpetuating each others powers and
perks.
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set his compensation and block any major corporate projects. The structure
of the board is governed mainly by the rules and regulations of each
country's corporate law and although there is a host of evidence on the
weakness of boards in the U.S.,125 there is less direct evidence of the
effectiveness of boards in the U.K.126
By appointing non-executive directors to the board shareholders should be
able to rely on this impartial group to closely monitor management. Despite
the fact that board members in both systems are appointable by
shareholders, with the diffused nature of shareownership rarely does any
shareholder vote a large enough stake to get active representation on the
board thus the board is effectively chosen by the Chief Executive Officer. 127
125.Jensen, M., The Eclipse of Public Corporation, Harvard Business Review, Sept
1989, 85; Weisbach, M. S Outside Directors and CEO Turnover, Journal of
Financial Economics, 431. '
126. The Cadbury Report (1992) recommended a number of changes in the
structure of boards of U.K. companies. One of their recommendations was a formal
process for the selection of a number of independent non-executive directors to
corporate boards.
127 Green H.S, Why Directors Can't ProtectThe Shareholders, Fortune, 17th Sept.
19~ at 28 - states that only those men and women who can get along with the
chief executive are elected to the board; Also Prokesch S, America's Imperial Chief
~ecutive, N.Y. Times Oct. 12, 1986, 25 posits that nominating committees are
Simply the arm and will of the chief executive, who feeds the names; Cadman J,
Non-executive Directors: Are They Truly Independent? April 1995, S.J., 346 at 347
states that non-executive directors are not truly independent as their appointments
are examples of the "jobs for the old boys"approach.
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One of the main problems with the unitary board system is that supervision
and monitoring roles become entangled with strategic decision-making and
management roles of the board. The dual board structure, however, involves
the legal recognition of two classes of directors having separate capacities,
functions and powers128 thus providing a more effective check on an
overwhelming management than a group of non-executives on a unitary
board.
The two-tier board system creates a clear separation of monitoring and
management organs thus ensuring a distinct distribution of responsibilities
and powers within the company129. The establishment of a dual board,
therefore, represents a shift from the concept of shareholders being the
ultimate owners of the company with the right to control its affairs. The
German system, thus, attaches less importance to the ownership of a
company and more emphasis is placed on the promotion of the commercial
enterprise which includes all the groups involved in the company as a money
making concern.
These important differences between the practices of these systems and the
128. Many of American commentators are sceptical of the effectiveness of
supervision by outside directors and do not believe that non-management directors
make a significant difference - Borowski, Corporate Accountability: The Role Of The
Independent Director, 9 J. Corp. Law455 at 462 and470- 71.
129. Karmel, The Independent Corporate Board: A Means To What End?, 1984, 52
Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 534 .
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resulting effect on shareholders' rights moves one to question the enthusiasm
of those who hail the relevant provisions of the Draft Fifth Directive as a move
towards an effective pattern of corporate control in Europe. Although the two-
tier management structure attempts to separate management from control
this practice of separating management and control as seen under German
law has been criticised on the basis that management should be a
homogeneous group with no possibility of interference from outsiders.130
Notwithstanding the above criticism, it can, however, be argued that the
differences bet'Neen the management of these systems are not as much as
would appear at first glance. Although the Anglo-American system has not
established a special supervisory board, practice has often aeated a similar
organ. The functions of non-executive/outside directors are comparable to
those of the German supervisory board, though it should be kept in mind that
even non-executive/outside directors still manage the company by approving
management actions while such pO\N8r is not enjoyed by the supervisory
board. The two-tier system has an obvious appeal for the non-executive rank
whose responsibilities would be greatly reduced where they no longer bear
legal liability for the actions of their executive colleagues. Despite all these
130. Ackert, Shareholders And Management: A Comparative View On Some
Corporate Problems In The United States And Germany, 46 Iowa L. Rev. 12-83, 23.
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no serious considerations are being given to a change to the continental two-
tier board system in the Anglo-American system. 131
131. In the U.K. the various committees ( Cadbury, Greenbury and Hampel) neither
me~tioned nor discussed this option and the American Law Institute (ALI) did not
deliberate on this possibility either in its Corporate Governance Project.
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CHAPTER SIX
THE PROXYVOTING MACHINERY
A) INTRODUCTION
The position at common law was that members of a company had to attend
and vote personally at general meetings by a show of hands.' To enable
absent shareholders vote at general meetings proxy voting was introduced.
The meaning of the term 'proxy' depends on the context used as it may refer
to the grant of authority to act on a shareholder's behalf or to the person
holding the authoritt.
Proxy voting should enable shareholders to participate in the decision-
making processes of their company even \NIlen they are absent from a
meeting. This chapter examines the mechanism of the proxy voting system in
order to determine \NIlether it constitutes a meaningful way by \NIlich
shareholders can exercise their voting rights.
1. Hamen v. Phillips (1883) 23 Ch. D. 14 (C.A.)
2. It is supposed to give shareholders who cannot attend general meetings the
facility of authorising others to vote their shares to appoint and remove directors or
appr~ve transactions that require shareholders' approval. - Solomon L.D. and
Palmiter, A.R., Corporations, 1994, 274, Little, Brown & Co. Proxy voting is,~erefore, aimed at providing shareholders with the means of exercising their voting
nghts to effect changes when necessary.
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B) PROXY VOTING UNDERUNITED KINGDOM LAW
Under U. K. statutory law, any member of a company entitled to attend and
vote at a general meeting is entitled to appoint another person, whether a
member or not, as his proxy to attend and vote on his behalf.3 In the case of
a private company a proxy also has the right to speak at the meeting.4
Although the Jenkins Committee recommended that this right of proxies to
speak at general meetings of private companies should be extended to public
companies this recommendation has not been implemented.5
Unless the articles provide to the contrary, the provisions of Section 372 do
not apply to a company which does not have a share capital nor may a
member of a private company appoint more than one proxy to attend the
same meeting.6 Unless the articles so provide, a proxy can vote only on a
poll and not by a show of hands. A member of a public company may appoint
t'NO or more proxies to vote in respect of different shares held by him, or may
appoint two or more proxies in the alternative - so that if the first named proxy
fails to attend and vote, the second one may do 50.7
3. Section 372 Companies Act 1985.
4. Section 372(1) Companies Act 1985
5. The Jenkins Committee Report Cmnd 1749 para. 463
6. Section 372(2){a) and (b).
7. Section 372(1) and (2) Companies Act 1985.
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Where proxy appointments are to be "in the usual form" a minor error as to
the member's name or the shares held by him or as to any other matter, will
not render the appointment invalid provided it does not mislead anyone as to
the meeting at which the proxy is authorised to vote. In Oliver v. Dalgleish
and Others,8 proxies for use at an extraordinary general meeting of a
company were given to T and some others to B. These proxies related to
resolutions for the removal of two directors and for the election of two new
directors in their stead. The proxies given to T misdescribed the meeting as
the annual general meeting. Holding that a misprint on the face of a proxy
did not entitle the company to reject it, Buckley J. stated that:
" the mistake that was made here seems to me to be of
so inoffensive a character and so unlikely to mislead
anybody, or to have had any effect whatever on what
the shareholders did, that I think the chairman was
wrong on his ruling that these proxies were not
properly to be admitted. ,,9
The right to appoint proxies would be valueless if the board could require the
documents appointing proxies to be lodged with the company a considerable
time before the meeting is held. On this basis, the Companies Act 1985
invalidates any requirement in a company's articles that proxy appointments
should be lodged, with the company or any other person, earlier than forty-
8. [1963] 3 All ER 330
9. Atp. 335
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eight hours before the commencement of the meeting or an adiournment.'?
1. The Contribution Of Case Law In The Development Of Proxy Voting
The courts have greatly contributed to the development of the law on proxy
voting in the United Kingdom through the interpretation of statutory provisions
and companies' articles. In Jackson and Others v. Hamlyn and Others11 a
company's meeting was not finished on the first meeting day so there was a
motion and poll for the meeting to be adjourned for thirty days. If the vote
went against the proposed adjournment, another meeting was to be held as
soon as possible. The proposal to adjourn was defeated and the question to
be considered by the court was whether the meeting to be convened in due
course was a continuation of the original meeting or an adjournment, so that
new proxies could be used at the resumed meeting if they 'N8re deposited
forty-eight hours before the day of the resumed meeting. The court held that
the resumed meeting which was held nine days after the original meeting of
10. Section 372(5) Companies Act 1985; The standard articles also require proxies
to be filed 48 hours before the meeting. The Companies Act 1929 and earlier Acts
contained no provisions with regard to proxies and articles of companies formed
under those Acts often permitted the appointment of proxies but required their
appointment to be lodged seven to ten days before the meeting. Unless such
articles have been altered to conform to the Companies Act 1985, it would seem
that lOdgement in advance of the meeting cannot be required by the company since
lodgement at an earlier or later time will render the proxy void.
11. [1953] 1 Ch. 57
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January 29,1953, was simply a continuation and not an adjournment and that
no proxies deposited after January 18, 1953 'NOuld be valid as the articles
required proxies to be deposited forty-eight hours before the meeting.
It is common for companies' articles to provide that a vote given by a proxy
shall be effective notwithstanding the revocation of the authority, provided
that the company has not received notice of the revocation." Where the
articles so specify such notice must be received before the meeting.
Provisions to that effect are clearly effective as between the company and the
members. In Spiller v. Mayo (Rhodesia) Development Company Limited13 it
was held that where the revocation has not been properly effected, the
member has a right to attend and vote in person and the company has a duty
to accept the member's votes in place of the proxy's.
In Cousins v. International Brick Company Limited,14 one of the articles of a
company provided that a vote given in accordance with the terms of an
instrument of proxy will be valid notwithstanding the previous revocation of
the proxy as long as the company has not received a written revocation
before the meeting. The Court of Appeal held that where a proxy had not
12. Article 63 of Table A 1985.
13. [1926] W.N. 78
14. [1931] 2 Ch. 90
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been validly revoked, the shareholder who had given the proxy was free to
attend the meeting and vote personally, Lord Hanworth observed that:
"In the absence of clear words taking away the shareholder's
personal right to vote the shareholder is able to attend and
give his O\Nl1 vote according to his O\Nl1 volition and the proxy
has no right to prevent it."15
An interesting question in relation to proxies is whether they are compelled to
exercise the authority conferred upon them. Unless there is a binding
contract or an equitable obligation compelling them to do so, the answer
appears to be in the negative. Generally, there is only a gratuitous
authorisation imposing no positive obligation on the agent, but merely a
negative obligation not to vote contrary to the instructions of his principal if he
votes at all. There may, however, be a binding contract if, for example, the
proxy is to be remunerated. In addition there may be a fiduciary duty if, for
instance, the proxy is the shareholder's professional adviser.
Although directors are not normally fiduciaries to individual shareholders, it
appears that if they are appointed proxies and instructed how to vote they are
required to obey those instructions. In Second Consolidated Trust v. Ceylon
Amalgamated Estates.16 in order to alter its debenture stock a company
needed to pass an extraordinary resolution. At the general meeting convened
for that purpose, the fourteen people present in person were unanimously in
15. Atp. 101
16. [1943] 2 All ER 567
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favour of the resolution but did not constitute a quorum unless the proxies
were counted. If a poll was demanded and the proxies used, the meeting
would have been quorate but the resolution would not have been passed.
The chairman, aware of all the facts and acting bona fide, did not demand a
poll so the resolution was passed by those present in person. The plaintiff
shareholders contended that the meeting was not properly constituted, the
proceedings were irregularly conducted and that the resolution was invalidly
passed. It was held that the chairman was under a legal duty to demand a
poll to give effect to the real sense of the meeting. Stating the position
succinctly Uthwatt, J. emphasized that:
"The duty of a chairman of a meeting is to ascertain the
sense of the meeting upon a resolution properly
coming before the meeting ..... I do not regard that as
a personal right to be exercised according to the fancy
of the chairman; in other words I do not think he has
unlimited discretion as to the manner in which he may
exercise that povver.,,17
2. Solicitation Of Proxies Under U.K. Law
Directors are allovved to employ companies' funds in printing or sending out
to shareholders proxy forms which are normally filled up with the names of
the directors or their nominees as proxies and in stamping and posting the
forms provided they honestly believe the expenses to be in the best interest
17.Atp.569
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of the company. In Peel v. London and North Western Railway Company,
Buckley L.J. commented that:
"the company may legitimately do and may defray out
of its assets the reasonable expense of doing all such
acts as are reasonably necessary for calling the
meeting and obtaining the best expression of the
corporation's views on the questions to be brought
before it...18
Although the provisions on proxy voting and the case law authorities give an
appearance of shareholder democracy and members being given the
opportunity to participate in the decision-making processes of their
companies, this appearance may be deceptive. The proxy voting machinery
may actually help to strengthen directors' positions on the board thus putting
them at an advantage over the shareholders. As Gower succinctly puts it:
It cannot be said, that these provisions have done much to
curtail the tactical advantages possessed by the directors. They
still strike the first blow and their solicitation of proxy votes is
likely to meet with substantial reponse before the opposition is
able to get under way. Even if their proxies are in the 'two-way'
form, many memberswill complete and logde them after hearing
but one side of the case, and only the most intelligent or
obstinate are likely to withstand the impact of the ....
uncontradicted assertions of the directors...19
This leaves shareholders' power to determine the composition of their boards
18. [1907] 1 Ch. 5 at p. 19
19. Gower L.C.B, Gower's Principles of Modem Company Law ( 6th Ed. By Paul L.
Davies), 1997,580.
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a mere window dressing. According to Prentice and Holland:
"This inherent powerlessness of shareholders has
been exacerbated rather than reduced by the proxy
voting system, at least as far as the United Kingdom is
concerned, because proxies tend to be exercised pro-
management and are granted before any shareholder
meeting is actually held.,,20
Emphasizing the fact that management usually obtains a majority vote during
shareholders' meetings, Maughan, J. gives a vivid description of the position
thus:
" ..... the dice are loaded in favour of the views of the
directors : the notices and circulars are sent out at the
cost of the company, the board has had plenty of time
to prepare ..... If we contrast it with the position of a
class of objectors, it is to be observed that a member of
the class ..... has no funds with \Nhich to fight the case
and he has no information .....,,21
Even though the Stock Exchange requires that listed companies should send
out "two_way" proxies to enable members to direct their proxies \Nhether to
vote for or against any resolution," some members will complete and lodge
the form before hearing the other side of the case. Only the very obstinate
20. 0 0 Prentice and P R Holland (eds), Contemporary Issues In Corporate
Governance, 1993,27, Clarendon Press.
21. Per Maughan, J. in Re Dorman Long and Company Limited [1934] Ch. 635 at
657-658
22. Yellow Book, Section 5, Chapter 2, para. 36. Table A of the 1985 Companies
A.ct al~o includes two forms of proxy, one of which gives the proxy complete
dlscretlo~ (Art. 60) and the other, a two-way proxy which is to afford members an
opportUnity of instructing the proxy how it is to vote (Art. 61).
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shareholders are likely to enquire into the assertions of the directors. In this
sense U.K. does not have the sort of rules that regulate proxy voting in the
U.S.
In 1975 Midgley, in a study to assess the use of proxies at general meetings,
had observed that even if a reply card is provided to shareholders for the
purpose of proxy votiing very few actually respond by appointing proxies23.
Prentice states that there is no evidence that much has changed since then24.
Even where a few shareholders seek to obtain proxies from other
shareholders to oust incumbent management they may run into problems
since indifferent shareholders are unlikely to withdraw their proxies after
hearing the arguments of the opposition.
As a result proxy fights are rare in the U.K. as few shareholders bother to turn
up and vote, or even sign the proxy forms assigning voting power to another
shareholder or other duly appointed proxies25. This leaves the board of
directors free to approve its own slate of directors.
23. Midgley, Companies and Their Shareholders - The Uneasy Relationship. 1975,
52
24. Prentice D.O., Aspects of Corporate Govemance Debate, in Prentice and
Holland (eds), Contemporary Issues in Corporate Govemance, 1993,41, Clarendon
Press,
25. Charkham J, Keeping Good Companies, 1995, Oxford University Press 294 -
where he states that few shareholders botherto complete their proxy cards.
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In theory, an opposition group can make use of the company's facilities to
communicate its ovvn views or to oppose the board, but the reality is that this
does not generally affect management position in any way. The fact that
management may not provide shareholders with the relevant information on
the proposals that would be voted on at an annual general meeting may
make shareholders' voting powers iIIusory.26 Management selects nominees
for appointment to the board and makes recommendations concerning them.
The board of directors, therefore, gets its ovvn policies and personnel voted
through without having to worry about adverse shareholder reaction.
C) PROXY VOTING UNDER GERMAN LAW
Although German law allows registered shares, most shares in German
public companies are in bearer form, and are deposited with banks. Such
shares give banks the right to exercise the votes attached to the shares as
proxies, without having to identify themselves as shareholders. The result is
that proxy voting gives German banks enormous influence over corporate
26. This Position must have moved Smith to hold the view that despite the greatly
increased financial reporting regulation, the reporting systems are not used by the
board to inform shareholders - see Smith, T. Accounting For Growth, 1992, 8-17,
London: Century Business; See also Sheridan, T and Kendall N, Corporate
G.ovemance, An Action Plan For Profitability and Business Success, 1992, 178
Pitman - where they state that with the existing regulation of the financial reporting
system audit committees of U. K. companies should have no excuse for abdicting
from their jobs.
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decision-making. This voting power exerciseable through their positions as
proxies enables the banks to vote the shares on behalf of the members
concerned without identifying the sharehotder." Banks normally appropriate
the function of voting by proxy to themselves by including a blanket
authorisation in every deposit agreement facilitating their appointment as
proxies by depositors.
German law recognises this practice of depository voting by providing that a
person who has been authorised by a shareholder to exercise voting rights in
his own name in respect of shares Vv'hich are not held by him, shall specify
the amount and class of such shares.28
1. Proxy Voting By German Banks
Although individual shareholders are generally not interested in attending
and voting at general meetings, a high proportion of their total voting power
will be represented at such meetings. The banks as custodians of deposited
shares are usually notified of proposed general meetings.
Professor Baums has succinctly described the voting power of German bank
thus:
27. Section 136(4) AktG, 1965 BGB1 1118 (W.Germ)
28. Section 129(3) AktG, 1965
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"All banks together on average represented more than four-
fifths (82.67%) of all votes which were present in company
meetings. With one exception, they always had at least a
majority of votes present. Consequently, they were able to elect
the members of the supervisory boards (so far as these are
elected by the shareholders, and not the employees).,,29
Banks are required to request from their clients instructions on how to vote
and should advise shareholders that they will exercise their voting rights in
accordance with the instructlon." In the absence of a contrary instruction a
bank will exercise the proxy in the way indicated on the form. This is known
as deposit share voting right (DSVR).31 To vote depository shares at a
general meeting banks have to follow a rather complicated procedure. They
have to submit to the shareholders specific proposals of how they intend to
exercise the shareholders' voting rights at a particular meeting.
Where no specific instructions have been given by the shareholders, banks
are permitted to vote in accordance with their own proposals." In exceptional
cases, however, a bank may deviate from the instructions received or from its
own proposals, if it appears from the circumstances that the shareholders
29. Baums T, Corporate Governance In Germany. The Role Of The Banks, 40 Am.
J. Compo L. 503 at 507
30. Section 128(3), AktG 1965
31. Section 135(6), AktG 1965
32. Section 135 para. 5, AktG 1965
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would approve of the deviation. Shareholders have to be informed of such
deviations and the reasons for mem."
The main question at this point is, whether German banks actually use their
proxy votes to influence management decisions. In large German companies
shareholders appoint up to one half of the supervisory board members
depending on the size of the company, the rest being appointable by the
employees. The supervisory board in turn appoints the management board
and approves major corporate decisions while the management board
handles day-to-day declslons." Banks use their votes to elect nominees to
the supervisory boards and in most cases a bank nominee chairs the board.
Commenting on the process by which German banks acquire influence over
corporate decision-making Roe states:
"Typically, individual investors deposit the stock they
own with their bank, and unless the owner gives the
bank special instructions, the bank votes the custodial
shares. . German bankers use their votes to elect
bank nominees to the supervisory boards of ninety-six
of the one hundred largest German firms and in
fourteen cases, a banker chairs the supervisory board.
Although no single bank generally controls an
industrial firm, together the three German large banks
can, if they act in unison, dominate the shareholders'
side of the supervisory board.,,35
33. Section 135 para. 8 AktG 1965
34. Chapter five of this work has highlighted the German two-tier board structure.
35. Roe M.J, Some Differences In Corporate Structure In Germany, Japan, and The
United States, 1993, 102 Yale Law Journal, 1927 at 1938-39; Also Baums T, Banks
And Corporate Control, 1991, 29-30, Berkerly Law And Economics Working Paper
No. 91-1
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2. Problems Faced By Banks In Their Role As Proxies
The exercise of proxy votes by banks places them in a unique position to
influence the outcome of shareholders meetings. Given small shareholders'
inactivity, the banks as proxy holders enjoy high voting rights without a
corresponding investment or risk and their readiness to represent small
shareholders could also affect individual shareholder activism.
The second problem is the issue of confl/'ct of interests. In most instances
banks are far from being disinterested representatives of the shareholders.
Due to the multiple role of German banks their interests and expectations
might be in direct conflict with those of the company's shareholders. Such
banks could exercise members' votes in a way that will safeguard their
personal interests and maintain their status. Their votes are, therefore, very
important on issues of corporate control and if they support management,
banks which are supposed to vote in the interest of shareholders could, on
the contrary, stifle shareholder activity36.
Banks' decisions on investment may be influenced by the desire to prevent
the company from withdrawing its deposit. They may vote for a new issue of
shares more in the hope of earning fees as underwriters than in the interest
of the company. Banks' interest in having a secured debtor may influence
36. Chapter three of thiswork dicusses this problem of institutional investors
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their votes for accumulation of profit against the distribution of dividends to
shareholders. These multiple roles played by German banks bring into
question the extent to which banks can truly represent the interest of
shareholders in general meeting when determining the composition of the
supervisory board. 37 As a result of this potential conflict of interests German
banks, as depository institutions with power to influence the decision-making
processes in companies, have experienced increasing criticism. 38
3. Moves To Limit Bank Powers Over The Proxy Machinery
The powers of German banks have attracted public, media and political
attention and as a result political forces have been at work in Germany in an
attempt to limit banks' influence over the governance of large companies."
37. Commenting on this Harm states that it is likely that the combination of equity
ownership, board membership and creditor of the same company influence bank
representation of other shareholders. -Harm, C. The Relationship Between German
Banks And Large German Firms, 1992, Policy Research Working Paper, 19
38. Baums T, Takeovers v. Institutions in Germany, in D.O. Prentice and P.R.J.
Holland (eds), Contemporary Issues In Corporate Governance, 1992, 155,
Clarendon Press; Prowse S, Corporate Governance In An International Perspective
: A Survey Of Corporate Control Mechanisms Among Large Firms In The United
States, United Kingdom, Japan and Germany, 1995, at 25, New York University,
S.olomon Center; Oomberg J, The Spreading Might Of Deutsche Bank, New York
Times, September23, 1990,28
39. Protzman F, Mighty German Banks Face Curbs, New York Times, Nov 7, 1989
at 01, Where it is reported that the German parliament has begun studying steps to
limit banks' voting power, seats on supervisory boards and their general influence in
Corporate decision-making.
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Managers in large companies have also opposed bankers' influence and
significant representation on the supervisory boards and are urging that laws
be put in place to reduce their dominance over compames." The German
government has also shown an intention to curb banks' powers by limiting the
depository shares that a banks may hold and vote on behalf of other
shareholders.41
Large German banks have, however, bowed to this pressure by lowering their
public profile and announcing that they will not fight curbs on their power over
the proxy machinery and other channels of control.42 Along these lines
German banks have started to vote their shares less aggressively in addition
to moves towards reducing industrial holdings in large German companies43
40. Roth T, West German Banks Face Threat Of Reduced Influence In Industry :
Bonn Will Consider Rules To Curb Their Holdings And Seats In Boardrooms, Wall
Street Journal, July 18, 1989 at A20 where it is stated that "with main stream politics
coming into play, bankers worry that they will be forced to sell part of their sizeable
equity holdings in West German industries, thus threatening their dominant position
in the country's equity marker.
41. Economist, Those German Banks and Their Industrial Treasures, (1995)
Economist, Jan. 21, 91-2; Also Chenoff, J., German Banks May Face New Rules
Pensions and Investments, 1994, 42
42 Kubler F.K, Institutional Owners And Corporate Managers: A German Dilemma,
1991,57 Brook. L. Rev., 97 at 101.
43. Fisher, A. Germany 97: Banking: Shake-up Sharpens Focus, Fin. Times, Nov.
18, 1997, 7 - states that Deutsche Bank produced a bombshell with its surprise five
per cent stake in Bayerische Vereinsbank, the big Bavarian bank. This move has
marked a radical departure from its traditional policy of holding large stakes in
companies.
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D) PROXY VOTING IN THE UNITED STATES
Prior to 1934 there were serious abuses of the proxy voting system in the
United States and the methods used then to obtain proxies were often
startling. Some companies even included statements creating proxies on the
back of each dividend cheque that they sent out to their shareholders." The
U.S. has now regulated proxies to a much greater extent than the U.K, the
most important legislative intervention being Rule 14a of the Securities
ExchangeAct 1934.45
1. Statutory Development Of Proxy Voting
As in the United Kingdom, the right to vote by proxy at corporate meetings in
the United States was not recognised under common law. In Philips v.
Wickham,46 expressing the opinion that voting by proxy was not a common
44. Vagts D.V, Basic Corporation Law, (1989), 3rd Ed. 403, Foundation Press
45. On this Hornstein comments that the SEC rules give shareholders a chance to
play an important role in corporate governance. - Hornstein, J.A. Proxy Solicitation
Redefined: The SEC Takes An Incremental Step Towards Effective Corporate
Governance, 1993, 71 Wash. Uni. L. a., 1129, 1133-34; Also Salwen K.J., SEC To
Allow Investors More Room To Talk, Wall ST. J., Oct. 14, 1992 at C1, notes that the
SEC rules have enabled shareholders to participate more effectively in corporate
governance.
46. 1 Paige N.Y. 590 (1829)
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law practice, the Chancellor stated :
"The right of voting by proxy is not a general right and
the party who claims it must show a special authority
for that purpose.,,47
During the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries in the United
States, clauses in special legislation expressly provided for proxy voting for
the first time. In 1811 the state of New York adopted a statute which
constituted the first general legislation on companies. This statute contained
the following provision on proxy voting:
"And be it further enacted, that the stock property, and
concerns of such company shall be managed and
conducted by trustees ..... and the election shall be
made by such of the stockholders as shall attend for
that purpose, either in person or by proxy .......48
In North Carolina the 1829 Laws had a provision which granted corporate
membersthe right to vote by proxies. It provided :
"any proprietor by writing, under his or her hand
executed before two witnesses, may request any other
member or proprietor to vote and act as proxy for him
or her at any general meeting.,,49
47. At p. 597. Also Brown v. Commonwealth, 3 Grant Cas. (Pa) 209 (1856)
48. New York Laws (1811), Chap. 69 para. 3 p. 123
49. North Carolina Laws (1829), Chap. 35 para. 2 p. 32
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Likewise the State of Maryland, in 1838, adopted an Act which prescribed
regulations for the incorporation of manufacturing and mining companies.
Among other things that Act provided :
"the stockholder shall be entitled to one vote for every share
owned by them respectively, up to the number of fifteen
inclusive ..... and they may vote in person or by proxy."sa
Although most states had legislative provisions of one kind or another which
granted shareholders the right to vote by proxy, where governing statutes
were silent on the subject, shareholders ensured that provisions were
included in their company's articles which secured them this right. It is,
therefore, vvorthwhile to look at the consequences of these self-help attempts
by shareholders to secure the right of voting by proxy for themselves.
In the Connecticut case of State ex rei Kilbourn v. Tudor 51 there was no
clause in the governing statute empowering the members to vote by proxy but
an article authorised proxy voting. At one of the general meetings some
shareholders sought to cast their votes by proxy but the presiding officer
rejected the votes. It was held that the votes should have been received.52
50. Maryland Laws (1838), Chap. 267 para. 5 p. 149; Also N.J. Laws (1840) para. 3
p. 123; Pa Laws (1849), No. 368, para. 4 p. 563
51.5 Day(Conn) 329 at 333 (1812)
52. Atp. 333
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This position was approved in Walker v. Johnson where the court commented
that:
"the great weight of authority in this country sustains
the proposition, that where the charter of a trading
corporation is silent upon this question, the power is
implied to enact a by-law conferring the power to vote
by proxy." 53
2. Federal Regulation Of Proxy Voting
In the United States the efficacy of shareholder participation in the corporate
electoral process through the use of proxy voting was called into question as
far back as the early 1930s. Since many shareholders voted by proxy,
corporate decision-making sometimes hinged on which of two opposing sides
could gather enough proxies to win a vote at shareholders' meetings, hence
the name "proxy contests".
Before the United States proxy regulations were put in place corporate
management was able to perpetuate itself in office through the use of the
unregulated proxy facilities.54 At the time directors did not attach much
importance to the requirement that corporate information had to be disclosed
53. 17D.C. App. 144 at 163 (1900)
54. Livingstone, J.A., TheAmerican Stockholder, 1955, Lippen Cotto Co. 30
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to shareholders, which made it difficult for members to take any view on
corporate policy issues.55 As a result it was recognised that for the proxy
voting machinery to fulfil its objective of affording shareholders the
opportunity of appointing others to exercise their voting rights, its regulation
was a practical necessity. In order to address this issue the United States
Congress enacted Section 14(a) of the 1934 Securities and ExchangeAct.
Its provision constitutes the statutory basis for the federal regulation of proxy
solicitation and proxy voting in the United States to date. It provides :
"It shall be unlawful for any person by the use of the
mail or by any means or instrumentalities of interstate
commerce or of any facility of any national securities
exchange or otherwise, to solicit or to permit the use of
his name to solicit any proxy or consent or
authorisation in respect of any security (other than an
exempted security) registered on any national
securities exchange in contravention of such rules and
regulations as the Commission may prescribe as
necessary or appropriate in the public interest 58
The need for such regulation was emphasised by the House Report of the
United States Congress. 57
55. Aranow E. & Einhom H Proxy Contexts For Corporate Control 89 (2nd ed.(1968) ,
56.H.R. Rep. No. 1383 73d Congo 2d Sess. 96, 1934
57. See Congo Rec. E-1142, Jan. 12, 1933.
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3. The Regulation Of Solicitation
Solicitation as regulated by Section 14a has been described as the process
of systematically contacting shareholders and urging them to execute and
return proxy cards which authorise named proxies to cast the shareholders'
votes, either in a manner designated in the proxy card or in accordance with
the proxy's discretion.58 The courts have also interpreted this term very
broadly. In SEC v. Okin59 the defendant shareholder sent a letter to fellow
shareholders in connection with an annual meeting asking them not to sign
any proxies for the company and to revoke any proxies that they may already
have signed. The court held that the defendant's actions constituted a proxy
solicitation.
In Sargent v. Genesco, Inc60 a letter which management sent to shareholders
stated the company's financial difficulties and endorsed the terms of a
refinancing plan. The letter did not expressly call for a shareholder vote on
the issue. Itwas held to constitute a solicitation even though no meeting was
scheduled. The reasoning was that whether a particular action constitutes a
solicitation or not depends on both the nature of the communication and the
circumstances under which it is transmitted. The court emphasised that in
58. Bemstein S. and Fischer, H., The Regulation Of The Solicitation Of Proxies:
Some Reflections On Corporate Democracy, 7 U. Chi. L. Rev. (1940) 226
59. 132F. 2d 784 (2d Cir. 1943)
60.492 F. 2d 750 (5th Cir. 1974)
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this instance the purpose of the letter was to persuade shareholders not to
oppose the proposed financial plan.
On the other hand the courts have attempted to strike a balance between
proxy solicitation and the furnishing of material corporate information. Where
disclosure of information to shareholders is for the purpose of seeking their
comments on corporate performance the courts are less likely to hold that a
solicitation has been undertaken. In Small'lNOod v. Pearl Brewina CO.81, a
company needed shareholders' approval of a merger. One month before
mailing the proxy statement, the company sent shareholders a letter stating
that the board favoured the merger's approval. The court held that this
communication from the company's management was not a proxy solicitation
but a mere disclosure of material corporate information.
4. The Securities Exchange Commission Rules
Section 14 (a) of the Securities Exchange Act 1934 can only be violated
where there are SEC rules to implement it. Rules vvere promulgated by SEC
to ensure that shareholder voting was not only facilitated by the proxy voting
system but that the mechanics of this facility were implemented fairly. The
proxy rules provide a four-way approach to shareholders' voting problems.
Firstly, the rules provide shareholders with the opportunity of soliciting
proxies from fellow shareholders and the right to have their proposals
included in their company's proxy statement. Secondly, they require
disclosure of material information from opposition groups in a proxy contest.
61.489 F. 2d 579 (5th Cir.), 419 U.S. 873 (1974)
231
Thirdly they prohibit the solicitation of proxies by the use of misleading
information in a fraudulent manner. Finally the proxy rules require full
disclosure of material information to be made available to shareholders on
management proposals for corporate decisions. These will now be
considered in turn.
a) Communication By Shareholders
Rule 14a-8 makes it obligatory for management to include a shareholders'
proposal in its proxy statement if the shareholders notify management of their
intention to present the proposal for action at a forthcoming shareholder
meeting. Where management opposes a shareholder's proposal it ehould, at
the request of the shareholder, include in its proxy statement a presentation
by the shareholder of not more than 200 words in support of his proposal.
A shareholder's proposal can, however, be properly excluded if it falls under
the enumerated instances of Rule 14a-8(1)(13) . An example of this is that a
shareholder' s proposal may be excluded from management proxy material if
it involves matters that are not proper subjects for shareholder action under
the laws of the company's domicile.
Rule 14a-11 provides the opportunity for shareholders who wish to elect
nominees to the board, other than those recommended by management, to
engage in their own proxy solicitation62• Under Rule 14a-7 such shareholders
may obtain, at management's option, either a complete shareholder address
list or a mailing of the shareholders' proxy materials by the corporation at the
shareholders' expense.
62. The SEC rules as amended in 1980 - 17 C.F.R. S. 240 14a-11 (1980)
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b) Disclosure By Opposition
The U. S. proxy rules require detailed disclosure by opposition groups in a
proxy contest. Rule 14a-11 requires that if there is a solicitation by a person
(or a group of persons) which opposes a solicitation by any other person or
group with respect to the election or removal of directors, certain information
should be disclosed. Such information includes the identity of the parties
concerned, the extent of their financial interests in the company and
involvement in previous proxy contests. This requirement ensures that
shareholders are adequately informed and can thus vote intelligently after
disclosure by management and management's opposition group.
c) Prohibition of False Or Misleading Information
Rule 14a-9 prohibits false or misleading information in communications
involving proxy solicitations. In applying this particular rule the courts take
into account the nature of the statement, the context in which it was made
and the individuals to whom it was made. In J. I. Case Co. v. Borak83 the
United States Supreme Court, taking into consideration the circumstances in
which misleading information was given, stated that there could be a private
cause of action under Section 14 of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934.
On that basis the court imposed liability on those persons who solicited
proxies in violation of rule 14a-9.
63.377 U. S. 426 (1964)
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d) Disclosure Of Information To Shareholders
Rule 14a-3 regulates the information which should be furnished to
shareholders. This rule provides that proxies can only be solicited if each
person soliciting has complied with the requirements pertaining to information
specified in Schedule 14A. This schedule requires a detailed disclosure of
matters to be voted upon at the meeting. Where the solicitation is by
management, information about the directors or nominees of directors should
be furnished including their names, occupations, remuneration and financial
interests in the company. Under Rule 14-3(b) if the solicitation is made on
behalf of management prior to an annual meeting of shareholders during
which directors will be elected, each proxy statement is required to be
accompanied or preceded by an annual report. The report is required to
contain specific information concerning the financial position and
management of the company.
Rule 14a-4 regulates the form of proxy document and provides that
shareholders should have the opportunity to approve or disapprove each
matter submitted to them, and, if the proxy involves the appointment of
directors, members should be given the chance to vote for or against the
directors nominated or to withold the right to vote at all. Under such a
circumstance, Section 14a-4d requires that a proxy may not confer authority
to vote on any person who is not named in the proxy statement as a bona fide
nominee. Rule 14a-6 requires all proxy-soliciting materials to be filed with
the SEC in advance of distribution to shareholders.
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5. Criticisms Of The SEC's Proxy Rules And Their Amendments
With the increase in institutional investors' activism, scholarly attention in the
late 1980s and early 1990s began to focus on the degree to which the proxy
rules impeded collective action by shareholders as communication among
them was not encouraged. The main thrust of these criticisms was that the
rules served to deter insurgent shareholders and protect incumbent
management. It was argued that the rule which permitted incumbents to
receive full reimbursement while insurgents vvere compensated only if they
succeeded and gained control of the board was unfair. This disadvantageous
position of shareholders had moved Professors Bebchuk and Kahan to urge
that insurgents should be partially compensated based on the percentage of
the vote received for their proposal.64
The second criticism was that the proxy rules discouraged shareholder
activism since it defined the key term "solicitation" to include any
communication that was reasonably likely to cause the person solicited to
give or withhold a proxy to management. This implied that any criticism that
might cause other investors to withhold their proxy was solicitation. It had the
effect of preventing large shareholders from taking appropriate actions
against managementthus insulating corporate management.
64. Bebchuk L. and Kahan M., A Framework For Analysing Legal Policy Towards
Proxy Contests, 1990,78 Calif. Law Review 1073,1081,
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The third criticism was that shareholders were prevented by the proxy rules
from effectively co-ordinating their actions to maximise their influence at
general meetings as this could be regarded as solicitation.65 Under the old
proxy rules shareholders were subject to costly and burdensome filing and
disclosure requirements." Those who contravened this rule were subject to
the same consequences as management, including disenfranchisement with
regard to the votes in question. 87
In 1989, the California Public Employees Retirement System (CaIPERS)
submitted a series of proposed proxy rule amendments to SEC, accompanied
by a lengthy critique of the existing proxy rules, which proposed that SEC's
over-regulation of the proxy voting process discouraged dissident
shareholders. In response the Commission undertook a study which resulted
in the issue of Securities Exchange Act Release No. 34-29315, June 17
1991, with three significant changes being proposed:
a) Where a shareholder was not seeking to obtain proxy authority, but was
simply responding to a solicitation, the shareholder was not obliged to make
any prior filing with the SEC or to distribute a proxy statement.
65. Black B., Shareholder Passivity Re-examined, 1990,89 Mich. Law Review 520,
525
66. RUle 14a-11
67. Committee For New Management Of Butler Aviation v. Widmark, 335 F. Supp.
146 (E.D.N.Y. 1971)
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b) The SEC proposed to eliminate the requirement of prior review of proxy
material. Previously, before a proxy statement or material could be used for
proxy solicitation, SEC review and approval was necessary. The review
process often took several weeks, with the delay working to the incumbent
management's advantage since the particular meeting might have been held
before the approval was given.
c) The Commission proposed to give a person seeking to make a proxy
solicitation a right to receive a shareholders' list from the company.
Previously Rule 14a-7 gave the company the option of providing a list or
mailing a proxy statement to the person making the solicitation at the latter's
expense. The 1991 proposals reverse this option, giving a dissident
shareholder the right to have the list sent to him or her.These proposals
generated heated controversies with the result that the SEC withdrew them in
late 1991 for a further study. Finally in October 1992, the Commission
adopted a compromised package of reforms in Securities Exchange Act
Release No. 34-31326.68
Although the Commission, in the 1992 Release, abandoned its original idea
of giving shareholders a right to receive a shareholder list, it stuck to its
central precepts that :
a) a person not seeking to obtain proxies should be free to communicate with
68. Securities Exchange Act Release No. 34-31326 (16 October 1992)
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other shareholders without any obligation to make any prior filing with the
SEC or to prepare a proxy statement, and
b) the costs of complying with the proxy rules needed to be reduced for those
who did solicit proxies."
To some extent, the 1992 amendments to the proxy rules have made the
process less burdensome for shareholders with the effect that members are
now free and more willing to communicate with others. Shareholders, for
example, were able to take advantage of these new rules to stage a
successful revolt against a major management initiative at K-mart
Corporation.70 Activists have reported that co-ordinating other shareholders'
support has become much easier under the new proxy rules."
Overall, the new rules go a long way toward answering the criticisms that the
former proxy rules prevented institutions and shareholders in general from
effectively co-ordinating their actions to improve the performance and
governance of their companies. Under the new rules investors can,
69. This 1992 Release was codified at 17 D.C.F.R. Ss. 240 14a-1 to - 103 (1994)
70. DUffC, Kmart Investor Join Opposition To Stock Plan, Wall Street Journal, June
1, 1994, at A4
71. Scism L, Border Activists' Success Raises Fairness Questions, Wall Street
Journal, Dec 15,1993 at C1, C22
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therefore, take actions as a group to maximise their influence at general
meetings.
E) CONCLUSION
Proxy voting which was designed to encourage corporate democracy and to
help return some measure of control to shareholders has not been completely
successful in rousing shareholders from their passivity. Although
shareholders have the power to remove directors it can be a difficult task, in
the face of management control of the proxy voting machinery, for members
to exercise this right. Even when directors are removed their successors are
nominated and appointed to the board by the remaining directors and not the
shareholders.rz
Shareholders have not achieved the level of participation and control which
the proxy machinery was supposed to give them. Proxy voting as currently
constituted in the U.K. is, therefore, not an ideal system for expressing
shareholders' views. While this system of voting is available to absent
shareholders, the exhorbitant costs and adversarial nature of proxy contests
deter shareholders from using the machinery to oppose management openly.
The advantages that incumbent management has enable it to retain control
almost without any reasonable opposition.
72. Blaire M.M, Ownership And Control, Rethinking Corporate Governance For The
Twenty-First Century 1995, 70, The Brookings Institution
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Having access to the company's resources, management is in the best
position to solicit proxies from shareholders and is normally successful in
obtaining a large majority of them. Since the outcome of proxy voting is
crucial to shareholder participation in corporate decision-making, it is
surprising that up to date there is no meaningful form of regulation in the U.
K. to guide this voting machinery. The Stock Exchange simply requires
companies to send out a tvvo-way proxy form whenever notices of general
meetingsare being sent out to shareholders.
One of the main differences bet'Neen proxy voting in the U.K. system and that
as practised in Germany is that while corporate managers control the proxy
mechanism in the U.K. it is doubtful whether German managers can even
lawfUlly make a proxy solicitation. German banks do not solicit proxies to be
exercised by management proxy committees as is the practice in the U. S.
The power of German banks is partly offset by the power of labour through
the institution of codetermination which does not exist in the Anglo-American
system. A core problem is, hovvever, that in their multiple roles German banks
are in a position to impose their outside interests on the company to the
detriment of other shareholders.
Proxy voting in the U. S. has come under more stringent regulation than in
the other systems under study. There have been serious attempts in that
jurisdiction to prevent the proxy machinery from being abused by
management. The United States SEC rules attach a lot of importance to
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disclosure of information and give shareholders the opportunity to
communicate among themselves. This enables shareholders to make
informed decisions on matters affecting their interests thus maximising their
influence at general meetings. These rules have gone a long way in
promoting the exercise of shareholders' voting rights even when they are
absent from general meetings.
Proxy voting in the U. K. and Germany is yet to experience the level of
regulation which this voting machinery has been subjected to in the U. S.
Although the Companies Act sets out rules which are to regulate proxy
voting, important issues such as proxy solicitation and disclosure of material
information to shareholders have not been addressed. Neither system makes
shareholders an influential factor in the corporate decision-making process. A
lesson can, therefore, be learnt from the developments in the U. S. in this
area of law where the regulation of the proxy voting system brings about a
balance betvJeen management proposals and the proper exercise of
shareholders' rights. The development of clear rules in the U.S. should
therefore encourage these other systems to take the necessary steps to
ensure that rules are put in place to ensure effective proxy voting by
shareholders.
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CHAPTER SEVEN
DISPROPORTIONATE VOTING ARRANGEMENTS
A) INTRODUCTION
Company shares can generally be described as carrying two main rights
- dividend rights and voting rights. The right to vote provides shareholders
with the mechanism through vvhich they can exercise some control over
directors1. Although ordinary shares normally have the same dividend rights
per share, the voting right attached to each share might differ. Where it is
sought to allocate control in a company in a way other than that reflected by
the actual amount that shareholders have invested in the company, a device
commonly used is to create classes of shares with different voting rights.
Companies with disproportionate voting powers of shares may have one
class of ordinary shares being denoted as having one vote per share vvhile
another class of shares may have no voting rights at all. Another option is the
German practice vvhere a company has a basic 'one share, one vote' system
but no individual shareholder would be entitled to cast more than a specified
number of votes regardless of how many shares they possess. As
1 To this effect Bebchuk and Kahan have stated that voting rights of shareholders
constitute a major element in the structureand control of a company - L.A. Bebchuk
& M. Kahan, A Framework For Analyzing Legal Policy Towards Proxy Contexts,
1990,78 Cal. L. Rev. 1071 at 1073.
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far as the owners of non-voting shares are concerned, such shares are
merely a form of investment which does not entitle them to intervene in the
management of their company.
Although one vote per share is the rule in most companies in the U.K., the
attachment of disparate voting rights to shares is still used by some
companies. In the U.S. one vote per share was the practice on the New Yorl<
Stock Exchange from 1926 until 1986. Under German corporate practice,
while the issue of disproportionate voting shares is not the norm, other voting
restrictions are employed. These restrictions have the effect of denying
shareholders of their full voting rights.
As one of the property rights of shareholders is the right to vote at general
meetings, this chapter will analyse the effect of disproportionate voting
arrangements on shareholders' ability to appoint and remove directors
through the exercise of their voting rights.
B) DISPROPORTIONATE VOTING UNDER U.K. LAW
The main rules concerning attendance and voting at general meetings of
companies are usually set out in the company's articles of association. Some
companies issue different classes of shares with provisions in the articles
conferring multiple voting power on one class, limited voting rights on
another, or even completely denying voting rights to a particular class. The
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main purpose of issuing disproportionate voting shares is the retention of
voting control within a selected class of shareholders while providing for
corporate expansion and financial flexibility.
1. MUltiple Voting Rights
Multiple voting grants a particular class of shareholders more votes than are
proportionate to their shareholding. A typical scheme of multiple voting is
where a company creates two classes of ordinary shares - Class A and Class
B. Class A shares would have all the normal attributes, including one vote
per share, while the class B would have these attributes with three
exceptions:
1. Ownership of Class B shares would normally be non-transferable.
2. Class B may be converted into Class A shares which would be freely
transferable.
3. Class B shares would enjoy multiple voting rights.
Since Class B shares would not be transferable, if shareholders in that class
wanted to sell their shares they would first convert them to Class A shares.
Over a long period, there would inevitably be a reduction in the number of
outstanding Class B shares. Under such circumstances, incumbent
managers would be more likely to retain their class B shares with the result
that these superior voting shares would gradually concentrate in the hands of
management. The effect of this would be that directors with superior voting
powers would be protected from being removed.
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Sometimes companies include in their articles a method of voting in a
particular circumstance which affects all shareholders in that of the company.
This was the position in Bushell v. Faith,2 where a company had a capital of
£300 in £1 shares. Faith and his sisters, Mrs Bushell and Dr Bayne 'Here the
three members and each held 100 shares. Article 9 provided that for the
removal of any director shares held by that director on a poll in respect of
such resolution \N'Ould carry the right to three votes per share.
On a proposal to remove Mr. Faith from the board he was able to record 300
votes as a result of this article therefore outvoting his sisters, who recorded
200 votes between them. The House of Lords, upholding the effectiveness of
article 9, stated:
"Parliament has never sought to fetter the right of the company
to issue a share with such rights or restrictions as it may think
fit. There is no fetter which compels the company to make the
voting rights and restrictions of general application and it seems
to me clear that such rights or restrictions can be attached to
special circumstances and to particular types of resolutions.
This makes no mockery of Section 184 (now Section 303
Companies Act 1985); '" .Had parliament desired to go further
and enacted that every share entitled to vote should be
deprived of its special rights under the articles it should have
said so in plain terms by making the vote on a poll one vote one
share. JJ3
2. [1970] AC 1099
3.Atp.1116
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This practice of giving multiple voting power to a class of shareholders was
also upheld in an earlier case. In Rights and Issues Investment Trust Ltd v
Stylo Shoes Ltd." which had to do with increasing the issued share capital of
a company and not the removal of directors, the court upheld the validity of a
resolution which doubled the voting rights of the management shares from
eight votes per share to sixteen votes per share. The resulting effect of such
an arrangement is that the class with minority equity shares might end up
having the majority votes on all or specific occasions.
In recent times, however, companies with unequal voting rights of ordinary
shares have taken steps to change their share structure. Whitbread, a
brewing, retailing and leisure group, has reformed its 45-year-old share
structure to give equal voting rights to all shareholders. Multiple voting rights
enjoyed by a particular class of Whitbread shareholders had been under
attack for some time. This move for change was made after institutional
shareholders pressed for changes to the company's outdated dual share
structure which gave holders of class B shares twenty times the votes of class
A holders5, Hammerson, one of UK's leading international property
investment companies, followed the example of Whitbread by reforming its
two-tier voting structure that same year6, This modem trend has resulted from
questions raised on the separation of ownership and voting in companies.
4. [1965] Ch. 250
5. Rawstome P, Whitbread Gives Equal Rights, Fin. Times, Oct. 7,1993,25
6. Taylor P, Hammerson Share Vote Changes, Fin. Times, Oct., 20 1993, 22.
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An alternative voting device to multiple voting shares which is used to vest
control in a specific group is the issue of fractional shares. This is done by
dividing up the class of shares that is to be given control into small
denominations thereby increasing its voting strength. An example is where a
company with £100,000 share capital has £75,000 worth of class A shares
with par value of £1 each thereby having 75,000 votes, while the remaining
£25,000 worth of class B shares could be given 10p par value thereby
possessing 250,000 votes.
2. Preference Shares
The provisions of a company's articles often state that the holders of
preference shares are not entitled to receive notices of or to attend or vote at
general meetings in respect of their shares except in certain clrcemstences",
It is normal for the articles to indicate that they have the right to vote on any
resolution involving a variation of their rights or a winding up. Usually,
cumulative preference shareholders are given voting rights during any period
when their dividend has not been paid in full for longer than a specified
period. In the 1990 case of Re Bradford Investment plc·8 the articles of a
7. ~or this reason preference shares are often regarded as a hybrid between share
caPital and loan capital - Farrar, J.H.and Hannigan B.M.,Farrar's Company Law,
1998,230, Butterworth.
8. [1990] BCC 740
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company provided that the preference shareholders had the right to vote if
dividend had not been paid in full six months after the due date. Dividend was
not paid to preference shareholders and they exercised their voting rights
over the appointment of directors. It was held that the shareholders 'Here
entitled to vote in such circumstances whether or not there 'Here profits out of
which dividends could have been paid. According to the court:
"... those provisions must be construed in accordance with the
obvious purpose of giving a vote to preference shareholders
whose dividends are in arrears, namely to allow them to participate
in the selection of management of the company or any other
matter entrusted to a general meeting. The right is needed
precisely in the case in which insufficient profits have been
made..."e
An alternative arrangement is where directors use a scheme called an
exchange offer whereby shares with higher dividend rights but 10'Her voting
rights are given to public shareholders in exchange for their original shares.
This device is normally utilised by company management with the knowledge
that public investors who are more interested in higher rates of dividend than
control over decision-making processes, will be attracted by it.
3. Non-Voting Shares
Many UK public companies have issued non-voting ordinary shares with the
9. Atp. 746
248
aim of ensuring that control is retained by a small proportion of equity
holders. This development gave rise to the demand that the Stock Exchange
should refuse to list such shares, or failing that, that the legislature should
intervene. Today non-voting shares are the simplest and most straight-
forward method whereby directors can render themselves irremovable without
their own consent, despite the fact that they may only own or control a small
fraction of the total equity shares in the company.
The objections to non-voting shares are strongest in the case of publicly
quoted companies, particularly with the current movement to encourage the
spread of shareholding amongst small private investors and more activism on
the part of institutional shareholders10. The Jenkins Committee, which
deliberated on the possibility of imposing legislative control over the issuance
of non-voting shares, was divided on the issue". After giving recognition to
the fact that non-voting shares strip shareholders of their property right by
denying them any level of control over their company, the majority took the
view that it would be too drastic a step to prohibit the issue of shares with no
voting rights.
10. Jenkinson and Mayer, The Assessment: Corporate Governance and Corporate
Control, 1992, 8(3) Oxford Review of Economic Policy1 at 2
11. Report of the Company Law Committee (Jenkins Report) 1962, Cmnd 1749.
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Although the minority of the committee supported submissions made in favour
of restricting the growth of non-voting shares, in the end no step was taken to
prohibit them. The nearest that the law has gone to this option has been
Section 370(6) of the Companies Act 198512 which states that for a company
having a share capital, every member has one vote in respect of each share
or each 10 of stock held by him; and in any other case every member has one
vote. The Stock Exchange on its part still permits the issuance of non-voting
or restricted voting shares13 but simply requires that such shares should be
clearly labelled.
In the Jenkins Report a minority of three recommended that all equity
shareholders should have a right to attend and speak at meetings and that
there should be a prohibition on the listing of non-voting or restricted voting
equity shares14. No legislative action has been taken on this recommendation
up till date although opposition by institutional investors has caused the issue
of non-voting shares to be less frequent15. In addition some UK companies
12. This provision states that in the case of a company originally having a share
capi~l, every member has a vote in respect of each share or each £10 of stock held
by him; and in any other case every member has one vote.
13. Section 9, Chapter I, para 11, Yellow Book or Chapter 13, App I, para 2, The
Listing Rules.
14. Jenkins Report, Cmnd. 1749 pages 207-210
15. Wright, S, Two Cheers For The Institutions, 1994, 38-42, Social Market
Foundation, London.
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are now enfranchising their non-voting shares. James Beattie, a department
store group, has loosened the grip of the founding Beattie family and given
holders of its 48 million A class ordinary shares voting rights16. Barr &
Wallace Arnold Trust, the motor and leisure group, has enfranchised its non-
voting A shares which are owned mostly by institutions17.
C) DISPROPORTIONATE VOTING RIGHTS UNDER GERMAN LAW
Under German law, shares may be issued with various rights attached to
them particularly as to the distribution of profit and the exercise of voting
rights. The freedom to issue shares with disparate voting rights is much
narrower than that under the Anglo-American system because of the detailed
prescription on voting rights by the Limited Liability Company Act (GmbHG)
1980 and the Public Company Act (AG) 1965.
1. Voting Restrictions In limited liability Companies
There are statutory regulations of the voting rights of shareholders in German
private companies where resolutions to approve a shareholder's activities as
managing director are concerned or where the managing director is to be
16. Price C, Beattie Gives Vote to "A" Holders, Fin. Times, June 2, 1995,20
17. Wolffe R, Barr & Wallace Calls Enfranchisement EGM, Fin. Times, Nov. 4,
1994, 18; Also Blackwell D, Comwell Parker To Enfranchise Its "A" Capital, Fin.
Times, Sept. 25, 1996, 34
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exempted from an obligation under the GmbHG. In addition, shareholders
with conflicting interests may not participate in a resolution approving their
actions.18
Similarly a shareholder will be deprived of voting rights if a resolution is to be
passed to remove him from the position of a director. This is not the case
under English law where enhanced voting rights may be enjoyed by the
director who is to be removed which may have the effect of rendering the
particular director irremovable19. Votes cast contrary to such a prohibition are
void and where the votes were relevant to the result of the voting then the
particular resolution can be declared void by the court.
2. Voting Restrictions In Public Limited Companies
Under German law, with the exception of preference shares, each issued
share generally confers a statutory right to vote20. The number of votes given
to each share is normally determined by its par value". Multiple voting rights
that exceed those attributable to the par value of a share are prohibited, but
18. Section 47 para 4 GmbH 1980 (as amended) stresses the principle that no one
should be a jUdge of his or her own case.
19. See Bushell v. Faith in the earlier part of this chapter at p. 244
20. Section 12(1) AktG 1965
21. Section 134(1) AktG 1965
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the government may permit an exception which has to be included in the
Articles of Incorporation. To this effect Section 12(2)22 provides:
"Multiple voting rights shall be prohibited. The highest authority
with responsibility for economic affairs in the federal state in
which the company is domiciled may grant exemption if required
in order to safeguard overriding interests of the public welfare."
The articles of a company may provide the maximum number of votes that
anyone shareholder may cast regardless of the actual shareholding. The
alternative device is for the articles to provide for voting to be done by
graduation23. Graduation operates so that the first one million Deutsche
marks of par value carries full voting rights, the second million carries half of
the normal voting rights and shares in excess of OM 2,000,000 par value are
not normally conferred with voting rights at all. By the sliding scale method, a
shareholder who possesses more than a certain number of shares may cast
proportionately fewer votes in respect of the excess. By these methods a
company may protect itself against control by one major shareholder.
These limitations on the number of votes that anyone shareholder can cast
obviously modify the rule of one vote per share. To facilitate the enforcement
of these limitations the articles may also provide that shares held by one
shareholder on behalf of another may be included in the latter's holdings in
22. Section 12(2), AktG BGB1.11120 1965
23. Section 134(1) AktG 1965
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determining the applicability of the limitation.24 In implementing the graduation
method voting rights are not taken away from the shares which are in excess
of the limit and so they are not required to be in any special form. The full
exercise of voting right by the shareholder is, hO'NSver, restricted, and if he
transfers part of his holding, the transferee can exercise normal voting rights
attributable to the shares acquired.
Maximum voting rights may be introduced, without the consent of the affected
shareholders, by amending the articles.25 Limitations on voting rights of these
sort do not imply that excess shares are treated as non-voting shares. For
the purpose of determining the total voting capital, all the voting shares are
taken into account, including those 'Nhich exceed the maximum voting limits.
Voting rights of German shareholders become exercisable only after full
payment of the contribution in respect of the shares has been made." The
statute may, however, confer voting rights 'Nhen payment of only part of the
contribution has been made. In such cases voting rights are exercisable in
proportion to the amount paid up on the share.27In other cases voting rights
24. Ibid.
25. ~mendments to the Articles require a three-quarter majority unless the Articles
proVide for another majority - See S.179(2) AktG 1965. The dissentient
shareholderscan be the ones whose voting rights are being limited.
26. Section 134(2) AktG 1965.
27. Ibid
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may not be exercised at all, either because the shareholder's rights are
suspended or because the exercise of voting rights on certain resolutions are
prohibited. Under Section 20,28 for example, if a company which has acquired
a substantial holding in another company has not notified that other company
of its holding, all the rights in respect of its shareholding are suspended until
it does so.
Furthermore, if a subsidiary of a company holds shares in it, the subsidiary
may exercise neither voting rights nor subscription rights on an increase of
capital29. Section 136 (1) of the same act provides that a shareholder cannot
vote on resolutions at general meetings to discharge himself or herself from
liability for breaches of duties owed as a member of a company's
managementor supervisory board.
3. Preference Shares
As in the U. K., preference shares normally have a specified percentage rate
of dividend payable on the shares out of the company's profits with the
possibility of cumulative rights to dividends. Where they have cumulative
rights, payment of dividends in respect of the years during which the
company makes no profit may be made retrospectively from the profits of later
28. Section 20, AktG 1965
29. Sections 136(2) and 56(2) AktG 1965.
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years. Under Section 140,30 shares with cumulative rights or retrospectively
payable preferential dividends may be issued as non-voting preference
shares. Such shares are not completely deprived of voting rights but the
rights cannot be exercised as long as the preferential dividend continues to
be paid.
If, however, the preferential dividend is not paid, or is not paid in full, in a
particular year and the dividend remains wholly or partly unpaid at the end of
the succeeding year, the shares will enjoy voting rights for as long as the
arrears of the dividends remain unpaid. Section 141, however, restricts the
issue of this class of shares to not more than one-half of the company's
issued capital. This again reflects an important difference between the voting
rights of German shareholders when compared to those of their UK
counterparts.
Under UK law there is no limitation on the percentage of preference shares
that can be issued by a company as long as they are clearly identified as
preference shares. Another important difference between these two systems
is that generally under German law shareholders are given equal treatment
with each shareholder having the same benefits and opportunities. This is
evidenced in the fact that non-voting shares and the issue of shares with
multiple voting rights are prohibited by Section 12.
30. Section 140, AktG 1965
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D) DISPROPORTIONATE VOTING UNDER UNITED STATES LAW
The need for restraint on the power of corporate management has received
continuous attention in the U. S. by way of legislative action, court decisions,
comments and discussions by academics. It has been recognised that
corporate govemance needs to be sUbject to certain restraints by federal and
state laws. There is also great emphasis on the need to channel power to the
appropriate organ in companies.
1. The Historical Development Of One Share/One Vote In The U.S.
As early as the 18th and 19th centuries there were moves by different states
in the U.S. to adopt the one share/one vote rule in corporate charters. At the
time three distinct systems of voting were adopted by states' corporate
charters. A few states adopted the one share/one vote rule but others went
to the opposite extreme of limiting the voting rights of large shareholders by
imposing a maximum number of votes which any individual shareholder was
entitled to cast.
Other states' corporate charters adopted a complicated formula by
decreasing voting rights as the size of the investor's holdings increased. A
good example of this is the Maryland charter which provides:
"for one share, and not more than two shares, one vote, for
every two shares above two, and not exceeding ten, one vote;
for every four shares above ten, and not exceeding thirty, one
vote; for every six share above thirty, and not exceeding sixty,
one vote; for every eight shares above sixty and not exceeding
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one hundred, one vote; but no person, co-partnership or body
politic shall be entitled to a greater number than thirty votes"31
By the second half of the nineteenth century, most American states' corporate
charters had provided for one vote per share and most preference shares, at
the time, had voting rights equal to those of the ordinary shares.32 In 1852
Maryland's first General Incorporation Statute fell in line with the other states'
statutes by adopting the one vote per share standard. New York's General
Corporation Law of 1909, for example, entitled each shareholder to one vote
per share unless otherwise provided in the certificate of incorporation. 33
Two important deviations from the one share/one vote standard subsequently
emerged. The first was the substantial limitation of voting rights given to
preferred shares as the right of holders of this class of shares to vote was
limited to the occurrence of certain contingencies such as non-payment of
dividend, or the alteration of their class rights. This practice is still the
modem norm both in the U.K. and the U.S.34 The second deviation was the
emergence of non-voting ordinary shares, one of the earliest examples of
31. Maryland Corporation Charter para. 1471 (1984)
32. Stevens, Stockholders Voting Rights And The Centralisation of Voting Control,
1926,40 Q.J. Econ 353 354,
33. 1909 N.Y. Laws Ch. 28 para 23
34. Cox J.D., Hazen, T.L. and O'Neal, F.H. Corporations, 1995 , Chap. 18.5-18.7,
Little Brown and Co
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which was the International Silver Company whose ordinary shares, which
vvere issued in 1898, had no voting rights until 1902 when one vote was
allowed for every two shares.35
After 1918 a growing number of companies issued two classes of ordinary
shares: one having full voting rights of one vote per share and the other
having no voting rights but sometimes having greater dividend rights.36 The
main objective of this was that by issuing the former to insiders and the latter
to the public, management could raise funds for the company without losing
control. The dissatisfaction that resulted from this practice moved different
sectors to call for the enfranchisement of non-voting shares and to do away
with the two-tier voting structure. The increasing opposition to the issue of
non-voting shares which emerged finally moved the U.S. courts and
administrative bodies to take a strict stand where voting rights of
shareholders vvere concerned.
2. Judicial Contribution
Different state courts in the U. S. have taken the stand whereby actions by
directors that result in the manipulation of shareholders' voting rights are
subject to strict judicial review. By taking this stand the courts have been
35. Stevenssupra note 32 at p. 355
36. Dewing A. 5., The Financial Policy of Corporations, 1953, 163
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careful to guard against attempts by directors to use their control over
corporate processes to ensure their perpetuation in office. When it comes to
shareholders' voting rights, courts have taken a firm stand on the prohibition
of shares with special voting rights especially where such enhanced voting
rights are given during contests for control.
In Asarco, Inc., v. M.R.H. Holmes A Court,37 the district court objected to the
issue of Class C preferred shares that would have had different voting rights
from the existing Class C shares. The court stated that although the New
Jersey Business Corporation Act permitted changes to voting rights between
different classes of shares, it did not permit different voting rights to be
created within a single class. The court emphasized that the right to vote is
one of the inherent rights of a shareholder and there is no moral justification
whatsoever for depriving shareholders of their right to vote...38
A number of cases in Delaware have also marked the most profound
articulation of U.S. judicial view on directors' actions that affect shareholders'
37.611 F Supp. 468 (D.N. J. 1985)
38. Ibid at p. 474
260
voting rights. In Televest. Inc. v . Olson,39 the court invalidated the issue of
preferred shares which established majority voting requirements for certain
transactions after finding that the directors acted to defeat a particular
shareholder's control ambitions. In Phillips v. Institutforrn of Am., Inc.,40 the
court invalidated share issue and bye-law amendments which were intended
to deprive majority shareholders of control over the company. The Supreme
Court of Delaware, in Blasius Industries, Inc.v. Atlas COrp.4\ held that the
actions of directors, designed for the primary purpose of interfering with
shareholders' voting right had to be accorded closer scrutiny. It emphasised
that:
"Actions designed principally to interfere with the
effectiveness of a vote inevitably involved a conflict
between the board and a shareholder majority. Judicial
review of such action involves a determination of the
legal and equitable obligations of an agent towards his
principal. ,,42
In Pretty v. Penntech Papers. Inc.,43 following the redemption of all preferred
shares other than those owned by incumbent directors, the court stated that
the use of corporate funds to purchase corporate shares, which was primarily
39. No. 5798, 1479 WL 1759 at 7 (Del. Ch. March 1979)
40. No. 9173,1987 WL 16,285 at 11
41.564 A. 2d 651 ( Del. Ch. 1988)
42. Ibid at p. 668
43.347 A. 2d 140, 143 ( Del. Ch. 1975)
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aimed at maintaining management in control, was improper.44
American courts have also refused to recognise the validity of non-voting
shares on the basis of states' constitutional provisions which have been
construed so as to prohibit the issue of this category of shares. As far back
as 1859, Section 3 of the Illinois Laws, provided that at general meetings of
shareholders:
"stockholders may vote, either in person or by proxy, one vote
for each share of stock held and thus represented."
Futhermore, Art. XI of the Illinois Constitution 1870 contains a similar
provision which has enabled the courts to hold that every shareholder is
guaranteed an unqualified right to vote all shares registered in his name.
In State ex rei Watseka Telephone Co. v. Emmerson,45 the court denied
mandamus to enforce the issue of a corporate charter by the Secretary of
State because the preferred shares of the proposed company denied
shareholders the right to vote. It was held that the \/\lOrding of the constitution
declared its meaning and that the courts had no right to add or take away
from that meaning.46
44. Also Lennane v. Ask Computer System Inc. [1990-1991] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) 95:674 at 98: 153 (Del. Ch. , Oct. 1990)
45.302111.300, 134 N.E. 707 (1922)
46. DUrkee v. People ex reiAskren, 155111. 354,40 N.E. 626 (1855)
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Consistent with this is the West Virginia Constitution which provides:
"The legislature shall provide by law that in all elections for
directors or managers of incorporated companies, every
stockholder shall have the right to vote, in person or by proxy,
for the number of shares of stock owned by him, for as many
persons as there are directors or managers to be elected, or to
cumulate said shares, and give one candidate as many votes as
the number of directors multiplied by the number of shares of
stock, shall equal, or to distribute them on the same principle
among as many candidates as he shall think fit, and such
directors or managers shall not be elected in any other
msnner.?"
On the basis of this provision the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeal, in
Dewey Portland Cement Co. v. O'Brien,48 held that insofar as the constitution
of West Virginia guaranteed to every shareholder the right to vote in the
election of directors, the issue of shares stripped of voting rights could not be
tolerated.49 The Pennsylvania Business Corporation Law provides
II Except as otherwise provided in the Articles and this Act,
every shareholder of record shall have the right, at every
shareholders' meeting, to one vote for every share standing in
his name on the books of the corporation. ,,50
The Pennsylvania Bureau of Corporation has given a clear interpretation to
this section by insisting that the only permissible deviation from one vote per
share is no vote at all. Using this provision of law the Supreme Court of
47. Art. XI S. 4 of 1872
48.96 S.E. 2d 171 (W. Va 1957)
49. Also Germer v. Tripper-State Natural Gas and Oil Co., 60 W. Va. 143, 54 S.E.
509 (1906)
50.1933 as amended
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Pennsylvania, in Commonvvealth. ex rei Cartwright v. Cartwright,sl held that
disproportional shares could not be voted in a company where the by-laws
provided for only one vote per share. According to this court if the
arrangement was allowed it would create a situation which was not intended
by the by-law.
Missouri Supreme Court has interpreted a similar constitutional provision so
as to protect shareholders. Where the corporate charter entitles shareholders
to vote in elections of directors any manipulations which might deprive the
minority of their property rights will be disallovved.52 In State ex rei Frank v.
Swanger,53 the court stated that shareholders should have the right to vote
their shares. According to the court, where this vvell-recognised common law
right is taken away there is a complete distortion of the law's very purpose.
Elaborating on this same point the court in the earlier case of Gregg v.
Granby Mining and Smelting CO.,54 stated:
"It was eVidently the purpose of our legislature
to settle this question of stockholders' voting rights by a
positive enactment......Thus the share is made the unit of
election, and not the person who owns it, regardless of the
number of his shares."
51.350 Pa, 368 (1944)
52. Section 6, Art. 12 of the Missouri Constitution (1875)
53.190 Mo. 561 89 S.W. 872 (1905)
54. 164 Mo. 616, 625, 65 S.W. 312, 313 (1901)
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3. Regulation ByAdministrative Bodies
There has also been, at one stage or the other, objection to disproportionate
voting rights of shares by some American securities administrative bodies. In
1926 the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) refused to authorise the listing of
non-voting ordinary shares, however designated. The historical background
maintain control, mainly 'pyramiding', non-voting shares and the voting trust.~
According to Serle and Means in about 21% of the 200 largest American
corporations in the early 1930s, control was attributable to a legal device. 56
It was in the heat of these developments that the NYSE first disapproved the
issue of non-voting equity shares in January 1926. Since then the NYSE has
continued to oppose the abuses that have arisen from the practice of issuing
disproportionate voting shares. Although this Stock Exchange has made no
rule against the issue of disproportionate voting shares, its practice has been
to enquire into such issues when they apply for listing, and to refuse to open
the facilities of its market to issues where abuses of this practice seem likely
to occur.57
55. Cox, Hazen, and O'Neal. Corporations. 1995, 13.81, Little Brown & Co.
56. Ber1e A. and MeansG., The Modem Corporation And Private
Property 88-89 ( New York, 1932, rev. ed. 1967)
57. Loomis & Rubman, CorporateGovernance In Historical Perspective, (1979)
Hofstr L. Rev. 141, 152-153
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Along the lines of the NYSE position, the North American Securities
Administrators Association (NASAA), in 1980, adopted a statement of policy
declaring:
"Unless preferential treatment as to dividend and liquidation is
provided with respect to publicly offered securities or the
differentiation is otherwise justified, the offering or proposed
offering of equity securities of an issuer having more than one
class of equity securities authorised or outstanding shall be
considered unfair and inequitable to public investors if the class
of equity securities offered to the public:
a} has no voting rights or
b} has less than equal voting rights, in proportion to the number
of shares of each class outstanding on all matters, includin~the
election of members to the board of directors of the issuer.'
The stand taken by these securities exchanges may have moved some other
American States to enact Corporate Law Statutes which disallowed the
creation of classes of shares which are stripped of voting rights or which had
limited rights to vote. To this effect the Florida Corporation Code provided:
" each outstanding share, regardless of class shall be entitled to
one vote on each matter submitted to a vote at a meeting of
shareholders...59
In line with this policy, seventeen other states in America have regulations
which prohibit the issue of ordinary shares with unequal voting rights. These
are Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Indiana, Kansas,
LOUisiana, Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, South Carolina, Tennessee,
Texas, Washington, Wisconsin, and Wyoming.
58. SeeStatement of Policy on Non-Voting Stock, 1 NASAA Rep. (CCH) para. 2401
59. Section 212, Florida Business Corporation Code1963
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4. Recent Developments
The public interest in the debate over these state and national regulations of
shareholder's voting rights may have moved the SEC to adopt Rule 19c-4
which limited the ability of U.S. companies to adopt disparate voting right
plans. This rule prohibited the exchanges from listing an issuer's equity
securities if the company issued shares which restricted or reduced the voting
rights of shareholders.60 This was SEC's first direct attempt at regulating,
SUbstantively, a matter of corporate governance applicable to all public
corporations.
Although Rule 19c-4 was challenged by the U.S. Business Roundtable
and invalidated by a court decision,61 SEC used its influence to
encourage the exchanges - the New York Stock EXchange (NYSE), the
American Stock Exchange (Amex) and the National Association of Securities
Dealers (NASD) - to adopt uniform listing standards that were modelled on
Rule 19c-4. Soon after that decision, the NYSE put forward a proposed
standard which is loosely based on Rule 19c-4 and, at the time of the
proposal, SEC's Director of Market Regulation expressed the hope that the
other eXchanges would follow the NYSE in adopting rules on the lines of Rule
19c-4.62
60. Exchange Act Release NO.25891 (July 7,1988)
61. Business Roundtable v. SEC, 905 F2d 406 (D.C. Cir. 1990)
62. See Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 895-896 (1990)
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The proposed standard reads as follows:
"Voting rights of existing shareholders of publicly traded
common stock registered under Section 12 of the Exchange Act
cannot be disparately reduced or restricted through any
corporate action or issuance. Examples of such corporate action
or issuance include, but are not limited to, the adoption of time-
phased voting plans, the adoption of capped voting right plans,
the issuance of super-voting stock, or the issuance of stock with
voting rights less than the per share voting rights of existing
common stock through exchange offer.
SUPPLEMENTARY MATERIAL: The above restriction against
the issuance of super voting stock is primarily intended to apply
to the issuance of a new class of stock, and companies with
existing dual class capital structure would generally be
permitted to issue additional shares of the existing super-voting
stock without conflict with the policy.,,63
This standard as proposed by the NYSE, was later adopted by the Amex
and the NASD.
E) THE EFFECT OF DISPROPORTIONATE VOTING ON
SHAREHOLDERS' RIGHTS
The view has been expressed that corporate members, being an important
group in the parties to the corporate contract, should play an important role in
the decision-making processes of their companies. By corporate contract is
meant the web of quasi-eontraetual and contractual arrangements which
regulate the relationship of the different groups in a company. Shareholders
are supposed to be able to resort to the voting process to
63. New York Stock Exchange Unifonn Voting Rights Policy - Request For
Comment 1 (Feb. 3,1994)
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remove incumbent management when management performance is
unsatisfactory. The voting rights of shareholders should be one of the most
significant checks on management with the final effect of moving
management to try and achieve the maximum return on shareholders'
investment64.
The view of the law is that shareholders as 'owners' are in a position to exert
some control by exercising their voting rights. By stripping shareholders of
their voting rights, corporate management could significantly limit the power
of shareholders to oversee management and protect their investment65.
Disproportionate voting rights of shares could result in management securing
majority voting rights on all occasions which would enable them to resist any
attempts by shareholders to remove them from the board.
The continuing existence of disproportionate voting power, therefore, can
create insurmountable obstacles to the ouster of incumbent management
and, where new directors are to be appointed, the selection process can be
undertaken by management either directly or indirectly without any input
64. Denham R. E, Envisioning New Relationships Between Corporations and
Intelligent Investors, Speech to the Institutional Investor Project Columbia University
School of Law Conference on Relational Investing, May 7, 1993.
65..Monk R.A.G. and Minow N, Watching The Watchers, 1996, 198, Blackwell
BU~lne~s, - where they argue that corporate managers often limit shareholders'
voting nghts thus restricting their voice in corporate governance.
269
from the shareholders66. It therefore becomes obvious that disproportionate
voting power of shares is contrary to the notion of corporate democracy.
According to Boone Pickens:
"equal voting rights and common stock ovvnership are
inextricably linked. Over two hundred years of experience have
established equal voting rights as a fundamental tenet of .
democracy."67
Like Pickens, others have argued that shareholder participation in corporate
decision-making on a one vote per share basis is desirable in itself. It,
therefore, becomes important that shareholder participation in the decision-
making process be considered a necessity for management efficiency.68
It can be argued that the mechanics of achieving a consensus among
thousands of shareholders in a large company constitutes an obstacle to
active shareholder participation and decision-making. Active participation is
also precluded by shareholders' widely divergent interests. As is the case in
66. Brewster A, Senate Testimony, Subcommittee on Securities, Oct. 17 1991. Also
Regan E, U. S Competitiveness: Financial Markets and Corporate Governance,
Synopsis of Remarks delivered at the Conference on Global Views on Performance
Measurement, Financial Executive Research Fund Dallas, Dec. 16, 1992, pp.4-5
67. Picken, B, American Corporations And Corporate Democracy, 1989, 87
68. Dooley, M. P., Two Models of Corporate Governance, 1992, 47 Bus. Law, 461,
466-467
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the U.K., shareholders in the U.S. buy company shares with profit-making as
their principal goal and where the performance of their company is not
satisfactory, even in the short term, they are likely to sell their shares rather
than involve themselves in the detailed affairs of their company.
The "efficient capital market hypothesis" is sometimes said to provide another
reason for shareholder's inability to participate in corporate control. If the
market is a reliable indicator of performance as the efficient capital market
hypothesis claims, investors can easily check the performance of companies
in which they hold shares and compare their current holdings with other
investment positions. Shareholders find it easier to switch to a new
investment than fight the incumbent managers.
Despite the market force, equal voting rights may help to check management
by making it accountable for its actions, while disproportionate voting shields
management from exposure to the full force of shareholder control. This point
was emphasised by the American Securities Exchange Commission during
the Rule 19c-4 controversy.59
Disproportionate voting rights of shares may be financial disadvantageous to
shareholders. Empirical evidence has shown that disparate voting rights of
69. ExChange Act Release No. 24623 ( June 22, 1987), Fed. Sec. Rep. (CCH)
84:143 at 88:773
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shares affect shareholder's Ylealth and the general income paid on their
shares since the stock market expects a 10Yler future flow of income from
lesser-voting shares.70 The ordinary share with full voting rights is likely to
sell at a higher price than one without voting rights because of the premium
that bidders will pay to buy voting control of a target company on a take-
over.
Specific studies have found significantly 10Yler prices resulting from
disproportionate voting rights of shares." These studies have concluded that
shares with superior voting rights do sell at higher prices. In a study which
attempted to determine the value of voting in tYl8nty-six companies with two
classes of ordinary shares, the class with voting rights traded at a price
premium of 5.44%. over and above the other class.n A follow-up study found
similar premiums in a sample of six private companies with two classes of
shares differentiated only by voting rights.73 The higher dividend that is paid
on lesser-voting shares is unlikely to compensate fully for the loss of
70. Partch, M, The Creation Of A Class Of Limited Voting Common Stock And
Shareholder Wealth, 1987, 18 J. Fin. Econ. 313, 314
71. Gordon J. N., Ties That Bond: Dual Class Common Stock And The Problem Of
Shareholder Choice, 1988,76 Cal. L. Rev 1 at 28-29; Also SEC Office of the Chief
Economist, Update - The effect Of Dual Class Recapitalizations On Shareholder
Wealth: Including Evidence From 1986-1987 (July 1987),4
72. Lease, Mceonnell & Mikkelson, The Market Value Of Control In Publicly-Traded
Corporations, 1983, 11 J. Fin. Econ. 439, 469
73. Lease, Mceonnell & Mikkelson, The Market Value Of Differential Voting Rights
In Closely Held Corporations 1984, 57 J. Bus. 44
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capital and has been vievved as a bribe to get shareholders to vote for
proposals they VIIOuld otherwise reject. 74
In the U.K. there is evidence that disproportionate voting rights of shares
deprive shareholders of liquidity and marketability of their shares. According
to Geoffrey Maitland Smith, chairman of Hammerson, one of the U.K.'s
international property investment institutions, one of the purposes of
equalising the voting rights of ordinary shareholders in that company was to
increase the marketability and appeal of the company's shares to the benefit
of all shareholders.75 Similarly Sir Michael Angus, Whitbread chairman,
commented that a move to give equal voting rights to all shareholders in
Whitbread would provide greater flexibility in addition to providing
shareholders with liquidity and marketabilityof their shares".
Under German corporate practice there is also clear evidence that disparate
voting right attached to a company's shares has a negative effect on
shareholders' investment. A move by RWE, the German industrial
conglomerate, to phase out its controversial multiple voting shares which
74. Exchange Release No. 25981 (July 7,1988)
75. TaylorP, Hammerson Share Vote Changes, Fin. Times, Oct. 20,1993, 22
76. Rawstome P, Whitbread Gives Equal Rights, Fin Times, Oct. 7.1993, 25
273
'Here mainly held by local authorities, is said to have enhanced the
attractiveness of the company's shares to investors. The shares jumped from
the value of OM 78.5 to OM 87.5 in Frankfurt after the announcement of plans
to simplify the share structure of RWE's registered shares from 20 votes each
to one vote per shars".
One is, thus, tempted to suggest that where management of a company with
disproportionate voting shares sells a controlling block and receives a
premium such a sale should be rigorously reviewed. As early as 1947, the
American courts had already moved in this direction. In Zahn v.
Transamerica,78 the Third Circuit allowed a cause of action by holders of
Axton-Fisher Class A shares challenging a redemption of the shares before
liquidation of the company because the board could not assert a persuasive
business reason for the transaction. The practical consequence of the court's
decision was that the Class A shareholders ware allowed by the court to
receive $240 per share from their liquidation rights instead of $80.80 from the
redemption of their shares. The court emphasised that:
"there was no reason for the redemption of the Class A stock to
be followed by the liquidation of Axton-Fisher except to enable
the Class 8 stockholders to profit at the expense of the Class A.79
77. ~tkins A, RWE Plans Simplified Share Structure: Move Would Phase Out
Multiple Voting Rights of Municipal Shareholders, Fin. Times, Aug. 151997,21
78. 162 F 2d 36 ( 3d Cir. 1947 )
79. Ibid at p. 46
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In Judah v. Delaware Trust Co. the Supreme court of Delaware, citing
Zahn's case with approval, reiterated that:
"close judicial scrutiny should be given to the actions of
management which served to ~rejudice the interests of
subordinate security holders.D
Disproportionate voting power of shares constitutes a source of potential
conflict between managers' self-interest and the interests of the shareholders.
Although directors are fiduciaries who are charged with the duty of acting in
the best interest of the 'company as a whole', which includes shareholders'
interests, it is clear that whatever the motive behind their issue, disparate
voting shares give a certain group voting control.
The fact that management's voting control is not commensurate with the risk
it bears may also bring about conflict of interest. As an illustration of the
potential conflict between managers' self interest and those of shareholders
in a dual class capital structure, the analogy of management leveraged
buyouts (MBOs) will be used. In effecting an MBO, management obviously
has conflicting interests to those of shareholders. On the one hand they are
fiduciaries of the shareholders charged with getting the best price for them.
On the other hand, as buyers, they have a strong self-interest in paying the
lowest possible price. There is always the temptation for managers to use
their voting control to further this self-interest.
80. 378 A. 2d 624, 628 ( Del. 1977)
275
In situations of disproportionate voting arrangements there is the same
potential conflict of interests where management controls the superior voting
shares. The temptation for the management team to act in its own self-
interest is very strong and, in the event of a proposal to remove one of them
from the board, shareholders' efforts are likely to be unsuccessful. The
resulting effect is that corporate management has no opposition even though
such is vital for the purpose of checks and balances.
F) CONCLUSION
Voting rights which should be a basic, inherent, right of shareholder have not
worked as a check on the competence, accountability, and diligence of
corporate managers. As Lowenstein rightly observes:
"what once seemed to be a basic, immutable right, equal voting,
81has been unbundled from common stock .
Shareholders should be in a position to monitor the exercise of powers by
managers to ensure that their actions are in the interest of investors. With
such arrangements as multiple voting rights, non-voting shares, fractional
shares and exchanqe offers, management in U.K. companies are able to
protect themselves from removal. Although the London Stock Exchange
81. Lowenstein. L. , Shareholders' Voting Rights: A Response To SEC Rule 19c-4
And To Professor Gilson, 89 Colum. L. Rev. 979
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does not regard disproportionate voting arrangements favourably, no positive
step has been taken to prohibit these arrangements.
Unlike in the U.K, U.S. courts and Securities Administrative bodies have
taken a strict stand on disproportionate voting arrangements especially \\'here
enhanced voting is used for the appointment and removal of directors.
Although multiple voting is generally prohibited under German law the
arrangement of voting by graduation is used. This practice which restricts the
voting power of any shareholder to a certain percentage of his total votes
constitutes a serious limitation to shareholders' voting rights.
In the three jurisdictions under study there has been one thing in common - a
general consensus that the exercise of voting rights by corporate risk bearers
is one of the bases of the legitimacy of corporate governance. These systems
have recognised that the primary legal weapon of shareholders is the right to
vote on their shares in general meetings. Where this right is denied them,
shareholders will be unable to monitor corporate managers. Without such
oversight of the management team, conflict of interests are likely to arise with
a resulting lack of accountability to the members.
Disproportionate voting rights of shares are, therefore, undesirable since they
are inconsistent with the principle of corporate democracy and affect the
powers of shareholders to appoint and remove directors. Strict legal or
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exchange rules can, therefore, go a long way in minimising the divergence
between the interests of managers, who use this device to entrench
themselves, and those of shareholders.
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CHAPTER EIGHT
SHAREHOLDERS' VOTING ARRANGEMENTS
A) INTRODUCTION
A shareholders' voting agreement is a contract between some or all the
members of a company requiring that they vote on their shares in a particular
way on certain defined matters and resolutions. Those matters may include
the financing and running of the company, conditions subject to which
company properties may be sold, policies on dividend payment and the
appointment and removal of directors. The shareholders retain title to their
shares and the right to vote on them but are contractually bound to vote
according to a pre-arranged plan.
A shareholders' voting agreement is a contract and is enforceable in
accordance with normal contractual principles1. They can be used to provide
some protection to minority shareholders against the principle of majority
rule, thus tailoring the corporate structure to fulfil the participants' particular
needs.
1. Puddephatt v. Leith j 1916 ] 1 Ch 200; Stedman G. and Jones J, Shareholders'Agr~ements, (1998), 3 ed.,58, Sweet & Maxwell; Comment, Voting Agreement or
Voting Trusts? A Quandary For Corporate Control, (1958) 10 Stan. l. Rev. 565
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As a voting device shareholders' agreements can be grouped into tYJO main
categories. The first category involves tYJO or more shareholders, each
oYJl1ing a minority interest but together controlling a majority of the shares,
'Nho agree to cast their votes as a unit on particular matters or for designated
candidates to be agreed on by the parties before the appointments. The
second type concerns one or more shareholders, often oYJl1ing a majority
interest, effectively giving up some voting strengths to others. This usually
takes the form of shareholders agreeing to vote their shares so as to ensure
the appointment of a certain person or group of persons, designated by the
other party, as director.
A voting trust, on the other hand, is a device, created by the transfer of voting
shares by shareholders to trustees ( usually other shareholders ) 'Nho hold
and vote on the shares for a term of years or for a period contingent on a
certain event, pursuant to a voting trust agreement. In the U.S. case of
Peyton v. William C. Peyton COrp.2, the court defined a voting trust as:
" A device 'Nhereby tYJO or more persons owning stock with
voting powers, divorce the voting rights thereof from ownership
retaining, to all intents and purposes, the latter in themselves
while transferring the former to trustees in whom the voting
rights of all the depositors in the trust are pooled...3
2.22 Del. Ch. 187, 194 A 106
3. Ibid at p.111
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The result is that the trustee has legal title to the shares in addition to the
right to vote either in the manner agreed on or at the trustee's discretion"
The shareholders are usually issued voting trust certificates which carry the
right to dividends and other asset distributions. Voting trusts are normally
created for the purpose of giving certain shareholders control over major
decisions in their companies and a voice in the selection of their directors5.
Voting trusts are commonly used in the United States but are relatively
neglected in the U. K. and Germany. This is evident from the fact that,
despite the extensive litigation which has taken place in the United States on
the problems caused by the use of voting trusts, there are neither case law
authorities nor statutory provisions on this specific issue in the U.K and
Germany.
The question is whether voting arrangements ensure active participation by
shareholders in the affairs of their company? This chapter will examine the
mechanics of shareholders' voting arrangements to determine whether these
devices are used to further or deprive shareholders of any significant role in
corporate decision-making and the composition of their board in particular.
4.. Pickering, M., Shareholders' Voting Rights And Company Control, (1965) 81
L.Q.R. 248 at 257
5. Choper, J.H. Coffee, J.C. and Gilson, R.J., Cases and Materials on Corporations,
1995, ( 4th Ed) 721, Little Brown and Co.
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As voting arrangements are unlawful under German laJ the comparisons in
this chapter will be restricted to the positions in the United Kingdom and the
Unites States.
B) ARRANGEMENTS UNDERU. K. LAW
1. Shareholders' Voting Agreements
English law has always recognised the right to vote as a right of property. In
Northern Counties Securities Ltd v. Jackson and Steeple Ltd7 Walton J.
clearly stated this position thus:
"When a shareholder is voting for or against a
particular resolution ..... he is voting simply in
exercise of his own property rights .....,,8
Shareholders' voting agreements are, however, valid ways by which members
can exercise their property rights, and parties to the agreement will be bound
by its terms, which will be enforceable in court provided that they do not
contravene the general law.
6. Gorton G. & Schmid F., Universal Banking and the Perfonnance of
Gennan Finns. (1996), National Bureau of Economic Research Working
Paper 5453, Cambridge: Rajan R, Insiders and Outsiders: The Choice
B~tween Relationship and Anns-Length Debt, 1992, 47 Journal of
Finance, 367
7. [1974] 1 W.L.R. 1133
8. See also Pender v. Lushington [1877] 6 Ch. D. 70; Carruth v. Imperial Chemical
Industries Ltd [1937] A.C. 707
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a. The Validity Of Shareholders' Voting Agreements
Where shareholders contract with the company or with each other in respect
of the exercise of their voting rights the courts have often upheld such
contracts. In Greenwell v. Porter' the plaintiff had purchased shares in a
company from executors and the transaction included a provision that the
latter should vote for, and not oppose, the re-election of directors appointed
by the plaintiff when they retire by rotation. To this effect clause one of the
agreement stated:
/I(i) The executors shall take all steps and do all things within
their power which may be required for obtaining the election, as
directors of Robinson's Brewery Limited, of Aynsley Greenwell
and Thomas Trevor White, and shall at all times hereinafter
vote for and not against their re-election as director ....."
The agreement extended to shares whether held by the executors in that
capacity or in their own personal capacity. On the retirement of one of the
directors some of the executors threatened to oppose his re-election.
Granting an injunction restraining the executors from voting against the re-
election the court stated that clause one of the agreement was valid and had
to be upheld. In Puddephatl v. Leith10 the plaintiff had mortgaged shares in
the companyto the defendant and transferred them into his name. By a
9. [1902] 1 Ch. 530
10. [ 1916] 1 Ch. 200
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contemporaneous letter, the defendant had undertaken to vote on the shares
as directed by the plaintiff. The court issued a mandatory injunction requiring
the defendant to comply with the undertaking as agreed.
Voting agreements can be entered into by all or some shareholders of a
company to supplement the articles of association. Generally speaking the
courts will give effect to an agreement by shareholders to vote in a particular
way at general meetings. Parties to the agreement will be bound by the
express terms of the contract and additional provisions will not normally be
implied. The agreement will impose obligations on the parties to vote in the
way stipUlated and will normally be strictly enforced by the courts.
Voting agreements are limited to the period of time within which parties to the
contract hold their shares and have no binding effect on transferees even if
notice was given of their existence. In Greenhalgh v. Mallard11 the appellant
agreed to subscribe for £11,000 worth of debentures in a private company
which was in urgent need of money. Some shares were allotted to the
appellant and to the three existing directors. A collateral agreement was
entered into at the same time between the appellant and the three directors
whereby the directors agreed to vote with and support the appellant when
reqUired by him to do so. The aim was to give the appellant
11. [ 1943] 2 All E. R. 234, C.A.
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sufficient voting control to enable him to carry an ordinary resolution. This
control was lost when the three directors sold all but one hundred of their
shares to other members of the company.
The appellant contended that in parting with their shares, the three directors
broke their contract by putting it out of their power to support the appellant
with the votes necessary to carry an ordinary resolution. The court held that
the obligation under the agreement was only to vote in respect of whatever
shares the three directors might have from time to time but came to an end
when they were sold. According to Lord Greene, M.R:
"I cannot bring myself to see that this document can
be construed as imposing an absolute duty on the
owner of the shares not to sell them. An obligation of
this kind might have unforeseeable results. ..... a
mere undertaking by the shareholder to vote in a
particular way, cannot by implication impose upon
him a prohibition against the sale of his shares.,,12
This problem can be overcome by inserting a clause which prevents parties
to the agreement from selling their shares.
A shareholders' voting agreement is not a constitutional document and so it is
not normally subject to alteration by a special resolution, but where a
particular majority is stipulated by the agreement itself an alteration has to be
effected by the majority specified. Where the parties to the agreement are
12. Ibid. at p. 240
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the company and all its members there might be an express requirement that
any person acquiring shares in the company should be required to become a
party to the rights and obligations under the agreement. In such cases a
shareholders' agreement is similar in effect to the articles of a company.
Despite this similarity there are important differences between the two.
Firstly, provisions of a shareholders' agreement cannot be altered without the
consent of all the parties to it unless the agreement so provides. Secondly,
an agreementof this nature creates personal rights which only bind parties to
the contract as such.
A shareholders' agreement can be regarded as an informal arrangement,
equivalent to a resolution of the members in general meeting13, if it is in
\Nriting and all the members are parties to it.14 Where there is unanimous
agreement between the shareholders to a proposal there can be little
objection to treating the agreement as binding. However, case law has gone
further to hold that where all the members who are entitled to vote on a
particular matter have informally agreed on it or accepted a course of action,
the agreementmay be treated as a resolution of the company.
13. In Re George Newman & Co. [1895] 1Ch 674 - the separate, individual consent
of shareholders was held to be equivalent to the consent of the general meeting; In
Re Gee & Co. ( Woolwich) Ltd. [1974] 1 All E.R. 1149 - shareholders' assent to a
statute-barred debt was held to be binding on the company.
14. Section 381A, Companies Act 1985 recognises this practice; Also Table A, art
53.
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In Cane v. Jones" two brothers, Percy and Harold Jones, formed a company
in 1946 to run the family business. Each was a director and the shareholding
was divided equally between members of Percy's family and Harold's family.
The articles gave the chairman a casting vote at both directors' and
shareholders' meetings, but Harold's daughter, Mrs Cane, claimed that an
agreement had been made betvlleen all the shareholders in 1967 which
provided that the chairman should cease to be entitled to use his casting
vote, so that Percy (who was currently chairman) did not have a decisive vote
in the company's affairs. Wheeler Q. C. sitting as a deputy judge of the High
Court held that the 1967 agreement, although not drafted as a resolution and
not signed by the signatories in each other's presence, represented a
meeting of minds of all the shareholders. He emphasised that since this was
the essence of a general meeting the agreement was effective to override the
articles.16
From these cases, it is clear that the courts will accept the agreement of all
shareholders as a corporate act in the same manner as a formal resolution17.
15. [1981] 1 All E.R. 533
16. Also the case of Re Duomatic Ltd [ 1969] 2 Ch. 365 at 373 where Buckley J
stated:
" I proceed upon the basis that where it can be shown that all
shareholders who have a right to attend and vote at a general
meeting of the company assent to some matter which a general
meeting of the company could carry into effect, the assent is as
binding as a resolution in general meeting would be."
17. Stedman G. and Jones J, Shareholders' Agreements, 1998, 3Rt ed, 76, Sweet
and Maxwell
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Where an agreement constitutes an informal resolution it may not bind third
parties18 although it may bind subsequent transferees of shares.19
b) Shareholders' Agreement As Fetters On Statutory Powers
There is now no doubt that shareholders can enter into agreements on how
they are to vote in general meetings on specific issues - examples are
increasing the share capital and removing a director. The question has been
\'Jhether such agreements constitute unnecessary fetters on the statutory
powers of a company exerciseable by shareholders in general meetingr> In
the case of Russell v. Northern Bank Development Corporation Ltd and
Others21 the House of Lords, hearing an appeal from the Court of Appeal of
Northern Ireland, had to determine the question \Vhether provisions contained
in a shareholders' agreement \Vhich apparently restricted the exercise of a
company's statutory powers were valid. The relevant facts of Russell's case
were that the five shareholders in Tyrone Bricks Limited ("T.B.L.") and the
18. Section 42 of the Companies Act 1985; There is also the issue of registration.
~n agreement which is the equivalent of a resolution which must be registered must
itself be registered at the Companies House.
19. This is unlike a pure shareholder agreement which has no binding effect on
transferees - Greenhalgh v. Mallard [1943] 2 All E.R. 234 C.A.
20. Jennifer James, Shareholder Agreement And The Constitution Of The
Company, 1992 S.L.R. 10
21. [1992] 1 W.L.R. 588
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company entered into an agreement under which each undertook that the
terms of the agreement should have precedence, between the shareholders,
over the articles of association. Clause 3 of the agreement stated :
"no further share capital shall be created..... without
the written consent of each of the parties hereto."
Some years later the board of T.B.L. gave notice of an extraordinary general
meeting at which it was proposed to move a resolution to increase the share
capital from £1,000 to £4,000,000.22 Mr Russell, who was one of the
shareholders, applied to the High Court of Northern Ireland for an injunction
to restrain the other shareholders from considering or voting on the proposed
resolution.
At first instance Murray J. dismissed the action on the ground that the
relevant agreement was invalid and ineffective in law as it was an attempt to
fetter the company's statutory power to increase its share capital. The High
Court's judgement was affirmed by a majority of the Court of Appeal.23 The
decision of the Court of Appeal was reversed by the House of Lords.
Upholding the validity of the agreement the House concluded that it was one
22. Section 121 Companies Act 1985 provides that, if so authorised by its articles, a
co~pany may alter the conditions of its memorandum by increasing its share
caPI~1. The articles of Tyrone Bricks Limited incorporated Table A Reg. 44 which
proVides "The company may from time to time by ordinary resolution increase the
share capital by such sum, to be divided into shares of such amount, as the
resolution should prescribe."
23. Hutton L.C.J., Kelly L.J., and MacDermott L.J. dissenting - [1991] B.C.C. 517.
289
of a purely personal nature and one which the shareholders were legitimately
entitled to enter into. Expressing the unanimous opinion of the House, Lord
Jauncey quoted with approval24 a passage from Lord Davey's judgment in
Welton v. SaffereVS which states:
"Of course, individual shareholders may deal with
their own interests by contract in such a way as they
may think fit. But such contracts, whether made by all
or some only of the shareholders, would create
personal obligations, of an exceptio personalis
against themselves only, and would not become a
regulation of the company, or be binding on the
transferees of the parties to it, or upon new or non-
assenting shareholders".26
Although these cases are based on the right to alter the share capital and
the articles of the company, it is obvious that if the issue was the appointment
or removal of directors the reasoning of the House of Lords would have been
the same. The effect would be to restrict the general meeting from acting in
accordance with its statutory power to remove directors with whom
shareholders are not satisfied.
Any resolution to remove directors which is contrary to the terms of the
agreement would be defeated unless those party to the agreement expressly
gave their written consent to vote in its favour. This intrusion on the
24. at p.1021
25. [1897] A.C. 299
26. at p.331
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company's ability to act in pursuance of a statutory power, even if only of a
temporary nature, constitutes a serious distortion of the intention of the laWZ7.
Emphasising that such obstruction may have the effect of preventing
shareholders from exercising their powers Stephen Griffin, referring to
Russell's case, states:
"The House of Lords have surely, in giving full effect
to the contractual force of a shareholder agreement,
created a monster which should, at the first
reasonable opportunity, be slain by legislative
reform". 28
It can rightly be said that the Russell's case upheld devices and private
agreements used to circumvent certain provisions of the Companies Act. It is
arguable that a member's vote, apart from being personal, is a part of the
company machinery and cannot be restricted by contract for the purpose of
preventing the application of some provisions of the law. Russell's case,
therefore, leaves company law theory at an uncomfortable juncture in the
face of mandatory provisions of company law existing side by side with valid
private agreementsand devices designed to frustrate them. 29
~7. This constitutes a deprivation of shareholders' individual voting rights and may
Induce the contracting parties to consider their own interests instead of the interest
of the company
28. Griffin 5., A Restriction On Statutory Powers, N.L.J. (1993) 589 at 590
29. Shapira G., Voting Agreements And Corporate Statutory Powers, (1993) 109
L.Q.R. 210
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2. VOTING TRUST
Voting trusts have been recognised under U.K. law and practice as having
three main uses. Firstly, where a company is formed for a purpose which has
to be implemented in a particular way, a voting trust can be put in place to
ensure that the controllers of the company are persons who will give effect to
the purpose of the company in the particular manner expected.30
Secondly, it has been argued that the numerous and dispersed shareholders
of U.K. public companies would benefit from voting trust arrangements which
would enable the trustees to exercise the power of appointing directors on
behalf of individual members. In recognition of this use of a voting trust
Wheatcroft, as far back as 1950, argued that boards of directors of many
large companies are self-perpetuating and that independent trustees should
be appointed by shareholders to deal with the appointment and remuneration
of corporate managers.31
Thirdly, a circumstance where there is potential for conflict of interest and
30. Re Astor's Settlement Trusts [1952] Ch. 534, where a trust was created to
safeguard editorial independence.
31. Wheatcroft, G.S.A., Directors As Trustees, British Management Review, Dec.
1950, (VoI.9), 45 at 48
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strife to occur may make the intervention of a trustee an important one. The
creation of a voting trust in such a situation would enable the trustee to
appoint or supervise the appointment of directors.
On the creation of a voting trust the trustee may have either an absolute or a
restricted authority to act on behalf of the shareholder. It is important that the
terms of a voting trust be clearly spelt out so that all the parties concerned
are aware of their rights and obligations under it. In Butt v. Kelson32 it was
held that where a company's shares are held on trust, the rights of the
beneficiaries are derived from the terms of the trust deed and not from the
company's regulation.
As long as the trust continues, the trustees have absolute and uncontrolled
authority and discretion to vote the shares in the trust. Persons that have put
their shares in a voting trust are often referred to as equitable owners of
shares. By the trust agreement they become equitable tenants in common in
the mass of shares transferred to the trustee, with a contractual right to
receive dividends and to retransfer the shares on the termination of the
trust.33
32. [1952] Ch. 197
33. WOloszyn, J.J., A Practical Guide To Voting Trusts, (1975) 4 U. Balti. L. Rev.
245
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Although a voting trust may be implemented to protect a major creditor of a
company, it may also be used to ensure permanency of tenure for a particular
group of directors. When used for this purpose this device takes from
shareholders their pO\Y8r to make fundamental changes and determine board
composition. It, therefore, has a similar effect to non-voting shares as a
means of concentrating control in a few hands. In view of the possible abuse
of this arrangement, shareholders' voting pO\Y8r should not be treated as an
assignable right. It should be exercised by the beneficial owner in the
company's interest and not used to protect the interests of outsiders.
C) VOTING ARRANGEMENTS UNDER U. S. LAW
1. Shareholders' Voting Agreements
It is common practice in the U.S. for participants in private companies to enter
into agreements among themselves to provide protection to minority
shareholders against the principle of majority rule or to tailor the corporate
structure to the participants' particular needs.34 Shareholders' agreements in
the U.S. typically cover the selection of members of the board of directors,
34. Geld, H. Close Corporation ControlAnd The Voting Agreement, (1981), 16 Land
& Water L. Rev. 225, at 227-8
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the naming of corporate officers and the amount of time each participant is to
devote to the company' business.35
a. The Stand Of The Early Courts
The early decisions in the United States almost invariably held a challenged
voting agreement to be invalid. By looking on shareholder agreements with
distrust the courts indicated that there could be no agreement by which the
voting right of shares was separated from ownership. The power to vote was
treated as inherently annexed to, and inseparable from, the ownership of
shares.
In deciding cases, the courts usually laid down broad statements of policy
that \YOuld invalidate any voting arrangement. In Long Park, Inc. v. Trenton
New Brunswick Theatres Company36 an agreement which entrusted the
management of a company to one of three shareholders but provided for a
shift to the other two for cause (the cause to be determined by an arbitrator)
was held to be void. A New Jersey court in NickoloQOulos v. Sarantis,37
35. Non-management matters may also be included in shareholders' voting
ag~ments, examples are method of resolving disputes that may arise among the
partiCIpants and re-purchase of shares by the company on a shareholder's death.
36. (1948) 297 N.Y. 174,77 N.E. 2d 633
37. (1928) 141 A. 792 N.Y.
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refused to enforce a unanimous shareholders' agreement under V\flich a 25
per cent shareholder was given a 50 per cent vote.
A Georgia court in Morel v. Hoge38 held void an agreement giving the holder
of 50 per cent of the company's shares the right indefinitely to name three of
five directors.39 In D'Arcangelo v. D'Arcangelo«)it was held that in the
absence of statutory provision it was unlawful and a gross violation of public
policy to permit or contract for the separation of voting power from share
ownership. The court in the North Carolina case of Sheppard v. Rocking
Power CO.41 held a ten-year voting pool and trust to be void as separating
voting power from ownership.
In such cases shareholders were considered to have contracted for each
other's independent advice and judgement at shareholder's meetings. Each
shareholder, therefore, owed his fellow shareholders a duty to vote his
shares in the best interests of the company, and the other shareholders were
thought to have a right to insist on the exercise of his independent judgement
in casting the votes.42
38.61 S.E. 487 (Ga. 1908)
39. Also Benintendi v. Kenton Hotel, Inc.,{ N.Y. 1945) 60 N.E. 2d 829 - where the
C?urt invalidated a bylaw requiring a unanimous vote of shareholders to appoint
directors
40.137 N J Eq 63,43 A2d 169
41.150 N C 776,64 Se 894
42. HOdge O'Neal H., Close Corporations, 5.04,1988, (3rd Ed.)
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b. Validity Under Statutory Law
Most modem state statutes in the U.S. have now validated shareholders'
agreements which bind the parties, as shareholders, in the absence of fraud
on the minority or other illegal object, and have declared them enforceable.
After the inclusion of such provisions on shareholders' voting agreements in
the Corporation Laws of different states the courts, especially those in New
York, have indicated some changes in jUdicial thinking on their validity. The
first state statute to provide for voting agreements was the North Carolina
Business Corporation Act 1955 of which the relevant provision reads:
"Contracts between two or more shareholders that
the shares held by them shall be voted as a unit for
the election of directors shall, if in writing and signed
by the parties thereto, be valid and enforceable as
between the parties .....,,43
The relevant provision of the New York Business Corporation Law that first
regUlated shareholders' agreement - Section 620(a) provides:
"An agreement between two or more shareholders, if
in writing and signed by the parties thereto, may
provide that in exercising any voting rights, the
shares held by them shall be voted as therein
·ded ,,44provl .....
43.8.55-72 North Carolina Business Corporation Act 1955
44. 8.620(a) New York Business Corporation Law 1961
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The provision on shareholder agreement in the Delaware General
Corporation Law has been the most elaborate. The most recent version
require such agreements to be in vvriting, signed by the contracting parties
and should not be for a term exceeding ten years"45
The Delaware provision on shareholders' agreements has been adopted in
the Corporation Laws of most States.46 The 1969 Model Business
Corporation Act provides that agreements among shareholders regarding the
voting of their shares shall be valid and enforceable in accordance with their
terms."
Some cases have, in the light of these statutory provisions, held that it is not
a Violation of shareholders' rights to cause their company's affairs to be
managed in such a way as they may think best for the purpose of furthering
the ends of the company if it does not infringe the statutory norm.
Shareholders can, on that basis, combine their votes or agree on how to vote
45 Section 218(c) of the Delaware General Corporation Law 1994
46. Examples of this are SS.158 and 300 Cal. Corp. Code 1990; 5.1Q-2A-307 Ala.
Code 1987; Ss.342, 350 and 354; 5.5/2 A45 Ch. 805 III. Ann. Stat. 1993; Ss.2331-
2332 15 Pd. Cons. Stat. Ann. 1994
47. Section 34 Model Business Corporation Act Ann, 1969, (3rd Ed.).
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for the appointment of directors so as to secure or retain the control of the
company,48
In Matter of Glekel lGluck),49 an agreement between the seller and buyer of
shares stated that if the directors designated by the buyer \Yare elected, the
shareholders were to use their best efforts to cause the company to qualify
the seller's remaining shares for public sale. This was held valid since it did
not impinge on shareholders' discretion to either sell off or keep their
sharesso.
Where a shareholders' agreement constitutes an infringement of
shareholders' rights it is likely to be rendered invalid. In Morgenstern v.
Cohon51 the court held illegal an agreement to indemnify persons for loss on
resale of shares purchased by other persons in order to vote for the re-
election of directors.52In Leventhal v. Atlantic Financed Coro.,53 a
48. This was upheld in the Texas case of Irwin v. Prestressed Structures, Inc. 420
S.W. 2d 491 (Tex. Civ. App.); Also the New York case of Petition of Rokeach and
Sons, Inc., 142 N.Y.S. 2d 460 (Mise
49.30 N. Y 2d 93,330 N.Y.S. 2d 371, 281 N.E. 2d 171 (1972)
50. See also Fromlin v. Merrall Realty, Inc. 30 Mise2d 288,215 NYS 2d 525
51.2 N.Y.2d 302, 160 N.Y.S. 2d 633, 141 N.E. 314 (1977)
52. Section 609 of the New York Business Corporation Law 1990 prohibits
shareholders from selling their votes or issuing proxies for any sum of money.
53.316 Mass. 194,55 N.E. 2d 20 154 AL.R. 260 (1975)
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shareholders' agreement between t'NO shareholders for dissolution in the
event of stated contingencies, and prohibiting parties from otherwise causing
dissolution, was held to be violating the shareholders' statutory right to file a
petition for dissolution.54 An oral promise by one shareholder to vote his or
her shares to keep a particular person on the board of diredors will be
unenforceable if the statute requires a voting agreement to be in writing.55
Generally speaking valid agreements between shareholders are specifically
enforceable because of the difficulties in calculating monetary damages
flowing from a loss or dilution of control cause by shareholders' failure to vote
their shares as agreed. The problem of enforcement was illustrated in
Ringling BrOs.-Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows Inc v. Ringling,se where the
Delaware Supreme Court upheld a voting agreement and ordered that it be
specifically enforced. According to that court:
"A shareholder may exercise discretion in judgement in the
matter of voting, and it is not objedionable that his motives may
be for personaJ profit, or determined by whims or caprice, so
long as he violates no duty owed his fellow stockholders."57
54. Also Apfelbaum v. American Binder Co., 10 Misc 2d 899, 173 NY.S. 2d 753(Sup. Ct. 1958)
55. Sanders v. McMullen 868 F2d 1462 (CA5 1989)
56. 53 A.2d 441 (Del Sup. Ct 1947)
57. Atp. 478
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c. Agreements Which Limit Directors' Actions
Shareholders agreements often have provisions which deal with matters
which are within management functions of the board. Where an agreement
among shareholders contains provisions which tend to limit the discretion of
the board of directors in managing the company in its best interest such
provisions are likely to be invalid. Examples are provisions in agreements
bet'Neen shareholders which govern the appointment of officers, or how
much they are to be paid, or when and in what proportions profits are to be
divided. Such provisions violate the statutory rule that the business and
affairs of a company shall be managed by or under the authority of the board
of directors.58
A leading case on this point is Manson v. Curtis59 which is significant for
holding that directors may not, by agreement entered into as shareholders,
abrogate their independent judgement. It involved an agreement entered into
by the majority of the shareholders which provided that each shareholder was
to name three directors. One of the parties, the plaintiff, was to continue in
the position of general manager for a year and, as such, was to manage the
business of the company and shape its policy while
58. See Section 27, ch.23 Gen. Corp. Law, Cons. Laws
59.223 N.Y. 313,119 N.E. 559 (1918)
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the president was to remain the only nominal head. The court found the
agreement invalid on the ground that its fundamental and dominant purpose
was to vest management solely and exclusively in the plaintiff. This was held
to have deprived the board of the discretion to select the management team.
In McQuade v. Stoneham60 three shareholders of a company that owned the
New York Giants baseball team agreed as shareholders to elect themselves
as directors and agreed as directors to appoint themselves as officers at
specified salaries. The New York Court of Appeals held that the provision
restricted directorial discretion and rendered the entire agreement invalid.
According to the court:
U the theory that directors exercise in all matters an independent
jUdgement in practice often yields to the fact that the choice of
directors lies with the majority stockholders and thus gives the
stockholders a very effective control of actions by the board of
directors. In truth the board of directors may check the arbitrary
will of those who would otherwise completely control the
corporation, but cannot indefinitely thwart their will. A contract
which destroys this check contravenes charter and statutory
provisions and is therefore illegal.,,81
An agreement between shareholders which purports to control the actions of
directors in handling the ordinary business of the company will therefore be
void. For this reason in Fells v. Katz,62 the court refused to enforce a
60.263 N.Y. 323,189 N.E. 234 (1934)
61. at p. 265
62. 175 N.E. 516 (N.Y. 1931)
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shareholders' agreement which provided that a designated person vvould
serve as president of the company for ten years and not be subject to
removal by the board.
From these different cases a general conclusion can be drawn that under
U.S. law agreements by shareholders which, in the absence of fraud on the
minority or other illegal object, do not infringe the statutory rights of
shareholders are valid. Agreements which deprive members of their statutory
rights, even when the majority of the shareholders are parties to it, are invalid
on the grounds of public policy. A completely different view is taken in the
U.K. where the courts have been consistent in giving effect to agreements
entered into by shareholders. The general view has been that shareholders
are under no fiduciary duties and what they may do individually they may do
collectively63 but the question is VY'hether a lesson can be learnt from the
attitude of the U.S. courts.
2. VOTING TRUSTS
Creditors, shareholders and other security holders of a financially unstable
company may require that they be given control through the mechanism of a
voting trust. Providers of capital would normally use a voting trust to ensure
themselves control of or at least a voice in the selection of new management
63. Supra at notes 9-11
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or ensure that a company's successful management continues. The voting
trust was invented to enable the trustees to vote as owners rather than as
mere agents.64 It is, however, arguable whether voting power can be
regarded as an assignable right rather than a privilege which should be
exercised for the protection of the interest of the beneficial owners of shares.
a. The Common Law Position
At common law in the U.S. there was a debate as to whether voting trusts
were to be regarded as illegal on the ground that the separation of voting
power from ownership of shares was in itself against public policy.65 The
practice of the court was to scrutinise their purposes and they would
frequently hold them to be against public policy. Because of the potential
abuse of this device the U.S. courts would invalidate any arrangement which
aimed at securing permanency of a particular management team on the
board
88
. In Re Pittocks WiII67 a voting trust agreement entered into by the
buyers and sellers of shares, whereby the sellers were to retain voting control
64. Henry W. Ballantine, Voting Trusts, Their Abuses and Regulations, 21 Tex. L.
Tev. 139(1942)
65. Tracey v. Franklin, 31 Del. Ch. 477, 67 A. 2d 56, 11 A,L.R. 2d 990; People ex
reI. Malcom v. Lake Sand Corp., 251 III. App. 499; Steele v. Fanners & Merchants
Mut. Tel. Assn., 95 Kan. 580, 148 P. 661; Miller v. Fanners Milling & Elevator Co.,
78 Neb. 441,110 N.W. 995.
66.. Adams v. Clearance Corp, 35 Del. Ch. 459, 121 A2d 302; Also Watts v. Des
MOines Regiter and Tribune, 525 F Supp. 1311 ( S.D. Iowa).
67.102 Ore. 159, 199 Pac. 633 (1921)
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indefinitely even after disposing of substantial parts of their shares to the
buyers, was held to be unenforceable.68
Endorsing this common law view the court in Warren v. Pim89 vigorously
maintained that a voting trust is :
"a masterpiece of professional ingenuity, which
confers absolute and uncontrolled discretion to a
group ..... whose personal stake in the success of the
company is so insignificant that it may be disregarded
entirely; which leaves them free from
responsibility for their own mistakes, oversights,
forgetfulness or want of prudence, and unhampered
by any duty even to supervise the proceedings of
their own appointees.,,70
The powers of a trustee are normally set out by contract and depend on the
terms of the trust agreement. Where the trust agreement is silent or unclear,
the courts will impose equitable limitations on the trustee's power to take
actions that might damage the company's business. In Brown v.
McLanahan,71 the court ruled that a trustee could not amend the charter to
give voting rights to debenture holders with the result that power was shifted
68. Also Bostwick v. Chapman, 60 Conn. 553, 24 AtL. 32 (1890), where a voting
tru~t entered into by some shareholders to gain some atlvantages for themselves
whl~ were unfair to the non-party shareholders was held to be against public policy
and Invalid.
69. 59 A. 773, (N.J. 1904)
70.atp.781
71.148 F. 2d 703 ( (4th Cir. 1945)
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away from the trust beneficiaries.
b. Statutory Regulation Of Voting Trust
Voting trusts are now provided for statutorily in all but one state of the United
States.n The 1969 Model Business Corporation Act provides that any
number of shareholders of a company may create a voting trust for
conferring on the trustees voting power for a period of not more than ten
years.73 One of the most elaborate provisions on voting trust has been
Section 218 of the Delaware General Corporation Law (1994) which provides:
" a) One stockholder or more may by agreement in writing
deposit capital stock of an original issue with or transfer capital
stock to any person or persons, or corporation or corporations
authorized to act as trustee, for the purpose of vesting in such
person or persons, corporation or corporations, who may be
designated voting trustee or trustees, the right to vote thereon
for any period of time determined by such agreement, upon the
terms and conditions stated in such agreement.
b) Any amendment to a voting trust agreement shall be made by
written agreement, a copy of which shall be filed in the
registered office of the corporation."
72. Only in Massachusetts is voting trust not provided for under Statute. Despite
~at,. even Massachusetts provides that its voting agreement statute does not
Invalidate any voting trust that is not otherwise illegal - S.41A Mass. Gen. Law Ch.
156B 1991
73. SeCtion 34 Model Business Corporation Act 1969
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When shares which are subject to a voting trust are transferred to a trustee,
trust certificates are to be issued to the o\Nl'lers of the shares. The 1969
Model Act requires the trustees to maintain a written record of the holders of
voting trust certificates evidencing a beneficial interest in the voting trust and
giving the names and addresses of all such holders as well as the number
and class of the shares in respect of which the voting trust certificates are
held. Some voting trusts operate in a way that the legal title in the shares
remain in the share o\Nl'lers with the trustees exercising the voting rights of
the shares. Simply depositing shares in a pool is sufficient to bring a
shareholder into a trust agreement making him bound by the agreement even
when he has not signed it.74
A voting trust, therefore, involves a more complete and formal surrender of
shareholders' legal rights than any other control device. It's procedure
commonly requires that a formal agreement be signed by the shareholders
creating the trust, and that a copy of the agreement be filed at the companys
principal office.75 Failure to comply with these provisions at one time led to
74.. In Haines v. Kinderhook Ry. Co., 33 App. Div. 154,53 N.Y.S. 368, a voting trust
Which was created in favour of a reorganisation committee was for a period of five
years. It was held to be binding on all those who had handed their shares over to
the committee even though they had not signed an agreement.
75. Section 34 Model Business Corporation Act 1969; 5.7 30 Revised Model
Business Corporation Act 1984; 5.706, 711 Cal. Corp. Code (1990); S.218(a) and
(b) Del. Code Ann. tit. 8 (1991); and 5.621 N.Y. Business Corporation Law (1986)
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the arrangement being invalid.76 More recent decisions have, however,
upheld such arrangements even when there has been less than literal
compliance with the provisions of the statute.77 Persons who have put their
shares in a voting trust become equitable tenants in common of the shares
transferred to the trustees, with a contractual right to receive dividends and
acquire their shares back on the termination of the trust.
c. Renewal OfVoting Trust
A majority of states expressly permit extensions or renewals of voting trust
agreements beyond the original term if the parties so agree within a certain
76. In Abercombrie v. Davies, 130 A. 2d 338 (Del. 1951) a group of shareholders
together holding a majority of shares, agreed that eight designated agents would
vote their shares under a proxy granted for ten years. Voting was to be determined
by .the agreement of seven of the agents or, if seven could not agree, by an
arbitration. To enforce the agreement the parties endorsed their share certificates
and deposited them with the agents. The court held that the agreement was a
voting trust because
1) ~ separated ownership and voting
2) ~t transfered voting power irrevocably for a definite period, and
3) Its ~rincipal purpose was to provide for voting control of the company. As a voting
trust, It was invalid for not complying with statutory requirements.
77. In Reserve Life Ins. Co. v. Provident Life Ins. Co. 499 F2d 715 (8th Cir. 1974) a
voting trust was held to be valid even though the trustee's address was omitted in
the agreement. In State v. Keystone Life Ins. Co., 93 So.2d 565 (La 1976) the court
upheld a voting trust agreement even though the statutory requirement was not
fulfilled as it had not been signed by all the parties.
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length of time before its expiration. 78 The 1984 Revised Model Business
Corporation Act authorises extensions of not more than ten years each by
signing an extension agreement and obtaining the parties' written consent to
the extension. The trustee is required to deliver copies of the extension
agreement and the list of beneficial owners to the company.79
Under the Revised Model Act, shareholders who do not agree to an
extension are entitled to the return of their shares upon the expiration of the
original term. A voting trust agreement which gives the trustee the power, at
the end of the trust, to make a new voting trust for a further term is invalid. 80
An extension of a voting trust agreement is required to be executed in
conformity with statutory provisions."
d. Revocation Or Termination Of A Voting Trust
Where a voting trust is to be revoked or terminated all parties to it are
required to give their consent. A trust agreement by one person to a trustee
78.,UnderS.706(b) Cal. Corp. Code 1990 a voting trust can be made for a ten-year
penodplusone further ten-year extension; Also S.218(b) Del. Code Ann. tit. 8 1991;
S.621 N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law 1986;
79. S.7.30(c) Revised Model BusinessCorporation Act (1984).
80. In the New York case of Gertenbach v. Rodnon, 171 Mis. 302, 12 N.Y.S. 2d
518, a .voting trust agreementwhich automatically extended the terms of the original
trust Without the consent of beneficial holderswas held to be invalid; Also upheld in
the Delaware case of Adams v. Clearance Corp., 35 Del. Ch. 318, 116 A2d 893
81. SeeFoye v. New York University 269 A2d 63 (Del.)
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for a third person is revocable by the creator at any time before it is
communicated to the beneficiary. A statutory voting trust, if valid, is
irrevocablefor the duration of the trust.82 Most States incorporate a maximum
initial duration of ten years with the possibility of extension for a further period
of ten years. In the rare case of a voting trust not being formed under a
statute it VIJOuld depend on the general common law and the terms of the
trust. Such agreements, if coupled with an interest, have generally been
sustained as irrevocable but where they are not coupled with an interest they
are regardedas conveying a revocable power.83
A voting trust, like any other trust may be terminated by a court of equity
when its purposes have become frustrated or impossible of
accomplishment.54 The courts may, after declaring particular trust agreements
invalid or against public policy, declare that the shareholders can revoke the
agreementand demand back their shares.85
82. In re Morse, 247 N.Y. 290, 160 N.E. 374, the New York Court of Appeal held
that a voting trust agreement confers on trustees the right to vote the shares
transferred to them for the duration of the period of the trust.
83. See Boyer v. Newbitt 227 Pa 398, 76 A 103
84. In Griffith v. Jewett, 9 Ohio Dec. Reprint 627, 15 Cin. Wkly L Bull 419, 19 Abb N.
Cas.. 457, a demand to vote according to the direction of certain persons as
prOVIded by the trust instrument was refused by the trustee. This was held to be
enough ground for the shareholders involved to terminate the agreement.
85. Luthy v. Ream, 270 III. 170, 110 N.E. 373; See also Sheppard v. Rockingham
Power Co., 150 N.C. 776,64 S.E. 894
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D) CONCLUSION
It has been recognised that voting arrangements may work to the benefit of
minority holders by giving them a say in the control of their company. On the
other hand they may provide means by which the power to control and direct
the affairs and policies of a company are perpetuated indefinitely. This would
defeat the contention that the holders of a majority of shares in a company
should have the right to determine the composition of their board of directors.
The party that benefits from the agreement will have voting control of the
shares in the instances when they directs the other parties on how they
should vote, making them bound by his direction. When considered in this
light voting arrangements are at variance with the common law position
whereby a shareholder's vote is regarded as a right of property which may be
exercised as the shareholder pleases and according to his own wishes and
private interests86.
This was the basis on which older cases in the U.S. held shareholder
agreements unlawful since they limited in advance shareholders' discretion to
86. Pender v. Lushington (1877) 6 Ch. D. 70 at 75. In North West Transportation
Co. v. Beatty (1887) 12 A.C. 589 it was held that a member cannot be preventedfro~ voting as he wishes in respect of any resolution by reason of his having a
particularinterest in its subject-matter.
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vote their shares in the best interest of the company thus separating
individual judgement from voting rights. The courts, at the time, insisted that
voting rights could not be irrevocably separated from ownership of shares.
They regarded shareholders' right to vote in accordance with their individual
jUdgement and assessment as being inherently annexed to, and inseparable
from, the ownership of the shares. Their present attitude is to take a case-by
case scrutiny of matters involving shareholders' voting arrangement.
A different view is taken in the U. K. where the courts have always given
effect to shareholders' agreements contending that shareholders are under
no fiduciary duties and what they may do individually they may do
collectively. Unlike in the U.S, shareholders are not seen as owing their
fellow shareholders a duty to vote their shares in what they conceive to be
the best interests of the company, by exercising an independent judgement in
casting the vote.
In the U.K. there has been no attempt at scrutinising such agreement for
purposes of determining their effect on non-contracting shareholders. Voting
agreements which are injurious to such shareholders or have the potential of
operating as a fraud on them or contain any irregularities should be made
void as contrary to public policy. Apart from this, statutory regulation along
the lines of those in the U.S.87 would also be useful in the U.K.
87. ':' gOod example is Section 218(c), Delaware Gen. Corp. Law 1994 which
~ulres such agreements to be in writing, signed by the contracting parties and
limitedto a term of ten years.
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CHAPTER NINE
INTERLOCKING DIRECTORATES
A) INTRODUCTION
In the absence of any agreement to the contrary, nothing prevents a director
from placing the experience and skills acquired in the course of employment
in one company at the service of another company, with the result that
interlocks are created. An interlock exists when one individual sits on the
board of two or more companies, with a resulting link being created between
the different companies. Brandeis has defined interlocking directorates as :
"men holding the inconsistent position of director in
two potentially competing corporations, even if those
corporations do not actually deal with each other...1
Two different types of interlocks have been identified, namely direct and
indirect. A direct interlock exists where one individual is a director of two or
more companies. It will be deemed indirect interlock where two directors,
each from a different company, sit on the board of a third company.2
1. Brandeis L, Breaking The Money Trusts, Harpers Weekly, Dec. 61913, p.13
2. ~erm.an, E. S., Corporate Control, Corporate Power, 1981, 197, Cambridge
UniversIty Press; Casvvell J. A, An Institutional Perspective On Corporate
Control And The Network Of Interlocking Directorates, 1984, Journal of
Economic Issues vol. XVIII No 2 pp 68-71
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Interlocking directorates, thus, affect the relationships between companies by
linking them up through board membership which can be used to facilitate
interactions between boards. This makes interlocking directorates of practical
significance.
A company can certainly derive considerable advantage from the
appointment of experienced individuals with intimate knowledge of the
company's area of business, who also hold a number of other directorships.
In today's business world the complexity of modem business demands that
every effort be made to utilise the skills and abilities of those who have expert
knowledge. The presence of such individuals on the boards of several
companies may work to the benefit of all parties involved. Two of the main
arguments in favour of interlocking directorates have been that they allow a
free flow of talents and are a good means of exchanging information without
which modern business would suffer.3
It is, nevertheless, important to bear in mind the risks attendant on the
holding of multiple directorships. A person who sits on several boards may
3. Mariolis P, Interlocking Directorates And Control of Corporations: The Theory Of
Bank Control. 1975 Soc. Sci. Quart. 425
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be faced with a number of competing demands by the different companies.
This situation is bound to place a director in a difficult position since the
director, as a corporate fiduciary, would owe a duty of loyalty to each of the
companies.
The potential problems of interlocking directorates was given early
recognition by Brandeis (later Supreme Court Justice of the United States),
one of the most outspoken critics of this network. According to him:
"The practice of interlocking directorates is the root of many
evils. It offends laws human and divine. Applied to rival
corporations, it tends to the suppression of competition and
violation of the Sherman law. Applied to corporations which
deal with each other, it tends to disloyalty and to violation of the
fundamental law that no man can serve two masters. In either
event it leads to inefficiency; for it removes incentive and
destroys soundness of judgement. It is undemocratic, for it
rejects the platform : 'A fair field and no favours,' - substituting
the pull of privilege for the push of mankind.....
This was re-iterated by the U.S. Senate Committee on Govemmental Affairs
thus:
" Personal interlock between business leaders may lead to a
concentration of economic and or fiscal control in few hands.
There is in this the danger of a business elite, an ingrown
group, imperious to outside force, intolerant to dissent and
protective of the status quo, charting the direction of industry...5
4. Brandeis L, OtherPeople'S Money, 1933,33, Foundation Press,
5. Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs, Subcomm. On Reports, Accounting~Management, Interlocking Directorates Among The Major U.S. Corporations,
ment No. 107,95" Congo 2d Sess (1978)
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This chapter focuses on the implications of interlocking directorates on
shareholders' right and ability to control their company through the
appointment and removal of directors. It examines the questions whether
interlocks affect directors' ability to represent shareholders' interests on the
board or subordinates the interest of some companies on whose boards the
directors sit to those of others.
B) INTERLOCKING DIRECTORATES UNDER U.K. LAW
The position under U.K. law is that every director has a fiduciary duty to act
so as to promote the best interests of the company.8 Shareholders therefore
appoint directors whom they feel will fulfil the goals of the company. A
director is, as a result, not allowed to enter into arrangements or
engagements which can result in a conflict of his personal interests and those
of his company.7
There are five main situations in which interlocking directorships may arise.
a) Where an executive director of a large public company is appointed a non-
executive director of another company because of his reputation.
6. In Re Smith and Fawcett Ltd [1942] Ch. 304 at 304 Lord Greene M.R. dearly
stated that directors "must exercise their discretion bona fide in what they consider
.... is in the interest of the company and not for any collateral purpose."
7. Aberdeen Rail Co. v. Blaikie Brothers [1843-60] All ER 249
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b} Where an executive director is under a service contract VIklich requires
him to serve on the board of a subsidiary company.
c} Where an individual with experience in corporate management is
appointed to a series of non-executive posts to contribute his experiences
to board deliberations.
d) Where a representative of a lending institution is appointed to various
boards to protect his employer's interests.
e) Where a person is appointed to various boards in a group of companies
at the request of a particular group of shareholders."
Whatever the situation that brings about multiple directorship, the legal
position of those so appointed is that they are required to act in the best
interests of each company to which they have been appointed. Clearly the
existence of interlocking directorates is likely to affect the independence of
directors' decision-making and their protection of shareholders' interests.
With the typical profile of non-executive directors showing that the majority of
them are themselves executive directors in other companies, the question is
whether interlocking directorates should be generally controlled by the law.9
8. Butterworths Company Law Service, Issue65, Aug. 1998at E68, Butterworths
9. DaVis, E. and Kay, J. Corporate Governance, Take-Overs And The Role Of TheNO~-Executive Directors, in Bishop and Kay (eds), European Mergers and Merger
Policy, (1993),212, Oxford University Press.
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Ezzamell and Watson have observed that
" being executives themselves and business
acquaintances of the executive members of the board, they
(non-executives) can hardly be expected to be independent of
the executives that appointed them. Clearly then whatever their
specific skills and value as advisers, affiliated non-executives
cannot be expected to perform the primary monitoring and
control role required to protect shareholders, interests."1o
It is, therefore unreasonable to expect non-executives to be independent
monitors on shareholders' behalf if they themselves are close acquaintances
of the executive directors. A survey by PA Consulting and Sundridge Park
cited by Bell has shown that 70 per cent of non-executives were either the
executives of other companies or personal acquaintances of the company's
chairman.11 A study by Hemmington-Scott of 1,612 U.K. listed companies
also found that the majority of non-executive directors were in fact executives
of other listed companies. 12
10. Ezzamel M. & Watson R., Wearing two Hats: The Conflicting Control And
Management Roles of Non-Executive Directors, in Keasey, Thompson and Wright,
Corporate Govemance: Economic, Management & Financial Issues, 1997, 63,
Oxford University Press 63
11. ~ell, D. Setting Pay At The Top, 1994, 5-16 Focus Report, Income Data
ServJces.
12. Hemmington-Scott, Non-Executive Director Statistics, 1992, Corporate Register,
5-9,. ( Hemmington-Scott), An earlier study by Cosh and Hughes had made similar
findings - Cosh A. and Hughes A., the Anatomy of Corporate Control: Directors,
Shareholders and Executive Remuneration of Giant U.S. and U.K. Corporations, 11
Cambridge Joumal of Economics, 285-313..
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1. Case Law Approval Of Interlocking Directorships
The issue of interlocking directorates 'Nant before an English court in London
And Mashonaland Exploration Company Ltd. v. New Mashonaland
Exploration Company Ltd.13 The plaintiff company appointed Lord Mayo as
director and chairman of its board. Later the prospectus of the defendant
company was circulated with the name of Lord Mayo at the head of the list of
directors. It was admitted that Lord Mayo had not objected to becoming a
director of a competing company.
The court did not think it necessary to prohibit him from sitting on the board
of more than one company. Chitty J., in this case, upholding mUltiple
directorates in such rival companies stated that they 'Nare subject to three
qualifications. According to him:
(a) A company can, through its articles of association restrict the activities
of its directors by requiring a director to give the whole of his time to
the business of the company thus prohibiting him from acting as a
director of another company.
(b) Where a separate contract, either express or implied, between a
director and a company limits a director's activities and requires
13. [1891] WN 165
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him to give his personal services to a particular company and not to
any other company.
(c) Where there is evidence or a real fear of disclosure by the director of
important confidential corporate information which had been obtained
in his position as director of the rival company.
Chitty J. finally decided that, subject to these qualifications, it is permissible
for a director of one company to act as a director of a competing company
and directors should not be restrained from so acting.
In Bell v. Lever Brothers Ltd 14 the principle was extended so as to allow a
director to do for himself that which can be done for a rival company. Lord
Blanesburgh, giving approval to Chitty J's view in the Mashonaland's case,
observed, in relation to the position of the appellants as directors of the
respondent company's SUbsidiary, that they were under no obligation to
refrain from dealing in the same commodities as their company. On the
authorities of London and Mashonaland Exploration Co Ltd v, New
Mashonaland Exploration Co Ltd and Bell v. Lever Brothers Ltd there is no
general prohibition against a director competing with his 0""" company,
whether on his 0",," account or by virtue of being a director of another
14. [1932] AC 161 at pp 195-6
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company in the same field of business. These cases fail to recognise that a
director occupies a unique position and they should make independent and
unbiaSed corporate decisions while sitting on the board.
2. Analogous Situations
Despite the decisions in these two cases it is obvious that a situation where a
director carries out or is associated with a business which competes with that
of his company is one which is likely to give rise to a conflict of the directors
duty and interest. A director is clearly a fiduciary of his or her company and
the position is certainly that, without the consent of the beneficiary, a fiduciary
is preclUded from competing with the beneficiary. This is the case in the
analogous field of partnership law. In the context of partnership the courts
have condemned conflict of interests where a fiduciary is concerned. In Ass
v. Benham15 Lindley L.J., succinctly stating the position of a partner as a
fiduciary, said :
"if a partner without the consent of his co-partners carries
on business of the same nature as, and competing with that
of the firm, he must account for and pay over to the firm all
profits made by him in that business ......18
15. [1891] 2 Ch. 244
16. atp. 255
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It is often stated that directors are trustees of their companies on the basis
that they occupy a fiduciary position in relation to those companies. In law
the duties of good faith which this fiduciary relationship imposes on directors
are virtually identical with those imposed on trustees. In York and North
Midland Railway Co. v. HUdson,17 Lord Romily indicated that:
"....directors are persons selected to manage the affairs of the
company for the benefit of the shareholders; it is an office of
trust which if they undertake it is their duty to perform fully and
entirely."18
The position is that trustees as fiduciaries must avoid situations where there
is a conflict of interest and duty to the principal. This issue was before the
court in Boardman v. Phiops,19 where the House of Lords held that profits
which were made from occupying a position of a fiduciary character should
be accounted over. Although not a company law case, Boardman v. Phipps
is of interest as it is an application of the rule that a person in a fiduciary
position should not put himself in a situation where there is potential conflict
between his interest and his duty.
17. 16 Beav. 485,491
18. At p. 491; Also in re Forest of Dean Coal Mining Co. 10 Ch. D. 451 at 453,
Jessel, M.R. had stated this same point when he said that directors are trustees of
corporate properties. See also re Faure Electric Accumulator Co. (1889) 40 Ch D.
141
19. [1967] 2 AC 46 at 123
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In Re Thomson,2O the testator, a yacht broker, directed his executors and
trustees to carry on his business after his death. When he died, one of his
trustees took a lease of the premises, was about to commence a business in
competition with that of the testator's and was challenged by a beneficiary
under the will. Holding that the trustee was in breach of his fiduciary duty
towards the beneficiary Clauson J. stated:
"The rule of universal application is that an executor and
trustee having duties to discharge of a fiduciary nature
towards the beneficiaries under a will, .... shall not be
allowed to enter into any engagement in YJhich he has or
can have a personal interest conflicting, ..,with the
interests of those, YJhom he is bound to protect...21
Given that company law imposes a strict no-conflict rule on directors22 it is
surprising that multiple directorates are permitted in the same industry under
U. K. law. It is, however, likely that the courts would, in some circumstances,
regard the actions of a director in one company, because of his duty to
another company, as giving grounds for an allegation of unfairly prejudicial
conduct in the way in YJhich a company is being run.23
20 [1930] 1 Ch. 203
21. at p. 215
22. This rule was firmly stated by Lord Cranworth LC in Aberdeen Railway Co. v.
Blaike Bros. [1843-60] All E. R. 249 at 252
23., Sec,tion 459 of the Companies Act 1985 (as amended by 5ch. 19, C.A. 1989)
wh!ch gives a memberthe right to petition the court where a company's affairs are
being or havebeen conducted in an unfairlyprejudicial mannerto the interests of its
members in general or some part of the members including the petitioner.
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In Scottish Co-operative Wholesale Society Ltd v. Meyer,24 a company was
formed by the appellant society and the respondents, Meyer and Lucas, to
manufacture rayon cloth subject to obtaining state licensing. The society held
the majority of its shares and appointed three of its own directors to the
board. The respondents filled the tvvo remaining seats and were joint
managing directors. After licensing ceased, the society transferred the
company's business to another branch of its organisation, thus causing its
activities to stop.
The respondents petitioned for relief under section 210 of the 1948
Companies Act the predecessor to section 459 of the Companies Act 1985 .
Ordering that the company should purchase the respondents' shares at a fair
price, Lord Denning commented on the potential conflict of interests in such a
situation. According to him, by appointing three of its directors to the board of
the textile company,
II these three gentlemen could not do their duty by both
companies They put their duty to the co-operative society
above their duty to the textile company in this sense, at least,
that they did nothing to defend the interests of the textile
company against the conduct of the co-operative society."25
24. [1959]AC 324
25. At p. 331
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3. Conflict Of Interests And Disclosure Of Confidential Information
Shareholders entrust their investment in corporate business to the
management of the board of directors. If director A is instrumental in making
a contract on behalf of company X, on whose board he sits, with company V,
on whose board he also sits, there is a dual agency. As he owes an equal
duty of loyalty to both companies there is likely to be divided allegiance and a
conflict of interest and duty to one of these companies.28
Although the principle stated by Chitty, J. in Mashonaland's case is still valid
under English law, it may not apply to an executive director who is employed
by the company under a contract of service. Where executive directors are
concerned the court may, in appropriate circumstances, be prepared to imply
into their contract of employment a term that they should not perform services
for a competitor even in their spare time.
In Thomas Marshall (Exporters) Ltd v. GUinle,27 a managing director had
agreed in his service contract neither to engage in any other business without
26..Bray,v. Ford, [1896] AC 44 at 51, where Lord Herschell clearly stated that "It is
an infleXIble rule of a court of equity that a person in a fiduciary position is not,
unless otherwise expressly provided, ....... allowed to put himself in a position
where his interest and duty conflict."
27. [1978] 3 W.L.R. 16
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the company's consent nor to disclose confidential information. He was
alleged to have done both, to have diverted the company's business to
himself and, later to have unilaterally repudiated the contract by resigning
without notice. Megarry V. C. held that on those facts he had breached his
duty of fidelity and good faith. In this case there was an express agreement
not to compete and there was also a diversion of the company's business. On
these facts the case cannot be regarded a clear authority for the proposition
that competing constitutes a breach of a directors' fiduciary obligation without
an express prohibition either in the articles or by contract.
Where a director has contracted to perform substantial services for a
company over and above those stemming simply from his position on the
board, the court may be prepared to imply a term that the director should not
perform similar services for a competitor. In Hivac Ltd v. Park Royal Scientific
Instruments Ltd,28 the plaintiff employed two 'NOrkers on highly skilled 'NOrk. In
their spare time they both worked for the defendant company on similar work,
which was in direct competition with that of the plaintiff company. The court
held that the t'M> employees had deliberately and secretly set themselves to
do in their spare time something which would inflict great harm on their
employer's business. Ordering an interlocutory injunction to restrain their
28. [1946] Ch. 169
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employment by the defendant company, the court emphasised:
"To say that people in these circumstances can, so to
speak, make a division in their minds between what is
confidential and what is not, and be quite careful while
they are working for the defendant to keep the
confidential information locked up in some secret
compartment of their minds theoretically may be all very
vvell, but from the practical point of view has certain
unreality.,,29
If a 'NOrker's duty of fidelity, which imposes fe'N8r obligations than the full
range of fiduciary duties O'N8d by directors to their companies, can preclude
him from engaging in work for a competitor, how then, can a director compete
with his own company? It is quite possible for a director to disclose important
confidential information, which has been acquired in his position as a
fiduciary of one company, to a competing company. By passing confidential
information to a competitor there is the likelihood of serious harm being
caused to the company.
Where a director serves on the board of different companies, there is also the
potential problem of the interests of shareholders being subordinated to the
opportunity for personal gain which is afforded the director by his fiduciary
position. Apart from the subordination of shareholders' interests, the incentive
for the director to serve each company in accordance with his
29. at p.173
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fiduciary duty is lessened in any dealing which involves competing
companies. Recognising this potential problem Farrar and Hannigan argue
that it would seem impossible for a director to act for very long for two
competing companies before he would find himself in an intolerable position.
According to them a director cannot serve two masters at once and would
inevitably be in breach of his duties to one or the other.30
Under U.K. law there is an anomaly between the duty imposed on directors,
as fiduciaries, not to place themselves in a position where their interests and
duty to the company may conflict, and the latitude which the law extends
towards the practice of a director holding office in two companies which might
even be competing. Apart from the issue of conflicting interests, there is also
the potential for disclosing confidential information acquired in the position of
director.
C) INTERLOCKING DIRECTORATES IN THE UNITED STATES
Brandeis had attempted, through a number of writings, to focus public
attention in the U.S. on competitive abuses and the conflict of interest
30. Farrar, J.H. , and Hannigan B.M., Farrar's Company Law (4th ed.), 1998, 414,
Butterworths.
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problems which he saw as the fruits of widespread interlocking directorates.31
This brought about public awareness and concern over the problems
resulting from these arrangements. The complex networks of inter-corporate
relationships convinced many observers that there was a core group of
managers who controlled a great number of U.S. companies. Investigations
revealed evidence that interlocking corporate managementwas a widespread
practice which had been used as a vehicle of personal gain and serious
conflicts of interest amongst directors.32
An investigation by the Pacific Railway Commission into the management of
railway companies, disclosed significant abuses in railway construction,
leases and repair contracts allegedly attributable to four Central Pacific
Railroad Company directors who also controlled the companies which were
parties to the contracts with Central Pacific.33 During an investigation of
United States Steel Corp.,34 the committee unveiled instances involving
31. Brandeis, Breaking The Money Trusts, Harpers Weekly, Nov. 22,1913 at 10;
32. Pam M, Intertocking Directorates, The Problems And The Solution (1913), 26
Harv. L. Rev. 467, states that these investigations uncovered common directors on~e board of competing companies which resulted in board meetings being turned
Into ceremonial occasions with minimum input of time and effort.
33. The Pacific Railway Commission, Executive Document, No. 51, 50th Congress,
1st Sess. (1887) - normally referred to as The Pettison Report
34. See H.R. Rep. No. 1127, 62d Cong., 1st Sess. (1912) - normally referred to as
The Stanley Report.
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anti-competitive practices in companies effected through the vehicle of
interlockingdirectorates. The Committee noted:
"The complicated web of agreements in restraint of competition,
" ... ... the inordinate sums paid to promoters and underwriters
are concrete instances of abuses directly traceable to this
community of interest between a few powerful individuals in
control of a number of great corporations. ,,35
President Wilson also spoke strongly against corporate interlocks and
emphasized that the result of interlocking directorates might be a collusive
relationship between the non-executives and the executive team which they
are supposed to monitor on behalf of shareholders. He argued that corporate
boards had to move on from the cosy clubs to diverse independent bodies in
order to be able to fulfil this important role. He made it clear that there was a
need for legislation which vvould render interlocking relationships between
COrporate directors illegal. In a message to Congress he asked for a law
which would:
"prohibit and prevent such interlockings of the personnel
of the directorates of great corporations ..... which in
effect result in making those who borrow and those who
lend practically one and the same, those who sell and
those who buy but the same person trading with one
another under different names and in different
combinations...36
35. Stanley Report, supra note - 34 at 209-10
36. H.R. REP. No. 627, 63d Cong., 2d Sess. 18 (1914) at 18
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1. Statutory Prohibition Of Interlocking Directorships
a. The Clayton Act
The publication of congressional reports that resulted from these
investigations together with the articles of Justice Brandeis and the public
speeches of President Wilson generated intense public reaction and this led,
to the enactmentof Section 8 of the Clayton Act. 37 This section reads:
"No person at the same time shall be a director in any two
or more corporations, anyone of which has capital,
surplus and undivided profits aggregating more than
$1,000,000, engaged in whole or in part in commerce,
other than banks, banking associations, trust companies,
and common carriers subject to the Act to regulate
commerce if such corporations are or shall have
been heretofore, by virtue of their business and location
of operation, competitors, so that the elimination of
competition by agreement between them would constitute
a violation of any of the provisions of any of the antitrust
laws. The eligibility of a director under the foregoing
provision shall be determined by the aggregate amount of
the capital, surplus, and undivided profits, exclusive of
dividends declared but not paid to stockholders, at the
end of the fiscal year of said corporation next preceding
the election of directors, and when a director has been
elected in accordance with the provisions of this Act it
shall be lawful for him to continue as such for one year
thereafter."
37. Section 8 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. S.19 (1970)
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Despite President Wilson's call for legislation that would prohibit both vertical
and horizontal management interlocks38 the United States Congress
responded in a narrow manner by prohibiting only horizontal interlocks.39
Section 8 of the Clayton Act contains three important conditions that have to
be fulfilled before interlocks amongst directors can be prohibited. Firstly, one
of the companies involved should have capital, surplus and undivided profits
in excess of $1,000,000. Secondly, the companies should be engaged in
commerce and thirdly, the companies should be competitors. It also has a
problematic exemption clause which exempts banks, banking associations,
trust companies, and common carriers from the prohibitions of the section.
i. Initial Strict Interpretation Of Section 8 of the Clayton Act
By The Courts
The older, more stringent view of the courts was that contracts betvYeen
companies with common directors '/Jere voidable at the option of either
company without regard to fairness. With the use of this strict view by the
courts, the scope of the bank exemption was put to test in a number of cases
38. ':' vertical interlock is one between companies situated in a supplier-customerrel~tionship - Brown Shoe Co v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 323 (1962), while a
honzontal interlock is one between companies performing similar functions in the
Production industry or sale of goods or services- Ibid at 334
39. This is evident in the wordings of Section 8
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In United States v. Crocker National Coro.40 a director of Bank of America
National Trust and Savings Association, sat on the board of Prudential
Insurance Company. A member of Prudential's board also sat on the board
of Bank of America National Trust and Savings Association. Three other
indiViduals on the board were also directors of Crocker National Bank,
EqUitable Life Assurance Society of the United States, and Metropolitan Life
Insurance Company. The main issue was 'Nhether the clause "other than
banks" prohibits interlocks between banks and non-bank competitors.
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, held that the Clayton Act prohibits
interlocks among banks and insurance companies. The court noted that the
Act was meant to apply to all sectors of the economy in addressing the
problemscaused by interlocking directorates.
In United States v. Sears, Roebuck and Companv,41 the Government brought
a Section 8 action because a Sears' director also sat on the board of B.F.
Goodrich Co. Sears contended that the enforcement of Section 8 required
40.656 F. 2d 428 (9th Cir. 1981); See also Alabama Fidelity Mortgage & Bond Co.
V. DUbberl~, 73, SO 911 (Ala 1916).
41. III F. Supp. 614 (S.E.N.Y. 1953)
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a finding that the interlocked companies were violating a particular law or
acting illegally. Rejecting this argument the court held that the mere
existence of interlocking companies constituted a violation of Section 8 of the
Clayton Act.42
iI. The Present Approach Of The Courts To Section 8 Of The Clayton Act
The U.S. courts have now come to realise that to forbid common directors
from participating in inter-corporate dealings is impracticable and
unvvorkable. They have now adopted a flexible rule under which the courts
scrutinise the influences of existing interlocks and determine the fairness and
reasonableness of a contract if it is challenged. The courts are now in the
position of taking a case-by-case approach, when scrutinising the motive and
fairness of each challenged contract.
In Continental Copper and Steel Indus. v. Johnson,43 a company's directors'
and officers' liability insurance policy was held to cover expenses in
defending suits against its directors, even though the suits arose out of their
duties as directors of another company, where they were serving on other
42. Supra at 621
43. 491 F. Supp. 360 (S.D.N.Y. 1980)
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companies' boards at the insured company's request. In re Illinois Valley
Acceptance Corp. v. Martin,44 it was held that transactions between
companies with interlocking directorates are merely voidable and that the
possibility of rendering them void would depend on proof of fraud or
unfairness. The standards that are applied to cases of interlocking directorate
are the same as those applied to interested director cases where there is the
potential for conflict of interest.
In Globe Woolen Company v. Utica Gas and Electric Company45 the plaintiff
company sued to compel specific performance of contracts to supply electric
current to its mills. The defendant company felt that the contracts were made
under the dominating influence of a common director and were unfair and
oppressive. Maynard, the plaintiffs major shareholder and a member of its
board of directors, was also a director of the defendant and chairman of its
executive committee, holding a single share to qualify him for office.
Maynard presided at the defendant's executive committee at which the
contractwas ratified, but did not vote. Holding that the contract was voidable
at the defendant's option, the court stated that:
44. 531 F. Supp. 737 (C.D. I'll. (1982)
45. 121 N.E. 378 (1986)
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"there was still a duty on the part of Maynard to warn the company of
the oppression which was either apparent on the surface or lUrking
beneath the surface46
This prevailing position indicates that the U. S. courts will not give an
arbitrary right to either company to enforce a contract entered into by
common directors but will use the fairness standard to scrutinise each case.
b. The Federal Trade Commission Act
Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act47 regulates interlocking
arrangements irrespective of their legal status under Section 8 of the Clayton
Act. The pertinent language of Section 5 states:
" Unfair methods of competition in commerce, or deceptive acts
or practices in commerce, are declared unlawful.
The Commission is empowered and directed to prevent
persons, partnerships, or corporations, except banks, common
carriers subject to the Acts to regulate commerce, air carriers
and foreign air carriers subject to the Federal Aviation Act of
1958, and persons, partnerships or corporations insofar as they
are subject to the Packers and Stockyards Act, 1921, as
amended, except as provided in Section 406(b) of said Act, from
using unfair methods of competition in commerce and unfair or
deceptive acts or practices in commerce.·
46. Ibid at 380; see also Ramacciotti v. Joe Simpkins, Inc., 427 S.W. 2d 425 (1978)
47. 15 U.S.C. Ss. 45(a) (1970)
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Under this provision of law the Federal Trade Commission ( F.T.C.) has the
pO'Ner to deal with specific instances in which interlocking arrangements are
found to either be anti-competitive or serve as vehicles for the promotion of
anti-eompetitive activities. In F.T.C. v. Brown Shoe Co.,"s the Supreme Court
found, in the legislative history of Section 5, congressional intent to confer on
the F.T.C. the power "to arrest trade restraints in their incipiency without
proof that they were outright violations of competition laws...48 It is, however,
noteworthy that Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act specifically
exempts banks from its coverage. The implication is that where bank
interlocking arrangements and practices are challenged, there are limits on
the F.T.C.'s power to issue an order against the bank.
D) INTERLOCKING DIRECTORATES UNDER GERMAN
CORPORATE PRACTICE
Under German law the appointment and removal of corporate managers are
not directly exercised by shareholders but by the supervisory board. This
makes seats on the supervisory board important for shareholders who desire
a say in COrporate control. In recent times, the emphasis of the supervisory
48.384 U.S. 316 (1966)
49. Also F.T.C. v. Sperry and Hutchinson Co., 405 U.S. 233 (1972); Atlantic
Refining Co. v. F.T.C... 381 U.S. 357 (1964)
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board's work has shifted towards advising and counselling the management
board and this has serious implications for the running of companies.50
Monitoring is no longer felt to be just a question of detecting past mistakes
but includes preventing them from being made in the first place, with the
effect that the monitors should have expert knowledge and a comprehensive
understanding of business policies.51 Under German Co-determination law,
although members of the management board may not sit on the supervisory
board, one individual may hold up to ten supervisory board positions52, thus
many interlocks may exist at the supervisory board level.
1. TheDevelopment of Board Interlocks
In contrast to the positions in the United Kingdom and the United States,
German universal banks combine a range of banking functions, with deposit-
taking, lending on credit, capital-raising, investment banking, foreign
eXchange operations, and industrial shareholdings all being undertaken by
one bank. The emergence of banks with multiple roles is closely related to
50. Steinherr A. and Huveneers C, Universal Banks : The Prototype of Successful
Banks In An Integrated European Market, A View Inspired By German Experience,
1990, Centre For European Policy Studies Research Report 2, p.63
51. Schneider-Lenna, Corporate Control In Germany, 8(3) Oxford Review Of
Economic Policy 11 at 20
52.Section 102(1)(b) AktG 1965
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the economic development of German capitalism of the late nineteenth
century. There was, then, an urgent need for long-term capital to back up the
move to industrialisation. The private banking system was inadequate for this
purpose and there was also a lack of private investors who were ready and
able to finance the construction of a modem economy.53
The universal banksSoi which resulted had a common interest - to finance and
control German industrialisation. Each of these banks tried to become the
'house bank' to one or more of the new industrial giants with the aim of
keeping those companies as long-term customers. The banks sought to build
up exclusive relationships ~ acquiring shares in the companies and sitting
on their supervisory boards.
With such inter-relationships between the universal banks and various
companies through representation on supervisory boards, a network had
developed where directors appointed by the banks sat on the supervisory
boards of various companies simultaneously. Although German law limits one
director to ten directorships, banks are still able to exercise
53. Tilly, R.H. German Banking 1850-1914: Developmental Assistance For The
Strong, (1986)15 J. Eur. Econ. Hist (1986),113
54. Deutsche Bank and Commerzbank were both founded in 1870 and Dresdner
Bank was founded in 1872
55.. Katzenstein P. J. (ed), Industry And Politics In West Germany, 1989,Comell
UniversityPress: Ithaco, 1989, 275
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considerable influence through board representations. Companies that are in
financial difficulties tend to form dose associations with other companies and
financiat houses. These other companies can be in the same industry since
there is no rute, under German taw prohibiting directors from serving on
boards of competing companies. Through these intertocking directorates, the
banks are said to be in a position to obtain unpublished information which
enables them to monitor the management of these companies.58
2. Interlocking Directorates As One OfThe Main Sources OfBank Power
Banks, on their part, also find it advantageous to become associated with
large companies by appointing officers to their boards. This may attract large
deposits as 'Nell as secure reliable customers for bank loans. By such
interlocks, the banks are able to gain an insight into underlying information
from business connections 'W'hich are not accessible to the general public.
Under German corporate practice, a bank will, therefore, demand a seat on a
company's board if it holds a significant fraction of its shares and such
directorships allow the bank to monitor and sometimes manipulate corporate
actions. To this effect Fitch and Oppenheimer have stated that:
56. Cable J, Capital Market Information And Industrial Performance: The
Role OfWest German Banks 1985 95 The Economic Journal 118 at 122, ,
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"For bankers ..... the potential advantages of interlocks are
mUltiple. They are a means of ensuring - or trying to ensure -
that the corporation does not jeopardise the bank's investments.
The interlock may also ensure that the bank is allovved to service
the corporation's financial needs.,,57
The powers of German banks can, therefore, be said to derive from three
main sources : board interlocks, corporate debt obligations and voteable
shareholding and these constitute direct tools for monitoring and decision-
making. It has, however, been argued in favour of interlocking directorates by
German universal banks that it is their expertise and experience which make
bank representatives particularly suited to perform this important function.58
Commenting on the advantages that may be derived by bank participation on
the supervisory boards of other companies Schneider-Lenna notes:
"The figures reveal that the influence exerted by banks via their
supervisory board mandates is quite substantial ..... If banks
wield greater authority it is because of their expertise in
financial matters, which via supervisory board mandates feeds
through into the management of the company."se
57 Fitch R. and Mary Oppenheimer, Who Rules The Corporations ?, July/August
1970, Part I Sociologist Revolution, 100
58. Deutsche Bank, Long-Term Trends In The Banks' Investment In Securities,
1987, Deutscher Bundesbank Monthly Report, 39 at 41; Baum T, Should Banks
Own Industrial Firms? Remarks From the German Perspective, 1992, Rewe de la
Banque de Belgique 5 at 11
59. Schneider-Lenna E Corporate Control In Germany, 8(3) Oxford Review Of
Economic Policy, 11, 19'
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With bank representatives being appointed to the shareholder seats on the
supervisory boards, German companies enjoy the specialised knowledge of
bank personnel. Bank participation at board level, therefore, enhances
business relations and brings long-tenn benefit to both sides.
Another argument in their favour is that banks exercise influence more in the
sense that information is exchanged and common strategies are discussed
between representatives of the banks and those of the executive board in the
forum of the supervisory board. This, in essence, is a form of mutual
dependency. Such close relationships between banks and other companies
enable the banks to be involved in the long-term planning and decision-
making processes of companies. The inclusion of bank representatives on a
company's supervisory board may result in an enhancement of the credit-
'NOrthiness of that company. With large banks acting in advisory roles in the
formulation of corporate financial policies, the result may be the
implementation of policies YJhich are in the long term interest of companies. eo
Critics of interlocking directorates by German banks have, however, argued
that the influence of bank representatives on company boards tend to bind
such companies to a given bank which is likely to lead to the lack of
60. Esser J, Bank Power In West Germany Revised, 1990, 13 West European
POlitics, p.17 at 29
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competition and improvements. Commenting on the powers exerciseable by
banks through their representatives on the boards of other companies, the
Monopolies Commission, as far back as 1975, had stated:
"The position of the banks in the economic system has
partially institutionalised itself independent of their role as
lenders of credit : the banks are represented on the
supervisory boards of numerous large firms; as important
shareholders in these firms, the banks should take their
voting rights seriously; their stakes in companies are
multidimensional, in legal and other ways ..... it can,
therefore, be argued that, through a combination of these
functions, the banks can substantially influence a good
portion of the overall decision-making of the large firms:81
In its sixth main Report in 1986, the Monopolies Commission continued to
argue that the accumulation of pO\Y8r by banks through direct shareholdings,
supervisory board positions and proxy voting right was threatening. This was
depicted by the representation of the largest banks on the supervisory boards
of the biggest German companies that year - the Deutsche Bank had
representatives in thirty-nine of them, the Dresdner Bank in t\Y8nty-two, the
Commerzbank in fifteen and the Allianz-Versicherung (insurance group) in
seventeen62. Apart from the anti-competitive tendencies, bank interlocks are
also criticised as putting banks in
61. German Monopolies Commission 1973-1983, Summaries Of The First Five
Bienniel Reports, Bader-Bader: Nomos,1987 p.19.
62. Esser J, supra note 55 at 25
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the advantageous position of gaining insight into confidential, underlying
information regarding business transactions.
E) CONCLUSION
By appointing directors to the board, shareholders entrust them with the
protection of their interests through overseeing management decisions and
policy actions. With the practice of interlocking directorates having the
potential of leading to unfair favouritism, anti-competitive tendencies and
conflicts of interest, the question is whether directors actually protect
shareholders' interests when they sit on the boards of various and even
competing companies at the same time? It is obvious that interlocks on
COrporate boards create collusion between the non-executive directors and
the executive team which they are supposed to monitor on behalf of
shareholders.
In the U.S., two different approaches have been adopted by the court in
cases involVing interlocking directorates. Under the older, more stringent
approach, contracts betvveen companies with common directors 'Nere
voidable at the option of either company without regard to fraud or fairness.
The new and prevailing position is that contracts bet'Neen companies haVing
directors in common are voidable only for fraud or unfairness. This is based
on the reasoning that directors should be permitted to represent different
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companies subject to judicial supervision as to fairness and good faith.
Provisions imposing a good faith standard are sometimes included in articles
of incorporation or even bylaws. Where that is the case, the fairness and
good faith of contracts between companies with interlocking directors will be
carefully scrutinised.
Under German law the common practice of interlocking directorates may give
rise to conflicts of interests with bank representatives sitting on the boards of
various companies. Good business practice should require that information
obtained from participation on one board should not be passed on to the
board of another company. In particular, banks should not use such
information for the benefit of other clientele, namely investors they serves in
other capacities. At the same time investors should be provided with all
information relevant to their investment decisions. Given this situation it is
obvious that there is the potential for a conflict of interests to arise. Insight
into confidential information has the potential for abusing such information to
the detriment of the company involved, other investors and the public.
Given that the law in the three systems under study imposes in each case a
nO-COnflict rule on directors, it might have been expected that competing
interlOcking directorships in the same industry would be generally precluded.
The U.S. has been foremost in attempts to regulate interlocks on corporate
boards. By the provisions of Section 8 of the Clayton Act and Section 5 of the
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Federal Trade CommissionAct interlocking directorates have been prohibited
in some industries. Apart from the statutory regulation of interlocking
directorates the U. S. courts go to the trouble of scrutinising each case of
interlocking directorship, brought before the court, to determine its influence
on corporate transactions and to ensure fairness and reasonableness.
Courts in the U. K. have simply recognised that a director of two rival
companies is walking a tight-rope and at risk if he fails to deal fairly with both
companies.63 It is difficult to reconcile the duty imposed on fiduciaries as
declared by the English courts in the partnership case of Aas v. Benham and
the trustee case of Re Thomson with the holding of Chitty J. in London and
Mashonaland Exploration Co v. New Mashonaland Exploration Co and the
dictum of Lord Blanesburgh in Bell v. Lever Brothers Ltd.
One would have thought that the same principles would apply with as much if
not more rigour and force to company directors as they do to other
fiduciaries. If anything this principle ought to apply with greater force to
company directors since they enjoy remuneration while some other fiduciaries
such as trustees provide their services free of charge.
63. Scottish Co-Operative Wholesale Society v. Meyer [1958] 3 All E. R. 56
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CHAPTER TEN
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS
The main aim of this research was to examine the right of control exercisable
by the general meeting through their povvers to appoint and remove directors.
It also aimed at determining 'lNhether corporate control through this channel
fulfils the intended purpose - that of enabling shareholders to determine the
composition of corporate boards. The work proceeded to consider the
principles, regulations and laws vvhich underlie this aspect of internal control
in the United Kingdom, United States and Germany.
This final chapter is divided into three parts and starts by reflecting on the
main observations made in earlier chapters. After reviewing the different
aspects of the research it comes to the conclusion that although the
COrporate control mechanism in all three systems have short-comings, each
system has its 0\Ml strong areas. This leads to the second part vvhich
answers the question whether each system should simply import the best
features of other systems? The final part proceeds to make recommendations
by putting forward proposals 'lNhich should help address the problems that
have been identified.
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A) AN OVERVIEW
CONTROL IN COMPANIES
There are important differences in the control of companies in the UK, US
and Germany as highlighted in chapter 2 of this Y.IOrk. The Anglo-American
system illustrates the problems caused in many companies by the separation
of ownership from control. In many cases, with their small stake in
companies, individual shareholders have little incentive to attend and vote at
general meetings. They tend to hand their votes over to others who are
sometimes selected by management which leaves control in the hands of the
directors.
In an attempt to address this problem the Anglo-American system has relied
on non-executive directors to protect shareholders' interests1. Where non-
executive directors are not completely independent of the executive team
they may not be in a position to challenge management decisions and take
appropriate actions on shareholders' behalf.
1. Chapter two of this work deals with this issue.
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The UK corporate control arena has experienced broad consultation
processes which have resulted in recommendations of self-regulatory
standards based on codes of best practice" In the US, corporate control is
based more on legal rules than self-regulatory codes with members being
given rights that their U. K. and German counterparts do not enjoy3.
Under the German system concentrated blocks of shares are supposed to
give German shareholders a strong incentive to monitor management. The
tvYo-tier board system together with the practice of co-determination may
actually go a long way to affect shareholders' control rights over the affairs of
their companies.
This chapter concludes that shareholders are not well protected by the
powers to appoint and remove directors since management in the Anglo-
American system selects its own candidates for the board - typically similarly
situated chief executives of other companies. This leaves managers free to
pursue
2. The Report of the Committee on the Financial Aspects of Corporate Govemance
(The Cadbury Report), 1992, London: Gee & Co; The Report of The StUdy Group
on Directors' Remuneration (The Greenbury Report), 1995, London: Gee & Co; The
Report of the Committee on Corporate Govemance. (The Hampel Report), 1998,
London: Gee & Co,.
3. Foremost of these are the efforts of the Securities Exchange Commission in
regulating different areas of internalcontrol in companies - The Securities Exchange
Act Release No 34-31326 (16 October 1992) through which the Securities
Exchange Commission (SEC) has made communication among shareholders less
burdensome; Also the Securities Exchange Act Release 34-31327 (Executive
Compensation Disclosure) (1992) - which describes in details how executive
compensation decisions are to be communicated to shareholders.
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their own agendas unchecked by the board. German shareholders are,
however, not better-off than their Anglo-American counterparts. Apart from
the issue of co-determination voting control is exercised by banks who benefit
from their monitoring function since they fulfil multiple roles",
INSTITUTIONAL HOLDERS
Institutional shareholders have the expertise and resources to monitor
corporate management and may have an incentive to intervene as their
holdings are usually too large to sell off without affecting the market. U.K.
institutions have started to have active dialogue with corporate managers in
an attempt to intervene where companies are not properly managed5. Despite
attempts by institutions in this system at collaboration there is still a need for
greater activism by this category of shareholders.
Although there is evidence of activism by major U.S. institutions such as the
California Public Employment Retirement Systems ( CalPERS ), there are
limitations on institutional intervention in that system. One of the mitigating
factors against institutional activism is the enactment of laws which limit the
~". See Chapter two of this work at pp 56-59; To this effect Schmalenbach has
Indicated that individual shareholders' involvement in German companies is less
prominent than in the U.K. and U.S. - Schmalenbach, D., Federal RepUblic of
Germany, in Lufkin and Gallagher (eds), International Corporate Governance,
(1990),110, London: Euromoney
5. This position has been highlighted in chapter three pp. 77-79
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ability of large financial institutions to hold concentrated blocks of shares. As
a result, the level of concentration or cohesion by institutions found in the
U.K. has not been experienced in the U.S. Despite the lack of legal
restrictions in the U.K, however, institutional activism is sometimes
constrainedby the cost of forming shareholders' coalitions.
Although German companies enjoy the support of large, powerful, long-term
shareholders, there is no significant participation by small or individual
investors in their control systems. Institutional investors in that system have
the ability to influence corporate management by patient, informed
interaction. German creditors also have stronger rights than their
counterparts in the UK and the US, with a resulting weaker shareholder right
due to their co-determination system.
With ownership of German companies being concentrated in the hands of a
small number of large companies, especially banks, the dispersed ownership
of shares among a large number of individuals and institutional investors in
the UK and the US makes a good contrast. This is significant as it depicts a
stronger relationship between German institutional investors and their
companies.
Although more direct monitoring and information gathering by institutions may
be associated with German corporate practice than is the case with
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institutions in the UK and US, yet in their multiple roles German institutions
are generally slow to act and only take actions in crisis situations. It would
therefore be incorrect to conclude that shareholders' interests are better
represented in that system as the German structure simply encourages the
representation of other stakeholders' interests and does not give the
necessary control to shareholders.
In all three countries there have been debates about the role of institutional
shareholders, both in respect of previous management errors and taking
preventive actions. Despite their growing predominance, institutions have not
exercised the level of control vvhich identifies them as owners rather than
mere investors.
THE STATUTORY AND REGULATORY FRAMEWORK
The statutory and regulatory frameworks on the appointment and removal of
directors do not actually give shareholders the power to determine the
composition of company boards as they portray. A number of important points
can be gathered from chapter 4 in this regard.
In the U.K. there is evidence that when filling casual vacancies management
picks the directors they believe will not "rock the boat." Although Section 303
of the Companies Act 1985 entitles the general meeting to remove a director
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by passing an ordinary resolution, a restraint on the exercise of this power is
directors' right to claim compensation or damages in respect of a termination.
With the board (including the executives) having the power to appoint the
executives and to fix their terms of services, it is not surprising that directors
entrench themselves through long service contracts.
In appropriate circumstances the removal of a director may result in the
winding up of a company on the just and equitable ground or may warrant the
less stringent remedies of an unfair prejudice petition. In addition a company
may include a provision entitling directors to weighted voting rights on any
resolution to remove a director. All these are valid methods used by directors
to prevent their removal thus entrenching themselves on the board.
In the U.S. the applicable common law rule is that shareholders have no
power to remove directors before the expiration of their term, except for
cause. This common law prohibition against removal can only be modified by
statute. Where a state statute does not give shareholders the right to remove
without cause, a director will be able to continue in office despite the
oPposition of a majority of the shareholders.
6. See chapter four of this work at pp.126-128
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Co-Determination Laws allow German employees to appoint up to half of the
supervisory board members to represent them. Those employee
representatives can only be removed by a resolution of the employees. A
notable difference between U.K. law and those of U.S. and Germany is that in
the last tvvo systems minority shareholders have the right to petition the court
to remove directors for substantial cause. This is useful where shareholders
wishing to remove directors cannot obtain the required majority vote.
BOARD STRUCTURE
Chapter 5 has highlighted board structures in these three systems and how
they affect shareholders' powers to appoint and remove directors. By
appointing independenUoutside non-executive directors shareholders in the
Anglo-American system are supposed to rely on this impartial group to
closely monitor management actions and policy decisions".
Despite the recommendations of the different committees8 that company
boards should have non-executive directors who are completely independent
of the executive team, the practice is still for the executives to pick the slate
of the non-executives. This problem is exacerbated where the chief executive
7. See Chapter 5 of this work at p. 160
8. An example is the recommendation of the Cadbury Committee in chapter
five at p. 165
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director is also the chairman of the board. Another problem faced by the
unitary board is that the function of management is entangled with that of
supervision with the effect that non-executive directors are jointly liable for
the actions of the executive team.
With the two-tier board system, German corporate practice appears to
provide a clear separation between the executive (the management board)
and non-executive directors (the supervisory board), with the primary function
of the supervisory board being to appoint, oversee and remove members of
the management board. As representatives of other companies rather than
individuals sit on the supervisory boards there is a greater chance of
continuity which may result in long-term policy planning. In addition such
representatives of large companies have their companies' reputations at
stake when sitting on the supervisory board of another company.
The rights given to employees under the Co-Determination Laws, however,
constitute a limitation on German shareholders' right to determine the
composition of the supervisory board9. When compared with the UK and US
Positions, where employee involvement in corporate decision-making is
discretionary, German shareholders are definitely at a disadvantage.
9. See Chapter 5 at p. 204; Also Prowse, S., Corporate Governance In An
I~temational Perspective: A Survey OfCorporate Control Mechanisms Among Large
Firms in the U.S., U.K., Japan and Germany, 1995, NewYork University Press, 30
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From these it becomes clear that neither the German two-tier boards nor the
unitary boards of the Anglo-American system enable shareholders' interests
to be properly represented on the board.
PROXY VOTING
Chapter six, which dealt with proxy voting, showed that as it is difficult for
some shareholders to be present at general meetings, proxy voting allows
absent shareholders to cast their votes. A proxy creates an agency
relationship which can be revoked at any time with the proxy being bound to
obey the voting instructions of the principal. This becomes awkward when
the proxy-holder is in the management team and in a position of greater
knowledge and power than the principal. The relationship is also abnormal as
the agent is normally the one that solicits the principal to establish the
relationship.
While management solicits proxies from shareholders at the company's
expense persons wishing to oppose management have to solicit proxies at
their own expense which turns out to be an expensive venture. The proxy
system which should give shareholders a say in the companies that they
invest in has, therefore, not been an effective mechanism for shareholder
representation. Managementhas access to the shareholder list for the
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purpose of solicitation with the result that the electoral system can be
manipulated to reduce the effect of shareholders' voting rights.
In the U.S. rules have been developed to regulate proxy voting which have
gone a long way to reduce the abuse of this machinery. These are embodied
in Rule 14a of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 ( as amended in 1992 ).
The 1934 rules have enhanced shareholder voting by making the process of
proxy voting more fairly implemented. The amendments of 1992 have made
the process even less burdensome for shareholders by enabling them to
communicate among themselves. This has made it possible for shareholders
to take actions as a group, thus maximising their influence at general
meetings.
Under German corporate practice individual shareholders normally deposit
their shares with banks who vote them as proxies. They can use these votes
to appoint their nominees to the supervisory boards, therefore, dominating
the shareholders' side of that board. Through the depository share voting
rights German banks occupy a real position of power and may not be in a
position to represent the interest of shareholders because of their multiple
roles as lenders, commercial bankers, brokers and equity holders. This may
result in conflict of interest as banks may exercise other shareholders' votes
in a way that safeguards their personal interests.
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In the U.K. and Germany the proxy voting machinery has fallen short of its
main purpose - that of providing shareholders with a means of voting even
when they are absent from general meetings. With the proxy rules that have
been put in place in the U.S, U. K. and Germany have a long way to go in this
direction.
DISPROPORTIONATE VOTING ARRANGEMENTS
Disproportionate voting arrangements confer on some groups voting rights
which exceed their equity stake in the company. Chapter 7 explored the
trends in disproportionate voting arrangements and how they affect the voting
rights of shareholders. As shareholders' votes constitute an essential element
of COrporate control, arrangements such as shares with multiple voting rights
and non-voting shares allow a small group to obtain and maintain control. In
the U.K., companies have used such arrangements as fractional shares and
eXchange offers in addition to multiple and non-voting shares, to ensure that
management insulates itself from possible shareholders' action and removal.
There has, hovvever, been a recent move by companies to change their dual
share structure in respect of multiple voting shares. Despite this there still
exists fractional shares, non-voting shares and exchange offers with the
effect that the minority may end up with majority votes on all or specific
occasions. Although the London Stock Exchange regards disproportionate
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voting arrangements unfavourably, no positive step has been taken to
prohibit them.
In the U.S. the initial rule was one-share-one-vote which was applicable in
most states through States' Corporate Charters. This position was changed
and companies began to issue two classes of ordinary shares: one having full
voting rights and the other having no right to vote. The resulting opposition to
this practice moved the U.S. courts and Securities Administrative Bodies to
take a strict stand on companies' voting structure. The New York Stock
Exchange (NYSE ) was foremost in disapproving the issue of shares
with disproportionate rights.
Under German corporate law the ability of a company to issue shares with
disproportionate voting rights is regulated by the limited liability Company
Act (GmbHG) 1980 and the Public Company Act (AG) 1965. Although
multiple voting isprohibited under German law an alternative device of voting
by graduation (also known as voting on a sliding scale) is used. By this
method a shareholder who possesses more than a certain number of shares
may cast proportionately fe'Ner votes in respect of the excess. By using this
method, voting rights are deprived the shares that are in excess of the limit
thus a modification of the rule 'one-vote-one-share'.
It is clear from all these arrangements that by stripping shareholders of their
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voting rights, the power of shareholders to determine the composition of
company boards and control their companies could be significantly limited.
Disproportionate voting tends to shield management from exposure to the
full glare of shareholders and can work to free directors from the slightest
element of accountability.
VOTING AGREEMENTS AND VOTING TRUSTS
Under the traditional corporate structure shareholders have a role which they
play through the exercise of their voting rights. Shareholders' voting power is
inherently annexed to and should be inseparable from ownership of shares.
Chapter 8 focused on voting agreements under which shareholders form
coalitions to vote in a particular way and trust agreements under which voting
rights are transferred to a trustee for a definite period. These arrangements
are used in the U.K. and U.S. but they are not permitted under German law.
Under U.K. law the courts have upheld shareholders' voting agreements as
valid ways by which shareholders can exercise their property rights. In this
system a shareholders' agreement is sometimes regarded as an informal
agreement equivalent to a resolution of the general meeting. The rationale for
this being that such an arrangement represents a meeting of minds of all
involved which is the essence of a general meeting. Voting trusts, although
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not in common use in the U.K., can be used to ensure that a particular group
wields control in a company.
In the U.S. the courts initially took a very strict view on voting arrangements
entered into by shareholders. Such arrangements vvere almost invariably held
to be invalid when challenged. The view of the U.S. courts then was that the
voting powers of shareholders should not be separated from ownership. With
the statutes of most states validating shareholders' voting arrangements,
there has been a change in judicial thinking. U.S. courts are now more willing
to validate arrangements which, in the absence of fraud on the minority or
other illegal object, do not impinge on statutory rights of shareholders.
This work recognises that shareholders' voting arrangements may have the
effect of assuring shareholders of a part in the fashioning and execution of
COrporate policies and changes. Despite their possible good uses, voting
arrangements may, on the other hand, be used to deprive shareholders of
any level of control in companies. It concludes that shareholders should be in
a Position to give each other their independent, individual judgement at
general meetings after a thorough consideration of the issues presented for
approval. They should not simply comply with judgements made long before
the problem existed but should be able to vote their shares in what they
individually conceive to be in the company's best interests.
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INTERLOCKING DIRECTORATES
Non-executive directors have one overriding role: to monitor the activities of
the executive team to ensure that shareholders interests are protected. In
chapter 9 of this research it was argued that the appointment of the executive
directors of other companies to act as non-executive directors, many of whom
have a pre-existing business relationship with the company, is fairly
widespread in the three systems under study.
u. K. courts have not disapproved of interlocking directorships although they
have condemned similar situations where partners and trustees are involved.
With the legal recognition of the fiduciary position of directors under U.K. law,
it is surprising that the courts have validated these arrangements in view of
the potential conflict of interests. The nearest that they have come to
condemning it has been the recognition that a director of two rival companies
is walking a tight rope.
Where non-executive directors are executive directors of other companies
themselves and business acquaintances of the executives on whose board
they sit as non-executives, they can hardly be expected to challenge the
management team. The fact that the managers of one company serve to
oversee the managers of another, therefore, undermines the ability of non-
executive directors to monitor corporate managers on shareholders' behalf.
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Under U.S. law the disadvantages of interlocking directorates were given
early recognition and made subject to statutory control. Section 8 of the
Clayton Act 1970 prohibits multiple directorships in companies, other than
banks, trust companies and common carriers once three conditions have
been fulfilled.10 Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act 1970 also
prohibits interlocking directorates which are anti-competitive or serve as
vehicles for the promotion of anti-competitive activities. These regulations on
interlocking directorships in the U. S. have gone a long way in restricting this
practice.
Under the German two-tier board system although a member of the
supervisory board cannot sit on the managementboard of the same company
there are considerable linkages between supervisory and management
boards of different companies.11 The Universal Banks have developed a
practice where their representatives sit on the supervisory boards of various
companies simultaneously. Although German law limits one director to ten
directorships, this still gives directors room to sit on boards of competing
companies. Where such directors are bank representatives, with banks'
multiple roles, there is likely to be conflict of interests.
10. See Chapter nine of this work at p. 331 for these conditions.
11. See Chapter 9 of thiswork at p. 337
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B) COMMENTS
From the above observations it can be concluded that the corporate control
mechanisms of all three systems under study have serious shortcomings.
Under the Anglo-American system shareholders have little impact on
corporate decision-making. Boards in that system wield control but bear no
risk or exposure to financial losses. In such a situation it becomes difficult to
ensure that the board accounts to shareholders (who are the asset owners)
as management policy may run contrary to shareholders' expectations and
interests.
When the relationship between the supervisory and management board is
closely examined, it can be observed that, by and large, the management
board cannot be effectively controlled by the supervisory board. The
supervisory boards simply follow the corporate strategies of their
management boards only to be surprised by their negative consequences.
With an average of four to five meetings per year it is obvious that the
controlling and monitoring role of German supervisory boards may be
superficial.
In the Anglo-American system, individual shareholders generally have little
incentive to be actively involved in the running of their company. With freely
tradable shares, corporate control relies heavily on the effect of the
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shareholders' right to sell their shares. The German co-determination
frameVVOrk, on the other hand, gives recognition to wider corporate
expectations and responsibilities. The bank-basedltwo-tier system relies on
self-monitoring within a network in which companies monitor each other.
Some of the important differences between U.K. law and that of the U.S. is
that in the U.S. shareholders have an inherent power to remove a director for
cause12 and a minority can apply to the courts to have a director removed. In
addition to these proxy voting in the U.S. has been tightly regulated to
enhance shareholders' voting rights. In the U. K. very little has been done by
way of regulation with the result that management controls this voting
machinery to the detriment of shareholders.
These differences in the corporate structure of the three systems under study
raise an important question - whether each system should simply import the
best features of other systems?
C) POSSIBILITY OF CONVERGENCE OR HARMONISATION
It has become obvious that the workings of the different systems are shaped
by local factors, rules and other circumstances making them better suited to
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the prevalent conditions of the particular system. Any suggestion of importing
the best features of one system to the other should give recognition to these
differences in the structure of companies, cultural and financial factors of
different systems. Proposals to make the three systems exactly the same
would be unrealistic to implement and should therefore be resisted.
The Anglo-American system would face practical problems if it attempted to
move wholesale to an insider system as operates in Germany and vice versa.
In the U.K. and U.S. the supervision of a company's activities by its owners is
replaced by the self-supervision of managers, and owners exert no direct
influence on company policy. Large institutional holdings enable German
companies to overcome the dilemma of collective action. The two-tier board
system depends, to a great extent, on a stable ownership structure which
discourages hostile outside acquisitions and changes in ownership. This
appearance of a more effective governance system in German companies
has moved commentators13 to contend that the two-tier, bank-based system
has considerable advantages over the Anglo-American market-based system.
12. See for example Section 141, Delaware Gen Corp. Law, 1994
13. Porter, M., Capital Disadvantage: America's Failing Capital Investment System,
Harv. B. Rev., Vol. 70 ( Sept.lOct. 1992) p. 65 at 71 • where he makes a call for U.
S. to imitate aspects of the German system; There have been similar proposals that
U.K. should learn from the German model of corporate govemance see Charkham
J, Corporate Govemance And The Market for Control of Companies, 1989, Bank of
England Panel Paper, No. 25, at 21
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The lack of effective monitoring and poorly developed external markets,
however, constitute serious drawbacks in the German system thus inducing
managerial slackness and internal collusion. These, in addition to employee
representation on the supervisory board result in the deprivation of
shareholders' rights in general, more so as employee representatives
traditionally vote with the incumbent manaqernent". As a result of these
German supervisory boards have been said to have evolved into closed
shops, where members work to perpetuate each other's powers and perks".
Another obvious problem is that banks, as creditors, may have a preference
for limiting the distribution of dividends among shareholders as high retention
of profit reduces the risk of the company defaulting on its outstanding debts.
This makes internally generated funds consistent with the notion of an
entrenched inside system. Proponents of the German system have often
stressed the fact that the financial ties and relationships in German
companies reduce agency costs and allow investors to monitor managers
more effectively than in the UK and the US16.
14. Franks, J. and Mayer, C., Ownership and Control, in H. Siebert (ed), Trends in
Business Organisation: Do Participation and Co-operation Increase
Competitiveness?, 1995, p. 187, Tubingen
15. Steinherr A. and Huveneurs C, Universal Banks: The Prototype of Successful
Banks In An Integrated European Market: A View Inspired By The German
Experience, 1990, Centre for European Policy
16. Grundfest, J., Subordination of American Capital, Journal of Financial
Economics, vol. 27,1990,89 at 98
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The establishment of a dual or two-tier board system in the UK, for example,
would bring about a shift from the "shareholder centred" system to one where
power is concentrated in other hands. The tradition of co-determination
renders the German model an unsuitable one for UK companies.
Although the present system of control by the general meeting over the board
of directors is an inadequate one any attempt at a wholesale transfer of the
good aspects of one system to another will conflict with the fundamental
differences that exist between them. Differences between Germany and the
Anglo-American systems would constitute barriers in any attempt to align the
mechanics of corporate governance in these countries. This was well
summed up by Hopt and Teubner when they stated:
To be sure, a transplantation of one national approach to
another country is not easily achieved, since the various
approaches to corporate social responsibility are intimately
connected to national economic and social structures and to
political and cultural traditions. "17
Although the corporate control mechanics of one system cannot be
transferred to another, knowledge of the practices of other systems can be
used to fill existing loopholes in ones system. With the U.K. and U.S. systems
being characterised by a high level of take-over and frequent changes in
ownership, the commitment of German owners is worth emulating.
17. Hopt, K., and Tuebner, G., (eds) Corporate Govemance and Directors'
Liabilities: Legal, Economic and Sociological Analysis on Corporate Social
Responsibility. ( 1985), Berlin Waterde Gruyter, p. v.
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Despite the growing dominance of institutional investors in the U.K. and the
U.S, institutions in these systems still have little incentive to act or behave
like their German counterparts. Institutional shareholders in the Anglo-
American system are generally more interested in the current market price of
shares and will support any transaction that will boost the immediate market
value of their company's shares.
An important difference between U.K. law and that of the U.S. is that in the
latter system shareholders have the power to remove directors for cause.
This right is usually provided for by state statute." To justify such a removal a
director must be guilty of some abuse of trust. The fact that there is no
equivalent provision under U.K. law is surprising in the light of the vvell-
established power of equity to remove trustees for substantial cause such as
misappropriation.
It is also 'NOrth noting that unlike the U.S. position where the court may
remove a director on the application of 10% of the shareholders, under U.K.
law the courts have no power to interfere with the management of companies
even on the basis of directors' dishonesty or inability to perform their duties.
As only 10% shareholding is required for the application to court, U.S.
shareholders are in a better position to determine the composition of their
boards. As the majority vote required to remove a director in the U.K. may be
18. An example is Section 141, Delaware GenCorp. Law1994
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difficult to obtain thoughts need to be given to this channel of corporate
control.
When proxy voting in the U.K. is compared to that of the U.S, where stringent
rules are put in place to prevent the abuse of this machinery, the attempts by
the London Stock EXchange leaves a lot to be desired. The regulation of
specific matters by the U.S. Securities Exchange Commission has enhanced
the disclosure of information and communication among shareholders. If
similar rules were promulgated in the U.K. they would go a long way to
promote the exercise of shareholders' voting rights and the control of their
companies.
In the U.S. the courts SUbject to serious scrutiny any shareholders voting
agreement or trust to which not all shareholders are parties. Such a scrutiny
is aimed at determining whether it has the potential to operate as a fraud on
non-eontracting shareholders. One cannot but give credit to this practice as a
close check should show whether the agreement has the tendency to induce
the parties to promoting their own interests to the detriment of the company.
An agreement should only be valid if it works no fraud on other stakeholders
and is to the benefit of the company.
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In addition to this, the statutory regulation of shareholders voting
arrangements in the U.S. makes a good contrast to the U.K. position. Under
the laws of most states shareholders can enter into valid voting arrangements
as long as they are in writing and signed by the parties involved.19 Some
states' law go to the extent of requiring that potential shareholders should be
notified of the existence of such agreements when they are buying company
shares. 20 This type of regulations are desirable in the U.K. as they VIIOuld
work to limit irregularities in shareholders voting arrangements.
The present position of corporate control moves one to make a case for a
way forward through more serious oversight of the management of
companies. The recommendations that follow are a combination of instances
where the use of legal rules and better monitoring of management by the
board could bring about improvements in corporate control.
D) RECOMMENDATIONS
In all three systems under study there have been debates and proposals for
changes to be effected in the area of corporate control." Most of the
19. An example is Section 218(c) Delaware Gen. Corp. Law 1994
20. An example is Section 616, New York Bus. Corp. Law (Mckinney 1986).
21. Examples are the Cadbury, Greenbury and Hampel Reports in the United
Kingdom and the American Law Institute Principles of Corporate Governance in the
UnitedStates
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proposals have centred on strengthening shareholders' rights and role in
monitoring the management of their companies. These proposals have
stemmed from the realisation that there is an absence of active shareholders
who actually playa significant role in the control of their companies. To solve
this problem the emphasis has been on changing the board structure to
include more independent non-executive directors to represent shareholders
interests on the board.
1. MANDATORY SHAREHOLDER ADVISORY COMMITTEES
FOR PUBLIC COMPANIES
With the problems faced by shareholders22 in controlling their companies the
existence of a shareholders' advisory committee would constitute a channel
for shareholders' involvement. As shareholders remain the ultimate
beneficiaries of the company with the main focus being the long-term
profitability and welfare of the company, the existence of a shareholder
advisory committee would create a forum for shareholders to make their
views known. This work recommends that the use of shareholder advisory
committees be made mandatory for all public companies.
22. Chapter two of this work at pp.37-38 discusses shareholders' inability to control
their companies
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Emphasising the advantages to be derived from Shareholders' Advisory
Committees Dent states:
"Those who can best decide what directors should do
are those who will be most affected by their actions;
that is, the shareholders. Only when shareholders
control the board will they start to figure out.. ..how to
handle executive compensation and all the other
problems that have long plagued corporate
governance".23
a) Examples Of Its Successful Use
This type of committee has been extensively used in Italy where the
COrporate structure consists of the general meeting of shareholders, the
board of directors and the advisory committee (Collegio sindacale). The
rationale for the existence of this committee is to provide a machinery by
which the actions of directors can be kept under control and the operations of
the company reviewed in the interest of shareholders.24 The functions that
Italian law assigns to the collegio sindacale are:
1. oversight of the general operation of the company;
2. review of managementactions to ensure that they align with
23. Dent, G. W., Towards Unifying Ownership And Control In The Public
Corporation, 1989, Wisconsin L Rev. 881 at 914.
24. See Visentini, G., Compatibility And Competition Between European And
American Corporate Governance: Which Model Of Capitalism?, 1998, Brooklyn
Joumal of International Law I.
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shareholders' interests; and
3. checking of company's accounts and auditors' reports to ensure that
they reflect the true financial position of the company.
This committee has the power to make comments and observations to
directors and shareholders in their respective meetings. It also has an
autonomous power to call a general meeting of shareholders to discuss and
take actions on serious irregularities in the operations of the company that
require immediate action.25
Another example of successful use of a shareholder advisory committee has
been the American oil company, Exxon. This committee was designed by
Exxon as a machinery for shareholder involvement in order to minimise free
riding among shareholders.26 Under the Exxon arrangement any shareholder
or group of shareholders may submit a proposal to the company to be elected
as shareholder representative. Members of the committee are compensated
for costs incurred and for time expended on the company's business. The
main task of this committee is to review all areas of the company's business
and advise the board of directors and the general meeting of its views.
25. See Pinto A.R and Visentini G., (eds), The Legal Basis of Corporate
Governance In Publicly Held Companies: A Comparative Approach, 1998, 105-107,
Kluwer Law International.
26. See Monks R.A.G. and Minow N., Watching The Watcher, 1996,275, Blackwell
Business.
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b) The Proposal
These examples give one an insight into the operation of shareholders'
advisory committees. Where the establishment of such a committee is made
a requirement for all public companies it may go a long way in solving the
problem of shareholder passivity. Members of the committee would be
appointed and removed by shareholders in the same manner as directors. A
possible drawback to the effectiveness of such a committee is that the same
majority that appoints the directors would be required to appoint members of
the advisory committee.
In that respect the committee members may be viewed as non-executive
directors with a different title especially as their compensation systems may
be similar. An important difference between members of the proposed
shareholders' advisory committee and non-executive directors is that the
former, not being directors, can only review management decisions and not
participate in the decision-making processes.
The existence of such a committee would create a forum for shareholders
(especially institutional investors) to interact with their board. Having a
greater say on key corporate issues would encourage institutional
shareholders to see themselves as 'owners' and not simple 'investors'. Such
an institutionally oriented committee may increase the incentive for large
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shareholders to be actively involved in controlling their companies. It would
serve as a resource to the board while enhancing the relationship between
the board of directors and the shareholders.
It can, however, be argued that the existence of a shareholder advisory
committee would reduce the already limited power of individual shareholders.
It should be remembered that the returns from the activities of such a
committee would include higher dividends and price appreciation of shares
which would be enjoyed by institutions and individual shareholders alike. The
existence of mandatory shareholders' advisory committees may also be
viewed as a step towards a two-tier board structure. The position would,
however, be that employees would have no say in their composition in
addition to the fact that members of such committees would not participate in
any aspect of management.
Another criticism may be that it would create a structure which gives
institutional investors uncontrollable powers just like the German banks. It
has to be emphasised that with their large holdings institutions are in the best
Position, given the right legal framework and proper incentives, to work
actively towards the long-term success of their companies."
27. One of the main reasons being that many of the blocks of shares held by
institutional investors are too large to dispose of without depressing the market.
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c) Powers Of The Shareholders' Advisory Committee
The proposed shareholders' advisory committees would have the power to
oversee the proxy voting machinery of their companies. When compared
with the U.S. proxy voting in the U.K. does not afford shareholders control of
their companies. The regulation and prohibition of specific matters by the
SEC Rules have enhanced the disclosure of information in proxy contests. If
Shareholders' Advisory Committees were made mandatory they would ensure
that adequate information is disclosed for shareholders 'Nho wish to vote by
proxy.
Through such disclosures shareholder's would become aware of other
shareholders 'Nho intend to attend specific general meetings. They would be
given access to the corporate treasury for purposes of communicating with
shareholders and financing proxy solicitations. Each committee would,
therefore, provide a forum through 'Nhich shareholders would effectively use
the proxy machinery. They would also have the pO\N8r to scrutinise and
approve shares with disproportionate voting rights as very little has been
done by way of regulating the issue of shares with disparate rights.28
28. The London StockExchange simply requires the words "non-voting" to appear in
the description of shares of that category - Admission of Securities to Listing 0.04- it
is silent on the issue of shares with multiple voting power.
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Where a shareholder advisory committee is involved in scrutinising the issue
of disproportionate voting shares, management vvould be unlikely, under the
glare of shareholders' scrutiny, to make drastic shifts in voting control. Apart
from these specific powers, advisory committees would have the power to call
general meetings of shareholders to notify the shareholders of any aspect of
mismanagement of the company. Once such actions are taken by the general
meeting the committee vvould communicate the views and intentions of the
shareholders to the board. In addition to these the committee vvould have
power to scrutinise and review any transaction undertaken by the company
which involves potential conflict of interests.
Members of the committee would be compensated for time expended on the
company's business. They would be reimbursed for reasonable travel and
other out-of-pocket expenses incurred in serving as committee members and
these vvould include indemnification and advancement of expenses as vvould
directors.
2. IMPROVING BOARD MONITORING
Some of the central responsibilities of company boards of directors are the
formUlation and implementation of business strategies on behalf of
shareholders. Corporate control has moved in the direction of concentrating
authority, in large companies, in the board of directors. The board of directors
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is at the very pivot of corporate governance. The Cadbury Report
emphasised this in paragraph 2.5 where it states that: "Boards of directors
are responsible for the governance of their companies." The board, and the
way it functions, will largely be determine by its composition.
It has been recognised that even the present emphasis on the monitoring role
of non-executive directors is fraud with problems. One of them being that
non-executive directors are selected by the chief executive and simply have
their appointments endorsed by the general meeting. The Cadbury Report
recommended that non-executive directors should bring "an independent
jUdgement to bear on issues of strategy, performance, and resources
including key appointments and standards of conduct".29
The importance of the role of non-executive directors in representing
shareholders interests has been recognised by all sectors. A clearer
distinction between the roles of the executive and non-executive directors
shoUld, however, be made. Although this may give the impression that boards
are divided into two sections on the German pattern, they would still operate
on the same unitary board which this YJOrk favours retaining on balance. The
fOllOwing are suggestions which if implemented, would help company boards
to monitor their companies more effectively.
29. See para 4.1
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a) Making A Certain Percentage Of Independent Non-Executive
Directors Mandatory For Public Companies
It has been acknowledged that more emphasis is being placed on the
importance of independent non-executive directors. The main reason being
that this category of directors should not be dependent on the chief executive
for promotion and, therefore, are relatively free from conflicts of interests. The
Cadbury Report has simply recommended that company boards should
include non-executive directors of sufficient calibre and number for their
views to carry significant weight in board decisions.3O
Taking into consideration the fact that boards vary in size according to the
needs of different companies this YJOrk recommends that public companies be
required to appoint non-executive directors to form at least half of their board.
Where that is achieved independent non-executive directors would be in a
position to make a meaningful contribution to the vital checks and balance
mechanisms in their company. Where a proportion of non executive directors
is determined by statute, it YJOuld ensure that the wide variation in the number
of non-executive directors on boards of different companies YJOuld be
reduced.
30. See para 1.3 of the Cadbury Code of Best Practice
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b) Limiting Interlocking Directorates
Chapter nine has shown that interlocking directorships have been a feature of
the corporate scene with the effect that managers of one company serve to
oversee the managers of another. This may create inter-corporate cohesion
and relationships that undermine the independence of non-executive
directors. More so interlocking directorates between companies in the same
industry may forestall the development of competition 'Nhich YtIOuld occur in
the normal expansion of each company.
Interlocks between manufacturing companies and banks may result in the
granting of credit to favoured companies and refusal of credit to competitors.
Where companies that are suppliers! purchasers have common directors, this
may result in preferential treatment 'Nhere there is a short supply to the
impairment of competition.
This work recommends that the number of board appointments that a person
may hold be limited to three by law. Such a limitation would enhance
monitoring as it would enable directors to make a significant commitment of
time to the affairs of each company. A chief executive officer should not
serve on any other board as the position requires total commitment and full-
time input. Apart from lack of time, mutuality of interests and lack of
competition that can be fostered by companies having common directors,
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there is a danger that such interlocks may result in a spiralling upward pay
round.
c) An Improved Method Of Selecting And Training Directors
There have been recommendations both in the U. K. and U. S. that non-
executive directors be independent by all standards. Where the Chief
Executive picks the non-executive group and counts the votes at general
meetings, directors are bound to feel that they 0\N9 the chief executive their
loyalty. A better system of finding director candidates should be put in place.
The Cadbury Committee recommended the establishment of nomination
committees as a method of independent assessment but did not include that
in the Code of Best Practice. In this respect all companies should be
required by law to have nomination committees made up of non-executive
directors.
The nomination committee should meet with the investors once a year to
discuss the processes and criteria used to search for candidates. Such
meetings would encourage the involvement of investors (especially
institutional shareholders) in the search for candidates. Nomination
committees should have access to independent professional agencies at the
company's expense.
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With the rate of changes in the business world, experience acquired five
years prior to an appointment may become irrelevant at the time of
appointment. In view of this an induction programme consisting of, among
other things, talks with customers, competitors, auditors, managers,
shareholders and employees, would enhance directors' understanding.
d) Mandatory Separation Of The Positions Of Chief
Executive Officer and Chairman
The Cadbury Report had emphasised the role of the board chairman by
stating that the chairman should be able to stand sufficiently back from the
day to day running of the business." Although the Cadbury's Code of Best
Practice indicates that there should be a division of responsibilities at the
head of a company to ensure a balance of power and authority,32 it stops
short of recommending this separation.
The title of chief executive officer has become linked with wide powers. One
of the functions of the board (including the chairman) being the removal of the
chief executive officer, this becomes difficult where the chief executive officer
is also the board chairman.
31. Para 4.7
32. Para. 1.2
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Where there is a mandatory separation of these roles the chief executive
officer would still have enough authority to make policy decisions while
sufficient accountability would be made to the board for the benefit of
shareholders. Where these positions are lumped into one there is a potential
conflict between commitment to management and the need for a balanced
view of the interests of shareholders.
A possible objection to a mandatory separation of these two roles may be that
it has the tendency of generating infighting in the board thus weakening the
leadership of the company. This objection would fail to take into
consideration the fact that there are two distinct roles involved - managing the
board of directors and managing the company. While the chief executive
officer bears the full responsibility for managing the company, the chairman is
responsible for managing the board.
e) The Mandatory Use Of Board Committees
Board committees such as audit, nomination and remuneration committees
can provide a valuable way of increasing board efficiency. Although the
delegation of specific business to board committees has been recommended
by the Cadbury, Greenbury and Hampel Committees, there is no compulsion
on companies to have such committees.
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This work recommends that the use of the three major committees of the
board - nomination, audit and remuneration committees - should be made
mandatory for all public companies. As the nomination committee has
already been discussed this part shall deal with the importance of the audit
and remuneration committees.
On appointment, members of the audit committee should be given an
induction training to understand their role as well as that of the auditors.
Committee members cannot make the right decisions without appropriate
information. Adequate and timely information is, therefore, essential for the
proper working of these committees. Moreover, the way that committee
members obtain their information will affect their knowledge and
understanding of committee deliberations.
As indicated by the Cadbury and Greenbury Reports, the primary tasks of the
remuneration committee should be to advise the board on remuneration
policies and implement such policies. This committee should comprise of
non-executive directors as executive directors should play no part in
decisions on their own remoneranon." The Greenbury Report has not only
recommended that boards should set up remuneration committees but has
33. As recommended by para 4.42 of theCadbury Report
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clearly stated that such committees should consist exclusively of non-
executive directors." It should draw up the remuneration report sections of
the annual report and accounts.
This committee should give its opinion not only on the remuneration of board
members, but should also have a distinct role in determining the
performance-related share options and compensation of executive directors.
The use of independent professional advice should be available to board
committees as recommended by para. 1.5 of the Cadbury's Code of Best
Practice but this should be co-ordinated by the non-executive chairman for
purposes of checking extravagances. The Greenbury Report also stressed
the importance of providing adequate support structures for remuneration
committees, stating that they vvould need to draw on outside consultants to be
in a position to make independent judgement on issues of directors'
remuneration.35
3. JUDICIAL POWER TO REMOVE DIRECTORS ON THE
APPLICATION OF MINORITY SHAREHOLDERS
Presently there is no judicial power to remove legally appointed directors in
the U.K. even where there is evidence of dishonesty or inability to perform set
34. Ibid paraA4
35. Ibid para 4.17
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down duties. As indicated in chapter 4 shareholders' power to remove
directors by a majority vote may not be a practical remedy. The fact is that
the majority shareholders may be in collusion with dishonest directors. A
minority of shareholders (for instance 15%) should, therefore, be able to
apply to the court to have a director removed from office on the grounds of
fraUd, dishonesty or some abuse of trust. If this right is given to the minority,
the only requirement on their part would be that there exists sufficient cause
for removal.
When such an application is filed, the director to be removed would be given
adequate notice and afforded the opportunity to respond to the accusations.
Even where a shareholders' agreement provides that a particular director
shall be maintained in office such an agreement will be subject to an implied
condition that the director will effectively perform the duties of the office.
Under such a circumstance a director should still be removable by the court
for any abuse of authority.
The right of minority shareholders to apply to court to have a director
removed would put shareholders in a better position to determine the
composition of their boards. It would bring U.K. shareholders in line with their
U.S. counterparts who only need to hold 10% of the outstanding shares of
any class to apply for the judicial removal of a director for cause. In the U.S.
such a removal can also be at the instance of the state's attorney general.
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This right as given to U.S. shareholders is usually provided for by state
statutes.36
The fact that there is no equivalent provision under U.K. law is surprising in
the light of the well-established power of equity to remove trustees for
substantial cause such as misappropriation or breach of trust. Under the law
of trust it is irrelevant that the breach of trust complained of is in any way
connected with an agent. As the majority vote of shareholders required to
remove directors in the U.K. may be difficult to obtain thoughts need to be
given in this direction.
4. MORE STRINGENT RULES ON PROXY VOTING
Proxy voting in the U. K does not afford shareholders the required control in
their companies. When compared to the U.S. where stringent regulations are
put in place to prevent the abuse of the machinery, the present position in the
U.K. leaves a lot to be desired. It can, therefore be said that the proxy voting
system has superseded the shareholders' meeting itself. The result is that the
outcome of contested issues will usually be a forgone conclusion. The
regulation of specific matters with regard to proxy voting would enhance the
use of this machinery by U.K. shareholders.
36. Examples are Section 706(d) N.Y. Bus Corp. Law ( McKinney 1986 ); Section
304 Cal. Corp. Code (West 1990 ) and Section 8.09 Revised Model Business Corp.
Act 1984
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Although the Stock Exchange Rules require a two-way proxy, which gives the
shareholder the opportunity to direct the proxy whether to vote for or against
the resolution, with the poor response of shareholders, management is still
left in control of the machinery. In addition to that, as the listing rules are not
statutory requirements they do not regulate all companies. Even the
requirements of Articles 60 and 61 that there should be t'NO forms of proxies
still leave management in control of this machinery.37
Although the facility of proxy voting has given an appearance of
shareholders' voting right being enhanced, this appearance is deceptive. For
shareholders to instruct their proxies intelligently they need to be informed on
corporate policies and existing alternatives. Shareholders need adequate
information on both sides of the case to be able to exercise their voting rights
properly.
Given that there are inadequate incentives for individual shareholders to
undertake proxy context to oppose management, a legal rule requiring
companies to reimburse insurgents may be a sensible way of obtaining
shareholder involvement. This might also vvork to reduce the free rider
problem. Rules should also be promulgated to make communication among
shareholders possible.
37. These two articles require that the first form should give the proxy complete
discretion and the second form should be a two-way proxy which can be used to
instruct the proxy on howto vote.
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E) BENEFITS OF THE PROPOSED MODEL
It is believed that significant benefits would be derived from the
implementation of these recommendations. There would be the creation of a
closer bond between shareholders and corporate management with a greater
focus on the long-term goals and interests of the company. Company
performance and potential returns to shareholders \YOuld be improved as
there would be an alignment of management actions with shareholders,
interests. Shareholders \YOuld be well-informed through good, open
communication and would have a clear understanding of their company's
goals.
Apart from providing companies with a higher quality of non-executive
directors who would also be better informed, the non-executive group would
be truly independent of the executive team. Non-executive directors would
have a deeper understanding of the key factors that would enable them to
come to a judgement about the long-term strategic plans of the company.
These better-qualified and independent non-executive directors would be in a
good position to monitor the executive team for the protection of
shareholders' interests.
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APPENDIX A
REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE FINANCIAL ASPECTS
OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE (The Cadbury Report)
Companies to whom directed
3.1 The Code of Best Practice is directed to the boards of directors of all listed
companies registered in the U.K but we would encourage as many other
companies as possible to aim at meeting its requirements.
Code Principles
3.2 The principles on which the Code is based are those of openess, integritvand
accountability. They go together. Openness on the part of companies, within
the limits set by their competitive position, is the basis for the confidence which
needs to exist between business and all those who have a stake in its success.
An open approach to the disclosure of information contributes to the efficient
WOrking of the market economy, prompts boards to take effective action and
allows shareholders and others to scrutinise companies more thoroughly.
3.3 Integrity means both straightforward dealing and completeness. What is
required of financial reporting is that it should be honest and that it should
present a balanced picture of the state of the company's affairs. The integrity
of reports depends on the integrity of those who prepare and present them.
3.4 Boards of directors are accountable to their shareholders and both have to
play. their part in making that accountability effectively. Boards of directors
need to do so through the quality of the information which they provide to
shareholders, and shareholders through their willingness to exercise their
responsibilities as owners.
3.5 The arguments for adhering to the Code are twofold. First, a clear
understanding of responsibilities and an open approach to the way in which
they have been discharged will assist boards of directors in framing and
winning support for their strategies. Itwill also assist the efficient operation of
capital markets and increase confidence in boards, auditors and financial
reporting and hence the general level of confidence in business.
3.6 Second, if standards of financial reporting and of business conduct more
generally are not seen to be raised, a greater reliance on regulation may be
inevitable.
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Statement of Compliance
3.7 We recommend that listed companies reporting in respect of years ending after
30 June 1993 should state in the report and accounts whether they comply with
the Code and identify and give reasons for any areas of non-compliance.
3.8 The london Stock Exchange intends to require such a statement as one of its
continuing listing obligations. We envisage, however, that many companies will
wish to go beyond the strict terms of the london Stock Exchange rule and
make a general statement about the corporate govemance of their enterprises
as some leading companies have already done. We welcome such statements
and leave it to boards to decide the terms in which they make their statement
of compliance. Boards are not expected to comment separately on each, item,
of the Code with which they are complying. but areas of non-compliance will
have to be dealt with individually.
3.9 The continuing obligations laid down by the london Stock Exchange should
require companies' statements of compliance to have been the subject of
review by the auditors before publication. The review should cover only those
parts of the compliance statement which relate to provisions of the Code where
compliance can be objectively verified (see footnote to the Code,). The
auditors should not be required to report formally a satisfactory conclusion to
their review, but if they identify an area of non-compliance which is not properly
disclosed, they should draw attention to it in their report on the financial
statements. We recommend that the Auditing Practices Board should consider
gUidancefor auditors accordingly.
3.10 The Code is to be followed by individuals and companies in the light of their
own particular circumstances. They are responsible for ensuring that their
actions meet the spirit of the Code and in interpreting it they should give
precedence to substance over form.
Keeping the Code up to date
3.11 We have addressed those issues which appeared from the evidence before
us to require the most immediate attention. The situation, however, is
developing. The Accounting Standards Board has in hand a programme of
work on the basis of financial reporting. Revised accounting standards and
improved methods of financial presentation will result. At the same time,
views on best boardroom practice will evolve in the light of experience. and
European Communitv directives and regulations may give rise to new issues.
It is essential, therefore, that the Code, in addition to being monitored, is kept
up to date.
3.12 We recommend that our sponsors. convened by the Financial Reporting
Council, should appoint a new Committee by the end of June 1995 to examine
how far compliance with the Code has progressed. how far our other
recommendations have been implemented, and whether the Code needs
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updating in line with emerging issues. Our sponsors should also determine
whether the sponsorship of the new Committee should be broadened and
whether wider matters of corporate governance should be included in its brief.
In the meantime. the present Committee will remain responsible for reviewing
the implementation of its proposals and for identifying further issues which its
successor body might usefully consider. These steps will establish a
continuing process of governance review.
Compliance
3.13 Raising standards of corporate governance cannot be achieved by structures
and rules alone. They are important because they provide a framework which
will encourage and support good governance, but what counts is the way in
which they are put to use.
3.14 The responsibility for putting the Code into practice lies directly with the
boards of directors of listed companies to whom it is addressed. Compliance
itself, however. is a matter for everyone concerned with corporate
Governance. We look to the financial institutions and the wide range of
bodies backing our work to encourage the adoption of our recommendations
by companies in which they have an interest. The media also have a part to
play in drawing attention to governance issues of public or shareholder
concern. It is vital to seize the opportunity presented by a climate of opinion
which accepts that changes are needed and which is expecting the
Committee to give the necessary lead.
3.15 The Committee recognises that smaller listed companies may initially have
difficulty in complying with some aspects of the Code and we have given
careful consideration to the responses to the draft report which addressed this
point. The boards of smaller listed companies who cannot, for the time being.
comply with parts of the Code should note that they may instead give their
reasons for non compliance. We believe, hovvever. that full compliance will
brine benefits to the boards of such companies and it should be their objective
to ensure that the benefits are achieved. In particular. the appointment of
appropriate non-executive directors should make a positive contribution to the
development of their businesses. Any practical issues which may arise in
respect of smaller listed companies will be thoroughly revievved b., the
Committee and its successor.
3.16 The Committee notes that companies will not be able to comply with items 4.5
and 4.6 in the Code until the necessary guidance for companies has been
developed.
Board Effectiveness
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4.1 Every public company should be headed by an effective board which can both
lead and control the business. Within the context of the UK unitary. board
system, this means a board made up of a combination of executive directors.,
with their intimate knowledge of the business, and of outside. non-executive
directors, who can bring a broader view to the company's activities, under a
chairman who accepts the duties and responsibilities which the post entails.
4.2 Tests of board effectiveness include the way in which the members of the
board as a whole work together under the chairman, whose role in corporate
governance is fundamental. and their collective ability to provide both the
leadership and the checks and balances which effective governance demands.
Shareholders are responsible for electing board members and it is in their
interests to see that the boards of their companies are properly constituted and
not dominated by anyone individual.
4.3 All directors are equally responsible in law for the board's actions and
decisions. Certain directors may have particular responsibilities. as executive
or non-executive directors, for which they are accountable to the board.
Regardless of specific duties undertaken by individual directors, however, it is
for the board collectively to ensure that it is meeting its obligations.
4.4 Whilst it is the board as a whole which is the final authority, executive and non-
executive directors are likely to contribute in different ways to its work, Non-
executive directors have t'NO particularly important contributions to make to the
governance process as a consequence of their independence from executive
responsibility. Neither is in conflict with the unitary nature of the board.
4.5 The first is in reviewing the performance of the board and of the executive. Non-
executive directors should address this aspect of their responsibilities carefully
and should ensure that the chairman is aware of their views. If the effectiveness
of the board. A number of companies have recognised that role and some have
done so formally in their Articles.
4.6 The second is in taking the lead where potential conflicts of interest arise. An
important aspect of effective corporate governance is the recognition that the
specific interests of the executive management and the wider interests of the
company may at times diverge, for example over take-overs, boardroom
succession, or directors' pay Independent non-executive directors whose
interests are less directly affected, are well-placed to help to resolve such
situations.
The Chairman
4.7 The chairman's role in securing good corporate governance is crucial.
Chairmen are primarily responsible for the working of the board, for its balance
of membership subject to' board and shareholders' approval, for ensuring, that
all relevant issues are on the agenda. and for ensuring that all directors,
executive and non-executive alike, are enabled and encouraged to play their
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full part in its activities. Chairmen should be able to stand sufficiently back
from the day-to-day. running of the business to ensure that their boards are in
full control of the company's affairs and alert to their obligations to their
shareholders.
4.8 It is for chairmen to make certain that their non-executive directors receive
timely, relevant information tailored to their needs. that they are properly
briefed on the issues arising at board meetings. and that they make an
effective contribution as board members in practice. It is equally for chairmen
to ensure that executive directors look beyond their executive duties and
accept their full share of the responsibilities of governance.
4.9 Given the importance and particular nature of the chairman's role. it should in
principle be separate from that of the chief executive. If the two roles are
combined in one person, it represents a considerable concentration of power,
We recommend, therefore, that there should be a clearly acceptable division of
responsibilities at the head of a company, which will ensure a balance of power
and authority, such that no one individual has unfettered powers of decision.
Where the chairman is also the chief executive, it is essential that there should
be a strong and independent element on the board
Non-Executive Directors
4.10 The Committee believes that the calibre of non-executive members of the
board is of special importance in setting and maintaining standards of
COrporate governance. The emphasis in this report on the control function of
non-executive directors is a consequence of our remit and should not in any
way detract from the primary and positive contribution which they are expected
to make. as equal board members, to the leadership of the company.
4.11 Non-executive directors should bring an independent judgement to bear on
issues of strategy, performance, resources. including key appointments. and
standards of conduct. We recommend that the calibre and number of non-
executive directors on a board should be such that their views will carry
significant vveight in the board's decisions. To meet our recommendations on
the composition of sub-committees of the board. all boards will require a
minimum of three non-executive directors, one of whom may be the chairman of
the company provided he or she is not also its executive head. Additionally.
two of the three should be independent in the terms set out in the next para-
graph.
4.12 An essential quality which non-executive directors should bring. to the board's
deliberations is that of independence of judgement. We recommend that the
majority of non-executives on a board should be independent of the company.
This means that apart from their directors' fees and shareholdings, they should
be independent of management and free from any business or other
relationship which could materially interfere with the exercise of their
independent judgement. It is for the board to decide in particular cases
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whether this definition is met. Information about the relevant interests of
directors should be disclosed in the Directors' Report.
4.13 On fees. there is a balance to be struck between recognising the value of the
contribution made by non-executive directors and not undermining their
independence. The demands which are now being made on conscientious non-
executive directors are significant and
their fees should reflect the time which they devote to the company's affairs. There
is. therefore. a case for paying for additional responsibilities taken on. for example,
by chairmen of board committees. In order to safeguard their independent
position. we regard it as good practice for non-executive directors not to participate
in share option schemes and for their service as non-executive directors not to be
pensionable by the company.
4.14 Non-executive directors lack the inside knowledge of the company of the executive
directors, but have the same right of access to information as they do. Their
effectiveness turns to a considerable extent on the quality of the information which
they receive and on the use which they make of it. Boards should regularly review
the form and the extent of the information which is provided to all directors.
4.15 Given the importance of their distinctive contribution, non-executive directors
should be selected with the same impartiality and care as senior executives. We
recommend that their appointment should be a matter for the board as a
whole and that there should be a formal selection process which will reinforce the
independence of non-executive directors and make it evident that they have been
appointed on merit and not through any form of patronage. We regard it as good
practice for a nomination committee (dealt with below) to carry out the selection
process and to make proposals to the board.
4.16 Companies have to be able to bring about changes in the composition of their
boards to maintain their vitality. Non-executive directors may lose something of
their independent edge. if they remain on a board too long. Furthermore, the make-
up of a board needs to change in line with new challenges. We recommend,
therefore, that non-executive directors should be appointed for specified terms.
Their Letter of Appointment should set out their duties. term of office, remuneration
and its review. Reappointment should not be automatic, but a conscious decision
by the board and the director concerned.
4.17 Our emphasis on the qualities to be looked for in non-executive directors,
combined with the greater demands now being, made on them, raises the question
of whether the supply of non-executive directors, combined with the greater
demand now being made on them, raises the question of whether the supply of
non-executive directors will be adequate to meet the demand. When companies
encourage their executive directors to accept appointments on the boards of other
companies, the companies and the individuals concerned all gain. A policy of
promoting this kind of appointment will increase the pool of potential non-
executive directors, particularly if the divisional directors of larger companies
are considered for non-executive posts, as well as their main board colleagues.
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Professional Advice
4.18 Occasions may arise when directors have to seek legal or financial advice in
the furtherance of their duties. They should always be able to consult the
company's advisers. If, however, they consider it necessary to take
independent professional advice, we recommend that they should be entitled to
do so at the company's expense, through an agreed procedure laid down
formally, for example in a Board Resolution, in the Articles, or in the Letter of
Appointment.
Directors' Training
4.19 The weight of responsibility carried by all directors and the increasing
commitment vvhich their duties require emphasise the importance of the way in
which they prepare themselves for their posts. Given the varying backgrounds.
qualifications and experience of director;, it is' highly desirable that they should
all undertake some form of internal or external training: this is particularly
important for directors. whether executive or non-executive. with no previous
board experience. Newly-appointed board members are also entitled to expect
a proper process of induction into the company's affairs. It is then up to
individual directors to keep abreast of their legislative and broader
responsibilities.
4.20 There are already courses for newly-appointed directors run by the Institute of
Directors and business schools. With the support of the Bank of England, the
Confederation of British Industry, the Institute of Directors, and PRO NED, a
new course covering the fu11 range of board responsibilities will be open to
directors shortly. The training and development of directors is of importance to
good governance and it is one of the issues which we suggest our successor
body should keep under review.
Board Structures and Procedures
4.21 The effectiveness of a board is buttressed by and procedures. One aspect of
structure is the appointment of committees of the board. such as audit,
remuneration and nomination committees.
4.22 Another is that boards should recognise the importance of the finance function
by making it the responsibility of a main board director, who should be a
signatory to the account on behalf of the board and should have the right of
access to the Audit Committee.
4.23 The basic procedural requirements are that the board should meet regularly,
with due notice of the issues to be discussed supported by the necessary
paperwork, and should record its conclusions. We recommend that boards
should have a formal schedule of matters specifically reserved to them for their
collective decision to ensure that the direction and control of the company
remains firmly in their hands and as a safeguard misjudgements and possible
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illegal practices. A Schedule of these matters should be given to directors, on
appointment and should be kept up to date.
4.24 We envisage that such a schedule would at least include:
(a) acquisition and disposal of assets of the company or its subsidiaries that are
material to the company,:
(b) investments, capital projects, authority levels, treasury policies, and risk
management policies.
Boards should lay down rules to determine materiality for any transaction, and
should establish clearly which transactions require multiple board signatures.
Boards should also agree the procedures to be followed when exceptionally
decisions are required betvveen board meetings.
The Company Secretary
4.24 The company secretary has a key role to play in ensuring that board
procedures are both followed and regularly reviewed. The chairman and the
board will look t company secretary for guidance on what their responsibilities
are under the rules and regulations to which they are subject and on how those
responsibilities
Nomination Committees
4.30 One approach to making board appointments, which makes clear how these
appointments are made and assists boards in making them, is through the
setting up of a nomination committee, with the responsibility of proposing to the
board, in the first instance, any new appointments, whether of executive or of
non-executive directors. A nomination committee should have a majority of
non-executive directors on it and be chaired either by the chairman or a non-
executive director.
Internal Controls
4.31 Directors are responsible under s.221 of the Companies Act 1985 for
maintaining adequate accounting records. To meet these responsibilities
directors need in practice to maintain a system of internal control over the
financial management of the company, including procedures designed to
minimise the risk of fraud. There is, therefore, already an implicit requirement
on directors to ensure that a proper system of internal control is in place.
4.32 Since an effective internal control system is a key aspect of the efficient
management of a company. we recommend that the directors should make a
statement in the report and account on the effectiveness of their system of
internal control add that the auditors should report thereon.
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Audit Committees
4.33 Since 1978. the New York Stock Exchange has required all listed companies to
have audit committees composed solely of independent directors and the 1987
report of the American Law Commission concluded that audit committees had a
critical role to play in ensuring the integrity of US company financial reports.
While experience of audit committees in this country is shorter, it is
encouraging, and around two-thirds of the top 250 U.K. listed companies now
have them in place.
4.34 Experience in the United States has shown that, even where audit committees
might have been set up mainly to meet listing requirements. they have proved
their worth and developed into essential committees of the board. Similarly,
recently published research in the United Kingdom concludes that the majority
of companies with audit committees are enthusiastic about their value to their
businesses. They offer added assurance to the shareholders that the auditors,
who act on their behalf, are in a position to safeguard their interests.
4.35 The Committee therefore recommends that all listed companies should
establish an audit committee. Our further recommendations on audit
committees are as follows:
(a) Audit committees should be formally constituted to ensure that they have
a clear relationship with the boards to whom they are answerable and to
whom they should report regularly. They should be given 'M"itten terms of
reference which deal adequately, with their membership, authority and
duties, and they should normally meet at least twice a year.
(b) There should be a minimum of three members. Membership should be
confined to the non-executive directors of the company and a majority of
the non-executives serving on the committee should be independent, as
defined in paragraph 4. 12 above. Membership of the committee should
be disclosed in the annual report.
(c) The external auditor should normally attend audit committee meetings, as
should the finance director. As the board as a whole is responsible for
the financial statements, other board members should also have the right
to attend. The committee should have a discussion with the external
auditors, at least once a year, without executive board members present,
to ensure that there are no unresolved issues of concern.
(d) The audit committee should have explicit authority to investigate any
matters within its terms of reference. the resources which it needs to do
so, and full access to information. The committee should be able to
obtain external professional advice and to invite outsiders with relevant
experience to attend if necessary.
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(e) The audit committee's duty should be determined in the light of the
company's need but should normally include:
(i) making recommendations to the board on the appointment of the external
auditor. the audit fee, and any questions of resignation or dismissal:
(ii) review of the half-year and annual financial statements before
submission to the board:
(iii) discussion with the external auditor about the
nature and scope of the audit, co-ordination 'Nhere more than one audit firm
is involved, any problems or reservations arising from the audit.
and any matters 'Nhich the external auditor wishes to discuss, without
executive board members present;
(iv) review of the external auditor's management letter;
(v) review of the company's statement on internal control systems prior
to endorsement by the board;
(Vi) review of any significant findings of internal investigations.
(f) Where an internal audit function exists. the audit committee should
ensure that it is adequately resourced and has appropriate standing within
the company. The internal audit programme should be in revieV1led b the
audit committee, and the head of internal audit should normally attend its
meetings.
(g) The chairman of the audit committee should be available to answer
questions about its work at the Annual General Meeting.
4.36 The Committee believes that boards should appoint audit committees,
rather than aiming to carry out their functions
themselves. A separate audit committee enables a board to
delegate to a sub-committee a thorough and detailed review
of audit matters, it enables the non-executive directors to
contribute an independent judgement and playa positive role
in an area for which they are particularly fitted, and it offers the auditors a
direct link with the non-executive directors. The ultimate responsibility of
the board for reviewing and approving the annual report and accounts and
the half-year report remains undiminished by the appointment of an audit
committee, but it provides an important assurance that a key area of a
board's duties will be rigorously discharged.
4.37 The Committee therefore regards the appointment Of properly constituted audit
committees as an important step in raisins standards of corporate Governance.
Their effectiveness depends on their having a strong chairman who has the
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confidence of the board and of the auditors. and on the quality of the non-
executive directors. Membership of an audit committee is a demanding task
requiring commitment, training and skill. The directors concerned need to have
sufficient understanding of the issues to be dealt with by the committee to take
an active part in its proceedings. This is why committees should, if it is
appropriate and within their authority, be able to invite outsiders with relevant
experience to attend meetings.
4.38 The external auditors should be present at the board meeting when the annual
report and accounts are approved and preferably when the half-yearly report is
considered as Ytlell.
Internal Audit
4.39 The function of the internal auditors is complementary to, but different from,
that of the outside auditors. We regard it as good practice for companies to
establish internal audit functions to undertake regular monitoring of key
controls and procedures. Such regular monitoring is an integral part of a
company's system of internal control and helps to ensure its effectiveness.
An internal audit function is well placed to undertake investigations on behalf
of the audit committee and to follow up any suspicion of fraud. It is essential
that heads of internal audit should have unrestricted access to the chairman
of the audit committee in order to ensure the independence of their position.
Board Remuneration
4.40 The overriding principle in respect of board remuneration is that of openness.
Shareholders are entitled to a full and clear statement of directors' present and future
benefits, and of how they have been determined. We recommend that in disclosing
directors' total emoluments and those of the chairman and highest-paid UK director,
separate figures should be given for their salary and performance-related
elements and that the criteria on which performance is measured should be explained.
Relevant information about stock options, stock appreciation rights, and pension
contributions should also be given.
4.41 In addition, YtIe recommend that future service contracts should not exceed three
years without shareholders' approval and that the Companies Act should be
amended in line with this recommendation. This would strengthen shareholder
control over levels of compensation for loss of office.
4.42 We also recommend that boards should appoint remuneration committees.
consisting wholly or mainly of non-executive directors and chaired by a non-
executive director. to recommend to the board the remuneration of the executive
directors in all its forms, drawing on outside advice as necessary. Executive
directors should play no part in decisions on their own remuneration. Membership
of the remuneration committee should appear in the Directors' Report. Best practice
in this field is set out in PRO NED's Remuneration Committee guidelines, published
in 1992.
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4.43 The Committee has received proposals for giving shareholders the opportunity to
determine matters such as directors' pay at general meetings. but does not see how
these suggestions could be made workable. A director's remuneration is not a matter
which can be sensibly reduced to a vote for or against; were the vote to go against a
particular remuneration package, the board would still have to determine the
remuneration of the director concerned. In addltlon, there are such practical
considerations as the need to agree directors' remuneration on appointment.
4.44 Shareholders require that the remuneration of directors should be both fair and
competitive. Striking this balance involves detailed consideration of the kind which a
remuneration committee, whose members have no personal interest in the outcome,
can give to the matter. Remuneration committees need to have the interests of the
company and the shareholders always in mind in coming to their decisions and the
chairman of the committee should be available to respond to any concerns of
shareholders at the Annual General Meeting.
4.45 The Annual General Meeting, provides the opportunity for shareholders to make their
views on such matters as directors' benefits known to their boards. It is the
Committee's view that shareholders can play a more practical governance role by
aiming to influence board policies in this way, than by seeking to make the detail of
board decisions SUbject to their vote.
4.46 Further changes to the rules for disclosure. such as lengthening the list of directors
whose remuneration is individually identified, and the role which shareholders could
play. either in voting on particular aspects of remuneration or in tabling advisory
resolutions along lines now developing in the USA, will need to be reviewed in the
light of experience. Directors' contracts and pay are aspects of board accountability
which the Committee will continue to monitor in the expectation that they will be on the
agenda of our successor body.
Financial Reports
4.47 A basic weakness in the current system of financial reporting is the possibility of
different accounting treatments being applied to essentially the same facts, with the
consequence that different results or financial positions could be reported, each
apparently complying with the overriding requirement to show a true and fair view.
Regardless of how far the market can understand the implications of alternative
accounting treatments or see through presentational techniques designed to show
company's figures in the most flattering light, there are advantages to investors.
analysts, other accounts users and ultimately to the company itself in financial
reporting rules which limit the scope for uncertainty and manipulation.
4.48 The lifeblood of markets is information and barriers to the flow of relevant
information represent imperfections in the market. The need to sift and correct the
information put out by companies adds cost and uncertainty to the market's pricing
function. The more the activities of companies are transparent. the more accurately
will their securities be valued.
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4.49 In addition, the wider the scope for alternative treatments, the less useful financial
reports become in terms of comparability - over time and between companies.
4.50 What shareholders (and others) need from the report and accounts is a coherent
narrative, supported by the figures, of the company's performance and prospects.
We recommend that boards should pay particular attention to their duty to present a
balanced and understandable assessment of their company's position. Balance
requires that setbacks should be dealt with as YlIeIl as successes, 'Nhile the need for
the report to be readily understood emphasises that words are as important as
figures.
4.51 The cardinal principle of financial reporting is that the view presented should be true
and fair. Further principles
are that boards should aim for the highest of disclosure consonant with presenting
reports which are understandable and with avoiding damage to their competitive
position. They should also aim to ensure the and consistency of their reports and
the,. should meet the spirit as well as the letter of reporting standards.
4.52 The Committee 'Nholeheartedly endorses the objectives of the Financial Reporting
Council and the Accounting Standards Board in setting reporting standards. It also
welcomes the action being taken by the Financial Reporting Review Panel over
companies 'Nhose accounts fall below accepted reporting standards.
4.53 The Committee recognises the advantage to users of reports and accounts of
some explanation of the factors likely to influence their company's future pro-
gress. The inclusion of an essentially forward-looking Operating and Financial
Review, along the lines developed by the Accounting Standards Board for
Consultation, would serve this purpose.
Reporting Practice
4.54 Listed companies publish full financial statements annually and half-yearly reports in
the interim. In between these major announcements. boards may need to keep
shareholders and the market in touch with their company's progress. The guiding
principle once again is openness and boards should aim for any intervening statements
to be widely circulated, in fairness to individual shareholders and to minimise th&'-
possibility of insider trading.
4.55 If companies reported quarterly, the need for more informal methods of keeping
investors informed would be diminished. Quarterly reporting would, however, involve
additional costs for companies and ultimately for their shareholders and has not been
recommended to us by shareholder bodies, 'Nho accept the present pattern of reporting
by boards.
4.56 We consider that interim reports should be expanded in order to increase their value to
users. We recommend that:
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(a) balance sheet information should be included with the interim report. There
should not be a requirement for a full audit. but the interim report should be
reviewed by the auditors, who should discuss their findings with
the audit committee;
(b) the continuing obligations laid down by the London Stock Exchange on UK
companies admitted to listing should be amended to that effect and the Auditing
Practices Board should develop appropriate review guidance;
(c) the Accounting. Standards Board in conjunction with the London Stock EXchange
should clarify, the accounting principles which companies should follow in
preparing interim reports;
(d) a requirement for inclusion of cash flow information in interim reports
should be considered by our successor body.
4.57 Research has shown that the most widely read part of company reports is the opening
statement, normally by the chairman. It is therefore of special importance that it
should provide a balanced and readable summary of the company's performance and
prospects and that it should represent the collective view of the board.
4.58 The demand for an ever-increasing, amount of detail in reports and accounts
has to be weighed against the need for them to be understandable by the
reasonably informed shareholder. Simplified forms of report. including the
shortened version of the accounts. allow boards to address shareholders who
would prefer such a statement, but make the need for the assessment to be
balanced even more exacting.
4.59 Although a company's published reports and its Annual General Meeting are
its primary channels of communication with shareholders, companies and their
major shareholders may need to be in touch more frequently. The Institutional
Shareholders' Committee's Statement on the Responsibilities of Institutional
Shareholders gives practical guidance on how shareholders can best exercise
their responsibilities as owners in this regard. We fully endorse their
recommendation that there should be regular contact between companies and
their major institutional shareholders at senior level and that such matters as
board strategy and structure should be kept under review.
Pensions Governance
4.60 There are governance issues relating to company pension funds, highlighted by the
Maxwell affair. but they fall within the remit of the Pension Law Review Committee
under the chairmanship of Professor Goode, which is
currently reviewing the framework of pension fund legislation and regulation. In the
light of this. The Committee decided that it would be inappropriate for it to
deal specifically with pension fund Governance issues.
Accountability of Boards to Shareholders
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6.1 The formal relationship, between the shareholders and the board of directors is that
the shareholders. elect the directors, the directors report on their stewardship to the
shareholders and the shareholders appoint the auditors to provide external check on
the directors' financial statements. Thus the shareholders as owners of the company
elect the directors to run the business on their behalf and hold them accountable for
its progress. The issue for corporate governance is how to strengthen the
accountability of boards of directors to shareholders.
6.2 A number of proposals addressing this issue were put forward by individual
shareholders and shareholder organisations. One was that shareholders should be
more closely involved in the appointment of directors and auditors through the
formation of shareholders' committees. Other proposals were directed at making it
easier for shareholders, individually or collectively. to put forward resolutions at
general meetings.
6.3 On the first proposal. we have not seen evidence explaining how it would be possible
to form shareholder committees in such a way, that they would be both truly
representative of all the company's shareholders and able to keep in regular touch
with their changing constituencies. Unless these tests of legitimacy. are met, the
Committee is unable to see how shareholder committees can become the accepted
link between a board and its shareholders.
6.4 The second set of proposals raises such questions as what legislation would be
needed to alter the present thresholds for tabling shareholder resolutions, and where
the costs involved in circulating shareholder communications should fall. How far
these suggestions are followed up should depend. in the Committee's view, on the
degree of support which they command from the shareholder body as a whole. This
may be a matter which our successor body will wish to review.
6.5 In the meantime, shareholders can make their vigils known to the boards of the
companies in which they have invested by communicating with them direct and
through their attendance at general meetings. Shareholder organisations set up to
represent shareholder interests generally may provide individual shareholders with
the choice of acting collectively in the case of particular companies if they prefer.
6.6 Shareholders have delegated many of their responsibilities as owners to the directors
who act as their stewards. It is for the shareholders to call the directors to book if they
appear to be failing in their stewardship and they should use this power. While they
cannot be involved in the direction and managementof their company. they can insist
on a high standard of corporate governance and good governance is an essential test
of the directors' stewardship. The accountability of boards to shareholders will.
therefore, be strengthened if shareholders require their companies to comply with the
Code.
6.7 Reports and accounts are presented to shareholders at the Annual General Meeting,
when they have the opportunity to comment on them and to put their questions. In
particular, the Annual General Meeting gives all shareholders, whatever the size of
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their shareholding, direct and public access to their boards. If too many Annual
General Meetings are at present an opportunity missed, this is because shareholders
do not make the most of them and, in some cases, boards do not encourage them to do
so.
6.8 In the Committee's view, both shareholders and boards of directors should consider how
the effectiveness of general meetings could be increased and as a result the
accountability of boards to all their shareholders strengthened. Possible ways forward
include providing forms in annual reports on which shareholders could send in written
questions in advance of the meeting. in addition to their opportunity to ask questions at
the meeting itself, and the circulation of a brief summary of points raised at the Annual
General Meeting to all shareholders after the event. Consideration might also be given
to ways of boards keeping in touch with their shareholders, outside the annual and half-
yearly reports. The Committee encourages boards to experiment with ways of improving
their links with shareholders along the above lines and shareholders to put proposals to
their boards to the same end.
Institutional Shareholders
6.9 The proportion of shares held by individuals and by institutions has broadly
reversed over the last thirty years, so that institutional shareholders now own the
majority of shares of quoted companies. They are, however, largely holding their
shares on behalf of individuals, as members of pension funds, holders of insurance
policies and the like. As a result, there is an important degree of common interest
bet'Neen individual and institutional shareholders. In particular, both have the
same stake in the standards of financial reporting and of Governance in the
companies in which they have invested.
6.10 Given the weight of their votes, the way in which institutional shareholders use their
pO\Y8r to influence the standards of corporate Governance is of fundamental
importance. Their readiness to do this turns on the degree to which they see it as
their responsibility as owners, and in the interest of those whose money they are
investing, to bring about changes in companies when necessary, rather than selling
their shares.
6.11 The Committee, therefore. warmly. \Y8lcomes the statement recently published by
the Institutional Shareholders' Committee on the Responsibilities of Institutional
Shareholders in the UK and we draw attention to three key conclusions which are
basic to the development of a constructive relationship bet\Y8en companies and
their owners.
1. Institutional investors should encourage regular. systematic contact at senior
executive level to exchange views and information on strategy performance,
board membership and quality of management.
2. Institutional investors should make positive use of their voting rights, unless they
have good reason for doing, otherwise. They should register their votes wherever
possible on a regular basis.
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3 Institutional investors should take a positive interest in the composition of boards
of directors, with particular reference to concentrations of decision-making power
not formally constrained by appropriate checks and balances. and to the
appointment of a core of non-executive directors of the necessary calibre,
experience and independence.
6.12 The Institutional Shareholders' Committee's advice to its members to use their voting
rights positively is important in the context of corporate Governance. Voting rights
can be regarded as an asset, and the use or otherwise of those rights by institutional
shareholders is a subject of legitimate interest to those on whose behalf they invest.
We recommend that institutional investors should disclose their policies on the use
of voting rights.
Shareholder Communications
6.13 These conclusions on the role of institutional shareholders raise issues over the
lines of communication between boards and their shareholders. The first issue is
one of parity between shareholders. The institutions are in a position to keep in
touch with the boards of the companies in which they have invested. in a way which
is not feasible for the individual shareholder. It is not possible in this respect to put
both classes of shareholder on the same footing. What boards must do, however, is
to ensure that any significant statements concerning their companies are made
publicly and so are equally available to all shareholders.
6.14 A second issue which arises over communications between institutional investors
and companies is the danger of imparting inside information. If price-sensitive
information is to be given (and it is the company's responsibility to decide what might
be price-sensitive), it must only be with the prior consent of the shareholder, who will
then be unable to deal in the company's shares until that information has been made
public. It is for shareholders to decide whether their longer-term interests are
impaired by becoming, insiders, because of the short-term constraints on share
dealing, which that position imposes.
6.15 If long-term relationships are to be developed, it is important that companies should
communicate their strategies to their major shareholders and that their shareholders
should understand them. It is equally important that shareholders should play their
part in the communication process by informing companies if there are aspects of the
business which give them cause for concern. Both shareholders and directors have
to contribute to the building of a sound working relationship between them.
Shareholder Influence
6.16 Because of the importance of their collective stake, we look to the institutions in
particular, with the backing of the Institutional Shareholders' Committee, to use their
influence as owners to ensure that the companies in which they have invested comply
with the Code. The widespread adoption of our recommendations will turn in large
measure on the support which all shareholders give to them. The obligation on
companies to state how far they comply with the Code provides institutional and
individual shareholders with a ready-made agenda for their representations to boards.
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It is up to them to put it to good use. The Committee is primarily looking to such
market-based regulation to turn its proposals into action.
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APPENDIX B
AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE'S, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
PART 111
CORPORATE STRUCTURE:
FUNCTIONS AN POWERS OF DIRECTORS AND OFFICERS;
AUDIT COMMITTEE IN LARGE PUBLICLY HELD CPORPORATION
ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATION
§ 3.01 Management of the Corporation's Business:
Functions and PO'Ners of Principal Senior Executives and Other Officers
The management of the business of a publicly held corporation should be conducted
by or under the supervision of such principal senior executives as are designated by
the board of directors, and by those other officers and employees to whom the
management function is delegated by the board or those executives, subject to the
functions and powers of the board under § 3.02.
§ 3.02 Functions and PO'Ners of the Board of Directors
Except as otherwise provided by statute:
(a) The board of directors of a publicly held corporation should perform the
fOllowing functions:
(1) Select, regularly evaluate, fix the compensation of, and, where
appropriate, replace the principal senior executives;
(2) Oversee the conduct of the corporation's business to evaluate whether
the business is being properly managed;
(3) Review and, where appropriate, approve the corporation's financial
objectives and major corporate plans and actions;
(4) Review and, where appropriate, approve major changes in, and
determinations of other major questions of choice respecting, the appropriate
auditing and accounting principles and practices to be used in the preparation of
the corporation's financial statements;
(5) Perform such other functions as are prescribed by law, or assigned to
the board under a standard of the corporation
(b) A board of directors also has power to:
(1) Initiate and adopt corporate plans, commitments, and actions;
(2) Initiate and adopt changes in accounting principles and practices;
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(3) Provide advice and counsel to the principal senior executives;
(4) Instruct any committee, principal senior executive or other officer and
review the actions of any committee, principal senior executive, or other
officer;
(5) Make recommendations to shareholders;
(6) Manage the business of the corporation;
(7) Act as to all other corporate matters not requiring shareholder approval.
(c) SUbject to the board's ultimate responsibility for oversight under Subsection
(a)(2), the board may delegate to its committees authority to perform any of its
functions and exercise any of its powers.
§ 3.03 Directors' Informational Rights
(a) Every director has the right, within the limits of § 3.03(b) (and subject to other
applicable law), to inspect and copy all books, records, and documents of every kind,
and to inspect the physical properties, of the corporation and of its subsidiaries,
domestic or foreign, at any reasonable time, in person or by an attorney or other agent.
(b) (1) A judicial order to enforce such right should be granted unless the
corporation establishes that the information to be obtained by the exercise of the
right is not reasonably related to the performance of directorial functions and duties,
or that the director or the director's agent is likely to use the information in a manner
that would violate the director's fiduciary obligation to the corporation.
(2) An application for such an order should be decided expeditiously and
may be decided on the basis of affidavits.
(3) Such an order may contain provisions protecting the corporation from
undue burden or expense, and prohibiting the director from using the
information in a manner that would violate the director's fiduciary obligation
to the corporation.
(4) A director who makes an application for
such an order after the corporation has denied a
request should, if successful, be reimbursed by the
corporation for expenses (including attorney's fees) reasonably incurred in
connection with the application.
ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATION
§ 3.04 Right of Directors Who Have No Significant Relation-ship with the Corporation's
Senior Executives to Retain Outside Experts
The directors of a publicly held corporation who have no significant relationship
with the corporation's senior executives should be entitled, acting as a body by the vote
of a majority of such directors, to retain legal counsel, accountants, or other experts, at
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the corporation's expense, to advise them on problems arising in the exercise of their
functions and pOVllers, if..
(a) Payment of such expense is authorised by the board; or
(b) A court approves an application for the payment of such expense upon a
finding that the board had been requested to authorise the payment of such
expense and had declined to do so, and the directors who have no relationship with
the corporation's senior executives reasonably believed that (i) retention of an
outside expert was required for the proper performance of the directors' functions
and powers, (ii) the amount involved was reasonable in relation to both the
importance of the problem and the corporation's assets and income, and (iii)
assistance by corporate staff or corporate counsel was inappropriate or
inadequate.
§ 3.05 Audit Committee in Large Publicly Held Corporation
Every large publicly held corporation should have an audit committee to
implement and support the oversight function of the board by reviewing on a
periodic basis the corporation's processes for producing financial data, its
internal controls, and the independence of the corporation's external auditor.
The audit committee should consist of at least three members, and should
be composed exclusively of directors who are neither employed by the
corporation nor Vllere so employed within the two preceding years, including
at least a majority of members who have no significant relationship [§ 1.341
with the corporation's senior executives.
PART III-A
ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATION
§ 3A.01 Composition of the Board in Publicly Held Corporations
It is recommended as a matter of corporate practice that:
(a) The board of every large publicly held corporation should have a majority of directors
who are free of any significant relationship with the corporation's senior executives unless a
majority of the corporation's voting securities are owned by a single person, a family group,
or a control group.
(b) The board of a publicly held corporation that does not fall within Subsection (a) should
have at least three directors who are free of any significant relationship with the corporation's
senior executives. *
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§ 3A.02 Audit Committee in Small Publicly Held Corporations
It is recommended as a matter of corporate practice that every small publicly held
corporation should have an audit committee to implement and support the oversight function
of the board by reviewing on a periodic basis the corporation's processes for producing
financial data, its internal controls, and the independence of the corporation's external
auditor. The audit committee should consist of at least three members, and should be
composed exclusively of directors who are neither employed by the corporation nor vvere so
employed within the previous tv"o years, including a majority of members who have no
significant relationship with the corporation's senior executives.
§ 3A.03 Functions and Povvers of Audit Committees
t is recommended as a matter of corporate practice that:
The audit committee of a publicly held corporation established under §§ 3.05 (Audit
Committee in Large Publicly Held Corporations) or 3A.02 (Audit Committee in Small
Publicly Held Corporations) should:
(a) Recommend the firm to be employed as the corporation's external
auditor and review the proposed discharge of any such firm;
(b) Review the external auditor's compensation, the proposed terms of its
engagement, and its independence;
(c) Review the appointment and replacement of the senior internal
auditing executive. if any;
(d) Serve as a channel of communication betvveen the external auditor and
the board and betvveen the senior internal auditing executive, if any. and the board.
(e) Review the results of each external audit of the corporation, the report of
the audit, any related management letter. management's responses to
recommendations made by the external auditor in connection with the audit, reports
of the internal auditing department that are material to the corporation as a whole,
and management's responses to those reports;
(f) Review the corporation's annual financial statements, any certification,
report, opinion. or review rendered by the external auditor in connection with those
financial statements, and any significant disputes betvveen management and the
external auditor that arose in connection with the preparation of those financial
statements;
(g) Consider, in consultation with the external auditor and the senior internal
auditing executive, if any, the adequacy of the corporation's internal controls;
(h) Consider major changes and other major questions of choice respecting
the appropriate auditing and accounting principles and practices to be used in the
preparation of the corporation's financial statements, when presented by the
external auditor, a principal senior executive [§ 1.30], or otherwise.
§ 3A.04 Nominating Committee in Publicly Held Corporations:
Composition, Povvers, and Functions
It is recommended as a matter of corporate practice that:
412
(a) Every publicly held corporation, except corporations a majority of whose
voting securities are owned by a single person, a family group, or a control group [§
1.091, should establish a nominating committee composed exclusively of directors
who are not officers or employees of the corporation, including at least a majority of
members who have no significant relationship with the corporation's senior
executives.
(b) The nominating committee should:
(1) Recommend to the board candidates for all directorships to
be fi lied by the shareholders or the board.
(2) Consider, in making its recommendations, candidates for directorships
proposed by the chief executive officer and, within the bounds of practicability,
by any other senior executive or any director or shareholder.
(3) Recommend to the board directors to fill the seats on board
committees.
3A.OS Compensation Committee in Large Publicly Held Corporations:
Composition, Powers, and Functions
It is recommended as a matter of corporate practice that:
(a) Every large publicly held corporation should establish a compensation
committee to implement and support the oversight function of the board in the area
of compensation. The committee should be composed exclusively of directors who
are not officers or employees of the corporation, including at least a majority of
members who have no significant relationship with the corporation's senior
executives.
(b) The compensation committee should:
(1) Review and recommend to the board, or determine, the annual salary,
bonus, stock options, and other benefits, direct and indirect, of the senior
executives.
(2) Review new executive compensation programs; review on a periodic
basis the operation of the corporation's executive compensation programs to
determine whether they are properly co-ordinated; establish and periodically
review policies for the administration of executive compensation programs; and
take steps to modify any executive compensation programs that yield payments
and benefits that are not reasonably related to executive performance.
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